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ABSTRACT 
There is much current interest in children's problem-solving, both within education, and 
within psychology. 
The present study explores the development of young children's problem-solving 
abilities, and the cognitive factors which might be related to this. Such development is 
conceptualised in terms of the emergence of increasingly sophisticated and powerful 
cognitive strategies. 
In a previous study (Whitebread, 1983), which involved 20 children aged 5 and 6 years, 
a strong interaction was revealed between underlying cognitive factors, strategy use and 
performance on a reclassification task. The present work is an extension of that study 
with a more complex task, and with a wider age-range of children. On this occasion, 
children's performance on an inductive reasoning task (the multidimensional 
discrimination learning task) was examined. The sample consisted of 72 Leicestershire 
Primary school children, comprising three equal groups of 24 children aged 6,8 and 10 
years. 
The children were tested on a number of cognitive factors theoretically predicted to 
influence performance on reasoning and problem-solving tasks. These predictors 
included working memory capacity, metacognitive awareness and control, style of 
attribution, and two measures of cognitive style (cognitive tempo and field 
dependence-independence). 
Cluster analysis of strategic components revealed a pattern of 7 clusters of increasingly 
complex strategic behaviours used by the children on the MDL task. These Strategy 
Clusters appeared to be principally differentiated by an increasing ability to integrate 
information gained from different trials. Two stylistic variations were also identified 
which were related to the number of hypotheses verbalised on each trial. 
Further investigation involving multiple regression analyses revealed that the major 
factor which predicted strategic behaviour and performance on the MDL task was 
metacognitive awareness and control. However, correlational analyses of subgroups 
revealed interactions between predictors, and between predictors and strategies, in 
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relation to performance. No significant effects were revealed relating to gender, but 
age effects in relation to predictors, strategies and performance were indicated. 
The implications for future research and for the development of children's thinking and 
problem-solving skills within educational contexts is discussed. 
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Chapter 1. OVERVIEW 
This first chapter provides an overview of the whole thesis, including the educational and 
psychological rationale behind the empirical study carried out, the design of the study, 
and the main results and implications. It may be useful to those not wishing to read the 
whole thesis, or for the reader who is familiar with the field of research and wishes to 
get an overview of the argument before looking at the details. The detailed argument of 
the thesis begins at the start of the next chapter, and some readers may wish to start at 
that point. 
Both within education and within developmental psychology there is much current 
interest in children's developing abilities to think, to reason and to solve problems. 
Within education there is a revival underway of interest in a pedagogy of 'active 
learning'. Curriculum developments enshrined within the new National Curriculum 
explicitly encourage problem-solving and investigational approaches. There is also 
what can only be described as a blossoming of interest and enthusiasm in teaching 
children to think. 
All this is probably partly a consequence of, and is certainly informed by, work within 
developmental psychology over the last 15 years or so concerned with the reasoning and 
problem-solving abilities of young children. Like much of modern developmental 
psychology, this work, at least in part, owes its origins to the contribution of Piaget, and 
to subsequent studies examining Piaget's model of cognitive development, together with 
his various claims about the thinking and abilities of young children. 
The ensuing analysis and exploration of factors involved in the developing cognitive 
systems of young children has been very productive. It has been largely carried out, 
however, within the other major paradigm of modem cognitive developmental 
psychology, the information-processing approach. This was originally developed by 
such as Klahr & Wallace (1976) and Simon (1978). 
Studies of the development of children's problem-solving abilities have been 
wide-ranging, and have looked at a number of different kinds of problems within 
different domains. Within the literature, however, the study of problems involving 
inductive reasoning, with the possible exception of the use of analogy, has been 
4 
relatively neglected. This is despite the fact that Glaser & Pellegrino (1987), for 
example, have indicated the centrality of inductive reasoning within human learning. 
The present study, therefore, attempts to redress this balance somewhat by investigating 
children's problem-solving behaviour on a task involving inductive reasoning. 
The general educational background to the current study, and particularly the resurgence 
of interest in children's problem solving, is set out in a little more detail within the next 
chapter. Chapter 3 reviews the psychological research literature in more detail which 
relates to problem solving and reasoning by young children, the particular inductive 
reasoning task used within the present study, and the work which has attempted to 
uncover the cognitive developments underlying children's increasingly sophisticated 
abilities to think, to reason and to solve problems. 
Research arising from Piaget's approach to children's problem solving and reasoning 
has demonstrated that children are often capable of sophisticated reasoning in a context 
which makes sense to them, and relates to their experience. A range of studies have 
indicated that the development of children's performance on problem solving tasks is a 
consequence of developing features of their underlying cognitive systems, rather than on 
their abilities to reason. Work within the information processing framework has 
focussed on children's development of increasingly sophisticated strategies, and the 
mechanisms by which these are developed and executed. 
Within the present study children's performance on a multidimensional discrimination 
learning task was examined. The sample consisted of 72 Leicestershire Primary school 
children, comprising three equal groups of 24 children aged 6,8 and 10 years. The 
MDL task was chosen as being a useful, and of late a rather neglected, vehicle for 
examining children's inductive reasoning. It is a task which has a long history within 
the study of human learning. Both Bruner, Goodnow & Austin (1956), in their classic 
study of concept attainment, and Gholson (1980) in his and other's studies of 
hypothesis-testing, have provided analyses of the strategies available to the learner when 
faced with this task. Within the present study an attempt has been made to use and 
build upon methodologies developed by this previous research, and to provide a 
systematic and comprehensive analysis of the development of children's strategies. 
Previous work with discrimination learning has focussed on young children's 
developing abilities to deal with negative information and irrelevancy. These two factors 
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are accommodated and investigated within the present design by the presentation of the 
MDL task in different problem types. 
The final part of the literature review examines the range of underlying cognitive factors 
which have been explored and advanced as significant within the development of 
children's thinking, reasoning and problem-solving abilities. As Voss (1989) has 
recently indicated in a useful overall review, analyses of problem-solving have 
suggested that it involves a wide variety of different cognitive processes. 
The manner in which the problem is understood and represented has been found to be 
crucial to success, as has the construction of sophisticated and highly structured 
knowledge within the particular domain. These two factors are clearly very strongly 
interrelated, and the discussion of underlying cognitive factors begins with them. It has 
long been established that performance on a task is strongly influenced by domain 
specific knowledge (see, for example, Chi's (1978) classic work on memory for chess 
positions). Donaldson (1978) and her co-workers have also established that a child's 
understanding and performance on a task is significantly affected by its relationship to 
their existing knowledge. 
Within the present study, however, no attempt has been made to explore this particular 
issue further. Rather, the focus of the present study is children's ability to generate 
strategies on a novel task. As English (1992) has recently reviewed, the relative 
significance of domain-specific knowledge and domain-general strategies in the 
development of problem-solving competence is a much debated issue, and it is clear 
from the literature that the good problem-solver needs both. 
Therefore, while the focus of the present study is on the generation of strategies, the 
significance of children's existing knowledge has very much been taken into account. 
Thus, the form of the MDL task is based closely on a version designed by Kemler 
(1978) using a story-and-game context. This is designed so that, in Donaldson's (1978) 
words, the problem will make "human sense" to young children, and their 
comprehension of the problem and their ability to develop strategies to solve it will be 
maximised. Kemler produced results to show that children performed much more 
effectively on her task than on the standard, abstract MDL task. 
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The related issue of representation is, however, an important part of the present study. 
For Siegler (1978), the development of effective problem-solving was seen as mostly 
dependent upon the manner in which the problem was encoded by the child, and much 
other research has indicated the significance of the efficiency with which a problem is 
represented for subsequent performance ( See, for example, Johnson-Laird's (1983) 
work on the construction of 'mental models'). Within the present study the efficacy with 
which children represented the problem to themselves is construed and examined as an 
aspect of metacognitive knowledge about the task, which is discussed below. 
The development of increasingly sophisticated strategies has been a strong theme within 
the problem-solving literature. Siegler's (1978) study is also of significance because it is 
an early example of an attempt to determine the progression of strategies used within a 
particular context (in his case, the balance beam problem). This is based on a 
methodology whereby children's strategies are inferred from their pattern of responding. 
A modified and developed version of this approach is used within the present study, 
however, which recognises the complexity of the development of strategic behaviour. 
Children's responses are analysed in terms of Strategic Components and the patterns in 
which these components combine together at different stages of strategic development is 
explored using the statistical technique of Cluster Analysis. 
The remainder of the review examines the claims of a number of underlying cognitive 
factors which have featured prominently in the literature as causal factors in the 
development of children's problem-solving abilities. The first included is what is 
sometimes construed as working memory capacity, and elsewhere as speed of 
processing in short-term memory. The significance of differences in the area of 
memory was first claimed by neo-Piagetians such as Pascual- Leone (1969,1970) and 
Case (1974,1984,1985). More recently, work by such as Anderson (1992) has 
suggested that the speed of basic processing is an innate biological factor closely related 
to the development of intelligence. Here the significance of content knowledge 
has once again been taken into account, and the FIT measure of general M-space 
devised by Pascual-Leone (1969) has been used alongside a specially constructed 
short-term memory test using the materials contained within the MDL task itself. 
Over the last 15-20 years perhaps the largest area of growth in the literature of cognitive 
development has been that related to metacognition, beginning, of course, with the 
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seminal study of Flavell, Beach & Chinsky (1966) (which, interestingly, shared a 
common concern with 'mediational processes' with studies of discrimination learning at 
that time). Since the term 'metamemory' was introduced into the literature by Flavell 
(1971) there has been considerable debate about the significance and definition of 
metacognitive processes. In a major review of these difficulties Brown (1987), however, 
asserts her view that 
ti 
metacognitive-like concepts lie at the very roots of the learning process" (p. 66) 
Certainly, Ann Brown and her co-workers have been one of the major research teams to 
finnly establish metacognition at the heart of the current revival of interest in 
mechanisms of change and development. There is now hardly an aspect of human 
functioning or skill which does not have its associated 'meta' component well 
documented and researched. 
Within the present study the distinction first proposed by Flavell (1981) between 
metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive experience has been followed. As regards 
metacognitive knowledge, Yussen (1985) and others have reviewed the conflicting 
evidence about the relationship between metacognitive knowledge and performance. 
Early studies of this relationship tended to conclude that only a weak relationship 
existed. Later work, however, has indicated that metacognitive knowledge may be more 
closely linked to performance where it is directly related to the individual's metacognitive 
experience of that task. Within the present study, therefore, rather than exploring the 
children's general metacognitive knowledge about their own cognitive processes, 
questions have been asked which focussed on the metacognitive knowledge they had 
derived directly related to the MDL task. These questions focus on the children's 
experience of the relative ease or difficulty of different versions of the task. As 
indicated above, this knowledge can also be taken, at least in part, as evidence of the 
efficacy with which the children internally represented the problem. 
Within the area of metacognitive experience the distinction between a monitoring and a 
control function has been adopted from Brown's (1978) earlier detailed analysis of the 
necessary components of a metacognitive system. These are referred to by her as 
Metacomprehension and Insight. The first term is retained within the present study, 
while the latter control element is characterised as Strategy Flexibility. Tasks have been 
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developed within the present study to measure these aspects of the children's 
functioning, under the general heading of Metacognitive Awareness & Control. 
Finally, various aspects of what might be termed 'learning style' have been included 
within the analysis. It is a matter of common observation that children's approaches to 
learning and solving problems vary not only in their effectiveness but also in their style. 
Within the present study there has been included an element related to the children's 
style of attribution, and two measures of cognitive style (cognitive tempo and field 
dependence-independence). The relationships between style of attribution (as originally 
conceived and developed by Weiner (1972,1979)), self-concept, and achievement has 
long been established and explored within educational contexts. Rogers (1982) 
provides an excellent review of the extensive literature in this area. Weinert (1987) has 
argued that research related to style of attribution has indicated similarities and 
significant conceptual links between this as an aspect of motivation and metacognition 
as an aspect of cognition, and there is interesting work demonstrating links between the 
two areas. Kurtz & Borkowski (1984), for example, in the context of certain memory 
tasks, have found significant relationships between aspects of metacognition, attribution 
and strategic performance. Within the present study the Children's Attribution of 
Responsibility and Locus of Control Scale (CARALOC) developed by Gammage 
(1975,1982) was used. This scale has been specifically designed for use with English 
Primary school children and has been shown by such as Osborn & Milbank (1987), in 
a major longitudinal study, to be significantly related to achievement in a number of 
cognitive areas. 
Cognitive style has also been a huge area for research over the last 20 years or so, and 
has been particularly related to different strategies of approach to solving problems of 
various kinds. Kogan (1971,1983) has provided extensive reviews of work in this area, 
and these two reviews provide a useful insight into the development of research and 
thinking in the area. The interesting point to note is that while he felt obliged to review 
at least 9 separate cognitive style dimensions in 1971, by 1983 he felt that only two had 
proved sufficiently fruitful in the intervening period to be worthy of inclusion. These 
were Reflectivity-Impulsivity (Cognitive Tempo or R-I) and Field 
Dependence-Independence (FDI). 
Cognitive Tempo was originally conceived and operationalised by Kagan et al (1964), 
who developed the Matching Familiar Figures Test (MEET), which is still the most 
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commonly used instrument. Subsequently there have been significant theoretical and 
methodological advances. At the theoretical level Zelnicker & Jeffrey (1979), for 
example, have redescribed the dimension in terms of different strategic approaches to 
processing information. Research has continued to demonstrate the significance of this 
dimension for cognitive functioning., and explored its relationship to other features. 
Borkowski et al (1983), for example, demonstrated significant relationships between 
cognitive tempo, metamemory, strategy use and performance on particular memory 
tasks. 
At the methodological level, the MFFT came in for considerable criticism, leading to the 
development by Cairns & Cammock (1978) of a longer and more reliable version, 
which is known as the MFF20. It is this latter instrument which has, therefore, been 
used within the present study. 
Perhaps the single most well-known and certainly the most intensively researched 
dimension of cognitive style is that of Field Dependence-Independence conceived and 
developed by Witkin and his associates. The FDI construct was first conceived as an 
aspect of basic perceptual processes (Witkin et al, 1954) and was then developed into a 
more general theory of psychological differentiation and cognitive style. It has 
subsequently been explored in relation to a wide range of cognitive functioning (see, for 
example, Goodenough's (1976) early review in relation to learning and memory). 
Interestingly, Pascual-Leone (1969) incorporated FDI into his neo-Piagetian model of 
cognitive development and successfully used it to explain the phenomenon of low 
inter-task correlations between Piagetian tasks at the same developmental stage. Witkin 
et al (1977) developed the case for significant educational implications of FDI. Kogan 
(1983) reviews work on the relation of FDI to various educational achievements and 
learning difficulties. 
Two key instruments have been devised and used as measures of FDI, the Rod & 
Frame test (RFT) and the Embedded Figures Test (EFT). Kogan (1983) reviews the 
evidence that while these two instruments are both tapping the ability to overcome an 
embedding context, they may be assessing rather different aspects of this. Current 
methodological advice appears to be to use both instruments and to use both scores, or 
produce a composite score. Within the present study, therefore, the RFT was used as 
well as the Children's Embedded Figures Test (CEFT), a version of the EFT devised for 
use with young children (see Witkin et al (1971)). 
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In addition to this fairly comprehensive collection of measures of underlying cognitive 
functioning gender and age were also included in the analysis. This was done partly as 
a check that the materials and procedures were not gender biased, and that younger 
children were enabled to display their problem solving abilities. It also had to be 
considered that gender and age-related differences in certain areas of cognitive 
functioning, reported in the literature, would appear in relation to performance on the 
MDL task. As regards age, for example, issues arise in relation to the general pattern of 
development (eg: linear or U-shaped ?) and recent evidence that the correlations between 
underlying abilities and performance increase with age (see Schneider & Weinen 
(1989). 
Chapter 4 provides details of the aims and design of the present study. The 
problem-solving literature, as noted above, has increasingly emphasised the 
development by children of cognitive strategies. Bjorklund (1990), for example, has 
recently edited a very comprehensive collection of work carried out in this area. The 
present study aims, therefore, firstly, to identify the strategies used by children when 
they are engaged with an inductive reasoning task such as the MDL task, and to map out 
the way in which these strategies develop. The relationship between strategy use and 
level of performance on the task is explored. Finally, the study aims to investigate the 
relationship between a range of underlying cognitive factors, strategy use and 
performance. In a previous study (Whitebread, 1983), which involved 20 children aged 
5 and 6 years, a strong interaction was revealed between underlying cognitive factors, 
strategy use and performance on a reclassification task. The present work has, 
therefore, also been conceived as an extension of that study with a more complex task, 
and with a wider age-range of children. 
The outline of the structure of the study begins with details of the procedures for 3 
different problem types of the MDL task. As indicated earlier, these different problem 
types required the children to deal with negative information and irrelevant information, 
as well as the standard MDL task. The analysis of the children's responses to the MDL 
task is detailed in terms of 10 Strategy Components and 3 Performance Indicators. Both 
the Strategy Components and Performance Indicators are derived from previous 
research, principally that contained in Gholson's (1980) collection of studies of 
children's hypothesis-testing behaviour on the MDL task. Details of the measures of 
the various underlying cognitive factors are also provided. These are referred to 
throughout the rest of the study as the Predictor Measures, although, of course, no 
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causal inference is necessarily implied by this terminology. The interrelationships 
between these various aspects of cognitive and metacognitive functioning, the 
development of strategic processing and performance on an inductive reasoning task is a 
central part of the debate within this thesis. 
Chapter 5 contains the report and analysis of the results obtained. Cluster Analysis of 
the scores for Strategy Components on the 3 different MDL problem types revealed a 
pattern of 7 clusters of increasingly complex strategic behaviours, within which 5 main 
clusters appeared in sufficient numbers to be worthy of further analysis. Discriminant 
Function Analysis of these 5 main strategy 'clusters' revealed that they appear to be 
clearly distinct groupings (although detailed analysis of individual 'central cases' within 
clusters reveal some interesting variations within groupings). The different patterns of 
strategic behaviour revealed by the Strategy Clusters are principally differentiated by an 
increasing ability to integrate information gained from different trials. Two stylistic 
variations were also identified which appear to be principally related to the number of 
hypotheses verbalised on each trial. 
Analysis of scores on the Performance Indicators revealed that the children in this 
sample performed at least as well as those in Kemler's (1978) study, if not better, thus 
confirming that the form of the MDL task used enabled 6-10 yr. old children to use 
their problem-solving abilities effectively. A developmental sequence was also revealed 
between the Performance Indicators representing a developmental sequence in the 
sophistication of understanding of the task by young children. There are strong 
relationships between patterns of strategic behaviour revealed by the Strategy Clusters 
and performance. An attempt was made within the present study to examine learning on 
the MDL task but this was not particularly successful, although a few interesting 
pointers emerge. 
In the last section of the analysis of results the relationships are examined between the 
Predictor Measures and strategic behaviour and performance. Correlational analysis 
revealed that Gender was the only Predictor Measure which was not significantly related 
to either strategic behaviour or performance. If nothing else this would tend to be 
reassuring that the materials and/or the methodology used within the study were not 
gender-biased. 
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All other Predictor Measures were clearly and positively correlated with performance, 
although at generally moderate levels, indicating that the relationships might not be 
simple linear ones and might involve some interactions between predictors as had been 
found in the author's previous study (Whitebread, 1983). Interestingly, after Gender, the 
next weakest Predictor Measure in its correlations with Strategy Components and 
Performance Indicators was the Rod & Frame Test, while the CEFT was amongst the 
strongest. This indicates support for the view that these two instruments tap into 
different aspects of FDI, and the MDL task seems to be much more clearly related to 
the aspects of functioning measured by the CEFT. Along with the CEFT, the other 
Predictor Measure most strongly associated with strategic behaviour and performance 
as measured by simple correlations was Metacognition, and within that Metacognitive 
Awareness and Control rather than Metacognitive Knowledge. 
Analysis of the relationships between Predictor Measures and Strategy Clusters 
revealed clearly distinct patterns of underlying cognitive factors associated with each of 
the clusters, and, once again, the CEFT and Metacognitive Awareness and Control were 
the most strongly discriminating between clusters. On this occasion, an intriguing 
relationship emerged between Metacomprehension and strategic style. Two of the five 
main Strategy Clusters appeared to share a strategic style involving the production of a 
high number of hypotheses on each of the trials of the MDL task, a style which in some 
ways appeared to be interfering with their performance on the task, and yet these 
clusters both scored strongly on the test of Metacomprehension. 
As a further means of disentangling the relationships of the underlying cognitive factors 
and patterns of strategic behaviour with performance Multiple Regression Analyses 
were carried out, and they revealed that the major factor which predicted strategic 
behaviour and performance on the MDL task was Metacognition. Pattern of strategic 
behaviour was also confirmed as a clear predictor of performance, and even some 
relation with learning emerged in this analysis. Some support was offered for the view 
that the Strategy Clusters not only represent different stages in the development of 
strategic behaviour in relation to the MDL task, but also a development in the ability to 
learn quickly and apply general strategies in relation to new tasks. 
The final part of the analysis of the data from the study consisted of correlational 
analyses of subgroups within the sample. Evidence from earlier parts of the analysis 
suggest that there might be significant interactions between underlying cognitive factors, 
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strategic behaviour and performance, and that there might be non-linear developmental 
relationships present (such as those discussed, for example, in Strauss & Stavy's (1982) 
review of U-shaped behavioural growth). Within the Multiple Regression Analyses, for 
example, a considerable amount of the variance was attributed to interactions between 
Predictor Measures and Strategy Cluster variables. Analyses of subgroups based upon 
Metacognition and Strategy Clusters confirmed interactions of the kinds predicted, and 
found earlier in the study of reclassification (Whitebread, 1983). The analysis of age 
subgroups revealed quite a strong U-shaped developmental pattern of relationships, with 
a number of Predictor Measures significantly related to performance at ages 6 and 10, 
but almost completely unrelated amongst the 8 yr. olds. 
Following a summary of the main findings of the study in relation to the original aims, a 
discussion of methodological issues arising from the study is provided in the following 
chapter, headed Summary & Discussion. Amongst the methodological issues which 
arise are the successful use of tasks placed in relatively meaningful contexts for young 
children, and the utility of Cluster Analysis as a way of revealing patterns of behavioural 
development. The limitations of this kind of cross-sectional study are also discussed, 
however. While this kind of methodology serves some purposes well, as illustrated in 
the present study, this may be usefully complemented by studies employing some kind 
of longitudinal design (the potential of which has been thoroughly argued, for example, 
by Hoppe-Graff (1989)), and by studies employing the kind of 'microgenetic' approach 
so well illustrated by Siegler & Jenkins' (1989) recent study of new strategy acquisition. 
The advantages and disadvantages of using a fairly artificial, 'well-defined' problem such 
as the MDL task, as opposed to real world problem-solving, are also discussed. 
The final section of this last chapter concludes the thesis by examining the implications 
of the present study and related work in the area for psychological theory and research, 
and for educational practice. Amongst the issues raised in relation to psychological 
research are the value of analysing children's behaviour on tasks in terms of their 
cognitive strategies, and the need to get away from simple, single factor models of 
cognitive change and the development of problem-solving skills. Analyses of 
problem-solving, including that contained within the present study, suggest that it 
involves a wide variety of different cognitive processes. Current research exists (see, for 
example, Folds et al (1990), Bjorklund et al (1990) and Howe & O'Sullivan (1990) all 
contained within Bjorklund's (1990) useful collection of recent work on children's 
strategies, and English (1992)) which has begun to illuminate the ways in which these 
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different processes and abilities interact and relate to one another, and this work needs to 
be continued and developed. In particular the central issue of the factors which facilitate 
transfer of learning and strategies to new domains and new tasks must be an important 
focus. 
Within the educational sphere, a number of issues arise. Teachers need to know which 
factors are involved in the development of children's abilities to think, to reason and to 
solve problems. A substantial literature now exists which has established a number of 
the most significant factors, and it is hoped that the present study makes a contribution 
to that. As reviewed in the next chapter, there is a strong, emerging interest in active, 
problem-solving approaches to learning and in teaching children to think. There is still 
much to be done, however, in raising teachers' understanding of the cognitive skills 
which enable children to tackle novel tasks and problems, or how they 'learn how to 
learn'. Models of the 'Good Strategy User' like that suggested by Pressley et al (1987) 
are valuable in this regard. 
Teachers also need to be aware of the issues in relation to teaching children to develop 
these skills. The debate, for example, about whether general problem-solving strategies 
can be taught, or whether teaching can only operate within subject domains, is relevant 
here. So are the emerging Vygotskian models of the teacher as mediator of the child's 
experience and notions of 'cognitive apprenticeship' (see Collins, Seely-Brown & 
Newman (1987)). Finally, the evidence of this study and much of the associated 
literature would suggest that a key element in any programme to help children develop 
these kinds of abilities must be the development of metacognitive abilities. The work in 
Britain of such as Nisbet & Shucksmith (1986) and in America of such as Borkowski, 
Brown and their co-workers (see, for example, Pressley, Borkowski & O'Sullivan 
(1985) and Campion (1987)) has demonstrated that metacognitive abilities can be 
developed through teaching, and has begun to indicate the kind of pedagogical 
principles upon which such teaching must be based. 
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Chapter 2. BACKGROUND: Problem-solving and Primary Education 
There is much current interest in young children's problem-solving. This is true at the 
level of the Primary school classroom, and within the literature of developmental 
psychology. Of course, it is often the case that work in these two different spheres is 
mutually reinforcing and influential. Both are also affected by, and influential upon, 
current socio-political movements and concerns. So it is the case that there is much talk 
at the moment within the political sphere of the need for a flexible workforce. Within 
the educational world there is a recognition that today's children are growing up in a 
changing world. Providing them with a body of knowledge which seems appropriate at 
the moment is not adequate to their needs; they need to learn how to learn, to think, to 
reason and to solve problems for themselves. 
Current cognitive developmental models of the child emphasise the active nature of the 
young learner searching after meaning. Recent work, in particular, has revealed the very 
early emergence of reasoning and problem-solving capabilities in young children. Yet, it 
is also clear that there are very considerable individual differences between children in 
their abilities to think and to learn. The present study is intended as a contribution to our 
knowledge about the ways in which children's abilities to reason and to solve problems 
develop, and the factors which might crucially affect individual differences. This is 
clearly of interest to the developmental psychologist, and also to the teacher of young 
children. 
Before setting out the aims of the present study in detail, however, it will be helpful to 
review the development of the current interest in children's problem-solving within 
education and psychology. The next two chapters are devoted to this review. Where 
issues or research have directly influenced the design and content of the present study 
this is also indicated (both the review of research and the report of the present study are 
carried out in the past tense; it is hoped that the explicit indication of the relation 
between previous work and the present study will be clear enough without resorting to 
the rather artificial device sometimes used of referring to the present study in the future 
tense). 
An interest in children as problem-solvers within education is not, of course, a new 
development. The view that young children's learning is best regarded, and best 
encouraged, as a problem-solving process can be traced back, within modern times, as 
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Williams (1985) points out, at least as far as Dewey's concern to replace didactic 
teaching methods with the creation of child-centred learning situations. Bruce (1987), in 
her review of the ideas of Froebel, Montessori and Steiner, picks out a belief in the value 
of intrinsic motivation, resulting in child-initiated and self- directed activity, and in 
allowing the child to interact with their environment, as key principles shared by these 
pioneers of early childhood education. In the 1960's and 70's Piaget's notion of the child 
as an active constructor of its own understandings was eagerly embraced by British 
Primary school teachers, and provided the intellectual underpinnings for a more general 
adoption of child-centred, activity based learning. 
There has been, however, within the British educational system, a notable resurgence of 
interest in the development and encouragement of children's thinking, reasoning and 
problem-solving skills over the last decade or so. This new movement, furthermore, has 
been accompanied by a new and more detailed analysis of the pedagogical and cognitive 
factors involved in this way of working. This renewed interest is undoubtedly the result 
of a conjunction of educational, socio-political and psychological factors. We will return 
to developments within the psychological literature in the next section. It is worth briefly 
reviewing here, however, the relevant educational and socio-political developments. In 
general terms these have related to three broad strands: the pedagogy of 'active learning', 
curriculum developments, and teaching for thinking. We will look at each of these in 
turn. 
Section A) The Pedagogy of 'Active Learning' 
In relation to pedagogy, in today's classrooms this broadly 'child-centred' tradition of 
ideas has translated into a set of principles which Kyriacou, Brown and Constable 
(1990) have recently described as 'active learning'. This approach, they suggest, 
embodies five key concepts : the use of concrete materials and direct experience, the use 
of small group work, pupil ownership of the learning process or task, personal focus 
and relevance of the learning process or task, and the use of investigational or 
problem-orientated techniques. This increased interest in 'active learning' has been 
supported at the level of pedagogical theory by the publication of a wide range of books 
exploring and advocating the use of active, investigational and child-centred approaches 
(see, for example, Dennison and Kirk (1990), Hunter and Scheirer (1988) and Rowland 
(1985)). Such works have explored ideas about ownership, control, 
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negotiation, discovery, meaningfulness, personal relevance, the process-oriented 
curriculum and so forth which have become the currency of contemporary pedagogical 
debate. 
At the level of classroom practice, Fisher (1987), reviews work carried out across the 
Primary curriculum and throughout the UK embodying a problem-solving approach. 
This includes work done in relation to writing from Wiltshire and Croydon, maths 
problems from Hull and West Sussex, problem-solving with control technology from 
Richmond, designing and making from the East Midlands and Yorkshire, historical 
investigations, decision-making in art, moral problems and much more. The 
bibliographies attached to each of the sections of this book are a testament to the 
multitude of practical problem-solving and investigational projects, initiatives and 
publications related to the Primary phase which have been carried out and produced 
within the UK in recent years. 
While it is not of direct concern to the present study, it is worthy of note that, at the level 
of Secondary education, the picture is very similar. Kyriacou (1992), for example, 
reviews the extensive changes towards more 'active' styles of learning carried out in 
Secondary school mathematics over the last decade, while Watts (1991) reviews the field 
more generally, highlighting the multiplicity of approaches to problem-solving now 
being adopted across the Secondary school curriculum. This latter author provides 
several useful case studies, and goes on to discuss issues of planning, classroom 
management and assessment. 
As each of these authors comment, these pedagogical initiatives have very much been 
encouraged by official curriculum reviews and reports, by Her Majesty's Inspectorate 
and, latterly, the National Curriculum Council. As long ago as the 1930's the Hadow 
Report (1931) urged the need for more active and experiential methods of learning. 
This view was, of course, reiterated strongly by the Plowden Report (1967), although the 
impact of this report on classroom practice is now recognised to have been much 
overstated. HMI reports over the last 10-15 years, for example, have continued to 
bemoan the over-preponderence of didactic teaching and practice, rather than application, 
of basic skills in Primary classrooms, and the lack of opportunities for problem-solving. 
Thus, in 'Better Schools' (DES, 1985a), they report that: 
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"In about half of all classes much work in classrooms is so closely directed by the 
teacher that there is little opportunity either for oral discussion or for posing and solving 
practical problems. " (para. 19) 
This concern to develop more investigational and problem-solving approaches within 
classrooms has, of course, been part of the general move in education over the last 
twenty to thirty years away from the simple transmission of facts and towards an 
approach which emphasises much more the processes of learning. This move has been 
supported by a plethora of research studies aimed at developing teaching programmes 
and methodologies more securely based in psychological understandings about how 
children learn. 
Amongst the earliest of these attempts to produce a 'cognitive curriculum' were those by 
Bruner (1966) and a number of preschool teaching programmes based upon Piagetian 
ideas, mainly developed in the United States, (see, for example, the review by Brainerd 
(1983a)). The general influence of Piagetian ideas within the British Primary school 
system is, of course, well documented, although, as with the Plowden Report, probably 
overstated. That Piagetian ideas have been widely invoked to give an intellectual or 
academic rationale to the general move towards a more 'active' pedagogy, however, is not 
in doubt. 
Information-processing approaches to thinking and learning subsequently spawned a 
huge research effort during the 70's and 80's, again principally within the United States, 
aimed at developing cognitive curricula and instructional programmes. These have been 
mainly concerned with the development of cognitive skills and strategies, 
problem-solving abilities and the problems of transfer and learning how to learn. Phye 
and Andre (1986), for example, provide a good review. Nisbet and Shucksmith's (1986) 
work in Britain concerned with developing metacognitive learning strategies is very 
much in this tradition. Most recently, Vygotskian approaches to learning and 
instruction, emphasising the mediation of knowledge by the teacher, have made a 
contribution in the ideas of such as Tharp and Gallimore (1988) in the States and 
Meadows and Cashdan (1988) in Britain. We will return to look at some of these 
programmes and developments in more detail when we come to consider the educational 
implications of the present research. 
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Section B) Curriculum developments 
Despite some claims to the contrary, this trend away from 'product' and towards 
'process' has been continued and embodied within the National Curriculum. As Fisher 
(1987) writes: 
"This approach moves from simply teaching the children the facts of language, 
mathematics, history, geography, science and other 'disciplines', towards encouraging 
children to be scientists, historians, geographers, linguists and mathematicians, through 
the use of appropriate problem-solving skills and processes. " (Introduction) 
It is, of course, impossible to separate out the way that children are taught from the 
content of what they are taught. A new pedagogy inevitably affects both methodology 
and curriculum. This is most clearly embodied within the National Curriculum. While 
it is not appropriate here to illustrate this point in detail for all the different subjects, we 
might take Mathematics as a good example. Within Mathematics, Attainment Target 1 
is concerned with Using and Applying Mathematics' (DES, 1991a). This new 
emphasis within Mathematics stems very largely from the influential Cockroft Report 
(1982), which stated that: 
"The ability to solve problems is at the heart of mathematics. Mathematics is only 
'useful' to the extent that it can be applied to a particular situation and it is the ability to 
apply mathematics to a variety of situations to which we give the name 
'problem-solving'. " (para 249, p. 73) 
The encouragement in this report (and in the subsequent report by HMI (DES, 1985b) 
'Mathematics from 5-16) for investigational and problem-solving approaches has been 
a major factor in the gradual transformation of Primary school mathematics. Numerous 
publications have embodied this approach, and provided teachers with ideas and support 
(see, for example, the Association of Teachers of Mathematics' Inset and Resource pack 
"Towards the Problem Solving School", the magazine "Strategies: Maths & 
Problem-solving 3-13", Charles (1985) and Whittaker (1986)). A similar picture of 
increasing concern for processes, to different degrees, could be drawn in relation to each 
of the other National Curriculum subjects. 
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Official reports and recommendations regarding teaching methods and the curriculum 
have, of course, at least in part, arisen as a response to socio-political as well as purely 
educational issues and developments. This has been nowhere more evident than in the 
new emphasis within the Primary school curriculum upon Science and Technology. 
While this development is clearly to a very large extent a consequence of a political 
imperative to provide a more technologically literate workforce, the move towards a more 
problem-solving approach is also evident within it. 
Thus, Attainment Target 1 within the new Science National Curriculum (DES, 1991 b), 
which counts as 50% of the subject for assessment purposes, is concerned with the 
skills and processes of 'Scientific Investigation'. This has been, at least in part, the 
outcome of the considerable amount of research concerned with children's thinking and 
learning in science, and the implications for teaching, carried out by such as Wynne 
Harlen (see Harlen & Osborne (1985)), the Children's Learning in Science Project 
(CLIS) at Leeds University (see Driver (1983)) and others. At the Secondary level, as 
Adey (1990) points out, the 'Thinking Science' materials produced by the Cognitive 
Acceleration through Science Education (CASE) project (Adey, Shayer & Yates, 1989), 
are an attempt to use psychological evidence about how children construct their own 
understandings of the world to help them develop the cognitive skills of 'formal 
operational' thinking (we will return to the influence of Piaget later). 
But perhaps the single most significant curriculum development within the National 
Curriculum, and the one which most powerfully embodies the new emphasis on children 
learning by solving problems, is the Design and Technology Capability element within 
the Technology curriculum (DES, 1990). It is described thus within the Non-statutory 
Guidance: 
"Design and Technology describes a way of working in which pupils investigate a 
need or respond to an opportunity to make or modify something. They use their 
knowledge and understanding to devise a method or solution, realise it practically, and 
evaluate the end product and decisions taken during the process. " (Section A. 1.2) 
Tickle (1990) has reviewed the manner in which CDT gradually emerged in the 80's as a 
Secondary school, and then a Primary school, subject. It was first included in an official 
curriculum document by HMI in 'The Curriculum from 5-16' (DES, 1985c). At the 
Primary level it was given a boost first by the publication of the seminal work of 
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Williams and Jinks (1985), and then by the implementation by the Department of Trade 
and Industry of the curriculum development project 'Problem Solving 5-13' (Sellwood, 
1987). HMI produced a report in the 'Curriculum Matters' series (DES, 1987) and the 
Design Council (1986) declared an early interest, which has continued with numerous 
support materials and a regular magazine devoted to Primary Design & Technology 
(The Big Paper'). Originally included within the remit of the National Curriculum 
Council working group for Science, Design and Technology (together with Information 
Technology) was then established as a separate subject in its own right. Over the last 
2-3 years there has been an enormous explosion of publications aimed at supporting 
Primary school work in this area, from the National Curriculum Council, LEA's and 
commercial publishers. 
While there has been controversy over the new balance and relationship between 
intellectual and practical elements within Design & Technology (the omission of the 
word 'craft' is significant here), it is clear that the problem-solving approach will remain 
fundamental to this area. Sellwood (1991) has recently produced a detailed analysis of 
and rationale for The Investigative Learning Process' in the Design and Technology 
Association's journal, within which he elaborates a Practical Problem-solving Model' of 
teaching and learning which he argues is fundamental to work within Design and 
Technology, and is applicable across the curriculum. Within this article he makes the 
following assertion, which states very clearly the new recognition of the significance of 
problem-solving for the teacher and the now well established position of cognitive 
developmental psychology: 
"While children are exploring, discovering and investigating the world around them, 
they are inevitably involved in problem-solving of various kinds. The development of 
skills that can recognise, analyse and then solve problems are fundamental to intellectual 
development and are, when suitably planned, exercised and monitored, the vital skills of 
'learning how to learn"' (p. 4) 
He goes on to propose a detailed model for teaching the skills of problem-solving, to 
which we will return in our discussion of educational implications at the end of the 
present study. 
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Section C) Teaching Children to Think 
The final strand of development which relates to this renewed interest in children as 
problem-solvers concerns the emergence of 'teaching for thinking' programmes. 
As a number of commentators have noted, much of this work initially originated in the 
U. S. A. where an interest in teaching thinking and problem-solving seems to have 
developed a little earlier than in Europe and Britain (see, for example, Tuma & Reif 
(1980), which contains interesting accounts of various programmes for teaching 
problem-solving skills, mostly to college students, and Baron & Sternberg (1987) for a 
more recent and excellent review of American work in this area). 
Although it is apparent that a considerable amount of work was being carried out in 
Europe and Britain, until fairly recently, it was all relatively isolated and unreported. 
Over the last few years, however, partly as a result of the burgeoning interest within the 
educational and public/political communities noted earlier, there has been a flurry of 
conferences, publications and other activity. Maclure & Davies (1991), under the title 
"Learning to Think: Thinking to Learn", edited the proceedings of an OECD 
Conference organised by the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (CERI) in 
July 1989. This was attended by 120 participants, 60 of whom were actively engaged in 
psychological and educational research related to this area. De Corte et al (1987) and 
Mandl et al (1989) have edited the proceedings of conferences held by the newly 
formed European Association for Research on Learning and Instruction (EARLI), much 
of which have been concerned with learning to learn, metacognition and 
problem-solving, all issues central to the teaching for thinking literature. Nisbet & 
McGuinness (1991) produced a detailed review of extensive work in progress on the 
teaching of thinking skills and strategies across the different regions of Europe and 
within Britain. Fisher (1990) and Coles & Robinson (1991 a) have produced reviews of 
the rapidly growing work within Britain. 
As evidence of the current level of interest in the teaching of thinking within Britain, 
Coles & Robinson (1991a) cite the 10,000 requests received for the supporting booklet 
to the BBC's series "The Transformers" (a series of films featuring the work of Lev 
Vygotsky, Reuven Feuerstein and Matthew Lipman) and the surprising and gratifying 
rapid sell-out of the first edition of their book published in 1989. This book contains, 
amongst other things, reviews of the work of Feuerstein ('Instrumental Enrichment') and 
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Lipman ('Philosophy for Children'), and of the Thinking Skills courses developed in 
Oxfordshire and Somerset based upon elements of these programmes. The efficacy of 
these and other courses has been the subject of recent hot debate within the Education 
Section of the British Psychological Society (see Burden (1993) and replies by Adey 
(1993) and Blagg (1993)). Nisbet (1991a) even reports that the National Curriculum 
Council have set up a Task Group to consider learning and thinking skills as a 
cross-curricular theme, although nothing has been officially heard of their deliberations 
as yet. 
While it would not be appropriate to review all the many different approaches to the 
teaching of thinking within the present context, a number of general issues of interest 
arise. First, as a number of commentators point out, there remain basic theoretical 
differences between psychologists working in this area. Both Maclure (1991) and 
Nisbet (1991b) characterise one aspect of these differences as being a mostly European 
attachment to a Piagetian model of developmental stages opposed to the more pragmatic 
approach of many American researchers, whose main theoretical models, where they 
have them, tend to be based on information processing approaches. The CASE 
(Cognitive Acceleration through Science Education) materials of Adey, Shayer and 
Yates (1989) are a good example of the European, Piagetian influenced approach, while 
Sternberg's (1986) Intelligence Applied is an example of the American leaning towards 
an information processing analysis. 
The second major debate, so far very much unresolved, is between the 'skills' approach 
and the 'infusion' approach. On the one hand, Feuerstein et al's (1980) Instrumental 
Enrichment, Bono's (1976) CoRT material, and much more is predicated on the 
assertion that there are identifiable thinking skills which can be directly taught. On the 
other hand, Adey et al's CASE materials, Lipman et al's (1980) Philosophy for Children, 
and many others are predicated on the assertion that children can only be taught to think 
via 'infusion' through a process of solving problems in the context of particular subject 
matter. Both volumes edited by Maclure & Davies (1991) and Coles and Robinson 
(1991 a) have this debate as a central thread of their organisation. 
There are, however, a number of common elements running through the vast majority of 
programmes devised in this area. In the context of the present study it seems 
appropriate to mention three. First, the crucial role of metacognition in transfer 
processes is increasingly recognised. In attempting to answer the question "Does 
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'teaching thinking' work? " Coles and Robinson (1991b) review evaluation studies of 
various programmes, particularly those of Feuerstein's Instrumental Enrichment and 
Lipman's Philosophy for Children. They report that both programmes have been shown 
to work in a number of settings. The test of 'teaching thinking' programmes is usually 
whether the subjects involved develop generalised improved thinking skills which help 
them to perform better on novel tasks and problems. To achieve this many programmes 
place emphasis on the training of metacognitive or 'executive' skills, such as goal-setting, 
planning and self-monitoring. Coles and Robinson (1991b) refer to Belmont, 
Butterfield and Ferretti (1982), who reviewed seven studies which provided evidence that 
transfer of learning skills can be learnt by 'training' metacognitive or 'executive' skills, 
and concluded that: 
"These facts suggest that the deliberate training of superordinate processes will 
result in important gains in the ability 
... 
to think productively and to solve novel 
problems. To the extent that productive thinking and novel problem-solving signify 
intelligence, we may be confident that intelligence can be modified by attending to 
children's superordinate self-management skills. It is unknown how much improvement 
can be expected, but we suppose that cognitive researchers have barely scratched the 
surface. " (p. 153) 
McGuinness (1990) reviews the contents and procedures of a wide range of 'teaching 
thinking' programmes within the three broad traditions of 'cognitive strategies', 'critical 
thinking' and 'knowledge restructuring' and concludes that they mostly rely upon 
enhancing metacognitive skills; furthermore, 
"over the years, the role of metacognition has been made more explicit and the 
variety of metacognitive tools has increased. " (p. 302) 
It is interesting to note, as an example, that Blagg and Ballinger (1991) in their review of 
their Somerset Thinking Skills course, explicitly discuss the increasing awareness and 
control by children of their cognitive styles (particularly in relation to Kagan et al's 
(1964) dimension of cognitive tempo, which is included within the present study). 
We will come later to the increasing wealth of psychological research devoted to the 
exploration of metacognitive processes, and their relation to children's developing 
abilities to learn and to solve problems. For the moment it is sufficient to note that the 
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significance of 'learning how to learn' is increasingly recognised within the world of 
education. 
The second common feature of many 'teaching thinking' programmes is the recognition 
of the significance of the quality of the teacher's role in facilitating students' own 
learning how to learn. This is made most explicit in Feuerstein's model of the teacher as 
a 'mediator' who selects and organises the world of stimuli for the child. McGuinness 
(1990), however, demonstrates that such mediation is a recurrent theme, under various 
other names 
- 
teacher modelling, reciprocal teaching, scaffolding, Socratic dialogue and 
so on 
- 
within many successful programmes. As she rightly points out, Vygotsky 
(1978) is now generally acknowledged as the father of this mediating, social 
interactionist, view of cognitive development. There is currently a considerable body of 
research being undertaken to explore the way experts model and scaffold teacher-learner 
interactions, characterised by Collins, Seely-Brown and Newman (1987) as 'cognitive 
apprenticeship', and to explore the implications of these processes for the learning of 
higher order thinking skills (see, for example, Wertsch (1985) and Moll (1990)). While 
this area of study is not directly relevant to the work carried out here, it has generated 
considerable interest within the research and educational communities, and it clearly has 
a direct bearing upon the question of how young children develop metacognitive and 
problem-solving strategies. 
The third common feature of many 'teaching thinking' programmes is an 
acknowledgement of the importance of the learner's attitudes and motivations and an 
emphasis upon creating positive learning environments. Nisbet (1991a) reviews a wide 
range of programmes from both Europe and America which contain this concern as a 
central element. Most programmes work on the basis that one must not only teach 
skills, but one must also encourage the disposition to use them. There are numerous 
findings, to which we shall refer in more detail later (see, for example, Gammage 
(1982)) which suggest that high self-esteem is a necessary precondition for 
achievement. There is a general recognition within programmes that positive attitudes to 
thinking are encouraged in a climate which is tolerant of questioning and exploration, 
and are discouraged by an emphasis on memorising and an authoritarian regime. 
Within the present study, the child's attributions in respect of their successes and 
failures at school are included as a possible factor related to the development of their 
problem-solving strategies. 
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Chapter 3. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Section A) Problem-solving: the Psychological Research 
i) Approaches to Cognitive development: children as problem-solvers 
This chapter reviews work which has been done within developmental psychology to 
explore the means by which children develop their abilities to think, reason and solve 
problems. This first section examines the emergence of an approach to learning within 
developmental psychology which implies a model of children as problem-solvers. It 
also reviews work which has attempted to identify key elements in the structure and 
development of children's general intellectual processing. The second section focuses 
down onto research specifically related to problem-solving and reasoning. The third 
section focuses down even further to look at work within this area which has been 
concerned with inductive reasoning and its role in learning; within this section the 
emergence of 'hypothesis theory' as an approach to children's concept learning and rule 
induction is also reviewed. From the work reviewed in each of these sections a number 
of significant issues emerge which have influenced the design of the present study. 
Within modem cognitive developmental psychology problem-solving has become an 
increasingly significant area of study. Sternberg (1982) has demonstrated that reasoning 
and problem-solving abilities have always been integral to notions of intelligence, even 
within early psychometric conceptions. Over the last 20 years or so, however, that there 
has been a burgeoning of interest and research into the psychological processes 
involved. Indeed, some influential modem theorists now regard problem-solving to be 
the fundamental cognitive activity (see, for example, Anderson (1983)). 
Psychological approaches to children's learning, however, have not always 
fundamentally regarded the child as a problem solver. Modern cognitive developmental 
psychology owes a huge debt to the work of Jean Piaget, of course, and, as Wood 
(1988), for example, has argued, it was Piaget's major contribution to place 
"'action' and self-directed problem-solving at the heart of learning and development". 
(p. 5) 
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Wood (1988), in his authoritative recent account of current work concerned with 
children's thinking and learning, reviews the demise of earlier behaviourist models of 
children's learning, within which learning was seen as a simple process of building up 
associations based upon external reinforcement. He reviews, in particular, the volume 
edited by Hilgard (1964) within which many of the contributors recognised the 
difficulties of S-R learning theory, and began to recognise the potential contribution of 
an approach which placed the learner in a more active role. 
Interestingly, as Bjorklund (1990) reviews, one of the developments arising out of these 
difficulties with S-R theory, amongst a group of psychologists referred to as the 
neobehaviourists, was the proposal that learning could be better explained in terms of 
intervening 'mediators'. Mediational theorists in the 1960's worked mainly with 
discrimination learning problems, and we will return to their work at the beginning of 
the next section when work related to discrimination learning problems will be 
considered as background to the present study. As we shall see, as Bjorklund (1990) 
indicates, the verbal mediators postulated by the neobehaviourists are one of the earlier 
examples of a kind of cognitive strategy. 
Piaget's contribution was very considerable indeed. He demonstrated that it was possible 
to analyse the behaviour of young children in terms of the quality of their reasoning and 
their cognitive strategies, and, of course, carried out a vast quantity of detailed 
observations of young children engaged in problem-solving situations (see, for example 
Inhelder & Piaget (1958,1964). 
While his general position has been enormously valuable and influential, however, his 
specific proposals for mechanisms of cognitive change and development have not 
proved particularly helpful. Meadows (1983,1993), amongst many others, has reviewed 
the difficulties with, for example, the notion of 'equilibration' and its two subsidiary 
processes of 'assimilation' and 'accommodation'. Whilst these processes seem 
plausible, they remain abstract and hard to tie down to specific predictions about 
behaviour. Where specific predictions have been possible, furthermore, the empirical 
data has not been encouraging. The central notion of cognitive conflict or 
disequilibrium as the engine of learning and development, for example, has been 
challenged by the work of such as Bryant (1982). This demonstrated that agreement 
between the information gained from two intellectual strategies may facilitate learning 
more effectively than conflict. 
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A more productive analysis of the means by which children become 
increasingly sophisticated problem-solvers has been that carried out within the 
information processing framework. Beginning with the early influential work of such 
as Klahr & Wallace (1976) and Simon (1978), this approach has generated an 
enormous quantity of detailed research, and an array of different theories. This is not 
the place to provide a detailed review of this work (see Siegler (1983,1991) for 
comprehensive reviews), but a number of key features and themes are germane to the 
present study. 
As Siegler (1991) reviews, the information processing approach to development starts 
by viewing the child as a processor of information with a strictly limited processing 
capacity. In order to surmount the difficulties this imposes, children develop ever more 
sophisticated and more powerful processing strategies. Rather than focus on stages of 
development, such as those which are such a feature of Piagetian theory, information 
processing theories focus on the means by which children select and represent 
information, the processes they use to process and transform it, and the effects of the 
constraints of their memory and processing systems. 
Two further defining features of the approach have been an emphasis on detailed task 
analysis, and on the precise analysis of change mechanisms. Both are these are also 
features of the present study. The first follows on very much in the tradition established 
by Piaget's careful analyses of tasks. However, the analysis of a logician has been 
replaced by that of a computer programmer. This has materialised in the form of Miller, 
Galanter & Pribram's (1960) 'TOTE', Klahr & Wallace's (1976) 'production systems' 
and Simon's (1978) 'problem space'. The argument is that in order to understand the 
representations and processes engaged in by a child when faced by a particular cognitive 
task or problem, it is vital to understand the nature of the information which needs to be 
processed, and the kinds of operations which need to be performed upon it. This kind 
of approach has been extremely fruitful. Siegler's (1978) analysis of the balance beam 
problem and Noelting's (1980) work on proportionality are perhaps the two best known 
examples of structural microanalyses of tasks which have revealed the nature of the 
development of children's strategic processing. 
The issue of "what develops? " and of mechanisms of change has been central to 
information processing research. Siegler (1983) reviews work which has highlighted 
basic capacities and processes, strategies, metacognition and the knowledge base as 
candidates for "what develops? ". In his later review (Siegler (1991)) he includes work in 
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a range of areas which has focussed on four change mechanisms: automatisation, 
encoding, generalisation and strategy construction. These factors seem vital to an 
effective study of children's problem-solving and, in different ways, many of the 
processes involved are included within the present study. Rather than intending to focus 
on the significance of any one factor, however, it is the intention within the present study 
to examine the relationships between them. A more detailed consideration of these 
factors is provided in the final section of this chapter. 
In a comprehensive consideration of psychological approaches to children's thinking 
and reasoning, Sternberg & Powell (1983) compare work related to the development of 
intelligent functioning within the four separate paradigms of Learning Theory, 
Psychometrics, Piagetian and Information Processing. From this analysis they produce 
four transparadigmatic principles of intellectual development which emerge across all 
these different approaches. As such, they have produced an authoritative statement of the 
current view of the main elements in the development of children as problem solvers. 
First, they find evidence from work within each of the four paradigms that 
II 
more sophisticated control strategies (metacomponents) develop with age" (p. 400). 
Of particular interest in relation to the present study is their argument that within the 
work of the neobehaviourists, which was mentioned briefly above, metacomponents of a 
kind are to be found as an explanatory mechanism. White's (1965) theory of the 
development of the ability to inhibit lower level associative responses so that the higher 
order conceptual processes will have time to take effect, and the possibility of multiple 
types of functioning, such as mediated versus unmediated learning (Kendler & Kendler 
(1975)), are both given as examples where metacomponents involving internal control 
mechanisms are implied. Within the information processing framework they refer to 
seminal work such as Flavell's (1981) proposal for a model of cognitive monitoring and 
Butterfield & Belmont's (1977) demonstration that a key feature of developmentally 
advanced functioning is the ability to select and apply optimal strategies. Metacognitive 
aspects of functioning have been a major area of research and theory related to the 
development of thinking and problem-solving ever since Flavell's studies of 'production 
deficiency' in the late 1960's, and are a key element within the present study. 
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Second, Sternberg & Powell (1983) find evidence from all four paradigms that 
"information processing becomes more nearly exhaustive with increasing age" (p. 402) 
As evidence for this they cite, for example, Siegler's (1978) balance beam study, within 
which he found that a major cause of younger children's failure to solve this problem 
was their failure to encode all the relevant information. Evidence from a wide range of 
research has confirmed that the successful problem-solver represents the problem to 
themselves more accurately, and more thoroughly, than the unsuccessful one. An 
attempt is made within the present study to explore the effectiveness with which the 
children represented the MDL problem to themselves. An interesting conjecture here 
would be the extent to which this relates to Kagan et al's (1964) concept of impulsivity 
versus reflectivity, and performance on the MFFI' test, which is included within the 
present study. 
Sternberg & Powell's (1983) third principle is that 
"the ability to comprehend relations of successively higher orders develops with age" 
(p. 403) 
Once again they cite evidence from all four paradigms. From the point of view of the 
present study of particular interest is the evidence they cite from learning theory 
approaches to concept learning. Odom (1966) and Osler & Kofsky (1966), using 
versions of the discrimination learning task, both found strategic differences in the way 
younger and older children responded to the task. They inferred that these differences 
were the result of differences in the levels of categories which the children were able to 
use as the basis for their responding. Domain-specific knowledge has repeatedly been 
shown to enable more structured representations to be made of problem areas. This has 
implications for the use of more sophisticated strategies, which is a further central 
feature of the study reported within this thesis, as is the extent to which this use of more 
sophisticated strategies is enabled by the lower demands made on working memory 
arising from a more structured knowledge base. 
Fourth, Sternberg & Powell (1983) cite evidence that 
"flexibility in the use of strategy or information develops with age" (p. 405). 
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Evidence is again cited from the discrimination learning and hypothesis testing 
literature. Odom & Coon (1966), for example, found that 6 yr. olds were much more 
likely to stick with a reinforced pattern of responses when it ceased to be reinforced than 
were 11 year olds. Gholson, Levine & Phillips (1972) found younger children more 
likely to make fixed responses to multiple discrimination learning tasks, and less likely 
to respond to feedback than older children. We will return, of course, to this literature in 
more detail in the next section. That the flexible and appropriate use of strategies is a 
key factor in the development of intelligent functioning and problem-solving is a central 
theme of the current study. Of interest also is the extent to which this might be linked 
to a more field-independent cognitive style, and to the confidence in tackling new 
problems provided by a more internal locus of control. 
Within the problem-solving literature the description Sternberg & Powell (1983) offer 
has often been characterised as the move from novice to expert. It is the intention within 
the present study to explore some aspects of the route and mechanisms by which this 
transformation takes place. More detailed reviews of work related to underlying 
cognitive factors in development and change mechanisms are provided in the final 
section of this chapter. Before we come to that, however, we now turn to look in a little 
more detail at research directly related to problem solving and reasoning, and within that, 
work related to induction, concept learning and hypothesis testing. 
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ii) Studies of Problem-solving & Reasoning 
Children's problem-solving and reasoning has been studied extensively within modem 
developmental psychology (see Mayer (1992), for example, for an excellent survey of 
the field). The vast majority of the work has been carried out within the two main 
frameworks of Piagetian and information processing theory. Piaget and his co-workers 
(see, for example. Inhelder & Piaget (1958,1964)) analysed children's performance on 
a vast range of reasoning tasks, and interpreted their success or failure in terms of stages 
in the development of logical structures of thought. The neo-Piagetian and 
post-Piagetian work stimulated by Piaget's vast achievement has been very productive, 
and has established a great deal of significance about children's thinking and 
problem-solving behaviour. Of relevance to the present study is work which has been 
devoted to exploring and developing Piaget's position in relation to three areas. 
First, the work of Donaldson (1978) and many others has established that children are 
capable of reasoning in a similar manner to adults much earlier than Piaget suggested, 
providing that they are familiar with the material and that the task makes 'human sense' 
to them. On the first point, Goswami (1992) has recently demonstrated, for example, 
that young children are capable of sophisticated analogical reasoning (supposed, 
according to the Piagetian position, to be dependent upon 'formal operations') with 
material with which they are familiar. On the second point, there has been some debate 
about the usefulness of Donaldson's notion of 'human sense'. What is clear, however, as 
Meadows (1993) has recently reviewed, is that, while both adults and children have 
difficulties with certain kinds of formal logic, young children are particularly 
disadvantaged when tasks are presented in an abstract form. Rather more than adults, 
they are dependent upon a meaningful context to help them to represent to themselves 
the logical relations between the elements in a task or problem. 
Braine & Rumain (1983), summarised a substantial amount of work suggesting a 
considerable resemblance between the reasoning of children just entering school and 
that of adults. In the same volume, Brown et al (1983) also reviewed a range of research 
demonstrating the early emergence of planful, strategic processing in pre-school 
children (i. e. before the much vaunted 5-7 shift beloved of mediationist (eg: White 
(1965)) and Piagetian theorists). Work in the last 10 years or so with very young, infant 
and pre-school children has shown that children's behaviour from a very young age is 
strategic, although the strategies they construct may not be very effective. Deloache & 
Brown (1987), for example, have provided evidence of the early emergence 
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of planning skills in children as young as 18 months; Bjorklund (1990) provides a 
review of other work which supports this view. 
Second, a whole range of work has suggested that factors other than logical structure are 
very often responsible for young children's difficulties with particular tasks and 
problems. Bryant & Trabasso (1971) demonstrated, for example, that quite young 
children are perfectly capable of making transitive inferences, and that their difficulties 
with the Piagetian form of this task were more associated with problems of memory 
than with logic or reasoning capabilities. Following Pascual-Leone's (1969,1970) 
demonstration that the sequence of children's success on Piagetian tasks can be 
predicted by the working memory load involved, the neo-Piagetians, such as Case (1974, 
1984,1985) have established factors associated with memory and automaticity of basic 
operations as of major significance in cognitive development. Within neo-Piagetian 
theory, notions about 'equilibration' have given way, consequently, to much more 
satisfactory and empirically testable transition mechanisms. 
The third area within which Piaget's ideas have been questioned is that relating to the 
notion of a fixed sequence of 'stages' of development. Brown & Desforges (1979), for 
example, have reviewed cross-cultural work on Piaget's tasks which has demonstrated 
that there are clear cultural effects upon the order in which success is achieved on the 
different tasks. The notion of 'structure d'ensemble', that each stage represents a 
coherent grouping of logical structures working together under some kind of synergy, 
and affecting the whole range of a child's cognitive functioning, has also not been well 
supported by empirical studies (see, for example, the review by Meadows (1983)). 
Brown & Desforges (1979) report evidence demonstrating very little inter-task 
correlation between tasks which are supposed to be at the same 'stage'. As we shall 
review in a little more detail in the final section of this chapter, Pascual-Leone (1969) 
managed to account for some of these difficulties by incorporating the cognitive style 
dimension of field-dependence into his model. Taken together all this evidence 
suggests that there may not be one route through a fixed sequence of stages of 
development. Within the present study the possibility is explored of different 
developmental routes based upon different strategic styles of behaviour. 
The picture which has thus emerged from a wealth of research is a much more complex 
one of a range of experiential, contextual and cognitive factors interacting to affect 
performance. New strategies emerge in a much more piecemeal and domain-specific 
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manner than that suggested by Piagetian theory, as Piaget himself began to concede in 
later versions of his model, and as the recent review and study of strategy construction 
by Siegler & Jenkins (1989), for example, confirms. 
Work on problem-solving within the information-processing framework has explored 
behaviour on a wide variety of different kinds of problems, but has begun with an 
analysis of the characteristics shared by all problems. Following Simon (1978) a 
problem is said to occur when there is a discrepancy between the present situation 
('initial state') and a desired state of affairs ('goal state'), and there is no existing routine 
that will get from the initial state to the goal state. Solution of the problem involves the 
execution of 'operators' on the initial state, and there may be 'constraints' on the use of 
these operators. 
Typically, research within this framework has examined behaviour on 'well-defined' 
problems where the initial and goal states are clearly defined, as are all the possible 
operators and the constraints upon them. This has enabled cybernetic models to be 
developed (such as Miller, Galanter & Pribram's (1960) TOTE, Klahr & Wallace's 
(1976) self-modifying 'production systems' and Simon's (1978) 'problem space') which 
have enabled the precise formulation of all possible 'moves' and thus the analysis with 
some precision of the behaviour of children and adults when faced with particular 
problems. Much of this research has used problems such as the 'Towers of Hanoi' and 
other such 'transformation' problems. Kahney (1986) has produced a useful review of 
work of this kind. 
The predominant concern of this research has been the demonstration that the 
development of children's abilities to think, to reason and to solve problems can be 
described very effectively in terms of the development of increasingly sophisticated 
strategies, a concern shared with neo-Piagetian theorists and researchers. The study of 
concept formation, and the identification of strategies such as 'scanning' and 'focussing', 
by Bruner, Goodnow & Austin (1956) is, of course, seminal in this field. Newell & 
Simon (1972), in their analysis of such problems as the Towers of Hanoi', first 
identified the planning strategy of 'means-end analysis' (including 'subgoaling') which 
has subsequently been very thoroughly investigated, and to which we shall return in a 
moment. Noelting's (1980) study of proportionality with juice mixture problems 
produced a series of four strategies of increasing sophistication, each involving the 
consideration of more information than the last. Case (1985) analysed these strategies 
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and demonstrated a progression in the demands on working memory. Siegler (1978) 
analysed the development of progressively more sophisticated strategies on the balance 
beam problem in terms of the number of decisions to be made. 
A number of theorists have developed models which attempt to explain the development 
of strategies within an information-processing framework, conceived in terms of 
conditional procedures very much like a computer programme. Principal amongst these 
are Klahr & Wallace's (1976) model of self-modifying production systems and 
Anderson's (1983) Adaptive Control of Thought (ACT*). While these systems have 
been relatively successful at modelling standard observations regarding skill acquisition 
(eg: the increasing automaticity of skilled performance), they have difficulty in 
accounting for the development of new rules or strategies. 
An interesting feature of the development of problem-solving strategies, and of skill 
acquisition generally, is the commonly observed U-shaped developmental pattern of 
performance. Strauss & Stavy (1982) edited an intriguing collection of studies revealing 
this kind of pattern of developmental growth within which a number of possible 
alternative explanations are offered to account for this phenomenon. These include 
various models involving reorganisation of internal representations, and discontinuities 
in strategy development. Karmiloff-Smith (1984) proposed an interesting three-phase 
developmental model which relates problem representation to style of strategic 
behaviour, and which incorporates data exhibiting U-shaped development from several 
problem domains including language acquisition and her studies of the block-balancing 
problem (see Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder (1974)). 
While the investigation of strategy development on 'well-defined' problems has 
facilitated precision in analysis, researchers have also wanted to investigate 
problem-solving procedures on'ill-defined', real world problems. Gilhooly (1988), for 
example, has reviewed work in the areas of physics, mathematics, computer 
programming and medical diagnosis, each of which has a significant literature. This 
work has contributed to a model of the development of problem-solving behaviour in 
terms of the move from being a novice to being an expert. Green & Gilhooly (1992) 
have provided a recent review and analysis of work related to expertise. 
Essentially, experts have been found to differ in two fundamentals from novices in any 
particular domain. First, as we have discussed in the previous section, they represent 
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problems differently. Odom (1966) and Osler & Kofsky (1966) have demonstrated the 
use of higher level categories by older children on a discrimination learning task, and the 
work by such as Chi, Feltovich & Glaser (1981) on physics problems has confirmed 
that the more extensive and structured domain knowledge of experts facilitates more 
effective representation of problems in a number of ways. In particular, experts and 
novices differed in the features of the problems which they considered relevant to 
finding a solution. As we shall see when we come to look at research using the multiple 
discrimination learning task, irrelevant information is a significant source of difficulty 
for young children in solving problems. This is a factor, therefore, which is included in 
the present study in the form of a version of the MDL task which contains irrelevant 
dimensions. 
The expert also has access to domain-specific strategies not available to the novice, and 
shows developments in the sophistication with which general problem-solving strategies 
are used within their area of expertise. In this regard, Sweller et al (1983), amongst 
many others, have reported a development from 'working backwards' through a problem 
using 'means-end' analysis, to a 'working forwards' strategy which has been found in 
many fields. While the present study is not centrally concerned with the issue of 
domain-specific knowledge, both these issues of effectiveness of representation and 
sophistication of strategy use are unavoidable in any consideration of the development 
of problem-solving abilities, and are, therefore, important elements in the present 
analysis. Along with other significant underlying cognitive factors, they will be 
discussed in a little more detail within the final section of this chapter. 
An issue of direct educational relevance arises from Sweller et al's (1983) finding that 
training on tasks with non-specific goals encouraged the development of the more 
sophisticated and effective 'working forwards' strategy. This would appear to tie in with 
the suggestion by Vandenberg (1990) that success on real life problems, because of 
their more 'ill-defined' structure, is more dependent upon representational processes, and 
may, therefore, necessitate more exploratory activity. We will return to this issue, which 
relates to the role of play in problem-solving, when we come to discuss the educational 
implications of the present study. 
The other major issue which has arisen from studies of expertise and problem-solving is 
that of transfer or generalisation of learning. As Siegler & Jenkins (1989) have 
reviewed, 
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"Those interested in education have long lamented the problem of inert knowledge... 
where children fail to apply strategies they know to new problems. " (p. 16) 
Expertise appears to be quite domain specific, and individuals who can display 
considerable expertise in one area can behave like novices in another. Strategies may 
fail to be applied when they would have been appropriate, or may be applied 
inappropriately. There are clear links here with the over and under extension of 
concepts commonly observed in young children. Learning the conditions of 
applicability of a strategy, Siegler & Jenkins (1989) conclude, may well be at least as 
difficult as the process of strategy discovery and construction. The evidence would 
appear to suggest, however, that domain-specific knowledge does not account for all 
development in problem-solving ability, and that there is a developing ability to transfer 
and generalise knowledge and general problem-solving strategies. Chi (1978), for 
example, had to go to considerable lengths to prevent adults from applying general 
strategies to her face recognition task. Ferrara, Brown & Campione (1986) found clear 
evidence of a developing ability to transfer inductive reasoning rules amongst 8-11 yr. 
olds. Work has been done which has successfully demonstrated that it is possible to 
facilitate transfer in a number of ways, mostly involving some kind of metacognitive 
training (eg Adams et al (1988), Campione (1987)). This is an important issue to 
which we will also return in our discussion of educational implications. 
Within the literature on problem-solving and reasoning all kinds of problems and 
reasoning tasks have been investigated and analysed. We have already mentioned the 
scientific reasoning problems of Inhelder & Piaget (1958,1964) and the transformation 
problems examined by such as Newell & Simon (1972), both of which have been major 
centres of interest and research. To this must be added studies of syllogistic, 
propositional and deductive reasoning, which have been numerous (see, for example, 
Braine & Rumain (1983) for a review, and Johnson-Laird (1983) for an account of the 
mental models approach to representation which has derived from this work). Of 
interest here is the general finding, supported by Donaldson (1983), that there is a 
strong resemblance between the reasoning of children entering school and the reasoning 
of older children and adults. Children and adults make the same kinds of errors, and 
tend to find the same kinds of problems easy or difficult. This ties in well with the 
similar finding, reported above, with regard to analogical reasoning, which has also been 
an area of considerable study (see Goswami (1992)). The roots of development in 
performance on tasks involving reasoning and problem-solving clearly he elsewhere 
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than basic reasoning capacities or understandings. It is the search for these other roots 
of development with which the present study is concerned. 
As Voss (1990) and Siegler & Jenkins (1989) have recently argued, however, with the 
possible exception of analogical reasoning, there has been a relative neglect within 
modem cognitive developmental psychology of the process which accounts for most 
human reasoning, and for much of our knowledge acquisition and learning, namely the 
process of induction. As we noted above, information-processing models of strategy 
development such as those developed by Klahr & Wallace (1976) and Anderson (1983) 
have difficulty in explaining the discovery of new rules and strategies. The Framework 
for Induction proposed by Holland et al (1986), however, is a recent and much more 
successful attempt to tackle this crucial issue within a production systems type of 
model. In the next section we will turn to look at this model, together with other work 
which has explored the relationship between the processes of inductive reasoning, 
concept formation and hypothesis testing. 
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iii) Induction, Concept Learning & Hypothesis Testing 
The production by Holland et al (1986) of their Framework for Induction marks an 
important recognition by information-processing theorists that any model of cognitive 
development must, critically, be able to account for learning, and that the processes of 
induction are central to this. Principal among the related phenomena involved in human 
learning to be examined by recent psychological research are concept formation, rule 
induction and the construction of new cognitive strategies. We will return to the issue 
of strategy construction in the final section of this chapter. Here, however, it is intended 
to look briefly at work concerned with concept learning and rule induction, and to how 
that relates to the work on hypothesis testing by such as Gholson (1980) and Kemler 
(1978) from which the present study is most directly derived. 
The central significance of processes of inductive reasoning within human learning have 
recently been well argued by such as Holyoak & Nisbett (1988) and Glaser & 
Pellegrino (1987). Induction is the process by which general rules are derived from 
particular instances. It is the process referred to by Klahr & Wallace (1976) as 
'regularity detection', which is central to their model of the human 
information-processing system. As is observed by most commentators in this area, the 
production and use by young children of rules about the structure of language is a 
common example of this kind of process at work. By contrast, other kinds of reasoning 
appear to be relatively difficult for the human information-processing system. The work 
of such as Wason & Johnson-Laird (1972) and Johnson-Laird (1983) on various 
forms of deductive reasoning, for example, has demonstrated that humans tend not to 
fully process information, nor to reason by the rules of formal logic, as required by this 
kind of reasoning. Johnson-Laird's 'mental models' analysis, deriving from work in this 
area, recognises that human learning is much more a matter of recognising common 
patterns in experience, and using these patterns to make sense of new situations and 
problems. This inductive process is sometimes found wanting, but the evidence 
suggests that it is, nevertheless, the fundamental mechanism of human learning. This is 
the essential inferential process through which humans go, in Bruner's (1957) words, 
"Beyond the Information Given". 
Holyoak & Nisbet (1988) point out that induction is involved in the modification of two 
related types of knowledge. Concepts about particular events or instances are developed 
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through the inductive processes of categorisation, and higher-order inferential rules are 
developed through the inductive analysis of causal relationships. Inferential rules 
include 'heuristics', or problem-solving strategies. Glaser & Pellegrino (1987) have 
reviewed the psychological development of measures to test human intellectual aptitude, 
and have demonstrated that tasks involving 'rule induction' have been central to such 
measures, and to the models of intellectual processes which have underpinned them. 
Research on concept learning has mostly focussed on the two related issues of the 
development of concepts and categories by young children and the bases upon which 
concepts or categories are formed. On the first point, once again, the evidence appears 
to be that, contrary to the earlier suggestions of such eminent theorists as Piaget, 
Vygotsky and Bruner, young children are capable of forming concepts and categories in 
exactly the same ways as adults, and do so from a very early age. Based on 
observations of young children's categorising during play, for example, Inhelder & 
Piaget (1964) and Bruner, Olver and Greenfield (1966) concluded that pre-school 
children were incapable of 'taxonomic' or categorical classification, instead producing 
'thematic' groupings. Vygotsky (1962) came to a similar conclusion with his block 
sorting activity, noting the 'chain concepts' produced by children under 6 yrs. old. 
Smiley & Brown (1979), however, offered an elegant refutation of this view simply by 
asking preschoolers who sorted objects thematically about the categorical relations 
among the objects. They found that these young children could explain the categorical 
relations perfectly. Cole & Scribner (1974) produced some entertaining cross-cultural 
evidence which throws some light on the situation. Tribespeople in Africa also 
spontaneously produced thematic groupings, but were quite capable of producing the 
ostensibly more sophisticated categorical sortings when asked "How would a stupid 
person do it? " Both the tribespeople and the children clearly possessed the relevant 
conceptual ability, but chose not to apply it to the particular situation, preferring to 
respond in a different way which made more sense to them. 
Siegler (1991) has reviewed work on the four main possibilities which have been 
advanced by researchers for the bases upon which concepts may be represented, and the 
evidence concerning the nature of young children's concept formation. As Holland et al 
(1986) have argued, the evidence of the work of such as Rosch (1978), however, has led 
to the current consensus that natural concepts or categories are based on clear 
'prototypes' but relatively vague boundary conditions. Smith (1988) has provided a 
review of the evidence in support of this view, and developed the argument that 
41 
hierarchical categorisation is an important mechanism of cognitive economy (i. e. 
lessening the load on working memory). This is an issue to which we shall return in the 
final section of this chapter, when we come to discuss the role of knowledge and 
representation in the development of problem-solving abilities. 
More recent work on concepts and categorisation has emphasised the instability and 
flexibility of concepts, and the extent to which local context can affect the way they are 
represented. Holland et al (1986) have argued that concepts or categories are most 
accurately described as "clusters of interrelated rules" (p. 179) which are the product of 
goal-directed inductive mechanisms. Neisser (1987), amongst others, in reviewing 
developments of Rosch's 'prototype' model, has argued that concepts are best viewed as 
a kind of 'theory' through which a great deal of an individual's accumulated knowledge 
is incorporated and used to fit the immediate context. Barsalou (1987) has developed the 
notion of concepts containing a core of stable, context-independent information, as well 
as information dependent on the current context, or on recently encountered contexts. 
This kind of loosely organised system, with particular pieces of information, or 
particular criteria, in play or not depending upon the immediate context, ties in very well 
with current connectionist models of cognition (eg Rummelhart & McClelland (1986)). 
This relates explicitly to one of the key structural differences from previous information 
processing, production systems (eg Anderson (1983)) incorporated by Holland et al 
(1986) in their Framework for Induction. Unlike previous models the Framework for 
Induction allows more than one rule to 'fire' at a time. They demonstrate how this 
allowance of a certain degree of parallelism greatly facilitates the generation of new rules 
in response to new problems and situations, through the processes of induction. It is 
this crucial role of inductive reasoning in the development of new representations and 
strategies, in response to new problems, which has guided the choice of type of problem 
to be investigated within the present study. 
Various further kinds of evidence have been instrumental in substantiating the current 
view that children's early reasoning is 'theory' driven. The first comes from work 
examining the claim of such as Piaget that much of children's early reasoning is 
perceptually dominated. Carey (1985a), Gelman & Markman (1986) and others have 
done fascinating and important work in this area, and have demonstrated, for example, 
that children as young as 4 yrs. old rely heavily on categories to direct their inferences, 
even when category membership is pitted against perceptual similarity. 
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Another source of evidence in this area relates to the way children make sense of 
commonly occurring sequences of events in their lives. The work of such as Schank & 
Abelson (1977) on 'scripts' and Nelson (1986) and her colleagues on 'General Event 
Representation' has emphasised, for example, the significance of inductive processes to 
generate theories about common patterns of events in their world which guide children's 
future representations and actions. 
A third kind of evidence comes from a range of experimental work carried out with a 
number of different inductive reasoning tasks. This work has been reviewed by such as 
Glaser & Pellegrino (1987) and Gilhooly (1988), the latter under the heading of 
"Generating and Testing Hypotheses". The tasks studied include analogy problems, 
concept identification problems (of which the MDL problem in the present study is an 
example), series completion problems and problems involving simulated and real 
research environments. 
An interesting and significant finding of work related to series completion problems and 
problems involving simulated and real research environments is the consistent 
prevalence of a 'verifying' or confirmatory strategy. Wason (1960), for example, in a 
version of the series completion task which required subjects to generate other series 
which conformed to the rule, found an overwhelming tendency for subjects to generate 
series consistent with their hypothesis and to keep on doing so until they felt confident 
enough to announce their hypothesis as correct. Few subjects either tried out series 
which would falsify their hypothesis, or spontaneously varied their hypotheses. In 
studies of simulated research environments Mynatt et al (1978) similarly found that 
deliberate attempts to falsify hypotheses almost never occurred. Klayman & Ha (1987, 
1989), in a series of studies based on Wason's (1960) number series production task, 
also found that successful and unsuccessful subjects showed the same predominant 
'positive test' strategy; they did find, however, that successful problem solvers were 
much more likely to positively test alternative hypotheses. 
Mynatt et al (1978) found also that, although subjects were mostly able to respond 
appropriately to the occurrence of disconfirming evidence, there was a tendency to 
disregard it about a third of the time. The evidence from this kind of study tends to 
confirm the view that human reasoning does not typically follow the classic 'scientific 
method'. Rather, it is dominated by an inductive mode of functioning which is simply 
set up to recognise common patterns and to act on them. Until information is presented 
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by experience which does not fit the existing pattern, that pattern is the one that holds; 
and, indeed, it might even hold in the face of disconfirming evidence, up to a point. 
Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder (1974), for example, argued that children do not recognise 
the significance of disconfirming evidence until a hypothesis is well established. It is 
only then that children begin to recognise the significance of counter-examples. At the 
end of a recent, thorough review of the evidence in relation to this issue, Small (1990) 
has suggested that failure to modify a hypothesis after disconf r ing evidence may have 
beneficial consequences for young children. In the real world rules are not as tidy as in 
the laboratory, and often have exceptions. Young children often have to formulate rules 
which handle the majority of cases. In these circumstances, Small (1990) argues, it 
would be maladaptive to give too much weight to disconfirming evidence. Klayman & 
Ha (1987,1989) have also argued that their 'positive test strategy' can be a very good 
heuristic for determining the truth or falsity of a hypothesis under realistic conditions. 
They go on to argue that human hypothesis-testing strategies must be understood in 
terms of the interaction between the strategy and the task at hand. This is an important 
research issue to which we will return at the end of the thesis. 
In the context of the present study this mode of functioning might be characterised as a 
'Win/Stay' strategy. As we shall see, it is the establishment of this kind of strategy 
which proves to be crucial in a concept identification task, of which the problem in the 
present study is an example. Another important piece of evidence which has established 
the view that children's reasoning is based on a process of generating 'theories' or 
'hypotheses' about regularities in the variety of their experience, is that from the 
neo-behaviourist, mediationist studies of discrimination learning conducted by such as 
the Kendlers (see Kendler & Kendler (1975) for a review). 
The Kendlers, and others, investigated two alternative theories of concept learning, which 
have been characterised as the 'continuity theory' and the non-continuity theory'. The 
'continuity theory' is that advanced by the behaviourist learning theorists such as Hull 
(1920) and involves the establishment and strengthening of single S-R associations 
between consistently present aspects of the stimulus and the particular response. Hull 
(1920), for example, demonstrated this process by which subjects learnt to respond 
appropriately to the ever-present 'radicals' in different sets of Chinese characters. The 
'non-continuity theory' suggests that individuals actively construct and test hypotheses 
until one works on a 'Win/Stay, Lose/Shift' basis (i. e. by induction). This theoretical 
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approach was first advanced by Bruner, Goodnow & Austin (1956), and developed by 
such as Levine (1975) and Gholson (1980). 
Kendler & Kendler (1975) review their investigation of these two theoretical positions 
by means of a series of experiments involving shifts in the rules. These involved 
2-dimensional discrimination learning tasks, where an original rule is learnt (i. e. that one 
of the two values of one of the dimensions is the correct solution), and then the rule is 
changed in one of two ways. Either, the other value of the same dimension becomes the 
correct solution (a 'reversal shift') or one of the values of the other dimension becomes 
the answer (a 'nonreversal shift'). Kendler & Kendler (1975) argued that the continuity 
theory, that concept learning involves strengthening single S-R associations, would 
predict that the 'reversal shift' would be the more difficult to learn because this involves 
unlearning an already established association as well as learning a new one; by contrast 
the 'non-continuity' theory, that concept learning involves forming a rule that 'mediates' 
between the stimulus and the response, would predict that the 'reversal shift' would be 
easier because the same rule still mediates, but just the values have changed. Their 
results supported the 'non-continuity' theory for college students and verbal children, but 
the 'continuity' theory for preverbal children and laboratory animals. 
These results were supported by further experiments involving an ambiguous shift of 
the rule, where subjects were given positive feedback about items containing both the 
opposite value of the original dimension, and one of the values of the other dimension. 
Subjects responses were classified in terms of the kind of shift they adopted. 'Reversal' 
shifts (i. e. adopting the opposite value of the original dimension) were preferred by 37% 
of 3 yr. olds, 50% of 5 yr. olds and 62% of 10 yr. olds. Kendler & Kendler (1975) 
concluded that as age increases thinking in the concept learning situation is more likely 
to be mediated by a general rule rather than by individual associations. 
Subsequent work in the area, and the results of the present study, however, would 
suggest that the interpretation by the Kendler's of the behaviour of preverbal, very young 
children, may be misguided. While it may be the case that laboratory animals form 
simple associations, the evidence about young children in relation to concept learning 
and other reasoning and problem-solving situations, some of which we have reviewed in 
the previous section, suggests that they are forming theories and devising strategies 
from a very early age, although these theories and strategies may be rather inadequate. 
As noted above, we will return to the issue of children's strategies in the next section. 
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The important general finding of support for the 'non-continuity', rule induction model 
of concept identification was further supported by Trabasso & Bower's (1968) study of 
college student's pattern of performance on a 6-dimensional task. Their pattern of 
choices remained at chance level for a long time, and then suddenly jumped to 100% 
correct. Furthermore, performance was not unduly disrupted by a rule switch half way 
through, while they were still responding at chance levels. This pattern does not accord 
with a model of gradually strengthening single S-R associations. It does accord with a 
model of trying out various rules or 'hypotheses' until one is found that fits, and then 
staying with that i. e. the hypothesis testing strategy of Win/Stay, Lose Shift' identified 
above. 
As Gholson (1980) has reviewed, this kind of evidence was crucial in the establishment 
of 'hypothesis theory' within the study of children's learning. The term 'hypothesis' had 
originally been used by Krechevsky (1932), a graduate student working with Tolman, to 
describe systematic response patterns exhibited by rats prior to solution in various 
discrimination tasks. The term, and the essential idea behind it, was not picked up again, 
however, until Levine (1959), a graduate student of Harlow's, systematised the 
'error-factors' (systematic response sequences prior to the achievement of learning set) 
Harlow (1950) had identified from his work with monkeys' discrimination learning. 
Rather than viewing these response patterns as errors interfering with learning, Levine 
reconceptualised them as part of a larger set of possible response patterns, some of 
which led to acquisition of the learning set. He characterised these response patterns 
partly in terms of the outcome of the Trial 1 response (Win' or Lose') and whether or 
not the response to Trial 2 was the same as to Trial 1 ('Stay' of 'Shift'). Thus Harlow's 
'stimulus-preference' error factor became Win-Stay, Lose-Stay', and a response 
sequence which led to acquisition of the learning set was characterised as Win-Stay, 
Lose-Shift'. As the label 'error factor' was no longer appropriate, Levine (1959) 
substituted Krechevsky's term 'hypothesis'. 
Gholson (1980) goes on to review how the emergence of mathematical learning theory, 
and the work of such as Restle (1962) and Trabasso & Bower (1968), established 
'hypothesis theory' in the 1960's as the dominant model for the analysis of children's 
learning. This kind of work, together with the seminal study of Bruner, Goodnow & 
Austin (1956) firmly established the multidimensional discrimination learning (NIDL) 
task as a fruitful tool for the investigation of children's conceptual learning, and 
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'hypothesis theory' as the most constructive model of the kind of learning involved. A 
number of researchers (see, for example, Sperr (1973) and Fuchs & Turner (1981)) 
subsequently explored and established links between the ability to generate and test 
hypotheses on MDL tasks and other well established skills of classification. As we 
have reviewed in this section, this lies very well with more recent models of children's 
conceptual learning as an inductive process of constructing 'clusters of interrelated 
rules', as identified by such as Holland et al (1986). 
The present study is an attempt to develop the work of such as Levine (1975), Kemler 
(1978), Gholson (1980) and others with the MDL task, and to continue and extend the 
exploration they began of the factors which influence children's performance on this 
kind of task, and the way in which children's strategies for generating and testing 
hypotheses develop. In order to explain the rationale behind the design of the present 
study it is necessary to review the work they carried out, and the methodological and 
psychological issues they developed. This review is carried out in the next section. 
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Section B) Multidimensional Discrimination Learning Problems & 
Hypothesis Testing 
i) Methodological developments 
Following on from the pioneering work of Bruner, Goodnow & Austin (1956) there 
was a massive amount of experimentation, particularly over the next 25 years or so, 
using every possible variation of the multidimensional discrimination learning task with 
adults and with children of varying ages. This section attempts to review the major 
findings of this work, particularly as they relate to the present study. Research has 
focussed on the factors which make concept identification easier or more difficult, the 
kinds of strategies which are adopted by children and adults, and the development of 
performance on this kind of task by children. These issues are addressed in the later 
parts of this section concerned with the MDL task. In the first part, however, certain 
key methodological developments are reviewed which have influenced the design of the 
present study. 
As will emerge during this review, just as with research related to children's 
problem-solving strategies across a range of different kinds of problem, strategies and 
performance on the MDL task are very dependent upon the exact nature of the task. 
This is an issue to which we will return in chapter 6 when we come to consider 
implications for future research and theory. Within the present study, however, an 
attempt has been made to produce a form of the MDL task which would enable young 
children to demonstrate their inductive reasoning abilities, while at the same time allow 
the identification of developmentally different strategic and performance levels. 
a) Identification of Strategies: Blank Trials and Introtacts 
The first major theoretical debate in the early days of hypothesis theory concerned the 
processes by which hypotheses are selected, and it was this debate which led to key 
methodological developments concerning the identification of subjects' hypotheses and 
their strategies for selecting them. 
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Restle (1962) and Trabasso & Bower (1968) developed a mathematical model of 
hypothesis selection which they demonstrated was generally able to account for the 
choice responses of adult humans on discrimination learning tasks. This model made 
three assumptions. First, when subjects are told "right" after a particular choice, they 
retain the same hypothesis and choose accordingly on the next trial (characterised 
elsewhere as Win/Stay'). Second, when subjects are told "wrong" 
, 
they reject their 
hypothesis and select a new one ('Lose/ Shift'). Third, and this is the area of contention, 
that subjects select a new hypothesis by returning the just-disconfirmed one to the pool 
of all possible hypotheses, and then randomly selecting a new hypothesis from the pool. 
Thus the just-disconfirmed hypothesis had the same chance of being selected as any 
other hypothesis. This was tantamount to assuming that subjects immediately forgot the 
just-disconfirmed hypothesis and was referred to as the 'zero-memory' assumption. 
While this set of assumptions led to mathematical calculations of patterns of choices 
which fairly accurately matched observed behaviour, the suggestion implied in the 
'zero-memory' assumption about adult memory was clearly contentious. Levine (1966), 
therefore, argued that, rather than making these kinds of a priori assumptions about 
hypothesis choice behaviour, it would be much better to probe directly the nature of 
subjects' hypotheses at each trial. It would then be possible to determine empirically 
whether subjects retained the same hypothesis after a "right", changed their hypotheses 
after a "wrong", and on what basis new hypotheses were selected. 
Levine (Levine (1966), Karpf & Levine (1971)) devised and investigated two techniques 
or 'probes' to identify hypotheses which have subsequently formed the methodological 
basis of work aimed at identifying patterns of hypothesis selection (or 'strategies') in 
human discrimination learning. These two techniques involve the use of 'blank trials' 
and 'verbal introtacts'. 
The 'verbal introtacts' technique simply consists of asking subjects to state their current 
hypothesis after each trial C tact' is a Skinnerian term for a verbal statement contingent 
upon a particular stimulus situation; 'introtact' is thus a verbal statement contingent upon 
an internal stimulus 
- 
in this case, a 'hypothesis'). To begin with Levine (1966) was 
unhappy about this as a way of proceeding, on a number of grounds. There is, to begin 
with, of course, the general issue of the validity of subjects' verbal reports of their own 
internal processing. In relation to discrimination learning, Verplanck (1962), for 
example, a prominent conditioning theorist of the time, had suggested that there was no 
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strongly systematic relation between verbalised hypotheses and overt choice responses. 
Second, there was the concern that requiring subjects to verbalise their hypotheses might 
induce them to employ hypotheses when this might not be the way they would have 
proceeded with the task otherwise. Finally, Levine wanted to devise a technique with 
general applicability to children and animals as well as adult humans. 
As an alternative, non-verbal technique Levine (1966) devised the method of 'blank 
trials'. This method assumes that if a subject is given no feedback after a trial they will 
retain the same hypothesis for the next trial. If a series of blank trials' is given, therefore, 
assuming the subject's hypothesis remains the same, it should be possible to identify 
their hypothesis from their pattern of choices. He devised series of these 'blank trials' to 
insert in MDL problems as a hypothesis probe. An example of such a series of trials 
for a 4-dimensional MDL problem is shown in Figure 3.1. As can be seen, the stimuli 
for these trials are constructed in such as way that the pattern of choice responses for 
each of the possible hypotheses is unique. 
The initial results with this technique were very positive. Levine (1966) gave a sample of 
college students a series of 16-trial 4-dimensional problems. Feedback was provided on 
Trials 1,6,11 & 16. Sets of 4 blank trials were interposed between the feedback trials. 
Analysis of choice-response patterns on blank trials showed that simple hypothesis 
patterns of the kind illustrated in Figure 3.1 occurred 92.4% of the time. Levine (1966) 
therefore claimed that it was clear adults do employ hypotheses in the MDL problem 
and that blank trials provide a successful probe for these hypotheses. He also found 
that the Win/Stay' strategy was employed 95% of the time (i. e. subjects retained their 
original hypothesis after positive feedback) and that 'Lose/Shift' was used 98% of the 
time (i. e. subjects changed their hypothesis after negative feedback). This latter finding 
was clear evidence against Restle's (1962) 'zero-memory' assumption, which would 
predict on this kind of problem that the just-disconfirmed hypothesis would be retained 
an eighth of the time (i. e. the figure for changing hypothesis should only be 87.5%). 
When it came to analysing the behaviour of children on the MDL task, however, as 
Phillips & Levine (1975) review, the blank trials technique was found to be rather less 
helpful. To begin with, use of the blank trial probe with children (7-13 yr. olds) by 
such as Eimas (1969) had shown that children were sometimes unresponsive to 
feedback (for, example, retaining the same hypothesis after negative feedback as much 
as 10% of the time). During early explorations with systematic patterns of responses 
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Levine (1963) had noted that there could be two sources of systematic patterns: 
hypotheses, which were responsive to feedback, and what he termed 'response-sets', 
which were not. Examples of the latter, observed in children's patterns of responses, 
included 'position-preference', when the child always chose the item on the left or right, 
irrespective of feedback, 'position-alternation' (a left, right, left, right pattern) and 
'object-preference', which is a preference for choosing a particular value of one of the 
dimensions, just the same as a genuine hypothesis, except that the child stays with it 
whatever, adopting what might be characterised as a Win/Stay, Lose/Stay' strategy. In 
Levine's (1966) original blank trials some hypotheses and response-sets were 
confounded in the same pattern of choice responses. This problem obliged Phillips & 
Levine (1975) to construct new blank trial probes which would discriminate between 
hypotheses and response-sets. 
Another more intractable difficulty, however, resulted in the abandonment of the use of 
blank trial probes with children. The problems constructed by Levine (1966) were quite 
short, with only 4 feedback trials. Gholson, Levine & Phillips (1972) recognised that 
children, as less efficient problem-solvers than adults, would need longer problems if 
they were to experience the success of solving them. They, therefore, used problems 
with 76 trials (16 feedback trials and 15 sets of 4 blank trials). This, of course, made the 
procedure extremely cumbersome, if the children were to tackle a number of different 
problems. The extent to which young children would be able to maintain concentration 
over this kind of length of procedure must be somewhat in doubt. Gholson, Levine & 
Phillips (1972) certainly found a high proportion of blank trial probes 'unclassifiable', 
which they presumed to be a consequence of children making accidental mistakes in 
their patterns of choices. As they were attempting to identify the 'systems' or strategies 
being used by the children in responding to feedback, this required that each child 
responded accurately to three feedback trials in a row (or a run of 15 actual trials) for 
their 'system' to be identified. An unacceptably large proportion of problems, in 
consequence, produced no usable data. 
At the same time as these difficulties were emerging, the validity of 'verbal introtacts' as a 
technique for identifying hypotheses and strategies was supported by new evidence. 
Karpf & Levine (1971) presented college students with sets of 4-dimensional problems, 
some of which involved blank trials and others required the students to give verbal 
introtacts. They found virtually no differences in the results obtained with the two 
methods; both techniques yielded the same description of underlying hypothesis-testing 
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processes. If anything, in fact, they found the introtact data to contain slightly better 
consistency and attributed this to the greater possibility of errors with the blank trial 
technique as discussed above. They also investigated the possibility that inserting verbal 
introtacts in a problem might have an effect on problem solution. In fact, they found 
that the percentage of problems solved was virtually identical irrespective of the probe 
used, and concluded that blank trial and introtact probes were interchangeable with 
adults. 
Following on from this Phillips (1974) compared the performance of 7 and 11 yr. old 
children in blank trial and introtact conditions with 4-dimensional problems. With the 
11 yr. olds the results were very similar to those of Karpf & Levine (1971). With the 7 
yr. olds, however, significantly more problems were solved in the introtacts condition 
than when blank trials were used. In the blank trials condition, furthermore, more 7 yr. 
olds were found to be relying on response-sets (or 'stereotypes' as Phillips refers to 
them) rather than responding to feedback in making their choices. Phillips & Levine 
(1975) suggest a number of reasons why this might be the case. First, they present 
evidence that the 4-dimensional problem presents heavy cognitive demands for 7 yr. 
olds, and that in these conditions the blank trial probe procedure, which in itself places 
extra demands on memory, makes the task unmanageable for some 7 yr. olds. The 
results of a study by Fingerman (1974) replicating the Karpf & Levine (1971) study, 
but adding an 8-dimensional version, would seem to support this view. In this more 
demanding version of the task college students were also more successful in an introtact 
condition than when blank trials were introduced. Second, Phillips & Levine (1975) 
suggest that the insertion of introtacts might lead to an increase in memory/rehearsal 
strategies amongst 7 yr. olds. Finally, they suggest that having to state their hypothesis 
and receiving feedback on every trial may 'clarify' the task for younger children. 
The overall picture, therefore, is that the use of blank trials would appear to lead to an 
underestimation of the problem-solving abilities of young children on the MDL task. 
For this reason Kemler (1978) uses verbal introtacts, and presents evidence to show that 
this technique did not disrupt the children's performance, and that the verbalisations 
produced were valid indices of their actual working hypotheses. 
On this last point, Phillips (1974) and Spiker & Cantor (1977) had expressed some 
reservations, finding that some kindergarten (5 yr. old) children produced hypotheses 
apparently unrelated to their actual working hypotheses, and to their subsequent choice 
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behaviour on the next trial. Phillips (1974) referred to these children as 'stimulus 
describers', and interpreted their behaviour as a consequence of a misunderstanding of 
the task instructions in relation to verbalisation of their 'hypotheses'. This interpretation 
was based on the fact that, when asked for the solution after successful completion of 
NIDL tasks, these children were usually able to correctly identify it, despite not having 
mentioned it at all during the actual solution process. 
Cantor & Spiker (1978), however, found that by adjusting their version of the MDL 
task so that the requirement for verbal introtacts did not interfere with the processing of 
young children, and by providing pretraining in hypothesis-testing strategies, it was 
possible to more or less eradicate instances of 'stimulus describing'. On this basis they 
concluded that introtact probes were a suitable instrument for monitoring the 
problem-solving strategies of kindergarten children. Kemler (1978), similarly, found 
virtually no evidence of stimulus describing in her data, and suggests that this (and some 
other related difficulties young children were found to have in early research with the 
MDL task) may well be accounted for by the abstract nature of the task and young 
children's consequent misinterpretations about what it required them to do. 
On the basis of this kind of evidence the technique of verbal introtacts is used within the 
present study. An interesting index of the validity of the children's verbalised 
hypotheses will be the extent to which they are locally consistent (i. e. relate to feedback 
on the current trial) and consistent with the choice behaviour on the next trial. We will 
return to this point when we come to analyse the strategies used by the young children 
within the present study. The issue of abstract and meaningful contexts is an important 
one to which we will return in part c) below of this methodological discussion. 
While Levine's (1966) blank trial probe is not used within the present study, however, as 
a way of revealing subjects' hypotheses, what has been preserved is the 'internally 
orthogonal' structure of the sets of stimulus pairs contained within such probes. Within 
the present study this way of structuring the stimulus materials is used for the slightly 
different purpose of ensuring that all problems presented a standardised opportunity for 
the children to sample the available information. This way of structuring the stimulus 
materials in a problem, represented in the example in Figure 3.1, ensures that, within a 
4-dimensional problem, over a run of 4 trials each of the 8 separate values (possible 
'solutions') receives a unique pattern of feedback (corresponding to the hypothesis 
patterns illustrated). This helps to ensure that the problem is equivalent in terms of the 
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pattern of presentation of information whichever value is taken as the 'solution'. This 
matter of the frequency and patterning of information presentation is an important one 
in concept identification, as originally highlighted by Bruner, Goodnow & Austin 
(1956). This issue is not a focus of the present study, but its effects need to be 
controlled for if it is not to confound our results. It is also important, as we noted 
Phillips & Levine (1975) discovered, to be able to distinguish between response 
preferences for particular items or positions, and between other more sophisticated 
strategies. A detailed description of the ways in which the MDL problems were 
structured within the present study to control for various possible confounding effects is 
provided in the next chapter. 
The pattern of choices made by subjects, allied to their stated hypotheses, was first used 
by Gholson, Levine & Phillips (1972) to analyse what they describe as the subjects' 
'system'; this was developed further by Kemler (1978) and is developed again within the 
present study. We shall return to this aspect of the identification of strategies when we 
come to consider work on children's strategies on the MDL task at the end of this 
section. 
b) Performance Indicators 
Research attempting to investigate the hypothesis testing behaviour of children with the 
MDL task has used a progression of different measures of their performance. These 
different measures have reflected the questions under investigation at different stages in 
the development of this area of research. 
The first research in this area with children was merely aimed at establishing whether 
children's behaviour on the MDL task could be described in terms of hypothesis testing. 
Thus Eimas (1969) replicated Levine's (1966) experiment using blank trial probes with 
children aged 7,9,11 and 13 years old., and reported that the mean percentages of blank 
trial probes conforming to simple hypotheses were 71,73,77 and 79 respectively. 
Gholson, Levine & Phillips (1972) took this a stage further and analysed the 
'hypothesis-sampling systems' of kindergarten children (5 yr. olds) as well as the ages 
sampled by Eimas. The issue here was the ways in which young children responded to 
feedback and co-ordinated information from the feedback on successive trials. As we 
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shall see when we come to discuss research related to the development of children's 
strategies, they made a distinction between 'stereotypes' and 'strategies'. They concluded 
that 5 yr. olds showed no evidence of the use of hypothesis-testing strategies. 
Subsequent research, such as that of Kemler (1978) and Schuepfer & Gholson (1980), 
attempted to explore and refine their model of the development of hypothesis-testing 
strategies, and, as we shall see, the identification of strategies of concept identification, 
and the mapping out of the ways they develop, has been a major focus of research. The 
pattern of children's choices, and the relationship of these to their stated hypotheses, 
have been major focuses of this kind of analysis. This kind of analysis is a central 
aspect of the current study. 
Research concerned with other questions, however, has used other measures of 
performance. The general performance level of children at different ages, and of 
different abilities, and the effects of different aspects of the MDL task, and the 'cognitive 
subprocesses' involved, have been generally assessed by reference to the number of 
problems solved (see, for example, Tumblin & Gholson (1980)). A more sophisticated 
measure, which is widely used within the literature, is the Trial of Last Error (see, for 
example, Kemler (1978), Phillips & Gholson (1980) and Cantor & Spiker (1984)). 
This is the measure of successful problem solution adopted within the present study. It 
simply involves establishing a criterion for successful solution, and recording the 
number of trials before that criterion is reached. Within the literature the criterion 
generally adopted has been five successive correct choices first established by Gholson, 
Levine & Phillips (1972), and this is the criterion used within the present study. 
Kemler (1978) and Cantor & Spiker (1984) both used verbal introtacts as probes of the 
children's hypotheses and additionally required for the children to reach criterion that 
they should verbalise the correct hypothesis on each criterion trial. Within the present 
study this additional criterion was not adopted because it was felt that this potentially 
confounded two rather different aspects of performance, namely the ability to solve an 
MDL problem and the ability to verbalise accurately about the hypotheses used to do 
SO. 
The apparent inability by young children at certain stages to monitor and report upon 
the mental processes which have guided their behaviour and decision-making is a 
commonly observed phenomenon, and has been a central focus of work on 
metacognition, which we shall briefly review in the next section. This phenomenon has 
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been recorded by Lunzer (1968) and Piaget (1977), for example, in relation to the oddity 
problem, where children can solve such problems but, when asked how they did it, are 
unable to produce the correct distinguishing feature. Lunzer (1968) found only one 4 
yr. old who could not learn to solve oddity problems, but it was not until the age of 8 
that children could generally give a satisfactory explanation or pose similar problems 
themselves. Phillips (1974), as we have discussed above, found a very similar 
phenomenon with the MDL task amongst children as old as 7. She found a number of 
children who reached the criterion of 5 successive correct choices without ever 
verbalising the correct hypothesis. She refers to these children as 'stimulus describers'. 
When asked for their hypotheses they apparently picked at random any feature of the 
'correct' stimulus. 
Although Phillips (1974) did find many of these children able to state the correct 
hypothesis subsequently at the end of the problem, and while some of this 'stimulus 
describing' may be attributable to young children's misunderstandings about an abstract 
task, there remains the possibility that the ability to verbalise the hypothesis or 
hypotheses currently under active consideration is a distinct aspect of performance on 
the MDL task. As such this may indicate significant aspects of representational 
processes in relation to the development of problem-solving and concept learning 
strategies. The relationship between this aspect of performance and the children's 
abilities to represent the MDL task ( as measured by the questions relating to 
metacognitive knowledge) will be an interesting aspect of the investigations within the 
present study. 
A final further aspect of performance investigated within the present study relates to the 
number of hypotheses verbalised on each trial of a problem. Early work using the 
MDL task was very much influenced by Levine's (1963,1966) assumption that, even in 
a 4-dimensional problem, subjects proceed by identifying and testing one hypothesis at 
a time. In later work, however, Levine (1970) found that college students routinely 
monitor several hypotheses both before the trial of last error (when they have 
presumably solved the problem) and after it. Young children were presumed, however, 
to operate with only one hypothesis at a time, and this was supported by the early 
findings of such as Eimas (1969). Furthermore, in support of this general view, Ingalls 
& Dickerson (1969) found that most children completely ignored 1 or 2 dimensions 
from consideration at all during standard 4-dimensional MDL problems containing 
blank trial probes. 
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However, when Phillips & Gholson (1980) gave them the opportunity to verbalise more 
than one hypothesis on each trial, and facilitated this by the use of a memory aid 
displaying all 8 possible hypotheses, different children displayed different patterns of 
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performance. Rather than being asked to verbalised an hypothesis on each trial, the 
children were asked to indicate "which things could still be correct". Some indicated 
only 1 hypothesis on each trial while others indicated 3 or 4. Some, furthermore, were 
able to indicate with increasing accuracy the number of hypotheses which were actually 
still possible solutions after different numbers of trials (i. e. 4 on Trial 1,2 on Trial 2, 
and 1 on Trial 3). This would appear to be an important, and probably the most 
sophisticated, aspect of performance on the MDL task (which, for example, clearly 
involves the use of the most sophisticated strategy of 'Focussing' originally identified by 
Gholson, Levine & Phillips (1972)). 
Within the present study, therefore, the children were also given the opportunity to 
verbalise as many hypotheses as they wished after each trial. It is hoped in this way to 
more accurately represent the actual structure of their strategic processing of the task. 
As we shall see, the number of hypotheses verbalised per trial emerges as an important 
component of different strategic styles in relation to the MDL task. The number of 
hypotheses verbalised on Trials 1,2 &3 was also used as a Performance Indicator. It 
will be interesting to compare the performance of the children on the MDL task in the 
present study with those in Phillips & Gholson's (1980). No memory aid was provided 
in the present study, but the task was presented in a more meaningful context (an issue 
to which we will turn in a moment). 
The possibility of a developmental sequence of performance on the MDL task is 
investigated within the present study. It seems probable that the ability to produce the 
ideal performance of verbalising the correct 'live' number of hypotheses on the first 3 
trials will develop later than the ability to solve the MDL problem and verbalise the 
correct solution. These different aspects of performance may be indicative of 
developments in the ability to represent the problem and to process the information 
involved. This will be an important area for discussion later in the analysis of the results 
of the present study. 
Details of the precise manner in which these three Performance Indicators were 
measured and scored are recorded in the next chapter and in Appendix A. 7. 
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c) Abstract and Meaningful Contexts 
Kemler (1978) introduced the major methodological innovation of presenting the MDL 
task to young children within a story-and game context, and argued that many of the 
previously perceived difficulties which young children had with the MDL task were a 
function of its abstractness. In her version, which has been very largely adopted within 
the present study, the children had to identify an item of clothing always worn by one of 
two identical twins. In previous studies with young children the task was always 
presented in the abstract form represented in Figure 3.1, as conceived by Levine (1963, 
1966) and others. 
As we shall review later when we come to look at evidence about children's performance 
on the MDL task, Kemler found children's abilities to act strategically and to solve 
problems when the task was presented in this more meaningful way to be considerably 
enhanced. Cantor & Spiker (1984) supported this finding in a study where the 
conventional multidimensional stimuli were replaced by toy animals, and found children 
as young as 5 yrs. old capable of the kinds of long-term strategies which even Kemler 
(1978) had not found. While this latter result appears to be partly the result of 
lightening the memory load of the task, the beneficial consequences of presenting the 
task in a context which enables young children to see its purpose is clearly confirmed. 
The parallels with the work of Donaldson (1978) and many others in relation to abstract 
Piagetian tasks is compelling. Just as the abilities and understandings of young 
children were underestimated by the misleading nature of many Piagetian tasks, so it 
would seem have the problem-solving abilities of young children in relation to concept 
identification on such as the MDL task. It will be interesting to compare the levels of 
performance of the children on a meaningful task within the present study with that 
achieved by children in previous work. 
Researchers using the conventional abstract form of the task noted a number of apparent 
difficulties young children had with it. We have previously noted, for example, the 
difficulties identified by Phillips (1974) in relation to children 'stimulus describing'. In 
this case, when children were asked for a verbal introtact they read off, apparently at 
random, any of the characteristics of the positively reinforced stimulus, apparently to 
'describe' which of the stimuli was the positive instance on that trial. They did not 
necessarily indicate their working hypothesis. Kemler (1978) found very little evidence 
of this kind of 'stimulus describing' behaviour on her task. 
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A further difficulty experienced by young children and identified by such as Eimas 
(1970) and Phillips & Levine (1975) occurred when they received negative feedback 
relating to their choice of stimulus on any particular trial. Tumblin & Gholson (1980) 
reviewed the evidence and carried out a study which appeared to show that young 
children benefited from being directed to switch their attention from the negative 
instance chosen to the complementary positive instance also on display in the standard 
MDL task. Some children in this study were taught the rule "wrong means look at the 
other picture", and their use of strategies and ability to solve the MDL problems was 
significantly improved as a result. 
While this has been presented within the literature as an aspect of young children's lack 
of control of their attention, it seems much more likely to be a problem arising from 
children's failure to understand the logical structure of the task. In a slight variation in 
the administration of the task devised by Kemler (1978), within the present study the 
children were provided with no directional cue as to the positive instance in any 
particular trial. It is suggested that the more meaningful task will facilitate young 
children's understanding of the logic of the situation, and such an attentional aid will be 
unnecessary. The 'local consistency' of the hypotheses produced by the children will be 
a useful indication of the validity of this analysis. 
The decision not to include a directional cue within the present study follows a 
fundamental principle of design adopted in relation to the MDL task. This is that the 
task of concept identification from multidimensional stimuli should be presented to the 
children in a way which, as far as possible, simulates real life learning. This involves it 
being presented in a way which is meaningful to them and makes sense, but also in a 
form uncluttered by artificial aids. This flows from the intention stated earlier to 
produce a form of the MDL task which would enable young children to fully 
demonstrate their inductive reasoning abilities, while at the same time allow the 
identification of developmentally different strategic and performance levels. In the next 
part of this discussion of work with the MDL task we consider a number of factors 
which have been found to affect children's performance, and explain the rationale arising 
from this work for the form of the task adopted in the present study. 
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ii) Factors Affecting Children's Performance 
a) Memory 
In relation to this concern to keep the task uncluttered by artificial aids, the results of 
using a memory aid reported by Eimas (1970), Phillips & Gholson (1980) and Kemler 
(1978) are of interest. As we shall see when we come to discuss research on the 
development of children's strategies on the MDL task, an early concern was the apparent 
inability of young children to use feedback information from previous trials to help 
them find the correct hypothesis. In an attempt to discover to what extent this was 
simply a memory problem (rather than one of understanding or strategy) a number of 
researchers devised memory aids to use with the task. Using a memory aid with an 
abstract form of the MDL task was found to be beneficial to 8 yr. olds by Eimas (1970) 
and 8 and 11 yr. olds by Phillips & Gholson (1980). 
However, when Kemler (1978) used a similar device with her more meaningful task, if 
anything, it appears to have interfered with young children's processing. In a review of 
this issue and others, Linder & Siegel (1983) argue that this difference in effect is 
attributable to the abstract 
- 
meaningful distinction between the two varieties of MDL 
task which we have just discussed. Certainly, it would seem likely that where a 
meaningful task is presented, any artificial additions or complications may confuse 
rather than help children to tackle it with their full potential. It is not, in fact, clear that 
the devices used by such as Eimas (1970) and Phillips & Gholson (1980) improved 
children's performance because they acted as a memory aid; they might, more plausibly, 
have helped because they made the logic of an abstract form of the MDL task clearer to 
young children. Memory aids are not generally available or used by children during real 
life conceptual learning or problem-solving. A memory aid was not, therefore, included 
in the present study. It will be interesting to compare the performance of children on the 
present task with those of Phillips & Gholson (1980), for example, to see what 
differences arise from these different forms of the task. 
Beyond this particular issue, however, it is clear that memory is a significant factor in 
any problem-solving behaviour, and will have significant effects upon performance on 
the MDL task. In the following section examining factors related to children's cognitive 
development, the important work by such as the neo-Piagetians (eg: Pascual-Leone 
(1969,1970) and Case (1974,1984,1985)) and others on working memory as a key 
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constraint affecting children's problem-solving will be briefly reviewed. 
An overwhelmingly important point to recognise from this research of relevance to the 
present study is that the strategies adopted by children in relation to any task are 
significantly affected by the working memory demands imposed (see, for example, 
Scardamalia (1977)). We have already seen this in relation to the MDL task in the case 
of Cantor & Spiker 's (1984) simplification (removing the dimensionality element of 
the task), and Phillips & Levine's argument that blank trial probes affected young 
children's performance because of the extra memory load imposed. This latter point 
was supported by reference to Fingerman's (1974) study demonstrating the same effect 
for college students when they were presented with an 8-dimensional problem. 
The main way that the memory demands of the MDL task can be varied is by altering 
the number of dimensions involved. Levine's (1963,1966) original studies of 
hypothesis testing involved 4-dimensional problems, but other investigators have used 
tasks involving anything from 2 to 8 dimensions. Davis (1985) provides a 
comprehensive review of children's performance on studies varying in the number of 
dimensions involved. What was important within the present study, however, was to use 
a task of a sufficient level of demand so that children aged 6,8 & 10 would display a 
range of strategic behaviour. Based upon Kemler's (1978) study, within which she used 
3,4,5 and 8-dimensional problems very similar to the problem used here, it was decided 
within the present study that 4-dimensional problems of this kind would serve the 
purpose, and the resulting analysis of children's strategic behaviour and performance on 
the task will be seen to largely validate this judgement. In any case, as is indicated in the 
next part of this review, a version of the task requiring children to use negative 
information was included in the study which would place extra load on working 
memory. It seemed unnecessary, therefore, to vary the number of relevant dimensions 
as well. 
b) Negative and Redundant Information 
It has been established for some time that young children have more difficulty dealing 
with negative than with positive information. Luria (1961) demonstrated this in several 
experiments. Before age 4-5, for example, he found that children were able to respond 
to the command "press", but unable to restrain pressing for the command "don't press". 
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In information processing terms this may be accounted for by the extra demands 
negative information makes upon working memory. Chomskian analysis (see Chomsky 
(1957)) of the structure of language, for example, suggested that negatives take longer to 
process because they impose an extra transformation. A negative piece of information, 
according to this view, is stored as a positive representation, plus a negative qualifier, and 
is thus two 'bits' of information instead of one. The greater likelihood of success from 
feedback of what is correct has also been highlighted by such as Bryant (1982) in his 
important study of agreement and conflict between children's strategies in relation to a 
measurement task. 
The difficulties children have with negative feedback within the MDL task has been a 
constant theme within the literature. We have already discussed the difficulties 
identified by such as Eimas (1970), Phillips & Levine (1975) and Tumblin & Gholson 
(1980) when children received negative feedback relating to their choice of stimulus on 
any particular trial. As we have argued, this particular difficulty may have been a 
consequence of the abstract version of the MDL task used in these studies, and may 
have been a problem of understanding the task rather than of memory load. 
A number of other studies, however, have highlighted a difficulty related to dealing with 
negative feedback which may have more substance. This is the commonly observed 
difficulty of children rejecting irrelevant and disconfirmed hypotheses and dimensions. 
In their original analysis of hypothesis testing systems, Levine, Phillips & Gholson 
(1972) identified 'perseveration' (staying with the same object or position) and 
'alternation' (alternating between positions or values of one dimension) as typical early 
patterns of responding which did not seem to be responsive to negative feedback. Davis 
(1985) reviews a range of early studies demonstrating that children's typical strategy on 
discrimination problems under the age of 4 is likely to be perseveration, and then 
alternation. Even Kemler (1978), with her more meaningful task, found kindergartners 
(5 yr. olds) with a strong tendency to resample previously rejected hypotheses. 
Explanations for these difficulties with negative information vary. Toppino (1980), for 
example, explored this phenomenon in a series of three experiments and concluded that 
children have a general inferential deficit for making use of negative and irrelevant 
information. Davis (1985) argues from this that perseveration and alternation reflect the 
young child's inability to differentiate between relevant and irrelevant information. He 
cites findings from physiological studies which relate inability to use cues from error to 
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the absence of internal inhibitory function. 
This relates to ideas about the development by children of the voluntary or selective 
control of their attention. This is an important aspect of the development of 
metacognitive control, and is a feature of children's developmental cognitive processing, 
of course, with a long research history. Lane & Pearson (1982), for example, have 
provided a review of the extensive literature in this area. Young children have 
consistently been found to be influenced in their problem-solving by the perceptual 
salience of particular aspects of the stimulus (eg: Odom (1978)) and to fail to selectively 
attend to the relevant aspects of a situation (eg : Hagen & Hale (1973)). 
Problems of this kind in relation to the MDL task have been identified and investigated 
by Kemler, Shepp & Foote (1976), Barringer & Gholson (1980) and others. Indeed, 
Zeaman & House (1963) attempted an early application of theories of selective attention 
to children's discrimination learning. Kemler (1978), however, refutes their view that the 
tendency to resample recently rejected attributes is a result of an attentional bias for a 
perceptually dominant stimulus dimension. She found that the kindergartners in her 
study perseverated on a variety of different dimensions. Kemler, Shepp & Foote (1976) 
did find evidence, however, of 5 and 7 yr. olds attending to incidental information about 
attributes in a way that 10 yr. olds did not. Barringer & Gholson (1980) investigated 
performance by normal and underachieving readers (aged 9 and 10) on a standard 
4-dimensional task and an 8-dimensional task where 4 dimensions were relevant, and 4 
irrelevant to solution. They found that the underachieving readers were twice as likely as 
the normal readers to exhibit irrelevant hypotheses. 
Despite her earlier finding of some problems with attention, however, Kemler (1978) 
sees the problem as more probably a combination of a memory deficit, with 
kindergartners relying solely on the information from the current trial, and a deficiency 
in young children's logical understanding of the MDL task which results in them 
staying with one attribute or dimension, and simply alternating between the values of 
that dimension depending on local feedback on each trial. She refers to this commonly 
observed pattern as 'attribute perseveration'. This is reminiscent of the work, to which 
we have referred earlier, stimulated by such as Wason (1960), which has demonstrated 
and explored the 'confirmatory bias' of human inferential reasoning. As we reviewed, a 
range of evidence has found adults reluctant to try out alternative hypotheses in certain 
'scientific reasoning' tasks, and it may be that young children are merely showing the 
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same bias on a task which is relatively more challenging for them. This is an issue 
which has continued to stimulate research and to which we will return in our conclusion. 
Whatever the causes of these difficulties with negative feedback and redundant 
information, it seems important to try to distinguish between them. For this reason 
within the present study two alternative versions of the MDL task were used, in addition 
to the standard 4-dimensional version. In order to ensure that the children really did 
have to deal with negative information a 'one-card' version of the task was devised, 
whereby only one half of the normal stimulus array of two complementary stimulus 
cards was shown. Instead of making the usual choice of the correct stimulus, the 
children had to say whether this was a positive or negative instance (in the context of the 
task devised by Kemler (1978) this amounted to saying which of the two twins they 
thought was displayed on the card in view). Following a negative instance, the children 
thus had to infer positive items, rather than being able to just simply look across at the 
complimentary positive instance revealed on the other card. The children's ability to deal 
with irrelevant information was dealt with by using an 8-dimensional version of the task, 
similar to Barringer & Gholson's (1980), where 4 dimensions were relevant, and 4 
irrelevant, in any problem. 
c) Feedback 
Arising from their early seminal study of concept identification behaviour on an MDL 
type of task, Bruner, Goodnow & Austin (1956) highlighted as one of the key issues in 
concept learning the nature and patterning of feedback. As Tumblin & Gholson (1981) 
review, this was also a key issue in much of the early study of discrimination learning 
carried out within the framework of behaviourist learning and conditioning theory. 
Issues to be investigated included the effects of varying the amounts of feedback (eg: 
partially reinforcing a particular stimulus (Weir (1964)), varying the type of feedback, 
including material, verbal and directional aspects (Daniel, Tumblin & Gholson (1980)) 
and the differential effects of positive and negative feedback (Gholson, Levine & 
Phillips (1972)). This is not an issue which is pursued within the present study, but it is 
important to control for its effects. Within the present MDL task feedback was 
provided on every trial, and it was purely verbal in nature. We have reviewed above the 
rationale for concluding that the efficacy of directional feedback demonstrated by such 
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as Daniel, Tumblin & Gholson (1980) may well be an artefact of the abstract version of 
the MDL task used. 
Tumblin & Gholson (1981) review evidence to show that children become progressively 
more efficient at dealing with positive and negative feedback. Since there is good reason 
to believe, however, as we have reviewed above, that negative feedback is more difficult 
to deal with than positive, the relative proportions of the two kinds of feedback received 
may well have significant effects upon the ease with which a new concept is learnt. As 
we have also indicated above, there is clear evidence to suggest that the strategies 
adopted by children in relation to any task are significantly affected by the working 
memory demands imposed ( Scardamalia (1977)), and it may well be the case that 
negative feedback imposes extra demands on memory. 
In an important investigation of this issue in relation to the MDL task, and its relation to 
other classification skills, Fuchs & Turner (1981) explored the effects of different 
feedback patterns. They used Levine's (1966) standard 4-dimensional task with 7 and 8 
yr. old children and preprogrammed the feedback sequence for the first three trials. 
Given the orthogonal structure of the stimuli presented, as we have outlined earlier, this 
feedback sequence then logically defined the correct solution to each problem, and the 
feedback on subsequent trials was then determined by that. The feedback sequences 
used were: 
++- (right, right, wrong) 
--- 
(wrong, wrong, wrong) 
-+- (wrong, right, wrong) 
+-- (right, wrong, wrong). 
In line with the processing model suggested above, they found both that these feedback 
sequences were related to the probability of a problem being solved, and that the 
feedback involving least memory demand (++-) evoked the most sophisticated strategy. 
As a consequence, within the present study, Fuchs & Turner's (1981) method of 
defining the solution to any problem by a preprogrammed feedback sequence was 
adopted, but in this case with the purpose of ensuring that each subject received the 
same selection of feedback sequences across the problems tackled. The details of these 
arrangements are provided in the next chapter. 
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iii') Children's Strategies and Performance 
A major concern of research concerned with hypothesis-testing behaviour in relation to 
the MDL task has been to explore the development of children's and adults' use of 
strategies, and consequent improvements in performance. An attempt has been made 
within the present study to build on this previous work, and to examine systematically 
the components which have been identified which together comprise the various 
strategic approaches to this kind of task. 
Bruner, Goodnow & Austin (1956) used a version of the MDL task in their seminal 
study of concept learning, and identified two distinct patterns of strategic behaviour. 
Their 'wholist' strategy involved subjects in remembering all the attributes common to 
those instances where the response was "correct", thus eliminating attributes that were 
not part of a positive instance. In relation to a slightly different version of the task, 
where subjects decided for themselves which instances they would sample, the 
equivalent types of strategy were referred to as 'focussing'. Other subjects adopted 
'partist' or 'successive scanning' strategies which involved them in identifying just one 
hypothesis at a time, keeping it while it continued to predict "correct" responses, but 
replacing it with a new hypothesis, based on all past experience, when it did not. In 
general, 'focussing' strategies were found to be more efficient because they placed less 
load on memory. 
While Bruner, Goodnow & Austin's (1956) subjects were college students, Mosher & 
Hornsby (1966) provided early evidence of children's developing abilities to use 
strategies in a study using a version of Twenty Questions with 6,8 and 11 yr. olds. 
Once again they found two general kinds of strategies, which relate well to those 
identified by Bruner and his colleagues. 'Constraint-seeking' strategies attempted to 
constrain the number of alternatives by asking questions which eliminated large 
numbers of the possible solutions. This is clearly related to 'focussing'. 
Hypothesis-scanning' strategies tested a single possibility with each question, clearly 
equivalent to 'successive scanning'. Mosher & Hornsby (1966) found that children over 
the age range studied showed a developmental pattern of increasing reliance on the more 
effective 'constraint-seeking' strategy. 
As we shall see, these early studies identified an important element in different patterns 
of strategic behaviour which was consumed by later studies of hypothesis-testing on the 
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MDL task, and which is a significant finding of the current study. The distinctions 
identified would seem to relate closely to a range of findings from other studies of 
problem-solving strategies. The 'holist' and 'serialist' strategic styles identified by Pask 
& Scott (1972), for example, would appear to be closely related. 
The crucial issues, from a strategic point of view, which were identified early on in the 
hypothesis-testing research, are the extent to which an individual is responsive to 
feedback, and the basis upon which possible hypotheses are sampled. We have 
reviewed earlier the 'zero-memory' model proposed by Restle (1962), which assumes 
perfect responsiveness to feedback but no memory for previously rejected hypotheses. 
Levine and his colleagues (Levine (1966), Gholson, Levine & Phillips (1972)), 
however, demonstrated that neither elements of this model appeared to be correct, and 
produced the first systematic attempt to map out the development of strategies of 
hypothesis sampling and testing. 
Gholson, Levine & Phillips (1972) used the blank trial methodology and carried out 
studies with 7,9 and 11 year old children, and with kindergartners (5 yrs. old). In the 
first experiment with the older children, they identified 4 hypothesis sampling 
'Systems', 3 of which they described as 'Strategies', and 1 as a 'Stereotype'. These were 
identified by examining the choice and hypothesis protocols of subjects and analysing 
them in various ways. Thus, they found that the children maintained their hypotheses 
when told "correct" as often as adults (Win/Stay'), but had an increased tendency to 
maintain disconfirmed hypotheses. Rather than being as a result of a 'zero-memory, 
random sampling of all possible hypotheses after negative feedback, however, this 
appeared to be the result of a small proportion of the children exhibiting a 'Stimulus 
Preference' response-set whereby their chosen hypothesis was maintained irrespective 
of feedback (Win/Stay, Lose/Stay'). This they described as a'Stereotype'. 
The remainder of the children (about 90%) were locally consistent' following negative 
feedback, and produced new hypotheses which had not just been disconfirmed. While 
all these children were locally consistent, however, the extent to which they used 
information from previous trials varied. Where all previous information was 
co-ordinated they referred to the strategy adopted as Focusing'. With the orthogonally 
constructed stimulus materials used, this would mean that after Trial 1, the hypothesis 
would be one of the 4 positively confirmed, after Trial 2 it would be selected from the 2 
remaining hypotheses consistent with the feedback on both trials, and after Trial 3 it 
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would be the solution. Two further less efficient ways of proceeding were also 
identified. First, 'Dimension Checking' consisted of a strategy whereby a dimension is 
eliminated and not repeated following each "wrong" response. This implies 
co-ordinating the information from two successive trials, since, if a hypothesis is 
correct on one trial and wrong on the next, the complementary value of that dimension 
must also be wrong. Even less efficient was the strategy of Hypothesis Checking' 
which consisted of eliminating and not repeating each separate hypothesis after it has 
been disconfirmed. 
In their experiment with kindergartners, however, Gholson, Levine & Phillips (1972) 
found much more evidence of stereotypic response sets. The 5 yr. olds maintained 
their hypothesis after positive feedback 79% of the time (as compared to 93% for 7 yr. 
olds, 94% for 9 yr. olds and 97% for 11 yr. olds), but they also maintained it 46% of 
the time after negative feedback. Examination of the protocols led to the identification 
of two further Stereotypes, 'Position Preference' and 'Position Alternation'. While 
Hypothesis and Dimension Checking were the dominant patterns found for 7 yr. olds, 
the 5 yr. olds appeared to be predominantly adopting response sets unresponsive to 
feedback. 
As we have discussed in the earlier part of this section looking at methodological 
developments, however, Phillips & Levine (1975) and Kemler (1978) have argued that 
the blank trial technique interferes with the performance of young children, and Kemler 
(1978) also argued that the abstract nature of the MDL task itself would have a similar 
effect. In her study she also developed the 'Stereotypes' and 'Strategies' approach, 
arguing that this analysis omitted an intermediate problem-solving mode. Thus, while 
the Strategies of Hypothesis and Dimension Checking, and Focusing, involved 
long-term co-ordination of information from successive trials, and the Stereotypes 
involved no co-ordination of information at all, Kemler (1978) suggested that 
hypothesis testing strategies could be identified which involved short-term efficiency 
without any long-term planfulness. 
An example of this is kind of short-term strategy is 'random sampling with local 
consistency'. Kemler (1978) demonstrated that many of the protocols in Gholson, 
Levine & Phillips' (1972) study could have been produced by this kind of strategy, and 
may well have been mis-classified as Hypothesis or Dimension Checking. She 
calculated that 50% of the protocols produced by random sampling with local 
consistency would be misclassified as Dimension Checking and 30% as Hypothesis 
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Checking. On this basis she replaced the kind of protocol analysis carried out by 
Gholson, Levine & Phillips (1972) with a series of statistical tests devised to detect 
short-term and long-term efficiency. 
Thus, for short-term efficiency she found that, on standard 3,4 and 5-dimensional 
versions of the MDL task, 7 and 11 yr. old children maintained hypotheses which were 
consistent with positive feedback on a trial ('Win/ Stay') an average of 91% and 98% of 
the time. Following negative feedback, every child except one 7 yr. old (who only failed 
to do so on one occasion) immediately rejected disconfirmed hypotheses ('Lose/Shift'), 
and new hypotheses were consistent with local feedback 100% of the time for 27 out of 
32 7 yr. olds and 31 out of 32 11 yr. olds. Choices on each trial were consistent with the 
hypothesis stated at the end of the previous trial 79% of the time for 7 yr. olds and 84% 
of the time for 11 yr. olds. 
As regards long-term efficiency she first of all examined the extent to which children 
avoided repeats of rejected dimensions ('Dimension Checking') and found that for the 7 
yr. olds, out of 64 problems, 48 3-dimension and 32 5-dimension problems were solved 
without repeats; for the 11 yr. olds the figures were 59 and 49 out of 64. In a further 
analysis she demonstrated a statistically significant development in this kind of 
long-term strategic processing between the two age groups. 
Intriguingly, further analysis of the hypotheses generated by the children who were not 
Dimension Checking revealed that some of these children were carrying out a strategy 
which Kemler (1978) referred to as 'attribute perseveration'. This involved a hypothesis 
pattern which alternated between the values on the same attribute or dimension 
depending upon feedback. Some children were more inclined to this pattern than others; 
other children were presumably engaged in differing degrees of Hypothesis Checking, 
although not a single instance of this as a pure strategy emerged from Kemler's (1978) 
data. 
In further experiments, Kemler (1978) explored the upper and lower limits of young 
children's capabilities. At the upper limit, she found no evidence of children using 
'stimulus memory' as well as 'hypothesis memory'. Thus, while the 7 and 11 yr. olds in 
her study often avoided resampling hypotheses they had previously selected and had 
rejected, they did sample hypotheses which had occurred in previously disconfirmed 
stimuli. 
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At the lower end, however, she found evidence to contradict Gholson, Levine & Phillips' 
(1972) claim that only 6% of kindergartners used strategies. Thus, while 5 yr. olds 
solved problems more slowly than older children, they did solve 73% of their problems 
in under 20 trials, which they could not do without some kind of strategy. On measures 
of short-term efficiency there was little sign that 5 yr. olds were qualitatively inferior to 
older children. On standard 4 
-dimensional versions of the MDL task, they maintained 
hypotheses which were consistent with positive feedback on a trial (Win/ Stay') an 
average of 90% of the time. Following negative feedback, they immediately rejected 
disconfirmed hypotheses ('Lose/Shift') 99 % of the time, and new hypotheses were 
consistent with local feedback 99% of the time. Choices on each trial were consistent 
with the hypothesis stated at the end of the previous trial 76% of the time. 
As regards long-term efficiency for her group of 5 yr. old children, however, she once 
again found an overwhelming tendency to repeat hypotheses which had previously been 
rejected. The pattern identified with some 7 yr. olds as 'attribute perseveration' was 
much more common. Of her 36 subjects 28 manifested this kind of pattern at some 
stage. These children were far more strategic than had previously been suggested, 
however, using a number of elements of short-term strategies which clearly, eventually, 
allowed them to achieve a solution. 
Schuepfer & Gholson (1980) subsequently carried out a detailed analysis of the 
beginnings of strategic behaviour with 3/4 and 7/8 yr. old groups of children. They 
used 2 and 4-dimensional problems of the standard abstract variety, and explored in 
detail the means by which children made progress from the various response-sets of 
position and object preferences to being capable of the kind of short-term strategic 
processing identified by Kemler (1978) 
At the earliest stages, amongst the 3 and 4 yr. olds, they found position hypotheses, 
which gradually gave way to object preferences. Interestingly, while Lose/Shift object 
was a strong component of object responding from the outset, Win/Stay object only 
gradually emerged. This finding of the earlier appearance of Lose/Shift than of 
Win/Stay is interesting, and will be seen to be borne out by the results of the present 
study. Amongst the 7 and 8 yr. olds they found evidence of a further stage, whereby 
irrelevant, disconfirmed hypotheses (eg: position, object 
-alternation) were more 
systematically rejected. This parallels the transition Kemler (1978) identified between 
short-term and long-term processing. 
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Within the present study, an attempt has been made to build on this research and 
develop a systematic analysis of the whole range of strategic processing on the MDL 
task. This has been done by analysing the hypothesis and choice protocols of the 
children according to each of the significant elements of strategy development identified 
by this earlier research. These elements have thus become the 10 Strategy Components 
within the present study. A central part of the work of the present study is to try to 
identify in more detail how these various elements or components are combined together 
at different stages in the development by children of strategic approaches to the MDL 
task. Details of the Strategy Components, and their scoring, are provided in the next 
chapter. 
Before we come to that, however, we must look first briefly again at the issue of what 
underlying cognitive factors develop in order to facilitate this development of strategic 
processing and behaviour. 
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Section C) Children's Thinking: what develops? 
Gholson (1980) and his co-workers began the attempt to explore what they termed the 
'cognitive subprocesses' involved in children's development of hypothesis-testing 
strategies on the MDL task. However, this was confined to initial investigations of the 
role of attention (Tumblin & Gholson (1980) and Barringer & Gholson (1980)), the 
effects of different kinds of feedback (Daniel, Tumblin & Gholson (1980)) and the 
effects of explicit memory aids (Phillips & Gholson (1980)). While, as we have 
reviewed, these studies contained a number of useful methodological developments, and 
raised some issues worth pursuing, within the present study a much more thorough 
attempt has been made to investigate the relationship between significant aspects of 
children's cognitive development and strategic behaviour and performance on the MDL 
task. 
As Voss (1989) has recently indicated in a useful overall review, analyses of 
problem-solving have suggested that it involves a wide variety of different cognitive 
processes. Many of these processes have emerged above in our literature review. As 
Pressley, Borkowski & Schneider (1987) have argued, it has become well established 
that what they refer to as The Good Strategy User' needs knowledge, access to a wide 
range of cognitive strategies, the cognitive and metacognitive abilities to use strategies 
effectively, and an affective disposition to make the necessary effort. This section is 
intended to briefly pull together the major research issues in relation to each of these 
areas, and to indicate how they have been dealt with within the present study. 
i) Domain Knowledge and Representation 
The manner in which a problem is understood and represented has been found to be 
crucial to success, as has the construction of sophisticated and highly structured 
knowledge within the particular domain. These two 
factors are clearly very strongly interrelated. 
It has long been established that performance on a task is strongly influenced by 
domain specific knowledge (see, for example, Chi's (1978) classic work on memory for 
chess positions). Donaldson (1978) and her co-workers have also established that a 
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child's understanding and performance on a task is significantly affected by its 
relationship to their existing knowledge. As we have reviewed, research on expertise in 
a number of domains has repeatedly revealed the key role of highly abstract knowledge 
structures which powerfully organise expert's declarative knowledge and their handling 
of problem-solving strategies. 
Attempting to solve a problem in an area in which a person has some knowledge is 
facilitated in a number of ways. Sternberg & Powell's (1983) third principle of the 
development of intelligent functioning, the 'ability to comprehend relations of 
successively higher orders' is clearly related to the development of a more highly 
structured knowledge base. Pressley, Borkowski & Schneider (1987) have also 
reviewed an extensive range of work demonstrating that knowledge facilitates more 
efficient and more extensive use of strategies. Processes of 'chunking' (Miller (1956)) 
and of automatisation of basic operations (Case (1974,1984,1985)) have been 
identified as ways in which knowledge reduces load on working memory. 
This kind of evidence has led some researchers to claim that the development of the 
knowledge base is the crucial, and perhaps only, difference between young children and 
adults. Carey (1985b), for example, has written that: 
"the acquisition and reorganisation of strictly domain-specific knowledge 
... 
probably 
accounts for most of the cognitive differences between 3-year-olds and adults" (p. 512) 
As we shall see, however, this is a claim which has been made for other aspects of the 
cognitive system with equal force and certainty. As English (1992) has recently 
reviewed, for example, the relative significance of domain-specific knowledge and 
domain-general strategies in the development of problem-solving competence is a much 
debated issue, with researchers on either side claiming the major significance for one 
aspect or the other. It is English's (1992) view, and that of the present author, however, 
that the evidence suggests the good problem-solver needs both. 
Within the present study, however, no attempt has been made to explore the issue of 
domain-specific knowledge further. Rather, the focus of the present study is children's 
abilities to generate and use strategies on a novel task. However, the significance of 
children's existing knowledge has very much been taken into account. Thus, the form of 
the MDL task is based closely on the version designed by Kemler (1978) using a 
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story-and-game context. This is designed so that, in Donaldson's (1978) words, the 
problem will make "human sense" to young children, and their comprehension of the 
problem and their ability to develop strategies to solve it will be maximised. Kemler 
produced results, as we have indicated earlier, to show that children performed much 
more effectively on her task than on the standard, abstract MDL task. 
The related issue of representation is, however, an important part of the present study. 
For Siegler (1978), the development of effective problem-solving was seen as mostly 
dependent upon the manner in which the problem was encoded by the child, and much 
other research, as we have seen, has indicated the significance of the efficiency with 
which a problem is represented for subsequent performance (See, for example, 
Johnson-Laird's (1983) work on the construction of 'mental models'). Within the 
present study the efficacy with which children represented the problem to themselves is 
construed and examined as an aspect of metacognitive knowledge about the task, which 
is discussed below. 
ii) Cognitive Strategies 
As we have seen, the development of increasingly sophisticated strategies has been a 
strong theme within modern cognitive developmental research. Bjorklund (1990), for 
example, has recently edited a very comprehensive collection of work carried out in 
relation to the development of children's strategies across a wide range of intellectual 
functioning. This includes mathematics, reading, the processes of attention and a variety 
of different kinds of problem-solving. As we have reviewed, this concern has its origins 
in such seminal work as Bruner, Goodnow & Austin's (1956) analysis of concept 
learning strategies, Miller, Galanter & Pribram's (1960) work on cognitive plans and 
Newell & Simon's (1972) identification of such general strategies as 'means-end 
analysis'. We have also reviewed the manner in which this early work influenced the 
development of research into children's hypothesis testing upon which the present study 
is founded. 
An important distinction has arisen in the literature between domain-specific and 
domain-general problem-solving strategies. As English (1992) has recently reviewed, 
some researchers have claimed that problem-solving skills are inherently 
domain-specific and best explained as a consequence of expertise within a knowledge 
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domain. As she demonstrates, however, the generation of domain-specific strategies in 
relation to a novel problem is best explained in terms of the interaction between 
domain-specific knowledge and domain-general strategies. Brown et al (1983) reviewed 
the relevant literature very comprehensively, and concluded that domain-specific 
knowledge was a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective learning and 
problem-solving. The effective use of general learning strategies was also crucially 
necessary. Pressley, Borkowski & Schneider (1987) reviewed a wide range of research 
evidence demonstrating the significance of both specific and general strategies for 
effective problem-solving. 
Within the present study (as with English (1992)) the focus is upon the generation of 
goal-specific strategies related to a novel problem which is nevertheless placed within a 
meaningful context. The emphasis here, therefore, is upon the role of general strategies 
in generating goal-specific strategies. As both English (1992) and Pressley, Borkowski 
& Schneider (1987) review, the general problem-solving strategies which have been 
most commonly identified within the literature relate to the metacognitive processes of 
monitoring (or self-awareness) and control (or self-regulation). These processes are 
included within the present study and will be discussed below under the heading of 
'Metacognitive Awareness and Control'. 
The analysis of specific strategies within the present study is based on the methodology 
commonly adopted within the hypothesis testing literature, whereby children's strategies 
are inferred from their pattern of responding. A modified and developed version of this 
approach is used within the present study, however, which recognises the complexity of 
the development of strategic behaviour identified by more recent research, such as that 
of Siegler & Jenkins (1989). They contrast their model of strategy construction with 
the model implied in, for example, Siegler's (1978) earlier work on strategy 
development. In the earlier studies the assumption was that a problem could be solved 
using a series of discrete strategies, and children would respond to the problem by 
consistently using one of these strategies. Development consisted of moving from 
using one discrete strategy to the next. As we have seen, this was similarly the model 
assumed by early work on hypothesis testing. Siegler & Jenkins' (1989) provide more 
recent evidence, however, which suggests that the processes of strategy use and 
development are very much more complicated. In response to any problem children use 
a mix of strategies, the frequency distribution between which will vary over time, and be 
influenced by a range of circumstances. New strategies emerge through a process of 
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strategy construction involving combining parts of existing strategies in novel ways, or 
grafting on new segments to existing procedures. 
The methodology of strategy identification embodied in the present study recognises 
these kinds of complexities. Rather than predetermining a set of discrete strategies 
which can be used on the MDL task by some kind of logical analysis, a procedure has 
been adopted which attempts to discover the kind of strategy mix actually employed by 
children. The children's responses were, therefore, analysed in terms of Strategic 
Components derived from previous work on the MDL task, and the patterns in which 
these components combine together at different stages of strategic development was 
explored using the statistical technique of Cluster Analysis. The details of these 
Strategy Components are provided in the next chapter, and the report of the results of 
the present study in Chapter 5 begins with the analysis of the Strategy Clusters which 
emerged. 
iii) Working memory 
As we have seen, one of the central insights of the information-processing approach to 
human cognitive functioning has been the constraint of limited short-term memory 
capacity (most notably highlighted by Miller's (1956) classic paper on the 'magic 
number 7'), and its implications. We have also reviewed earlier studies which have 
demonstrated significant effects of memory on performance on the MDL task. This is 
clearly an aspect of underlying cognitive functioning which had to be included in the 
present study. 
The most influential early model of the structure of the memory system was the 
multi-store model developed by Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968) within which they 
proposed that controlled processes such as rehearsal and organisation were applied in 
the short-term store to maintain information, transfer information to and from the 
long-term store, and solve problems. Shiffrin & Schneider (1977), amongst others, 
went on to analyse these controlled processes, or strategies, in terms of the amount of 
the limited short-term memory capacity required for an operation's execution. 
Subsequently, the investigation of 'working memory systems', first suggested by such as 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974), has proved to be a very fruitful area. 
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This work has been paralleled and reinforced by the work of the neo-Piagetians we 
reviewed earlier which re-analysed Piaget's problem-solving tasks in terms of their 
demands on children's memory capacities. The work of Pascual-Leone (1969,1970) 
was seminal in this area. In an extensive range of studies he demonstrated that the 
sequence of children's success on Piagetian problem-solving tasks could be predicted 
by the load on working memory involved in each of these tasks. This led him to 
develop a theory of M-space (a measure of working memory capacity), which he 
claimed the evidence suggested grew maturationally. 
In developing these ideas, however, Case (1974,1975,1985) has presented evidence that 
the apparent growth in the size of working memory capacity is, in fact, a product of 
increasing automaticity of basic operations. The key studies here were those reported 
by Case, Kurland & Goldberg (1982), within which they demonstrated a strong 
relationship between word memory span and speed of word repetition (a measure of 
automaticity of basic operations) for children and adults. Both measures were 
demonstrated to show improvement with age, and the role of experience and familiarity 
was highlighted by the finding that adult's performance with nonsense words matched 
that of 5-6 yr. old children on real words on both measures. 
Here, once again, some researchers have been attracted to the view that developments in 
the memory system are the fundamental cognitive development which facilitate 
everything else. Brainerd (1983), for example, prefaced a comprehensive review of 
work on 'working memory systems' by the claim that 
II cognitive development can, in fact, be reduced to memory development. " (p. 168) 
More recently, work by such as Anderson (1992) has suggested that the speed of basic 
processing is an innate biological factor closely related to the development of 
intelligence. Within the present study, however, the view is taken that while 
developments in working memory capacity are clearly an important element in the 
development of cognitive functioning, they are one element in a complex set of 
inter-relationships with other factors. In particular, there is clear evidence of 
inter-relationships with both domain-specific knowledge and familiarity, as illustrated by 
much of the work reviewed above, and with the use of strategies. On the latter point, for 
example, the elegant studies reported by Scardamalia (1977) have demonstrated that the 
strategies adopted in relation to a task will vary according to the memory load imposed. 
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The inter-relationship between working memory capacity and familiarity with the 
material to be remembered, as we have reviewed, has been suggested by Linder & Siegel 
(1983) to account for the discrepant findings of Eimas (1970), Phillips & Gholson 
(1980) and Kemler (1978) in relation to the utility of memory aids with the MDL task. 
Kemler (1978) found that a memory aid did not help children with her more meaningful 
task containing material which would be more familiar to them than the abstract material 
used in the other studies. Within the present study, the same more familiar materials 
were used, in order that the working memory load of the task would be manageable for 
young children. Even in this case, however, it is clear that the effective working memory 
capacity for the materials used in the MDL task would vary between children, and this 
might be a significant factor in their problem solving behaviour. 
The recognition of the complex inter-relationships between working memory and other 
aspects of cognitive functioning has led to the use within the present study of two 
complementary measures of working memory capacity. The significance of 
domain-specific knowledge or familiarity has once again been taken into account, and a 
specially constructed short-term memory test using the materials contained within the 
MDL task itself was therefore used as one measure (as opposed, for example, to a digit 
or word-span test which would be dependent upon experience in another domain). It 
was clear, however, that this kind of short-term memory test is itself subject to the use of 
strategies. Children who were able to generate and use effective strategies on the MDL 
task might well also be able to do so for this short-term memory test. It was, therefore 
complemented by the use of the FIT measure of general M-space devised by Pascual 
Leone (1969), upon which it is much more difficult to behave strategically, but which is, 
of course, unrelated to the MDL task in terms of domain-specific knowledge. 
iv) Metaco ný irion 
As was noted in the earlier discussion of educational programmes designed to teach 
children to think, a strong and consistent element within such programmes has been an 
emphasis on the processes of metacognition. Similarly, over the last 15-20 years 
perhaps the largest area of growth in the literature of cognitive development has been 
that related to metacognition. This has its origins, of course, in the seminal study of 
Flavell, Beach. & Chinsky (1966) (which, interestingly, shared a common concern with 
'mediational processes' with studies of discrimination learning at that time). Young 
79 
children were found to be capable of carrying out a memory strategy, but incapable of 
producing that strategy for use spontaneously. This finding led to the notion of 
'production deficiency' and a blossoming of research concerned with children's 
knowledge about and control of their own cognitive functioning. While the development 
of working memory might be necessary to enable children to carry out more and more 
complex strategies, it was clearly insufficient to explain the origins of new strategies in 
children's repertoires. For this, researchers have increasingly looked to the development 
of metacognition. There is now hardly an aspect of human functioning or skill which 
does not have its associated 'meta' component well documented and researched. 
Since the term 'metamemory' was introduced into the literature by Flavell (1971), 
however, there has been considerable debate about the significance and definition of 
metacognitive processes. As we shall see, some of the key developments arising from 
the research associated with this debate are reflected in the measurement of 
metacognitive processes within the present study. In a major review of these difficulties 
Brown (1987), however, in a conclusion which echoes the claims for other aspects of 
cognitive functioning reviewed above, asserts her view that 
"metacognitive-like concepts lie at the very roots of the learning process" (p. 66) 
Certainly, Ann Brown and her co-workers have been one of the major research teams to 
firmly establish metacognition at the heart of the current revival of interest in 
mechanisms of change and development. It will be recalled that Sternberg & Powell's 
(1983) first principle of intellectual functioning is, significantly, that 'more sophisticated 
control strategies (metacomponents) develop with age'. 
Of interest in relation to the present study are the models provided by Brown & 
DeLoache (1978) and Shatz (1978) to account for production deficiencies, and to 
suggest a way in which metacognitive processes might interact with working memory 
capacity. It will be recalled that in a previous study (Whitebread (1983)) such an 
interaction was found. Shatz (1978) pointed out that the metacognitive processes of 
conscious monitoring themselves require some working memory space. They will only 
occur, therefore, when all the individual's working memory capacity is not taken up by 
carrying out the actual task. Brown & DeLoache (1978) developed this into a general 
model of learning both developmentally and within any task. They suggested that the 
novice on any task will initially show little or no 'intelligent self-regulation'. Then, as the 
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task and its sub-processes become more familiar (and, thus, according to Case's (1974, 
1984,1985) model take up less working memory capacity) there will be an increasingly 
active period of deliberate monitoring and self-regulation. Finally, as the necessary 
subprocesses and their coordination become overlearned, expertise is achieved and 
performance on the task becomes relatively automatic. It is one of the major aims of the 
present study to explore whether this kind of interaction between metacognition, 
working memory capacity and performance appears in relation to the MDL task. 
Within the present study, in our consideration and measurement of metacognition, the 
distinction first proposed by Flavell (1981) between metacognitive knowledge and 
metacognitive experience has been followed. 
a) Metacognitive Knowledge 
As regards metacognitive knowledge, Yussen (1985) and others have reviewed the 
conflicting evidence about the relationship between metacognitive knowledge and 
performance. Some early reviews, such as that by Cavanaugh & Perlmutter (1982), 
tended to conclude that only a weak relationship existed, while other work, such as that 
reviewed by Wellman (1983), found evidence of stronger links. 
Schneider (1985), however, in an integrative review of research attempting to find links 
between metamemory and memory performance, concluded that the strength of the 
relationship found depended upon the aspect of metamemory upon which the study 
focussed, and the methodology used to assess it. The early work reviewed by 
Cavanaugh & Perlmutter (1982) tended to rely on single measures, often derived from 
questionnaires or verbal questions relating to subjects' general knowledge about 
different memory tasks. Later work, however, as Wellman (1983) and Schneider (1985) 
discovered, indicated that metacognitive knowledge may be more closely linked to 
performance where it was directly related to the individual's own metacognitive 
experience of the task in question. 
Within the present study, therefore, rather than exploring the children's general 
metacognitive knowledge about their own cognitive processes, questions have been 
asked which focus on the metacognitive knowledge they had derived directly related to 
the MDL task. These questions focus on the children's experience of the relative ease 
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or difficulty of different versions of the task. As indicated above, this knowledge can 
also be taken, at least in part, as evidence of the efficacy with which the children 
internally represented the problem. 
Schneider & Weinert (1989) have reviewed more recent studies of 
metamemory-memory links which indicate that the intercorrelations among 
metamemory, strategic memory behaviour and performance increase with age. 
Schneider (1986), for example, found low correlations between metamemory and 
strategic memory behaviour amongst 617 yr. olds, but significant correlations for 8/9 yr. 
olds. Schneider & Weinert (1989) have suggested that this pattern may be accounted 
for by the developing interactions between strategy use and strategy knowledge 
suggested by Flavell's (1978) bi-directionality hypothesis and the principle of reciprocal 
mediation developed by Pressley, Borkowski & O'Sullivan (1985) as part of their model 
of knowledge about strategies. According to these models, initial strategy use leads to 
some vague recognition of the strategy's usefulness, which in turn leads to greater 
strategy use, which then leads to more developed knowledge of the strategy's utility, and 
so on. By this kind of process, knowledge and strategic behaviour become increasingly 
closely related. Within the present study, as will reported in the Results chapter, the 
pattern of development of these kinds of relationships was examined by looking at 
relationships within age subgroups. 
b) Metacognitive Awareness and Control 
Wellman (1983) and Schneider (1985) also produced evidence to suggest that measures 
of subjects' on-line monitoring and control of their own understanding and performance 
might tend to be more directly related to performance. This relates to the aspect of 
metacognitve activity referred to by Flavell (1981) as metacognitive experience. Within 
this area the distinction between a monitoring and a control function has been adopted 
from Brown's (1978) earlier detailed analysis of the necessary components of a 
metacognitive system. These are referred to by her as Metacomprehension and Insight. 
The first term is retained within the present study, while the latter control element is 
characterised as Strategy Flexibility. 
Both Brown (1978) and Robinson (1983) have provided reviews of work related to 
Metacomprehension, and demonstrate the complexities of the cognitive processes 
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involved. As they both argue, being aware of one's own level of understanding in 
relation to any problem or task is fundamental to putting together an effective pattern of 
strategic behaviour in response to it. The problems of Metacomprehension, as they both 
make clear, however, can range from simply being aware that you do not know 
something to the very complex business of ascertaining that you have the optimal 
information for tackling a particular task, or identifying the exact source of one's 
difficulty. The simple recognition that you do not know something may be a necessary 
precursor to strategic development, but, some evidence would suggest, may also not be 
sufficient. 
Robinson (1983), for example, reviewed her own work and that of Markman (1981) 
relating to young children's difficulties with monitoring their own understanding of 
verbal messages. Sometimes the children were unaware of any problem of 
understanding, but even when they were aware that they had a problem they often could 
not analyse its source. Nisbet & Shucksmith (1986), reviewed the evidence on this 
point, and concluded that if children are simply aware that they do not understand this 
can lead to a kind of 'destructive bewilderment', rather than the kind of constructive 
cognitive conflict suggested by Piaget. As we will see, the present study offered some 
support for the position that metacomprehension, at an elementary level, may be a 
necessary but not sufficient cause of strategy development. 
Measuring the extent to which young children are aware of their own level of 
understanding is clearly not a straightforward matter. Brown (1978), however, 
presented evidence that requiring children to rate the confidence they had in their 
responses to a problem seemed to be a useful technique, and one which Berch & Evans 
(1973), for example, had successfully used with children as young as 6 yrs. old. This 
task was, therefore, adapted as a measure of Metacomprehension within the present 
study. 
As Brown (1978) goes on to argue, a central feature of the successful problem-solver is 
that they use their on-line monitoring of their own understanding and success at tackling 
the problem to guide their choice and execution of cognitive strategies. Sternberg & 
Powell's (1983) fourth principle of intellectual functioning, it will be recalled, was that 
'flexibility in the use of strategy or information develops with age'. Brown (1978) 
reviews the work of Butterfield & Belmont (1977), for example, who examined changes 
in the employment of a particular strategy as a function of task difficulty. They found 
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that young children took longer to select a strategy initially, abandon it when it was no 
longer necessary, and reinstate it when its use was again required. Small (1990) has 
reviewed a range of more recent studies which have confirmed that Strategy Flexibility 
and self-regulation increase with age and are related to successful problem-solving. 
Within the present study a measure of Strategy Flexibility was devised, based upon the 
approach of Butterfield & Belmont (1977), but related to the MDL task. This involved 
a measure of how quickly the children abandoned a taught strategy when it was no 
longer appropriate. 
v) Attributional style: Locus of Control 
A further common feature of educational programmes designed to teach children to 
think, as we noted earlier, has been a recognition of the importance of the learner's 
attitudes and motivations. The relationships between style of attribution (as originally 
conceived and developed by Weiner (1972,1979)), self-concept, and achievement has 
long been established and explored within educational contexts. Rogers (1982) 
provides an excellent review of the extensive literature in this area. 
Weinen (1987) has argued that research related to style of attribution has indicated 
similarities and significant conceptual links between this as an aspect of motivation and 
metacognition as an aspect of cognition, and there is interesting work demonstrating 
links between the two areas. Borkowski, Milstead & Hale (! 988), for example, in a 
major analysis of the components of children's metamemory, present a range of 
evidence to support the view that attributional beliefs are closely related to the effective 
use of cognitive strategies. Thus, Kurtz & Borkowski (1984), in the context of certain 
memory tasks, found that children who attributed their successes to effort (i. e. an 
'internal' locus of control) were more strategic and higher in metamemorial knowledge 
than children who attributed learning outcomes to non-controllable factors such as 
ability or task characteristics (i. e. an 'external' locus of control). 
Within the present study Locus of Control was measured by means of the Children's 
Attribution of Responsibility and Locus of Control Scale (CARALOC) developed by 
Gammage (1975,1982). There are many scales in this field of attribution and 
self-esteem (see Phares (1976) and Lefcourt (1976) for comprehensive reviews), but the 
CARALOC scale is one of the few developed and refined for use with English Primary 
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school children. It attempts to measure the extent to which a child's Locus of Control is 
internal, as opposed to external. It has been shown by such as Osborn & Milbank 
(1987), in a major longitudinal study, to be significantly related to achievement in a 
number of cognitive areas. 
vi) Cognitive Style: 
The final aspect of cognitive functioning which has been widely suggested to have 
important implications for problem-solving behaviour is that of 'cognitive style'. 
Analysis of the different strategies used in relation to particular tasks has led some 
researchers to suggest that individuals might vary in their strategic preferences. We 
have mentioned in our earlier discussion of children's strategies in relation to the MDL 
task, for example, the 'holist' and 'serialist' styles identified amongst adults by Pask & 
Scott (1972). Cognitive style has been a huge area for research over the last 20 years or 
so, but there remains much debate about the validity of many of the models developed. 
Kogan (1971,1983) provided extensive reviews of work in this area, and his two 
reviews offer an insight into the development of research and thinking in the area. The 
interesting point to note is that while he felt obliged to review at least 9 separate 
cognitive style dimensions in 1971, by 1983 he felt that only two had proved sufficiently 
fruitful in the intervening period to be worthy of inclusion. These were 
Reflectivity-Impulsivity (Cognitive Tempo or R-I) and Field Dependence-Independence 
(FDI). Schmeck (1988) has argued in an even more recent review that a range of 
conceptualisations or styles can all be encompassed by one broad inclusive dimension 
of individual difference, which he labels 'global versus analytic ; this looks similar to 
Pask & Scott's (1972) 'holist' and 'serialist' dimension, but is in fact a much broader 
conception embracing elements of cognitive and attributional functioning. 
Nevertheless, within it R-I and FDI are recognised as significant elements, with the 
'global' style implying Impulsivity and Field-Dependence and the 'analytic' style 
involving more Reflectivity and Field-Independence. It is these two dimensions of 
cognitive style, therefore, which are included in the present study. 
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a) Cognitive Tempo: Reflectivity- Impulsivity 
Cognitive Tempo was originally conceived and operationalised by Kagan et al (1964), as 
a dimension involving the extent to which an individual can delay a response when 
searching for a correct answer, where what response to make is initially uncertain. 
Subsequently there have been significant theoretical advances. Zelnicker & Jeffrey 
(1979), for example, redescribed the dimension in terms of different strategic 
approaches to processing information which relate closely to Pask & Scott's (1972) 
'holist' and 'serialist' dimension, as well as to Schmeck's (1988) reconceptualisation 
described above. 
What is clearly involved in the Matching Familiar Figures Task (MFFT) devised by 
Kagan et al (1964), which is by far the most commonly used instrument, is the 
thoroughness with which information is encoded and processed before a response is 
made. The Reflectivity end of the dimension involves delaying a response until the 
relevant information has been thoroughly encoded and processed, while the Impulsivity 
end involves responding more quickly, and before all the relevant information has been 
thoroughly considered. Kagan et al (1964) and others have presented evidence which 
shows that children move more towards the Reflectivity end of the dimension with age. 
Subsequent research has demonstrated the significance of this dimension for cognitive 
functioning, and explored its relationship to other features. Borkowski et al (1983), for 
example, demonstrated significant relationships between cognitive tempo, metamemory, 
strategy use and performance on particular memory tasks. This is clearly related to the 
well researched finding that gifted children and adults spend longer encoding a problem 
before responding than do average children (see, for example, Sternberg & Rifkin's 
(1979) study of analogical reasoning). Sternberg & Powell's (1983) second principle of 
intellectual functioning, it will be recalled, was that 'information processing becomes 
more nearly exhaustive with increasing age'. 
Of particular interest in relation to the present study is the review by Davis (1985) of 
research demonstrating a link between Cognitive Tempo and performance on concept 
learning and discrimination tasks. Nuessle (1972), for example, used Levine's (1966) 
version of the MDL task with 10 and 14 yr. olds and found that Reflectivity was 
associated with more proficient use of the Focussing strategy. He suggested that a 
reflective cognitive style facilitates focussing because it allows for the more effective 
retrieval and recoding of information. 
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At the methodological level, there have also been significant developments. Kagan et al's 
(1964) MFFT came in for considerable criticism, leading to the development by Cairns 
& Cammock (1978) of a longer and more reliable version, which is known as the 
MFF20. It is this latter instrument which has, therefore, been used within the present 
study. 
b) Field Dependence-Independence 
Perhaps the single most well-known and certainly the most intensively researched 
dimension of cognitive style is that of Field Dependence-Independence conceived and 
developed by Witkin and his associates. The FDI construct was first conceived as an 
aspect of basic perceptual processes (Witkin et al, 1954) and was then developed by 
Witkin et al (1962) into a more general theory of psychological differentiation and 
cognitive style. It has subsequently been explored in relation to a wide range of 
cognitive functioning (see, for example, Goodenough's (1976) early review in relation to 
learning and memory). 
Interestingly, Pascual-Leone (1969) incorporated FDI into his neo-Piagetian model of 
cognitive development and successfully used it to explain the phenomenon of low 
inter-task correlations between Piagetian tasks at the same developmental stage. He did 
this by demonstrating that the difficulties children had with Piagetian tasks were of two 
distinct origins. Some tasks were difficult because of the load they placed on memory, 
but others were difficult because of their misleading structure. The latter kinds of task 
were more easily solved by Field-Independent subjects. 
Kogan (1983) reviews work on the relation of FDI to various educational achievements 
and learning difficulties. Early versions of the theory saw Field-Independence as 
superior because this involved a more impersonal, analytic and task-orientated approach. 
More recently, the two ends of the dimension have been seen as more equally valuable, 
with Field Dependent individuals better at interpersonal and holistic tasks (it may be that 
some of Piaget's tasks were more difficult for such children because they paid too much 
attention to misleading social cues). 
Witkin et al (1977) argued that FDI has major educational implications and reviewed a 
range of studies providing evidence that Field Dependent children learnt more 
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neffectively when the material had a social content, where there was external 
reinforcement, where the material was relatively structured, and where the relevant 
information was more perceptually salient. Field-Independent children, on the other 
hand, learnt more effectively when material was presented as an intentional learning task, 
where learning depended upon intrinsic motivation and the material was relatively 
unstructured; they were also relatively unaffected by the perceptual salience of relevant 
information. Of particular interest in relation to the present study is evidence Witkin et 
al (1977) presented of the relative difficulty Field-Dependent children might have with 
concept-learning tasks which require them to adopt an analytic, hypothesis testing 
approach. This would lead to the prediction that such children would have relative 
difficulty with the MDL task. 
Two key instruments have been devised and used as measures of FDI, the Rod & 
Frame test (RFT) and the Embedded Figures Test (EFT). Kogan (1983) reviews the 
evidence that while these two instruments are both tapping the ability to overcome an 
embedding context, they may be assessing rather different aspects of this. Current 
methodological advice appears to be to use both instruments and to use both scores, or 
produce a composite score. Within the present study, therefore, the RFT was used as 
well as the Children's Embedded Figures Test (CEFT), a version of the EFT devised for 
use with young children (see Witkin et al (1971)). Details of this and all the other 
measures used within the present study are provided in the next chapter. 
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Section D) The Contribution of the Present Study 
The present study thus arises in response to the current interest within both education 
and psychology related to the developing thinking, reasoning and problem-solving 
abilities of young children. 
A range of studies have indicated that the development of children's performance on 
problem-solving tasks is a consequence of developing features of their underlying 
cognitive systems, rather than on their abilities to reason. Work within the information 
processing framework has focussed on children's development of increasingly 
sophisticated strategies, and the mechanisms by which these are developed and 
executed. 
Studies of the development of children's problem-solving abilities have been 
wide-ranging, but the study of problems involving inductive reasoning (with the 
possible exception of the use of analogy), a process central to much of human 
learning, has been relatively neglected. The present study, therefore, attempts to help 
redress this balance by investigating children's problem-solving behaviour on a task 
involving inductive reasoning. The study aims to identify the developmental sequence 
of strategies developed by children on an inductive reasoning task, and the underlying 
cognitive factors which might be related to this development. 
The task chosen for investigation was the multidimensional discrimination learning 
task. This task has a long history within the study of human learning, but analysis of 
the development of strategies in relation to it by young children has been rather 
piecemeal. Within the present study an attempt has been made to use and build upon 
analyses and methodologies developed by previous research, most notably that 
concerned with the hypothesis-testing approach, and to provide a more systematic and 
comprehensive analysis of the development of children's strategies. 
The methodology used within the present study recognises the complexity of the 
development of strategic behaviour identified by more recent research. In earlier 
studies the assumption was that a problem could be solved using a series of discrete 
strategies, and children would respond to the problem by consistently using one of 
these strategies. Development consisted of moving from using one discrete strategy 
to the next. More recent evidence, however, has suggested that, in response to any 
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problem, children use a mix of strategies, the frequency distribution 
between which will vary over time, and be influenced by a range of circumstances. 
New strategies emerge through a process of strategy construction involving combining 
parts of existing strategies in novel ways, or grafting on new segments to existing 
procedures. 
The methodology of strategy identification embodied in the present study recognises 
these kinds of complexities. Rather than predetermining a set of discrete strategies 
which can be used on the MDL task by some kind of logical analysis, a procedure has 
been adopted, involving analysis based upon Strategy Components, which attempts to 
discover the kind of strategy mix actually employed by children. 
A further reason for the choice of task related to the fact that it would be a 'novel' task 
for the children, and one which is not clearly dependent upon any particular 
knowledge base. Much of the recent literature on the development of problem-solving 
strategies has been concerned with the development of expertise within particular 
domains. The relative significance of domain-specific knowledge and domain-general 
strategies in the development of problem-solving competence is a much debated issue, 
but it is clear from the literature that the good problem-solver needs both. If we are to 
understand how the good problem-solver uses general strategies to develop task 
specific strategies, we must study performance on novel tasks. The second important 
focus of the present study is, therefore, on the contribution of different aspects of the 
cognitive system to the generation of goal-specific strategies. 
Attempts to relate the development of strategies and performance on the MDL task to 
underlying cognitive factors have been extremely limited. The present study therefore 
attempted to examine the relationship of the development of strategies and performance 
on the MDL task to a range of underlying cognitive factors which have been advanced 
as significant within the development of children's thinking, reasoning and 
problem-solving abilities. These factors related to metacognitive knowledge (which 
relates to representation of the problem), metacognitive awareness and control, 
working memory, attributional style (locus of control), and cognitive style 
(reflectivity-impulsivity and field dependence-independence). 
Much of the literature is devoted to advancing the cause of one particular feature of the 
cognitive system as the fundamental determinant of cognitive change and development. 
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The present study, however, emphasises the need to get away from simple, single 
factor models of cognitive change and development, and instead emphasises the need 
to investigate the significant interactions between underlying cognitive factors, strategy 
use and performance. In a previous study (Whitebread, 1983) with 5 and 6 yr. olds a 
strong interaction was revealed between age, working memory, metacognitive 
awareness, strategy use and performance on a reclassification task. The present study 
attempted to examine these kinds of interactions on a more complex task and over a 
wider age group. As regards age, for example, issues arise in relation to the general 
pattern of development (eg: linear or U-shaped ?) and recent evidence that the 
correlations between underlying abilities and performance increase as children develop 
through the Primary years. 
In order to investigate these various issues, the study was structured in relation to 4 
areas of investigation, or aims. These involved the analysis of the sample of 
children's responses to the MDL task in terms of the development of problem-solving 
strategies, the relation between strategies and performance, the relationships between 
the various cognitve factors and the development of problem-solving abilities, and 
interactions between cognitive factors (or 'predictors'), strategies and performance. In 
the following chapter, details are provided of the ways in which the study was 
structured, and the investigations and analyses which were carried out, in order to 
address these 4 central aims. 
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Chapter 4: DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
Section A) Introduction: Aims and Structure of the Study 
The forgoing review of the literature relating to the development of children's 
problem-solving abilities and related cognitive factors sets out the background of 
research and ideas upon which the present study was conceived. This chapter is 
intended to explain the aims of the present study and the details of the design and 
execution of the empirical work carried out. 
The 4 broad aims of the study were to identify the development of children's strategies 
on the MDL task, to examine the relationship between these patterns of strategic 
behaviour and performance, to examine the relationship between various underlying 
cognitive factors and problem-solving ability, and to investigate any interactions between 
these predictors, strategies and performance. The remainder of this section sets out these 
aims in detail, indicating the main ways in which they arise from previous work 
discussed earlier, and the broad structure of the methodology developed to carry them 
out. 
i) The Development of Problem-solving Strategies 
The first main aim of the study was to investigate the pattern of development of strategic 
behaviour amongst Primary school aged children on an inductive reasoning task. For 
the purposes of the present study this was investigated using the Multidimensional 
Discrimination Learning (MDL) Task. As reviewed above, this task is one which has 
been widely employed within the problem-solving literature, and one which simulates in 
a controlled manner learning through the processes of rule induction. Gholson (1980) 
and his associates, Kemler (1978) and others have developed techniques related to this 
task which allow close analysis of the strategies adopted by subjects. Kemler (1978) has 
also devised an ingenious story-and-game format which makes the task usable with 
young children. These investigators and others have also carried out detailed analyses of 
features of the MDL task which appear to provide difficulties for young children, and of 
the developmental range of strategies adopted by children in their attempts to solve the 
problem. 
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Working from this basis, within the present study an adapted version of Kemler's MDL 
task was used, with the children being required to verbalise hypotheses (or 'introtacts') 
on every trial. The advantages of providing a meaningful context for the task, and of the 
verbal introtact requirement, have been discussed in our earlier review of methodological 
developments. 
The children's responses were analysed according to 10 Strategy Components, again 
based very largely on the work of Gholson (1980), Kemler (1978) and their associates. 
This approach was adopted, as indicated in the last section of the previous chapter, in 
recognition of the complexity of the development of problem-solving strategies. 
Research outlined earlier suggests that children's responses to a problem-solving task 
can best be described in terms of increasingly sophisticated and complex patterns of 
strategic behaviour, involving successive recombinations of different strategic elements. 
The 10 Strategy Components devised seek to offer a comprehensive description of the 
elements which might make up these developing strategic patterns. Cluster Analysis 
was used as a means of identifying these patterns, and Discriminant Function Analysis 
to determine the nature of relationships between different Strategy Clusters. 
ii) Strategies and Performance 
The second main aim of the study was to examine the relationship with performance of 
the revealed patterns of strategic behaviour. As we have discussed in the previous 
chapter, much of the problem-solving literature has suggested that children's 
performance is strongly linked to their strategic behaviour. It was therefore important to 
establish whether this was the case with the MDL task as used within the present study. 
Again derived from the work of Gholson (1980) and others reviewed above, 3 different 
measures of performance were devised within the present study, and are referred to 
within the report of the study as the Performance Indicators. These Performance 
Indicators consisted of a measure of how quickly each problem is solved (Trial of Last 
Error), whether the solution to each problem is correctly verbalised once it has been 
discovered (Verbalisation of Correct Hypothesis during Criterion) 
, 
and to what extent 
'perfect processing' is produced in the pattern of verbalised hypotheses on the first 3 
trials of each problem (Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 & 3). A subsidiary aim of the study 
was to investigate the possibility that improvement on these Performance Indicators will 
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not occur simultaneously, but will follow a developmental sequence representing a 
deeper understanding of the task. 
iii) Predictors of the Development of Problem-solving Abilities 
As reviewed above, a wide range of cognitive factors have been identified in the literature 
as being significant for general cognitive development and, specifically, the development 
of problem-solving abilities. It was the third main aim of the study to establish to what 
extent the patterns of strategic behaviour and performance on an inductive reasoning 
task such as the MDL task appeared to be related to such cognitive factors. 
The influence of these factors were explored in two different ways within the present 
study. First, within the MDL task itself it was attempted to examine the influence of 
certain factors by varying the form of the problem. Thus, as well as the standard 
4-dimensional problem, subjects were asked to tackle problems which obliged them to 
deal with negative information and with redundant information or 'noise'. We have 
discussed earlier work which has attempted to look at children's difficulties in dealing 
with negative and irrelevant information on the MDL task, and suggestions that these 
forms of problem place additional loads upon working memory and upon selective 
attention. Different versions of the problem were devised within the present study 
which, it was hoped, would clearly distinguish between these two different aspects of 
cognitive functioning. 
Second, separately from the MDL task, subjects were assessed on Predictor Measures 
related to Working Memory capacity, Metacognitive Knowledge and Awareness and 
Control, Attributional style (Locus of Control), Cognitive Tempo 
(Reflectivity-Impulsivity) and Field Dependence-Independence. Some of these 
measures have been developed and published within the relevant literature, and some 
were specifically devised for the present study. We have reviewed in the last chapter the 
ways in which these aspects of cognitive functioning have been shown to relate to the 
development of problem-solving strategies and performance. 
It is, of course, possible that other factors than those included in the present study might 
be involved in determining the children's responses to the MDL task. In order to at least 
partly cover this possibility the children's Gender and Age was also included in the 
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analysis. Any large effects associated with these factors, and not associated with any of 
the cognitive factors included in the study, could be taken as evidence of the influence of 
contextual, maturational or other cognitive factors not included in the present study. 
As these Predictor Measures were likely to intercorrelate (which turned out to be the 
case, as will be reported in the next chapter), it was planned to use Multiple Regression 
Analysis to separate out their individual effects in relation to performance. 
iv) Interactions between Predictors, Strategy and Performance 
As we have indicated earlier, a previous study (Whitebread (1983)) had revealed 
significant interactions between underlying cognitive factors, patterns of strategic 
behaviour and performance on a reclassification task. In particular, an interaction was 
found between metacognition and working memory in relation to performance. As we 
have reviewed in the previous chapter, there is research evidence to suggest, for example, 
that significant interactions might be expected between metacognition and working 
memory. The fourth main aim of the present study was, therefore, to examine the 
possibility that the relationships between different elements of problem-solving 
behaviour are complex and non-linear. This was done, as before, by examining 
correlations between Predictor Measures and Performance Indicators within sub-groups 
of the sample. It was planned to look at sub-groups defined by Metacognition (as was 
the case in the earlier study), by Strategy Cluster, and by Age. It seems likely that 
aspects of metacognitive processing and pattern of strategic behaviour should mediate 
the relationship between other cognitive abilities and performance. The analysis by age 
was intended to reveal any tendency towards U-shaped development, and to investigate 
the possibility that underlying cognitive functions might be increasingly related to 
performance as children grow older. 
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Section B) Procedures 
i) Structural Arrangements 
a) Sample of Children 
The study was carried out with a sample of 72 Leicestershire Primary school children, 
comprising three equal groups of 24 children aged 6,8 and 10 years. The children were 
drawn equally from 2 large village schools which together drew their children from 
across the social spectrum. Within each age subgroup half were drawn from each 
school, and within each of these age/school subgroups of 12 children, half were girls 
and half boys. Based on work reviewed earlier with the MDL type of problem, it was 
felt that this sample would provide the full range of performance and strategic 
behaviour which we wished to investigate, while all the children should be mature 
enough to understand what was required in each of the various problems and tasks. 
b) Timetable of Tasks and Tests 
The various tasks and tests administered within the study were carried out with each of 
the children on 7 separate days according to the following schedule: 
Day 1 Working Memory test with MDL materials 
Day 2 Multidimensional Discrimination Learning (MDL) task 
Metacognitive Knowledge questions 
Metacomprehension test 
Strategy Flexibility test 
Day 3 Matching Familiar Figures test (MFF20) (Cognitive Tempo) 
Day 4 Rod & Frame Test (RFT) (Field Dependence-Independence) 
Day 5 Children's Embedded Figures Test (CEFT) (Field 
Dependence-Independence) 
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Day 6 Figural Intersections Test (FIT) (Working Memory) 
Day 7 Children's Attribution of Responsibility and Locus of Control (CARALOC) 
Scale (Locus of Control) 
Day 2 was always the very next day after Day 1. The WM test with MDL materials 
was administered first to familiarise the children with the MDL materials, and it was 
important that the children came to the MDL task with this fresh in their minds. The 
various tests related to Metacognition were all carried out on the same day as the MDL 
task itself, so that the metacognitive experiences and learning which had occurred 
during the MDL task should also still be readily available to recall. 
Each of the other 5 tests was administered on a separate day, over the course of the next 
week or so. The group tests (FIT and CARALOC) were left to the end, so that the 
children would be very familiiar with the experimenter by that stage, and thus more 
likely to be relaxed with him when they were in a small group. 
ii) The Multidimensional Discrimination Learning Task 
a) Methodology and Design of the Problem 
The MDL task used in the study was very strongly based upon that developed by 
Kemler (1978). As we have discussed earlier, the principal components of this method 
which make it particularly helpful when investigating the problem-solving behaviour of 
children, are the use of verbal 'introtacts' and the setting of the problem in a 
story-and-game context. Each child was asked to solve three different forms of the 
MDL problem, or three problem 'types': 
- 
the standard problem (problem type a) 
- 
the problem involving the use of negative information (problem type b) 
- 
the problem with 'noise' or redundant information (problem type c) 
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1. Materials 
Each one of the stimuli consisted of a 51/2 x8 in. line drawing of a young girl 
portrayed from the knees to the top of the head. The differences between stimuli were 
introduced by elaborating the basic form with variable kinds of clothing. These 
clothing items consisted of 2 variations for each of 8 clothing attributes or 'dimensions', 
as follows: 
Hair ribbons/bobbles 
Hat crown/pointed 
Glasses clear/dark 
Necklace beads/pendant 
Badge teddy bear/butterfly 
Hand ring/bangle 
Belt buckle/bow 
Balloon sausage/round 
For the pre-training procedure to familiarise the children with the materials and the 
accompanying story, the materials consisted of 2 basic cards with no extra clothing 
items, labelled "A" (for "Anna") and "S" (for "Sally"), and 2 sets of cut-out versions of 
the extra clothing items (see Appendix A. 1). 
For the standard problems the materials consisted of 2 sets of 16 complementary pairs 
of cards (each pair representing Anna and Sally at a particular moment in time) with 
each girl shown wearing all possible combinations of clothing items from 4 dimensions 
(see Appendix A. 2). 
For the problems involving the use of negative information, where only one card is 
shown on each trial (representing either Anna or Sally), the materials consisted of 2 
further sets of 16 cards showing all possible combinations of clothing items from 4 
dimensions. 
For the problems involving 'noise' or redundant information, the materials consisted of 
2 sets of 16 pairs of cards, structured as for the standard problems with each girl 
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shown wearing all possible combinations of clothing items from 4 dimensions, but with 
the girls on each occasion or trial also wearing 4 identical clothing items from the 
remaining 4 dimensions not involved in that particular problem (see Appendix A. 3). 
2. Procedure 
Pre-training 
Each subject was presented with the MDL problems individually. They were 
introduced to the problems by the experimenter recounting to the child the story of two 
identical twins (examples of which were to be found in each of the two schools, and 
were referred to). These twins were called Anna and Sally and they always dressed 
alike, with the result that their identities were always being confused by their school 
friends and by their teacher. At this point the 2 basic cards with no extra clothing items, 
and labelled "A" and "S", were introduced to the child. 
In order to be able to tell the twins apart, the story unfolds, their teacher decided to buy 
them some extra little items of clothing which were different. At this point the clothing 
cut-outs were presented to the child, a pair at a time, and the child asked to name them. 
For example: 
Experimenter: "She bought them two different hats like this 
- 
what sort of 
hats are they? " 
Child: "A crown and a witch's hat" 
Every day, it was agreed, the twins would wear some of their new clothes so that 
everyone could tell who was who. For example, they might decide on one particular day 
to wear their hats and their badges. However, the story continues, the twins decided to 
play a trick with their new clothes. Many times in the middle of the day, just when their 
friends were beginning to remember which twin was wearing which clothes, the twins 
would switch some of their clothes to get their friends mixed up. For example, they 
might switch their hats. 
While the teacher didn't mind the twins playing tricks on their friends, however, she 
really did need to know who was who. So, it was agreed that each day the twins would 
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have a secret that they only told to their teacher. The secret was the one different item 
of clothing that the twins promised not to switch the whole day. 
The game is to find out the twins' secret, that is, which different item of clothing Anna 
wears all day and never switches. 
The game was then demonstrated by placing items from 2 dimensions (both 
complementary) on the two basic cards and, after the child had listed what each twin 
was wearing, actually switching one pair of items in front of the child. Before and after 
the switch the child was asked to say what the twins' secret could still be and any 
mistakes were corrected by the experimenter. When the child had carried out 2 such 
problems in succession without error (i. e. no switched or irrelevant items named), 4 
dimensional problems (2 complementary, 2 identical) were presented in the same 
manner. Once again problems of this type were presented until the child responded to 
2 in succession without error, and then 4 dimensional problems (all complementary) 
were presented. 
Apart from the fact that the child actually saw the switches of clothing items occurring, 
these last problems are, of course, identical to the standard problem to be used in the 
experimental phase of the study. When 2 problems of this type had been tackled in 
succession without error it was assumed, therefore, that the child was ready for the 
experimental problems. As a consequence of the story format and this careful 
pre-training procedure, it was hoped that as far as possible children's performance on 
the experimental problems should not be hindered or influenced by lack of 
understanding of the basic rules of the game. 
Experimental Problems 
For the experimental problems the children were reminded at the beginning of each 
problem that it is a new day and the twins could have a new secret. On trial 1 for each 
problem the child was asked to list what each twin is wearing when they arrive at school 
at the start of this new day. Throughout the children were allowed to use their own 
labels for the various clothing items, so that individuals did not have the additional 
burden of coping with unfamiliar terms (which, as we have reviewed earlier, might place 
extra load on working memory). 
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For each problem the game proceeded by showing the child cards which represented 
how the girls appeared after each successive switch of clothing items, up to a maximum 
of 16 occasions or trials. Each child was asked to solve six such problems, two each of 
the three different problem types: 
a) the standard problem where each trial consisted of presenting two cards showing 
the girls wearing complementary items from 4 dimensions (see Appendix A. 2) 
b) the problem involving the use of negative information where each trial consisted 
of presenting only one card showing one girl wearing items from 4 dimensions 
c) the problem with 'noise' or redundant information where each trial consisted of 
presenting two cards showing the girls wearing items from all 8 dimensions, 
complementary items from 4 dimensions and identical items from the other 4 
dimensions (which are thus irrelevant or redundant) (see Appendix A. 3). 
For problem types (a) and (c), after each pair of cards had been presented the children 
were asked: 
"Which one do you think is Anna? " 
and the child's response was followed by verbal feedback ("Yes, it is" or "No, that's 
Sally") and by a second question: 
"What could be the twins' secret today? Which clothes is Anna always wearing and 
never switching today? " 
For problem type (b) it was explained to the children that this time they would only see 
one of the twins at once and, after each card had been presented, the children were 
asked a slightly different first question: 
"Do you think this is Anna? " 
and their response was followed by the same verbal feedback and second question as 
for the other problem types. 
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As there are 8 possible combinations of the clothing items from 4 dimensions which 
each twin can wear (with one item fixed) each problem consisted of a maximum of 16 
trials during which each twin wore every possible combination twice. However, a 
problem was stopped before all cards had been shown if the child successfully 
achieved a solution. For this purpose the criterion was 5 successive correct 
identifications of Anna (not including trials 1-3 when feedback was predetermined 
- 
see 
below). If Anna was correctly identified on Trial 16, but the criterion had not been 
achieved up to that point, extra trials were presented (beginning the sequence again with 
the cards presented at Trial 1) until criterion was achieved or Anna was incorrectly 
identified, whichever occurred the sooner. For criterion to be achieved it was not 
necessary that correct identifications be associated with correct verbalisations of the 
'secret'. This criterion was adopted because of the evidence, reviewed earlier, that 
children's ability to solve this kind of problem may precede their ability to correctly 
verbalise their hypotheses or understandings, and so it was important to clearly 
distinguish between the two achievements. 
During the problems a record was kept on an MDL Record Card (see Appendix A. 4) 
of the child's responses to the two questions asked, and the verbal feedback provided 
by the experimenter. 
b) Experimental Design 
Over the 6 problems tackled by each child it is important to control for preference 
effects related to clothing items, array positions and the two twins, for the effects of 
different patterns of item presentation and verbal feedback, and for learning effects. In 
order to try to cope with these various difficulties the following design features were 
adopted for the presentation of the experimental problems. 
In order to attempt to control for preference and sequence of item presentation effects, 
two measures were taken. First, the 6 problems were designed so that each dimension 
was included as relevant in 3 problems, and was either not present or irrelevant 
(redundant) in the other 3 problems. Second, the sequence of switches and consequent 
pattern of item presentation was standardised across all 6 problems. This standardised 
sequence is reported in Appendix A. 5. As will be seen upon examination, this 
sequence was further devised so that each successive set of 4 trials defines the solution. 
(In fact, 
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with 4 dimensions, it is possible to define the solution within 3 trials so long as items 
are switched 'orthogonally' (as devised by Levine (1966) for his blank trial probes), and 
this has been done within the present sequence; the 4th trial array within each set of 4 
trials simply reverses the positions of the two twins in the 1st trial of that set. ) All 16 
different possible arrays are presented once, so that whichever item is defined as the 
solution (or the twins' secret) each girl will appear 8 times on each side of the array in 
two card problems, and each girl will simply appear 8 times in the one card problems. 
In order to control for the effects of feedback patterns, as identified by such as Fuchs 
& Turner (1981), rather than have pre-defined solutions to the various problems, the 
solutions were defined by predetermined patterns of feedback on Trials 1-3. As it 
happens, with at least one positive and one negative feedback over three trials there are 
only 6 possible patterns, thus: 
1. ++- 
2. 
--+ 
3. +-+ 
4. 
-+- 
5. +-- 
6. 
-++ 
It was therefore possible to present each child once with each feedback pattern. As it 
was also important to control for the effects of feedback patterns on particular 
problems, it had to be ensured that each problem was presented with each feedback 
pattern equally across children. As the order of presentation of problems had to be 
varied in order to control for learning effects (see below) this could be achieved by 
standardisir. g the order of presentation of feedback patterns. This order of feedback 
patterns was, therefore, standard across children. 
In order to control for learning effects, if we were to be able to compare the children's 
performance on the three different types of problems they had to be presented in all 
possible sequences. Further, in order to investigate learning or improvement in 
performance over the 6 problems, it was decided to present the 6 problems in 2 rounds, 
each round containing one problem of each type. The possible orders of problems were 
thus as follows: 
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1. abcabc 
2. acbacb 
3. bacbac 
4. bcabca 
5. cabcab 
6. cbacba 
As there are 6 orders of problems, 4 children (2 of each gender) within each age group 
were presented with the problems in the same order. 
c) Analysis 
The children's performance on the MDL task was analysed in terms of the strategies 
they apparently adopted in order to reach a solution, and in terms of various measures 
of their success at solving the problems. As indicated earlier, both the components of 
strategic behaviour and the indicators of successful performance identified and 
investigated are drawn from published analyses of children's and adults' performance 
on the discrimination learning tasks, principally those by Gholson, Levine & Phillips 
(1972), Kemler (1978) and Gholson (1980). 
1. Strategies: the 10 Components 
The strategies adopted by the children were analysed in terms of 10 Strategy 
Components. These consisted of recognisable patterns of choices made in response to 
the request on each trial to identify 'Anna' and of verbal 'introtacts' or hypotheses in 
response to the second question on each trial about current possible 'secrets' or 
solutions to the problem. The theoretical model adopted in the present study suggests 
that these Strategy Components are combined and recombined successively in different 
ways to form new patterns of strategic behaviour as children's ability to tackle the MDL 
task develops. They are as follows: 
1. Number of Hypothe_per Trial: simply a measure of the average number of 
hypotheses verbalised by the child on each trial. In a4 dimensional problem with an 
'orthogonal' pattern of stimulus presentation, such as the ones used in the present study, 
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there are, of course, four possible solutions still available at Trial 1, two possible at Trial 
2 and only one from Trial 3 onwards. As we have reviewed earlier, in the vast majority 
of early research on discrimination learning and hypothesis testing subjects were only 
ever permitted to verbalise 
, 
or presumed to be holding, one working hypothesis. 
Phillips & Gholson (1980), however, used 4 dimensional problems and asked subjects 
to indicate "which things could still be correct", and found interesting variations in the 
number of hypotheses being considered by different children. 
2. Hypotheses Consistent with Local Feedback: this is a measure of the percentage 
of hypotheses produced which are consistent with the feedback the child has just 
received on that trial about their identification of Anna. The ability to respond to 
feedback has, of course, been a central feature of analyses of responses to the 
discrimination learning task. Gholson, Levine & Phillips (1972), Kemler (1978) and 
Gholson (1980) all found this to be perhaps the first significant strategic development. 
It marks the transition from 'response sets' or 'stereotypes' to what Kemler has 
characterised as short-term strategic behaviour. Tumblin & Gholson (1980) guided 
children's attention to the correct stimulus when the child chose incorrectly and taught 
the rule "wrong means look at the other picture", and found that the children made 
significant progress. We have reviewed earlier the discussion by Kemler (1978) and 
others as to whether this ability to respond to local feedback is a result of developing 
attentional control or understanding of the decision-making logic inherent in the 
problem. With the more meaningful task adopted in the present study we would expect 
to find high levels of local consistency with a sample within which the youngest 
children are 6 years old. 
3. Choice Consistent with Previous Hypothesis: this measure is of the percentage 
of choices or identifications of 'Anna' consistent with the hypothesis or hypotheses 
verbalised on the previous trial. As we have reviewed, Kemler (1978) argues that the 
next developmental stage in terms of strategic behaviour is the ability to remember and 
use previous hypotheses. This marks the shift from short-term to long-term strategic 
behaviour. Phillips & Gholson (1980) found evidence to support this view. As the use 
of the verbal introtact methodology enabled Kemler (1978) to discover, however, to 
begin with young children often do not co-ordinate their memories of previous 
hypotheses and their stimulus choices. Phillips (1974) and Spiker and Cantor (1977) 
found children who verbalised about a value of the stimulus they chose, but whose 
verbalisations were largely unrelated to the process guiding the choices. They referred 
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to this pattern of response as 'stimulus describing'. We shall refer to this phenomenon 
again when we describe the indicators of successful performance on the MDL task 
used within the present study, and, in particular, the indicator related to verbalisation of 
the correct hypothesis during the criterion trials. 
4. Lose/Shift Hypothesis: Schuepfer & Gholson (1980) identified two strategic 
developments which enabled children to respond to feedback. The first to emerge was 
the ability to shift from a hypothesis when it had been disconfirmed by negative 
feedback. This measure is, therefore, of the percentage of hypotheses which were not 
repeated on the next trial after negative feedback (irrespective of the choice or 
identification of Anna made on that trial). A child who scores 100% on Strategic 
Component 2 will, of course, also produce a 100% score on this measure. Differences 
will arise, however, where a child shifts from the disconfirmed hypothesis but to a new 
hypothesis which is also inconsistent with local feedback. Thus it is possible to score 
100% on this measure but less than 100% on Strategic Component 2. 
5. Lose/Shift Dimension: this measure is similar to the last one, except that it 
consists of the percentage of dimensions not repeated on the next trial after negative 
feedback relating to one of its two values (or clothing items). It is important to 
distinguish this pattern of strategic behaviour from the Lose/Shift Hypothesis strategy 
because a number of researchers, including Kemler (1978), as we have reviewed, found 
a common pattern of responding in young children generally referred to as 'attribute 
perseveration'. This consists of runs of verbalised hypotheses which simply alternate 
on the two values of the same dimension, whichever happens to be locally consistent 
with the current trial's feedback. Kemler (1978) found many examples of this pattern 
amongst kindergartners. The Lose/Shift Dimension strategy avoids this, and might be 
seen to suggest a more thorough grasp of the logic of the problem situation and a more 
sustained ability to co-ordinate information from previous trials. However, it must be 
recognised that random 'stimulus describing' will produce a pattern which would score 
quite highly on this measure (i. e. a score of 75%); at a certain stage 'attribute 
perseveration' might, therefore, represent a more sophisticated attempt to co-ordinate 
information. 
6. Win/Stay: Schuepfer & Gholson (1980) identified this as the second, and 
perhaps more significant strategic development which enables children to respond to 
feedback. This measure is of the percentage of confirmed hypotheses repeated on the 
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next trial (again, as with Lose/Shift, irrespective of the choice or identification of Anna 
made on that trial). 
7. Hypothesis Checking: both Gholson, Levine and Phillips (1972) and Kemler 
(1978) identify this strategy as the simplest which involves some long-term memory 
and co-ordination of information (i. e. over more than two trials). This is a measure of 
the percentage of hypotheses receiving negative feedback on the next trial which are not 
repeated throughout the remainder of the trials in that problem. As a strategy it does 
not involve, as Gholson, Levine and Phillips (1972) argue, any understanding of the 
logical relation of the two values of each dimension, and simply regards each value (or 
clothing item) as a separate hypothesis or possible solution. It does also not involve, as 
Kemler (1978) points out, any co-ordination of information beyond immediate 
feedback relating to verbalised hypotheses. 
8. Dimension Checking: this is a similar measure of the percentage of disconfirmed 
dimensions not repeated throughout the remainder of the problem. As both Gholson, 
Levine and Phillips (1972) and Kemler (1978) argue, this strategic behaviour crucially 
implies an understanding of the logical relation of values within a dimension. Thus, if a 
hypothesis, which is locally consistent with feedback on one trial, is disconfirmed on 
the next, a child who is simply Hypothesis Checking could produce the other value of 
the same dimension as the new hypothesis. A child who is Dimension Checking, 
however, has in some sense come to understand that the other value of that dimension 
cannot be the solution either, since it was effectively disconfirmed on the previous trial. 
An item from another dimension must be advanced as a possible solution. Again, 
however, as with Strategy Component 7, it does not involve any co-ordination of 
information beyond immediate feedback relating to verbalised hypotheses. 
9. Focusing over 2 Trials: the most sophisticated strategy involves an ability to 
respond to feedback, an ability to remember and use information 
about previously tested verbalised hypotheses, an understanding of the logic of the 
problem and crucially the ability, to varying degrees, to co-ordinate all this with 
information gained from feedback to previous stimuli. In Kemler's (1978) terminology 
this involves co-ordinating the 'hypothesis memory' involved in Hypothesis and 
Dimension Checking with 'stimulus memory'. Gholson, Levine and Phillips (1972), 
Kemler (1978) and others have referred to this strategic behaviour as Focusing. 
Phillips & Gholson (1980) confirmed that the ability to remember previous stimuli 
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co-ordinated with previous hypotheses was central to success on the MDL task. This is 
a sophisticated and complex pattern of strategic behaviour, and clearly develops over 
time. Within the present study it was, therefore, decided to measure Focusing at two 
levels. This measure is of the percentage of verbalised hypotheses consistent with local 
feedback on the current trial and consistent with all stimulus feedback on the previous 
trial. 
10. Focusing over All Trials: this final measure is, therefore, of the percentage of 
verbalised hypotheses consistent with local feedback on the current trial and consistent 
with all stimulus feedback on all previous trials. After Trial 3, of course, this effectively 
means that the verbalised hypothesis must be the correct solution. 
These descriptions of the 10 Strategy Components are intended to explain what they 
involved in terms of the children's patterns of responses, and to provide a rationale for 
their inclusion on the basis of previous research with MDL problems. While there may 
be some logical overlap between some measures (clearly some of the more 
sophisticated logically include some of the less sophisticated), it is intended that 
between them they should provide a comprehensive basis for discovering and 
describing different developmental patterns of strategic behaviour on the MDL task. 
What has not been included here are precise details of the scoring procedures for each 
of the Strategy Components. In some cases (particularly in relation to cases where 
more than one hypothesis is verbalised on a trial, or where an irrelevant clothing item is 
produced as a verbalised hypothesis on the type (c) problems) these scoring 
procedures are quite complex. They are, therefore, detailed in Appendix A. 6. 
2. Performance Indicators 
The success of the performance of the children on the MDL task was measured in 
three ways, each of which relates to a rather different aspect of performance. There is 
evidence, which we have reviewed earlier, which would suggest a developmental 
sequence between these different areas of performance, and the investigation of this 
developmental sequence is one of the aims of the present study. The three Performance 
Indicators are as follows: 
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1. Trial of Last Error: this measure simply records a score based on the last trial at 
which an incorrect choice or identification of 'Anna' is made; it is a standard measure of 
the efficiency with which a discrimination problem has been solved used by Kemler 
(1978) and throughout the literature. Obviously it is a finer measure than simply 
recording the number of problems solved within a fixed number of trials. For the 
purposes of the analysis of results the scores are reversed, since the lower the score, the 
better the performance. 
2. Verbalisation of Correct Hypothesis During Criterion Trials: we have referred 
earlier, within the description of Strategy Component 3, to the phenomenon of 'stimulus 
describing'. This refers to children whose choice of stimuli is clearly being guided by 
some hypothesis, but who are unable to verbalise that hypothesis. When asked to 
verbalise their hypothesis, instead of reflecting upon the processes which guided their 
choice, they simply read off or describe a locally consistent attribute. As we have 
discussed earlier in our review of the literature, this lack of ability by young children at 
certain stages to monitor and report upon the mental processes which have guided their 
behaviour and decision-making is a commonly observed phenomenon. This has been 
recorded by Piaget (1977) amongst others. This measure was, therefore, used simply 
to record the number of criterion trials (of which there were 5 for each correctly solved 
problem) upon which the correct hypothesis was verbalised alone. It is predicted within 
the present study that the ability to verbalise the correct hypothesis consistently once 
the MDL problem has been solved will emerge later than the ability simply to solve the 
problem. 
3. Number of Hypotheses on Trials 1.2 & 3: as we have discussed in relation to 
Strategy Component 1, Phillips & Gholson (1980) found that when given the 
opportunity to verbalise more than one hypothesis on each trial different children 
displayed different patterns of performance. Some indicated only one hypothesis on 
each trial while others indicated 3 or 4 hypotheses on each trial. Some, furthermore, 
were able to indicate with increasing accuracy the number of hypotheses which were 
actually still possible solutions after different numbers of trials (i. e. four on Trial 1, two 
on Trial 2 and one on Trial 3). This measure, therefore, is a score of how closely the 
number of hypotheses verbalised on Trials 1,2 &3 matched this ideal performance. It 
is predicted within the present study that the ability to produce this ideal performance 
(which clearly involves the use of the most sophisticated Strategy Component, 
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Focusing) will develop after the ability to solve the MDL problem and verbalise the 
correct solution. 
Details of the precise manner in which these three Performance Indicators were scored 
are recorded in Appendix A. 7. 
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iii) Predictor Measures 
a) Gender 
While there are no specific predictions in relation to gender within the present study, it 
was felt important to record this information about the children involved. As described 
earlier different groups within the study were carefully matched so that they contained 
equal numbers of boys and girls. It is important, however, to analyse the results of the 
study to see if there were any significant gender effects. Any such effects might 
indicate a gender bias in the materials or the style of presentation of the experimental 
tasks (all presented by the male author), which have been reported in a number of areas 
related to the present study. Hort & Taylor (1990), for example, have reported effects 
on inductive inference resulting from the way in which items were described. It might 
also be, of course, that there is a gender variation in the development of problem-solving 
abilities related to the MDL task. 
For the purposes of analysis, boys were scored 1 and girls 2; an equally mixed group 
would thus have a mean score of 1.5. 
b) Age 
The age of the children (in years and months) was also recorded. This was again partly 
as a safeguard. As we indicated earlier in the Introduction to this section, it is possible 
that other factors than those specifically included in the present study could be involved 
in determining the children's performance on the MDL task. Any large effects 
associated with Age (or Gender) but not associated with any of the cognitive factors 
included in the study, could be taken as evidence of the influence of contextual, 
maturational or other cognitive factors. 
It was also important to record the Age of the children so that we could compare 
performance on the MDL task used with that on other similar tasks used in previous 
studies. Part of the rationale for the design of the present task was that it should allow 
young children to demonstrate their full capabilities unhindered by extraneous 
contextual effects, and it is important to monitor the extent to which this has borne fruit. 
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There are also, as we have seen, specific developmental patterns reported in the literature 
in relation to children's learning and performance, which it is an aim of the present study 
to investigate in relation to the MDL task. An analysis by age is carried out, for example, 
to reveal any tendency towards a pattern of U-shaped development (see Strauss & Stavy 
(1982)), and to investigate the possibility that the relationship between underlying 
cognitive and metacognitive abilities and performance strengthens as children grow 
older (see Schneider & Weinen (1989)). 
c) Working Memory 
As well as recording these two basic pieces of information tests were carried out, as 
indicated earlier, in an attempt to assess the level of development of each child in a 
number of cognitive areas which have been highlighted in the literature as potentially 
influential in the acquisition of problem-solving abilities. 
The first of these cognitive areas is that of Working Memory. We have reviewed earlier 
the significance of this aspect of cognitive functioning within information processing 
and neo-Piagetian models, and evidence of the effects of memory factors on 
performance on the MDL task. A rationale has also been presented for including within 
the present study two complementary measures of working memory capacity. These 
measures were the FIT (Figural Intersections Test) devised by Pascual-Leone (1969) 
and a short-term memory test devised by the author to be used with the MDL materials. 
FIT, it was argued, has the advantage of being non-strategic, but the disadvantage of 
being unrelated in content to the MDL task. The measure devised with the MDL 
materials has the advantage of using content identical to the MDL task, but offers more 
opportunity for effective problem-solvers to devise memorial strategies. 
The design, procedure and scoring for each of these tests is described below and in the 
associated appendices. 
1. Working Memory Test with MDL Materials 
This test was actually the first test administered to each child within the study. This was 
done to familiarise the children with the MDL materials before they were faced with the 
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MDL task itself. In order to avoid confusion between the two tasks (particularly with 
respect to the logical relationship of clothing items belonging to the same dimension in 
the MDL task, which was not a feature of the stimulus arrays used in this task) the 
Working Memory Test was always carried out on a separate day from the MDL task. 
A pilot was carried out with this test to ensure that the procedures were clear and that it 
effectively discriminated between children and produced scores appropriate for the age 
group under investigation in the present study. The results of this pilot were 
encouraging on both counts and are recorded in Appendix B. 1. 
The test was devised as a test of Working Memory, rather than as a test of simple 
short-term memory. As we have discussed in our earlier review, a crucial point about 
working memory is that it involves holding items in the short-term memory store and 
operating upon them. The test, therefore, involves recognising clothing items seen on a 
display of Anna and Sally and allocating these items to one of three different boxes 
depending upon who was seen wearing them (i. e. either Anna or Sally or both of them). 
Materials 
The stimulus cards were drawn in exactly the same manner as those used for the 
experimental problems in the MDL task, except that cards of 'Anna' were marked with 
an'A' and cards of 'Sally' were marked with an 'S'. 
In the arrays of pairs of cards presented for this task there was also not the same logical 
relation between clothing items of the same dimension that there was in the MDL task. 
It was, thus, not the case that if Anna was wearing one item, Sally must be wearing the 
complimentary or identical item. In fact, in any array all the items displayed were from 
different dimensions. Any item could be worn just by Anna, or just by Sally, or by both 
Anna and Sally. 
For the pre-training procedure there were three 1-item pairs of cards (showing both 
twins, but only one clothing item being worn by one or both of them), two 2-item pairs 
(showing two items being worn by one or both twins) and three 3-item pairs. Each of 
the 16 clothing items were featured once on these pairs of cards. (For example arrays 
and the full list of the cards displayed within the pre-training procedure, see Appendix 
B. 2). 
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For the actual test trials there were three pairs of cards displaying each of 1 to 8 clothing 
items. 
For both the pre-training and the test trials there were also 10 cut-outs of each of the 16 
clothing items, each set of 10 displayed in their own little box. These cut-outs were 
identical to those used in the pre-training procedure for the MDL task (see Appendix 
A. 1). 
There were also three posting boxes labelled 'A', 'S' and 'A+S'. These boxes measured 
approximately 5x 6" and were 3" deep, and on the top they had a slot large enough to 
receive the cut-outs of the clothing items. A stop-watch and a screen to conceal the array 
of cut-outs were also used. 
Procedure 
Pre-training 
Each child was initially told that we were going to play a game about things you wear 
and presented with the collection of 16 little boxes containing the cut-outs of the 
clothing items and asked to name them. It was felt to be important that the children 
should name the items for themselves so that familiar names for items were used in the 
test. Having 
to cope with unfamiliar names would obviously place extra load on the child's memory 
capacity. 
The child was then presented with the first 1-item pair of cards and asked to select from 
the cut-outs the matching item and place it in the appropriate box, according to whether 
it was being worn by Anna (box 'A') or Sally (box 'S') or by both Anna and Sally (box 
'A+S'). If the child made an error and selected the wrong item or placed an item in the 
wrong box, this error was pointed out by the experimenter and the child asked to try 
again (in practice very few errors occurred). This procedure was then repeated for a 
further two 1-item pairs, two 2-item pairs and three 3-item pairs, so that all 16 clothing 
items had been matched and correctly boxed by the end of the pre-training procedure. 
(see Appendix B. 2). 
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Test Trials 
The pre-training was followed immediately by the test trials. It was explained to the 
child that the game was obviously too easy for them so in the next part of the game, to 
make it more interesting, they had to remember what Anna and Sally had been wearing. 
The child was presented in the same way with pairs of cards, but now they were only 
allowed to look at them for 15 seconds, after which they were turned over. The array of 
cut-outs was also concealed by a screen during this stimulus viewing time to prevent any 
premature selecting. After the stimulus cards had been turned over, the screen was 
removed and the child asked to place cut-outs in the appropriate boxes as before. 
Each child was presented initially with a 1-item pair. If the child completed the trial 
successfully (i. e. recognised and correctly boxed the item displayed) the next trial 
involved a 2-item pair. So long as trials were completed successfully, the next trial 
involved one more item (up to a maximum of 8 items, which proved to be quite 
sufficient). When a child failed a trial, the next trial involved the same number of items 
up to a maximum of three trials with the same number of items. If, on either the second 
or third trial with that number of items, the child successfully recognises and boxes all 
items, then the next trial goes on to one more item as before. If the child is not 
completely successful on any of the three trials with a particular number of items, but 
successfully recognises all items on any one trial, then the test proceeded to trials with 
one more item. Each child was thus given the opportunity to demonstrate the maximum 
level of performance of which they were capable. At the point where the child fails to 
recognise all items on any of the three trials with a particular number of items, however, 
then the test was concluded. 
Scoring 
A record of each child's performance was kept on a WM Record card (see Appendix 
B. 3). The WM (Working Memory) score for each child was calculated by awarding 
one point for each completely successful Trial 1 (i. e. the first trial with each number of 
items), and half a point for each completely successful Trial 2 or 3. For an example of 
this scoring procedure, see Appendix B. 3. 
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2. The Figural Intersections Test (FIT) 
The FIT is a group administered paper and pencil test for use with children and adults 
designed by Pascual-Leone (1969) as a measure of M-power or M-space i. e. the power 
or operating capacity of the working memory. We have reviewed earlier Pascual- 
Leone's contribution to the development of the notion of working memory. This test 
went through several versions during development, and it is the final version, referred to 
in the literature as FIT RAC-794, which was used here. Essentially the test consists of 
being asked to find and mark a common area which is simultaneously inside a number 
of intersecting shapes. This task, it is argued, requires the subject to simultaneously 
hold each of the shapes in working memory while they are being operated upon in the 
process of co-ordination and searching for the common area. 
Materials 
The FIT RAC-794 consists of 36 test items, plus 8 introductory or pre-training items. 
Each item consists of two sets of simple geometric shapes, a set on the right called the 
presentation set and a set on the left called the test set. The presentation set contains a 
variable number of shapes, physically separated from each other. The test set contains 
the same shapes as the presentation set, but arranged in an overlapping configuration so 
that there exists a common area of intersection, which is simultaneously inside all of the 
shapes. 
The shapes in the test set may differ in size or orientation from those in the presentation 
set, but they match in shape and proportions. In some items there is also a misleading 
irrelevant shape in the test set (not present in the presentation set), which does not form 
a common area of intersection with all the other shapes. 
Within the pretraining items (see Appendix C. 1), the first three items involve only 1 
shape and no overlapping, two items involve 2 shapes overlapping, two items involve 2 
shapes overlapping and an irrelevant shape in the test set, and one item involves 3 shapes 
overlapping. 
Within the test items, the number of shapes in the presentation sets varies between 2 and 
8. This number designates the class of the item. Items from different classes appear in a 
random order. Within the 36 items there are five items for each class, one with an 
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irrelevant shape, except that there are no items with an irrelevant shape in class 2 and 
there are six items in class 4, two with an irrelevant shape. Examples of test items appear 
in Appendix C. 2. 
Procedure 
Pre-training 
The test was administered to small groups of children, usually all the children from one 
school class, at a time. This was never more than eight children. 
The pre-training procedure was carried out in accordance with the instructions in 
Pascual-Leone's test manual. Each child was issued with a brightly coloured felt-tip pen 
and a test booklet. The pre-training procedure essentially consists of working through 
the eight pre-training items with the group of children, and making sure that all the 
children understand the rules of this game about shapes. The concepts the children must 
understand are as follows: 
- 
left and right: on each item they are trained to first make a dot inside all the shapes 
on the right (all items) 
- 
inside: the dot must be inside the shape, on the line does not count (all items, 
particularly item 2) 
- 
matching shape: they are trained to then find matching shapes on the left (all 
items); a matching shape can be a different size (they are asked to draw a smaller circle 
on the left in item 3, and then put a dot in it), and it can be turned on its side or even 
upside down (items 3-7) 
- 
intersection of shapes: on the left we are only allowed one dot, so if there is more 
than one shape we must find a place to put our one dot that is inside all the shapes 
(items 4-7) 
- 
multiple same shapes: if there are two squares on the right, then we must put our 
dot inside two squares on the left (items 5& 7) 
- 
irrelevant shapes: shapes which are not on the right don't count 
- 
you can ignore 
them when placing your one dot on the left (items 6& 8) 
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Every effort was made to engage the children actively in this pre-training procedure, by 
asking for corrections to deliberate mistakes, asking for volunteers to give us the right 
answer, and so on. After each item was discussed all the children placed their dots and 
any errors were discussed and corrected. In each case the reason why a particular 
placement was correct was repeated. 
At the end of the procedure it was repeated again that the children should first put one 
dot in each of the separate shapes on the right, and then go to the left and put just one 
dot in a place which is inside all the shapes. They were told to think very carefully 
before placing their dot on the left because you can't rub out felt-tip pen, and more than 
one dot counts as wrong. 
Testing 
The children were then asked to complete the 36 test items, and again the procedures 
detailed in the test manual were followed. No further help was given, although the 
procedure for completing an item could be repeated. The children were encouraged to 
make a dot on the left for all items, even if they were not sure. The random ordering of 
the class of items helps to keep the children interested, because they keep getting 
relatively easy items in amongst the more difficult ones. Where a child made a mistake 
and wanted to correct it, they were told they could do so on this one occasion, but the 
next one would be counted wrong. (In fact, the corrected items is still scored as 
incorrect). 
While the children were completing the test items, the experimenter circulated amongst 
them and watched out for certain errors 
- 
such as multiple marks on the test set, dots on 
lines or so big that they cover more than one area etc 
- 
which were corrected. The test 
does not have a time limit, but, as Pascual-Leone suggests, most children completed it in 
about 20-30 minutes. 
Scoring 
The difficulty of an item is clearly largely determined by the number of shapes which 
have to be simultaneously considered. According to Pascual-Leone's (1969,1970) 
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theory subjects should successfully complete all those items in classes up to the 
capacity of their working memory, and no items beyond that point. However, the pattern 
of responses is never quite as neat as that and there are a number of issues which have 
to be addressed in order to arrive at a score. 
Two principal issues are how to count items with irrelevant shapes (is the irrelevant 
shape counted or not in determining the class? ), and whether to allow scores on more 
difficult items when simpler ones have been failed. In the FIT manual Pascual-Leone 
recommended a scoring method and presents evidence of the validity and reliability of 
the test on that basis, which is reproduced in Appendix C. 3. Johnson (1982), however, 
reviewed the arguments published in the literature about the reliability and validity of 
different scoring procedures, and resolved the matter by taking four different ways of 
scoring the results and then taking the average of these as the final score. This 
procedure has been adopted in the present study. Details of this scoring procedure, and 
Johnson's (1982) justification of it, are also reported in Appendix C. 3. 
d) Metacognition 
As we have argued, while the development of working memory might explain children's 
ability to carry out more and more complex strategies, it cannot explain the origins of 
new strategies in a child's repertoire. For this researchers have increasingly looked to 
the development of metacognition. We have reviewed earlier the common acceptance in 
the literature of the distinction first made by Flavell (1981) between metacognitive 
knowledge and metacognitive experience. One of the weaknesses in early studies of 
metamemory identified by such as Schneider (1985) was a tendency to rely on single 
measures. Within the present study, therefore, a range of activities were devised to test 
for both aspects of metacognitive development. In the analysis of results the scores on 
each of these measures is reported separately and as part of a combined Total 
Metacognition score (computed simply by weighting each of the separate measure 
scores equally and summing them). 
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1. Metacognitive Knowledge 
On the whole attempts to link children's general level of metacognitive knowledge with 
their abilities on any particular task have been disappointing. Yussen (1985), Brown 
(1987) and others, however, have pointed to a lack of precision in the choice of 
metacognitive and performance variables as an area of difficulty here. Rather than 
attempt to measure the children's general level of metacognitive knowledge, therefore, it 
was decided within the present study to restrict our investigation to their developing 
metacognitive knowledge about the MDL task based upon their experiences of 
attempting that task. This knowledge, it is argued, might be taken as a measure of the 
extent to which the children monitored their experience. The quality of this knowledge, 
as we have also suggested, might also be taken as a measure of the efficacy with which 
the children internally represented the problem. 
The test of metacognitive knowledge was administered soon after the child had 
completed the MDL task (i. e. later on the same day) and was split into three questions 
designed to find out if the child had developed an awareness of factors which made any 
particular MDL problem easier or more difficult. The form of Question 2, in particular, 
also derived to some extent from a suggestion by Lunzer (1968), developed in an earlier 
study (Whitebread (1983)) that requiring children to reproduce a problem is a good 
indication of their representation of it, and the metacognitive knowledge they have thus 
derived. 
Materials 
Stimulus cards of exactly the same kind as those used in the MDL task were used again 
for this test. 
For Question 1, example cards were needed to represent each of the three different types 
of problem, i. e. one complimentary pair showing items from four dimensions (standard 
problem), one card showing four items from different dimensions (problem involving 
negative information) and one pair showing four complimentary and four identical items 
(problem with noise). 
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For Question 2, the two basic cards of Anna and Sally with no extra clothing items and 
two sets of cut-outs of the clothing items were used. 
For Question 3, pairs of example cards were used with the following combinations of 
complimentary and identical items: two complimentary; two complimentary and two 
identical; four complimentary; four complimentary and four identical; eight 
complimentary. 
Procedure 
The children were seen individually for this test, and were told that we were going to 
play some more games about Anna and Sally. They were then presented with the 
following problems and asked the following questions: 
Question 1 
The child was reminded that in the game about the twins they had been presented with 
three different kinds of problems. The experimenter then reminded the child about the 
three problem types, describing what the child had been shown on each trial, and 
demonstrated each with example cards. With all the example cards laid out in front of 
him or her, the child was then asked to indicate the answers to two questions: 
"Which type of problem was easiest ?" 
and 
"Which type of problem was hardest ?" 
Question 2 
The child was then shown the basic cards of Anna and Sally and the two sets of cut-outs 
of all the clothing items that their teacher had bought for them to wear. The child was 
again then asked to respond to two questions: 
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it 
and 
Can you dress the twins so that it would be easy to find out their secret It 
"Can you dress the twins so that it would be hard to find out their secret ?" 
Question 3 
The child was then told that they were going to be shown how the twins had arrived at 
school on some other days. They were then shown, in this order, the example pairs of 
cards with the following combinations of complimentary and identical items: two 
complimentary; two complimentary and two identical; four complimentary; four 
complimentary and four identical; eight complimentary. On each occasion they were 
asked the question: 
"If the twins arrived at school dressed like this, how many times do you think they 
would need to swop clothes before you could work out what was their secret ?" 
Scoring 
In broad terms the children's responses to these three tasks were scored as follows. 
For Question 1, one point was awarded for each correct assessment based upon the 
child's own performance in terms of the number of problems solved. This was taken to 
be a reasonable indication of how the child would have experienced relative difficulty, if 
they had monitored it. Where the number of problems solved had been the same for 
different problem types it was not felt to be justified to go on to look at Trial of Last 
Error scores. This was partly because any one child carried out the MDL problems in a 
particular order, which might be expected to influence T of LE scores, but which might 
not necessarily correlate to the child's own perception of the relative difficulty of the 
different problems. In these circumstances the standard problem was taken to be the 
easiest and either of the other two types of problem as the hardest. 
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For Question 2, points were awarded according to the number of dimensions of clothing 
items which the child put on the twins. The more dimensions the child put on the more 
points were scored in the "hard" condition and the fewer points were scored in the 
"easy" condition. The scoring system gave most weight to dimensions where the twins 
were dressed by the child in complimentary items, but some weight was also given to the 
addition of identical items. 
For Question 3, the absolute number of "swops" suggested to be needed by the child 
was discounted. Rather, the scoring was based on the child indicating that they 
recognised, by steadily raising the number of swops needed, that the problems presented 
were increasingly more difficult. 
Details of the exact calculation procedures for scores on these three questions, and the 
record sheet used, are reported in Appendix D. 1. 
2. Metacognitive Awareness and Control 
Brown (1978), as we have reviewed earlier, has provided a detailed analysis of the 
necessary components of a metacognitive system. Based upon this and other analyses 
we have selected for inclusion in the present study two aspects of metacognitive 
experience or processing which might be argued to be particularly significant for the 
development of efficient problem-solving behaviour. These are those aspects referred to 
by Brown (1978) as Metacomprehension and Insight (referred to within the present 
study as Strategy Flexibility) 
Metacomprehension 
The test of Metacomprehension made use of a procedure devised by Berch and Evans 
(1973) to ascertain how confident a child is that their present response is correct. This 
involved carrying out two further standard MDL problems with each child, but asking 
them to stop the problem when they were confident that they had found the correct 
solution. The children indicated their level of confidence by pointing to one of two 
photographs of a child of their own gender looking either pleased or unsure. Berch and 
Evans (1973) have argued that this procedure compensates to some extent for children's 
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conservative response bias in a recognition memory test. It seemed that this might, 
therefore, be a useful technique to adopt when asking children in the present study to 
indicate when they knew they had found the twin's secret. 
Materials 
Two sets of stimulus cards of exactly the same kind and structure as those used in the 
standard MDL task were used in this test. This comprised two further sets of 16 
complimentary pairs of cards with each girl shown wearing all possible combinations of 
clothing items from 4 dimensions. Within these sets of cards the pattern of item 
presentation followed the standardised sequence used in the 6 MDL problems and 
reported in Appendix A. 5. Over the two problems each of the 8 clothing dimensions 
was included once, with different combinations of items being used to those used in the 
MDL problems. 
Two pairs of photographs were also used. One pair showed a boy and one a girl. 
Within each pair one photograph showed the child looking happy and confident, and the 
other showed the boy or girl looking unsure. These photographs are reproduced in 
Appendix D. 2. 
Procedure 
This test was carried out with each child individually immediately after the test of 
Metacognitive Knowledge. 
The two problems were carried out exactly as before for the standard MDL problems. 
The child was briefly reminded of the game (which they had played only the day 
before), but this time it was explained that it was up to them to stop the game when they 
were sure that they knew the twin's secret for that day. 
They were then shown the two photographs of the child the same gender as themselves, 
which were discussed with the child. The child was asked to describe how the child in 
each photograph felt, and this was discussed with reference to everyday classroom 
experiences until the experimenter was happy that the child understood the difference 
between feeling unsure and being confident that you know something. As a check of 
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this understanding, the experimenter then asked each child a few questions and asked 
the child to place their hand on the photo which indicated how they felt about their 
answer. For example: 
Experimenter: "What is two add three? " 
Child: "5 !" (places hand on confident photo) 
Experimenter: "How old am I ?" 
Child: "20 ?" (places hand on unsure photo) 
After 5 or 6 questions of this type, if the child was clearly using the photos correctly, the 
MDL problems were started. If not, then the experimenter asked more questions and 
discussed the responses until the child was able to use the photos correctly. In practice, 
very few of the children had any difficulty with this procedure. 
The child was then asked to place a hand on the unsure photo at the beginning of the 
MDL problems. The child was told to keep their hand on the unsure photo as long as 
they were not sure they knew the twin's secret, but as soon as they were sure that they 
did know it, then they were to stop the game by moving their hand to the confident 
photo and saying: 
"I'm sure Anna always wears the 
.... 
". 
The experimenter conducted the problems exactly as in the NIDL problems, with the 
addition that after the child had offered their hypothesis or hypotheses at the end of each 
trial, he asked: 
"Are you sure that is what Anna always wears today, or are you not sure yet? Do 
you want to keep your hand where it is or do you want to move it to the other photo 
now? " 
For each problem the experimenter kept a record of the child's responses on an MDL 
record card as before (see Appendix A. 4), but the presentation of stimulus cards 
stopped immediately the child declared him or herself sure about the twin's secret, and 
moved a hand onto the confident photo. 
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Experimental design 
Within this test it was once again important to control for the effects of feedback 
patterns. The solution to each problem was again defined by one of the six possible 
feedback patterns used in the MDL task. On this occasion, however, as each child only 
tackled two problems, the feedback patterns were rotated between subjects so that within 
each age group the first child received patterns 1. and 2., the second child patterns 2. and 
3., the third child patterns 3. and 4. and so on. As this produces six possible pattern 
combinations, four children within each age group received the same pair of feedback 
patterns. 
Scoring 
The children's performance on this test was scored according to the accuracy with which 
they stopped the game related to the trial upon which they should have been sure as to 
the solution (because of the structure of the card sequence this is always Trial 3 in these 
problems). There are essentially three possible types of performance. Either: 
- 
the child stops before it is possible to be sure 
- 
the child stops as soon as it is possible to be sure 
- 
the child stops after it is possible to be sure. 
The first response is clearly the weakest. Developmentally, as we have reviewed, we 
know that young children initially tend to be overconfident about their state of 
knowledge. The second response is clearly the strongest, and the third response is 
clearly somewhere in between. Some account has also to be taken of whether the child 
stops the game having actually discovered the correct solution or not. A simple scoring 
system was devised, therefore to take account of both of these factors. Thus, scores 
were awarded for each of the two problems according to the following scheme: 
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Score 
0 child stops the problem before it is possible to be sure about the 
solution (i. e. before Trial 3) 
1 child stops the problem when it is possible to be sure about the 
solution, but incorrect solution 
2 child stops the problem when it is possible to be sure about the 
solution, with correct solution, but at least 2 Trials after the 
correct Hypothesis is first verbalised 
3 child stops the problem when it is possible to be sure about the 
solution, with correct solution, and either immediately or on the 
next Trial after the correct Hypothesis is first verbalised 
With any constructed scoring system of this kind, of course, there are dangers that the 
scoring system itself might influence the structure of the results. In the case of this 
measure this turned out to be a very real issue. The initial scoring system was, therefore, 
adapted, as is reported when we come to deal with it within the Results chapter. The 
adaptations carried out, however, did not substantially alter the pattern of results, 
suggesting that this original scoring system was adequately reflecting the real pattern of 
the children's responses. 
Strategy Flexibility 
Another aspect of metacognitive awareness and control highlighted by Brown (1978) is 
that referred to by her as 'Insight', which she contrasts with 'Blind-Rule Following'. 
Brown (1978) reviewed the studies of Butterfield and Belmont (1977), for example, 
concerned with changes in the employment of a strategy when it was more or less 
appropriate. In the present study a test of Strategy Flexibility was devised which 
consisted of teaching the child a strategy for solving the standard 4 dimension MDL 
problem, and then seeing whether the child would be able to change the strategy when it 
became inappropriate, or would blindly follow the rule. 
123 
Materials 
For the strategy training trials 4 sets of stimulus cards of the same kind and structure as 
in the standard MDL task were used (i. e. with complimentary items for 4 clothing 
dimensions). The sets used here, however, differed in two respects from the standard 
sets. First, they contained only the first 8 complimentary pairs in the sequence, because 
this is all that is needed to reach a solution following the strategic procedure adopted in 
this test. Second, the solution to each set is predetermined, and the cards are labelled 
either "Anna" or "Sally" on the back. 
For the test trials 6 further sets of the same kind were used, except that the clothing 
items were complimentary in only 2 dimensions and identical in the other 2 dimensions. 
These dimensions were arranged so that the 'solution' dimension was always nearer the 
bottom of the picture than the identical (and thus, irrelevant) dimensions. An example of 
these sets of cards is reproduced in Appendix D. 3. 
Procedure 
This test was again carried out individually with each child immediately following the 
test of Metacomprehension. 
The Experimenter began by explaining to the child that he had some further problems 
about Anna and Sally to which he did not know the solution (the twin's secret) himself. 
However, he had a good way of quickly working out what their secret must be. He then 
demonstrated the Dimension Checking strategy with one of the strategy training sets of 
cards (i. e. with 4 complimentary dimensions). This consisted of dimension checking 
each of the 4 dimensions, beginning with the dimension which was nearest the top of the 
picture and proceeding down in order from top to bottom. The Experimenter explained 
to the child that this was a good idea because then you couldn't get muddled and forget 
which pairs of clothing items you had already checked. The dimension checking 
procedure for each dimension was as follows: 
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- 
trial l: 
- 
guess which twin is Anna 
- 
turn cards over to read names and discover which is Anna 
- 
verbalise which clothing item from the dimension under 
consideration is currently being worn by Anna 
- 
trial 2: 
- 
guess that Anna is the twin wearing the verbalised clothing 
item 
- 
turn cards over to discover which is Anna 
- 
if Anna is still wearing verbalised item, proceed to next trial 
and repeat procedure; 
- 
if Sally is now wearing the verbalised item, discard that 
dimension, and verbalise the clothing item which Anna is 
wearing from the next dimension down 
- 
Repeat this procedure until trial 8 is reached, by which time the 
solution will have been discovered. 
Having carried out this procedure with the first set of cards, the Experimenter then 
repeated it with the second training set of cards, this time encouraging the child to join 
in. The child was then given the third and fourth sets to practise the strategy, helped if 
necessary by the Experimenter. If the child did not use the Top to Bottom Dimension 
Checking strategy perfectly on his or her own with the fourth set of training cards, then 
the first set was used again and so on until the child did master the strategy. 
After the fourth set, or as soon as the child carried out the strategy successfully unaided 
with a repeat set, the test sets of cards with the irrelevant dimensions were introduced. 
With these sets, of course, the Top to Bottom strategy was inappropriate because the top 
two dimensions were irrelevant. A record was kept of the child's verbalised hypotheses 
on each trial for each of the problems (see Appendix D. 4). New sets of cards were 
presented to the child until they completely ignored the irrelevant dimensions on two 
consecutive sets. 
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Scorina 
The test of Strategy Flexibility was scored according to the trial on which the child 
changed from "blindly" following the strategy they had been given (dimension checking 
from top to bottom) to a strategy which ignored the top 2 irrelevant dimensions. In order 
to score a change of strategy had to be consistently maintained for two consecutive 
trials, as follows: 
Performance 
No consistent change of strategy over all 6 trials 
Eventual strategy change maintained over 2 consecutive trials 
(i. e. on trials 2-6) 
Immediate strategy change maintained over 2 consecutive trials 
(i. e. on trials 1& 2) 
e) Attributional style: Locus of Control 
Score 
0 
1 
2 
We now come on to various aspects of learning style. This includes elements of what 
are referred to in the literature as 'patterns of attribution' and 'cognitive style'. For the 
purposes of the present study three aspects of individual difference were selected which 
have appeared in the literature to have some claim to be particularly significant. These 
are Locus of Control, perhaps the most heavily researched element in style of 
attribution, together with two cognitive style dimensions, Cognitive Tempo 
(Reflectivity-Impulsivity) and Field Dependence-Independence. We have reviewed 
earlier the literature which establishes the claims for each of these aspects of individual 
functioning. 
This first section reports the manner in which each child's Locus of Control was 
assessed. 
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Materials 
Within the study Locus of Control was measured by means of the Children's 
Attribution of Responsibility and Locus of Control Scale (CARALOC) developed by 
Gammage (1975,1982), which was derived and adapted from reliable and well validated 
American scales and refined for use with English Primary school children. It attempts 
to measure the extent to which a child's Locus of Control is internal, as opposed to 
external. It was refined on the national cohort which formed the sample for the Child 
Health and Education Study (CHES), a longitudinal study carried out at Bristol 
University of all children in Britain born during one week in April 1970. As reported 
by Osborn and Milbank (1987), in their report based on that study, scores on the 
CARALOC scale proved to be the 'behavioural assessment' most strongly associated 
with mathematics, reading and other attainments at age ten. 
The CARALOC scale comprises 20 items. Each item consists of a question about how 
the child feels about some aspect of school work or social relationships, and the child is 
simply asked to agree, disagree, or indicate that they are unsure about each of the 
questions, by placing a tick in one of three columns headed "Yes", "No" and "? ". In 
order to make the test less transparent only 15 of the items measure Locus of Control. 
The other 5 items ask the child questions about attitudes to school and schoolwork 
unrelated to Locus of Control. A copy of the question and response sheets used in the 
present study appears in Appendix E. 1. 
Procedure 
This test was administered in a separate session with the same small groups of children 
as those used for the FIT test. 
The experimenter began by explaining to the children that he was going to ask them 
how they felt about a number of questions, which were written down on the sheet they 
had been given. It was explained that after each question there were three boxes, marked 
"Yes", "No" and "? " (which means "Don't Know" ) and that they had to put a tick in one 
of these boxes depending upon how they felt about each of the questions. 
It was emphasised that there were no right or wrong answers to these questions, because 
different people feel differently about them. 
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It was further explained that they were not the sort of questions about which you need to 
think a long time. If they felt straight away that they agreed with a question then they 
should put a tick in the "Yes" box. If they knew straight away that they disagreed with 
the question they should put a tick in the "No" box. If they had to think about it for 
very long, it was explained, that meant they were not sure and they should put a tick in 
the "? " box. 
It was then explained that the questions were about things that children do at home and 
at school, and things that sometimes happen. If one of the questions was about 
something that they had never done, or something that had never happened to them, then 
they were asked to try and imagine what they would feel about it. If they could not 
imagine how they would feel then they were told to just answer "Don't Know". 
Following this preamble the experimenter then told the children that he was going to 
read Question 1, and that the children should follow it on their sheets. They should then 
put a tick in one of the three boxes. Then he would read Question 2, and so on. 
The experimenter then read Question 1 and then said: 
"Now, if you agree, put a tick in the 'Yes' box, if you disagree put a tick in the 'No' 
box, and if you can't decide, put a tick in the 'T box. " 
The children were then given 10 seconds to make their tick. If they had not made a tick 
after this interval, they were told to put it in the '? ' box. The experimenter then read out 
Question 2 and so on, following the same procedure through the 20 questions. 
Scoring 
Each of the 15 Locus of Control items was scored according to the procedure devised 
by Osborn and his associates. The items are scored positively in the direction of an 
internal Locus of Control, so that the larger the score the more internalised the child's 
Locus of Control. Thus a child can score 0,1 or 2 on each item. A "Don't Know" 
response always scores 1. On the positively directed items "Yes" scores 2 and "No" 
scores 0, while other items are negatively directed and the scoring is reversed. The 
maximum score achievable is thus 30. The details of the scoring for each of the items is 
reported in Appendix E. 1. 
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f) Cognitive Tempo: Reflectivity-Impulsivity 
As reviewed earlier, Kogan (1971,1983) has produced comprehensive reviews of work 
in relation to children's cognitive styles, and possible theoretical and educational 
implications. From the multiplicity of different dimensions of 'style' proposed in the 
literature, one or two have emerged as worthy of further investigation. Amongst these, 
the dimensions of Reflectivity-Impulsivity (otherwise referred to as Cognitive Tempo) 
and Field Dependence-Independence have, as we have seen, been taken up within the 
literature, and have been shown to be of some significance in relation to other aspects of 
children's cognitive functioning and development. These are, therefore, the two aspects 
of cognitive style which were investigated within the present study. 
This section reports the manner in which each child's Cognitive Tempo was assessed. 
Materials 
The instrument which has been very predominantly used to assess children's cognitive 
tempo is the Matching Familiar Figures Test (MUTT) developed by Kagan et al (1964). 
This test attempts to assess the extent to which a child delays a response in the course of 
searching for the correct alternative in a context of response uncertainty. The child is 
required to match a standard figure with one of six variants, only one of which is, in fact, 
identical to the standard. Latency of response and number of errors are obtained for 
each test item. 
As Kogan(1983) reviews, however, the MFFT has been severely criticised as a 
psychometric instrument on a number of grounds. The principal criticisms relate to the 
unreliability of the error scores, and to the manner in which error and latency scores 
were originally used as a measure of cognitive tempo. We will deal with the latter 
criticism below when we consider scoring procedures. The most successful attempt to 
deal with the first criticism, however, has been that by Cairns and Cammock (1978), who 
developed a longer and more reliable version of the test. The original MFFT had a 
number of different forms, each containing 12 items, and reported test-retest and internal 
consistency reliabilities averaged only around 
. 
52. Cairns and Cammock investigated 
the item-total error correlations of 30 test items and selected the 20 items which 
discriminated most efficiently between 'impulsive' and 'reflective' 7-11 year old children. 
129 
On this basis they produced a much more reliable version of the test, with reliabilities 
calculated using the delayed split-halves technique of 
. 
89 for errors and 
. 
91 for 
latencies. They named this new version of the test the MFF20, and it is this version 
which was used within the present study. 
In the administration of the MFF20 the test items are preceded by two practice items. 
Each item consisted of two cards, on one of which was printed the target picture or 
figure, and on the other the 6 variants. The cards were of standard A4 size. A copy of 
one of the practice items and a sample test item are reproduced in Appendix F. 1. 
A stopwatch was also used to record latency times. 
Procedure 
This test was administered individually to each of the children on a separate day within 
the testing programme. 
The experimenter sat on the opposite side of a table from the child and placed the stack 
of cards on the table between them. The stack of cards was arranged with each of the 
target figure cards face down on top of its associated six variants card, so that when the 
experimenter lifted up the top card and stood it up vertically behind the stack the target 
and six variants were simultaneously revealed to the child. 
The experimenter greeted the children and relaxed them with a little incidental talk, 
explained that they were going to play another game today and then followed the 
instructions issued with the MFF20 test. These began with the experimenter turning 
over the first practice item and saying: 
"I am going to show you a picture of something you know and then some pictures that 
look like it. You will have to point to the picture on the bottom page (points ) that is just 
like the one on this top page (points ). Let's do some for practice. " 
The experimenter then helped the child to find the correct answer for the two practice 
items. These items are very straightforward and none of the children experience any 
difficulty in completing them successfully. The experimenter then said: 
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" Now we are going to do some that are a little bit harder. You will see a picture on 
top and six pictures on the bottom. Find the one that is just like the one on top and 
point to it. " 
The experimenter then lifted up the next card to reveal the first test item and 
simultaneously started the stopwatch. As soon as the child pointed to one of the six 
variants on the bottom card the stopwatch was stopped and the latency time recorded. If 
the child had pointed to the correct matching figure, the experimenter praised the child 
and said: 
"Well done. That's right. Now see if you can do this one. " 
If the child's response was incorrect the experimenter said: 
"No, that's not the right one. Have another go. Find the one that's just like this one 
(points to target figure ). " 
The child was allowed to keep trying on each item until the correct variant was pointed 
to or the child had made six errors. In this way all 20 items were worked through. 
Scoring 
For each item the experimenter recorded the time lapse (or latency) between the child 
first seeing the target and variants (when the top card was lifted up) and the child 
pointing to one of the variants, together with the number of errors made before the 
correct answer was identified. These were recorded on an MFF20 record sheet, a 
completed sample copy of which is reproduced in Appendix F. 2. As shown on this 
sample, the total number of errors and the average latency per item were then calculated 
and recorded. 
As Kogan (1983) reports, originally these error and latency scores were treated as 
separate measures, and much of the early literature was taken up with the debate as to 
which was the better measures of the Reflectivity-Impulsivity dimension. Early attempts 
to integrate the two measures consisted of simply plotting the two scores against one 
another on a scatterplot and splitting the resulting scatterplot into four quadrants around 
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the median scores for each of the measures. This method was typically used to classify 
children as fast-inaccurate, fast-accurate, slow-accurate or slow-inaccurate. 
These early scoring procedures were criticised, however, by Salkind and Wright (1977) 
on a number of grounds, principally that they resulted in the loss of valuable 
information. If only errors or latency are considered, this gives an incomplete picture of 
the children's strategies for processing information, and the quadrant method replaces 
continuous data with oversimplified dichotomies. They therefore proposed a model of 
Reflectivity-Impulsivity which conceptually and methodologically integrates speed (or 
latency) and accuracy (or errors). The resulting scoring procedure, which has been 
adopted for the purposes of the present study, synthesises the raw latency and error 
scores and converts them into the constructs of Impulsivity and Efficiency. 
Within the present study only the score for Impulsivity was calculated and used 
according to the formula devised by Salkind and Wright (1977). Details of this scoring 
procedure are reported in Appendix F. 2. For the purposes of the analysis of results 
these scores were reversed, so that Reflectivity, which is likely to be positively related to 
performance on the MDL task, is scored positively. 
g) Field Dependence-Independence 
No study concerned with stylistic variation in children could possibly exclude some 
consideration of Field Dependence-Independence (FDI). As we have reviewed earlier, 
and as Kogan (1983) illustrates in his review, no other cognitive style dimension has 
attracted anything like the sheer volume of research interest. A number of different 
tasks have been developed as measures of FDI, but two have emerged as the 
overwhelmingly dominant choices of researchers working in this area. These are the 
Rod & Frame Test (RFT) and the Embedded Figures Test (EFT). As Kogan (1971) 
reviews, both of these tests have been shown to be reliable and Witkin and his associates 
have produced evidence of a high level of intertask consistency for groups of children 
and adults. By the time of his second review, however, Kogan (1983) reviews the 
extensive debate carried out in the interim as to whether these two tests are measuring 
exactly the same cognitive construct, or two different constructs. The best advice at the 
present time, however, appears to be to use both measures and use both scores 
separately, or to produce a composite score. This is the procedure which has been 
adopted within the present study. 
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1. The Rod & Frame Test 
This is the earliest test devised by Witkin and his associates, and arose out of work 
concerned with how people locate the upright in space. Witkin et al (1954) suggested 
that the upright can be located by means of information from the visual environment (or 
'field') and from sensations within the body. The Rod & Frame test was devised to see 
which of these two sources of information was most dominant in individuals when the 
information coming from the two sources was contradictory. Interest in this test arises 
from the finding that there are marked individual differences in the responses to this 
test. Some individuals appear to rely mostly upon the information from the visual field, 
and are thus field-dependent, while others appear to pay most attention to information 
from their own body sensations, and are thus field-independent. 
Materials 
The materials needed to carry out this test were the Rod & Frame apparatus, a cardboard 
model of this apparatus and a tape recorder. 
The Rod & Frame apparatus consisted of a luminous square frame pivoted at its centre 
so that it could be tilted to the left or right up to 280 from the vertical. Pivoted at the 
same centre but moving independently of the frame is a luminous rod. A battery and red 
bulb were used in a circuit, attached to the apparatus, which allowed the experimenter to 
read the angle of the rod tilt from a protractor mounted at the back of the apparatus. This 
apparatus was essentially the same as that used by Witkin and his associates, a 
photograph of which appears in Appendix G. 1. 
Procedure 
This test was carried out individually with each child on a separate day within the testing 
programme. 
However, as this test has to be carried out in a totally darkened room, the task was 
explained to the children beforehand in small groups and in the light with the use of a 
cardboard model of the Rod & Frame apparatus. The children were told that they would 
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be doing the next game in the dark, and all they would be able to see would be a square 
frame with a straight rod inside it. They were then shown how the rod and the frame 
could both be tilted in either direction, and it was explained that all they had to do was 
say when the rod was straight up or vertical. To ensure that they understood what was 
required, each child was asked to find a vertical line in the environment, which they all 
managed quite easily. As a reminder, they were all asked to do this again individually 
just before their turn at the test. 
The experimenter then played the game with the group. This consisted of tilting the 
frame and the rod and gradually moving the rod towards the vertical until told to stop by 
the children. The children could say "Move" if they wanted the experimenter to move 
the rod more, "Back" if they wanted it moved back towards its original position, or 
"Stop" if they were happy that it was now upright. 
As it was vital that they did not see the test apparatus and the surrounding room in the 
light, each child was led blindfolded into the room by an assistant and sat down in a 
chair positioned at about 8 feet from the Rod & Frame apparatus, which was mounted 
on a table so that the child would be looking directly at it. The assistant then closed the 
door to the room, turned off the light and removed the child's blindfold. 
The experimenter, who was seated behind the Rod & Frame apparatus, greeted the child 
as he or she came in the room and, once the blindfold was off, reminded them about the 
square frame and the rod which they had played with earlier and demonstrated how they 
both tilted in either direction, making sure that the child understood which part of the 
apparatus was the rod. In the completely darkened room all the child would be able to 
see was the luminous rod and frame. 
The frame was then tilted at 280 to the left (as the child saw it) and the rod was tilted at 
270, also to the left. The child was asked to say either "Move", "Back" or "Stop" as 
before. Each time the child said either "Move" or "Back" the rod was moved 30 by the 
experimenter. When the child said "Stop" the experimenter recorded the reading (i. e. the 
angle of tilt as shown by the protractor) into the tape recorder. 
Each child completed 8 trials. The frame was tilted 280 to the left or right on the 
following schedule : LLRRLLRR. The rod was initially tilted 270 to the left or right on 
the following schedule: LRRLLRRL. This ensured that of the 8 trials, 4 were with the 
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rod initially tilted to the left, and 4 to the right. Also, in 4 trials the rod and frame were 
initially tilted in the same direction, and in the other 4 they were initially tilted in 
opposite directions. 
Before each of the trials the child was asked to say if they could see anything else in the 
room other than the rod and frame. If the child became adjusted to the light, and could 
thus use other cues from the visual environment other than the frame, then the child was 
asked to turn round for a minute or two while the light was turned on. 
Scoring 
After the tests were complete the 8 readings for each child were simply transcribed and 
averaged to produce an overall score. For the purposes of the analysis of results these 
scores were reversed so that Field-Independence, which is likely to be associated with 
performance on the MDL task, is scored positively. 
2. Children's Embedded Figures Test 
The Embedded Figures test (EFT), also devised by Witkin and his associates, also 
attempts to assess the extent to which people's perceptions are dependent or 
independent of the surrounding visual field. In this case, however, the subject's task on 
each trial is to locate a previously seen simple figure within a larger complex figure 
which has been so organised as to obscure or embed the sought-after simple figure. 
Witkin et al (1971) present evidence from numerous research studies arguing that the 
EFT measures the same kind of perceptual style dimension as the Rod & Frame test, 
and that the FDI construct measured by these tests has broad ramifications for general 
cognitive functioning. They present evidence, for example, of gender and age-related 
differences for scores on the EFT. As we have noted earlier, however, Kogan (1983) 
has reviewed evidence produced subsequently to suggest that the EFT may be 
measuring a related but different aspect of Field Dependence-Independence. 
As Witkin et al (1971) also review, the original EFT test proved to be too difficult for 
most children under the age of nine, and this led to the development first of CIEF by 
Goodenough & Eagle (1963), which was devised to be simpler and more appropriate 
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for young children, and which proved to have good reliability and validity for children in 
the 5-9 age range, but had certain practical difficulties. 
Stephen A. Karp and Norma Konstadt then developed the Children's Embedded Figures 
Test (CEFT), which incorporated many of the features of the Goodenough & Eagle test, 
but eliminated some of the practical disadvantages. Witkin et al (1971) report a 
test-retest reliability of 
. 
87 for the CEFT for children in the age range 5-12 yrs. Claims 
in respect of validity are based upon correlations with EFT and WISC subtests. The 
CEFT requires children to find two simple forms in the shape of a TENT and a 
HOUSE which are embedded within a number of more complex figures. The CEFT 
was used within the present study as being most appropriate to the age-range under 
consideration. 
Materials 
The CEFT consists of the following materials: 
Simple forms: cut-out models of the two forms (TENT and HOUSE) which are 
embedded in the complex figures. 
Discrimination series (D1-8): a set of 8 cards, each of which shows one of the 
simple forms and three similar, but obviously incorrect forms. There are 4 such cards 
for the TENT and 4 for the HOUSE forms. 
Demonstration Series (El & 2): 2 cards, each of which has 3 incomplete pictures, 
representing stages of embeddedness of the simple TENT form. 
Practice Series (P1-3): 3 complex figures which are designed to illustrate the 
procedure for the child, 2 for the TENT series, and 1 for the HOUSE series. 
Test Series: a series of complex figures, 11 of which (T 1-11) have the simple TENT 
form embedded in them, and 14 of which (Hl-14) have the simple HOUSE form 
embedded in them. 
Examples of all these materials are reproduced in Appendix G. 2 
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Procedure 
The test was administered individually on a separate day within the testing programme, 
broadly in accordance with the procedures laid out in the test manual prepared by 
Witkin et al (1971). 
Pre-training 
The experimenter began by training the child to discriminate the simple TENT form, 
using the Simple Form cut-out of the TENT and Discrimination cards D1-4. The child 
was shown the cut-out and it was discussed that it looked something like a tent. The 
child was then asked to find another tent that looked exactly like the cut-out on card D 1. 
When the child had pointed to one of the forms the cut-out was placed over it to see if it 
matched. If it did not match the experimenter discussed with the child why it was 
incorrect. The concepts of correct shape, size and orientation were stressed. The child 
was then shown card D2 and so on, until he or she made two correct selections in 
succession. In practice, none of the children had any difficulty with this. 
The experimenter then demonstrated the embedding process for the child using the 
Demonstration cards E1&2. With the TENT cut-out still visible on the table the 
experimenter pointed to each figure in turn on the two Demonstration cards and asked 
the child to show where the tent was by running his or her finger around the outline of 
the TENT shape hidden in the figure. In each case the cut-out was then used by the 
child to confirm the result. If the child had any difficulty in locating the TENT in any of 
these figures, the experimenter showed the child where it was by running his finger 
around the correct outline and then placing the cut-out over the correctly identified form. 
The fact that lines may cross the TENT form, and that different parts of it may be 
different colours was emphasised. 
Finding the TENT form fully embedded in complex figures was then practiced using 
the Practice cards P1 & 2, using the same procedure as with cards El & 2. With card 
P2, however, the TENT cut-out was removed from view so that the child had to find the 
TENT form 'blind'. Once again the child's answer was checked using the cut-out, and 
the correct answer demonstrated if the child made a mistake. 
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Tes"n 
The child was then required to locate the TENT shape on the Test cards in the same 
manner, without the TENT form in view. The 6 yr. olds began with card Ti. The 8 and 
10 yr. olds, however, in accordance with the Test Manual instructions, began with card 
T6 and were credited with items T1-5 providing they were successful on at least three of 
cards 717-11. If they had less than three successes on these cards, however, then they 
were tested on T1-5 as well. Testing was stopped upon completion of the TENT series 
if the child failed all cards T7-11. Otherwise the child then went on to tackle the 
HOUSE cards. 
Before presenting the items in the HOUSE series (Hl-14), a brief pre-training 
procedure was carried out as before using Discrimination cards D5-8 to introduce the 
HOUSE form, and the single Practice card P3. 
The child then proceeded to work through the HOUSE Test cards until there had been 
five consecutive failures, when the test was stopped. 
On cards T1-3 and H1-3, if the child failed to identify the simple form correctly, the 
experimenter demonstrated the correct answer, using the cut-out. After that, however, no 
feedback was given and the cut-out was not shown except if the child requested to see it, 
or if the child had three consecutive failures, or to verify the child's answer. 
Scoring 
A successful identification of the simple form was only scored as correct if it was made 
before the cut-out was seen on any particular item. Responses were simply scored 1 for 
a correct identification and 0 for a failure. The total score for any child thus equalled the 
number of items upon which the child was successful, 25 being the maximum score. 
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Chapter 5. RESULTS 
Section A) Introduction: Review of Aims and Structure of Analysis of the 
Data 
It is important that the methods of analysis used in a study of this sort are clearly related 
to the questions and hypotheses under investigation. This introduction, therefore, 
attempts to explain the main methods of analysis used on the data collected with 
reference to the aims of the study and the main hypotheses under investigation. 
The first aim of the study was to explore the development of cognitive strategies 
amongst 6-10 year old children on the MDL task. Our hypothesis was that children's 
developing responses to this problem solving task can be described in terms of 
increasingly sophisticated and complex strategies. It was further hypothesised that this 
developing pattern of strategic behaviour is not simply a linear sequence, nor is it 
describable in terms of just one or two overriding factors. Rather the development of 
problem-solving strategies is a complex process involving successive recombinations of 
different strategic elements. At each stage of development the performance of an 
individual child is thus best described not in terms of their place on particular linear 
dimensions, or of their adoption of one particular strategy, but in terms of the pattern of 
their response relative to characteristically developing patterns of strategic behaviour. 
A range of strategies adopted by children in response to the MDL task has been 
identified in the literature reviewed earlier. From this analysis, as described in the 
previous chapter, 10 Strategy Components were identified, and the children's responses 
to the MDL task scored for each of these components. The correlation matrix between 
these Strategy Components is reported in Table 5.1. at the beginning of the next section. 
It reveals a mixed pattern of predominantly middle range positive correlations (19 
between 
. 
40 and 
. 
70), with a relatively smaller proportion of strong positive correlations 
( 10 of more than 
. 
70) and quite a sprinkling of weak or negative correlations (16 less 
than 
. 
40). 
The significance of some of these relationships for the development of strategic 
behaviour will be discussed at the beginning of the next section along with the table of 
correlations, but for the moment the overall pattern is the matter of interest. The rather 
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complicated pattern of inter-relationships revealed by this table, and the evidence 
reviewed earlier about the complex nature of strategy acquisition and development, 
suggested that it might be profitable to analyse the children's strategic behaviour by 
means of Cluster Analysis. This method of analysis seemed most likely to accurately 
represent and reflect the complex nature of the development of children's 
problem-solving strategies, because it picks out typical patterns in multivariate data of 
this kind, rather than reducing complex patterns to one or two linear factors. Brennan 
(1971) demonstrated the efficacy of this kind of statistical technique for analysing 
multivariate data in the behavioural and social sciences some time ago. Since then it has, 
strangely, not been widely used. Within education its most celebrated use was within 
Bennett's study in the 1970's of teacher types (see, for example, Bennett & Jordan 
(1975)). It remains, nevertheless, in the view of the author of this thesis, a useful 
statistical tool; its utility is demonstrated by the light it throws on the pattern of 
children's strategic development within the present study. 
The next section (B) describes the Cluster Analysis carried out, and the basis upon 
which a solution was reached indicating that the data grouped most reasonably into 7 
clusters, 5 of which are numerous enough in terms of cases within the sample studied to 
be worthy of further detailed analysis. These Clusters are described in terms of their 
mean scores on the Strategy Components, by means of a closer examination of 5 
'central' cases from each of the 5 main clusters, and by a Discriminant Function 
Analysis to explore the existence of any general factors distinguishing between the 
identified patterns of strategic behaviour. This analysis revealed a general 
developmental factor together with a 'style' factor clearly distinguishing between the 
different strategy clusters. 
Section C) begins with an analysis of the children's performance on the MDL task, and 
compares the results of the present study with previous findings. It then goes on to 
examine the second main hypothesis of the study which is that a strong relationship 
exists between strategies and performance. Again, this was explored by a variety of 
means including the use of correlations, comparison of mean scores and the 
performance profiles of the 5 most "central" cases in each strategy cluster. The 
hypothesised strong relationship was indeed found, and the existence of such a strong 
relationship between strategy and performance acts as a kind of validation of the clusters 
of strategic behaviour identified. Examination of the mean scores of Strategy Clusters 
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on each of the three Performance Indicators also revealed evidence to support the 
hypothesised developmental sequence in the quality of understanding and performance 
on the MDL task. 
The third main area for investigation relates to the relationship between strategy and 
performance and a range of factors identified from the literature to be significant for 
general cognitive development, and the development of problem-solving skills. These 
relationships were explored again by the procedures outlined in the previous paragraph, 
and also, since it was felt likely to be difficult to distinguish the separate relationships or 
effects of particular Predictor Measures, by means of Multiple Linear Regression. 
Clear relationships were revealed between some of the Predictor Measures, Strategy 
Components and Performance Indicators, principally those related to metacognition and 
representation, with lesser effects related to field-independence. 
Some relationships were revealed, however, of a non-linear and complex nature. The 
final section of this chapter reports the findings in relation to this issue. It was 
hypothesised that there would be significant interactions between the underlying 
cognitive factors, patterns of strategic behaviour and performance. For example, a 
previous study (Whitebread, 1983) had identified such an interaction between 
metacognition, working memory, strategy and performance on a reclassification task. 
This was examined principally by means of examining differential patterns of 
correlation within strategy clusters and other subgroups based upon scores on the tests 
of metacognition and the three age groups. Significant interactions were revealed, 
indicating support for the hypothesis that relationships between underlying cognitive 
factors and performance are mediated by strategic behaviour. There was also some 
evidence of non-linear or U-shaped development. 
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Section B) Analysis of Problem-solving Strategies 
i) Correlations between Strategy Components 
In Table 5.1 are reported the correlations between the Strategy Component scores 
across all three problem types. In the previous section the general pattern and range of 
these correlations was noted, and used as a justification for the use of Cluster Analysis 
to reveal the patterns of strategic behaviour amongst the sample of children studied. 
While it is clear that the pattern of inter-relationships between the Strategy Components 
overall is not straightforwardly linear, there are some overall patterns revealed in this 
table of interest, particularly as they relate to the general structure of strategic 
development suggested by such as Gholson, Levine & Phillips (1972), Kemler (1978) 
and Schuepfer & Gholson (1980). 
Table 5.1 
Correlations between Strategy Components 
1 No. of Hs per Trial 
12H cons with local feedback 
2 13 3 Choices cons with prey H 
3 59** 47** 4 Lose/ Shift H 
4 
-30* 58** 04 5 Lose/ Shift D 
5 
-37* 31** -03 59** 6 Win/Stay 
6 40** 55** 63** 
-10 04 7H checking 
7 
-04 58** 41** 49** 67** 53** 8D checking 
8 
-10 46** 33** 33** 75** 55** 91** 9Foc/ 2 Trials 
9 16 72** 54** 26* 50** 77** 81** 84** 10 Foc/ 
All Trials 
10 26* 63** 55** 17 44** 76** 78** 82** 96** 
In examining this table it has first to be recognised that some of the relationships are as 
much a result of the inter-connectedness of some of the components as of anything 
relating to the children's pattern of responses. Thus, for example, the strong relationship 
(. 59) between Strategy Components 1 (No. of Hypotheses per Trial) and 3 (Choices 
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consistent with previous hypothesis) is not very surprising. Clearly, the more 
hypotheses produced on any one trial, the greater likelihood there is, just by chance, that 
the next choice of Anna will be consistent with one or more of them. Similarly, scoring 
well on Strategy Component 2 (Hypotheses consistent with local feedback) inevitably 
results in scoring well also on Strategy Component 4 (Lose/Shift Hypothesis) and once 
again there is a reasonably strong relationship (. 58). 
Other results, however, tell us more about the pattern of responding. That this 
correlation between Strategy Components 2&4 is not stronger, for example, reveals 
that very often some children shifted away from a hypothesis which had just been 
disconfirmed, but then made a choice of new hypothesis which was not consistent with 
local feedback. As we shall see, this was mostly a consequence of the difficulties some 
of the children had dealing with MDL problems involving negative or irrelevant 
information. 
A number of other more general patterns emerge which largely support the suggested 
developmental patterns of previous researchers. Thus, the separate development of 
short-term and long-term processing suggested by Kemler (1978) is supported by these 
figures. Thus, of the 10 strong correlations (> 
. 
70) it is noticeable that 8 of them are 
between the 5 most sophisticated, long-term Strategy Components (6-10). This is 
clearly a very cohesive group of behaviours. Correlations between these components 
and the short-term ones (2-5), on the other hand, are, generally weak or moderate, with 
only 2 strong correlations. The correlations amongst the less sophisticated components 
are themselves weaker. 
The quite separate development of Lose/Shift (Strategy Components 4& 5) and 
Win/Stay (Strategy Component 6) proposed by Schuepfer & Gholson (1980) is 
particularly well demonstrated. Both correlations are very close to zero. As Kemler 
(1978) found Lose/Shift also correlates very weakly with Strategy Component 3 
(Choices consistent with previous hypothesis), which is perhaps the first element in a 
transition from short to long-term processing. Lose/Shift Hypothesis (Strategy 
Component 4) is also particularly weakly associated with any of the more sophisticated 
long-term components. As we shall see, analysis of the patterns of strategic behaviour 
revealed by the Cluster Analysis suggests that Lose/Shift Hypothesis is associated with 
a very early, simple pattern of responding, unconnected to any kind of planful or 
strategic behaviour, and this is borne out by the present figures. 
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The other notably weak relationships revealed in Table 5.1 are those between Strategy 
Component 1 (No. of Hypotheses per Trial) and most of the other components. Apart 
from the correlation discussed above with Strategy Component 3, the only other 
moderate correlation (> 
. 
4) is that with Strategy Component 6 (Win/Stay). Here again, 
however, this is at least partly an inevitable consequence of the scoring procedures. The 
percentage of confirmed hypotheses repeated is likely to be increased, by chance, where 
a larger number of hypotheses are being verbalised on each trial. All other correlations 
for Strategy Component 1 are weak, which suggests that No. of Hypotheses per Trial is 
largely unrelated to strategic development, and is perhaps a matter of style, as will be 
revealed and explored when we come to analyse the patterns of strategy behaviour 
revealed by the Cluster Analysis, which we come to next. 
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ii) Auster Analysis 
Cluster Analysis was carried out to identify patterns of strategic behaviour amongst the 
72 cases in their performance on the MDL task. In order to explore patterns in the data 
thoroughly this was carried out at two levels. First, using the total scores on the 10 
Strategy Components across the 3 problem types, and second, using the separate scores 
on each of the 3 problem types, again in relation to the 10 Strategy Components, 
producing 30 scores altogether. 
These analyses used the method of Iterative Relocation and were carried out with the 
CARM programme within the PMMD package of multivariate statistics produced by 
Youngman (1976). All other statistical analyses reported in this thesis were carried out 
using the PMMD package. 
a) Using 10 Total Scores 
This analysis is based on the total scores on the 10 Strategy Components across the 3 
problem types. The Error Plot for this analysis is reproduced in Figure 5.1. The top 
half of this is produced in such a way as to represent the pattern of fusions of clusters, 
beginning with 15 and working all the way down to a final fusion of all the cases into 1 
large cluster. The bottom half of the Error Plot records the error coefficients after each 
fusion, both numerically and in the form of a graph. 
In order to make a decision about the number of clusters which best represents the 
pattern of the data, the size of the error after each successive fusion must be examined. 
The best method to get a realistic comparison of the effects of each fusion is to compare 
the percentage increase in the error coefficient produced by each fusion. The error 
coefficient is a measure of the loss of within-cluster similarity. So long as clusters are 
fused without any great increase in the error, then reasonably similar cases are being put 
together in clusters. When a large percentage increase occurs in the error coefficient, 
however, this is an indication that rather dissimilar cases are being artificially fused into 
clusters. A good representation of the data is therefore achieved by taking the cluster 
solution immediately prior to a fusion producing a large percentage increase in the error. 
The relevant figures are reported in Table 5.2. 
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Fig. 5.1 
Error Plot for 10 Total Strategy Component Scores 
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Table 5.2 
Error Increases for 10 Strategy Component Total Scores 
Fusion No. of Coeff. % Increase 
Clusters of Coeff. 
1 14 1.14 
2 13 1.89 65.8 
3 12 1.98 4.8 
4 11 2.16 9.1 
5 10 2.19 1.4 
693.03 38.4 
783.40 12.2 
873.42 0.6 
963.69 7.9 
10 5 5.28 43.1 
11 4 10.48 98.5 
12 3 14.50 38.4 
13 2 16.76 15.6 
14 1 56.35 236.2 
The first two major losses in within-cluster similarity are highlighted in bold type and 
occur when fusing 10 clusters into 9 and 6 clusters into 5. A 10 Cluster solution, 
however, would produce very small average cluster sizes and a level of detail which is 
not justified by the total sample size of 72 cases or by the general theoretical model 
underpinning this investigation. On this basis the 6 Cluster solution would appear to be 
the more reasonable and valuable solution to pursue at this time. 
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b) Using 30 scores on different problem types 
This analysis is based on the three problem types which, as outlined in the previous 
chapter, relate to important factors identified by previous research as contributing to the 
difficulty of the MDL task. These three problem types were the standard 4-dimensional 
MDL task (problem type a), the task with negative information (only one card revealed; 
problem type b) and the task with noise or redundant information (8-dimensional: 4 
relevant &4 irrelevant; problem type c). 
The Error Plot for this analysis is reproduced in Figure 5.2, and once again percentage 
increases in the error coefficient after each fusion have been computed and are reported 
in Table 5.3. 
The first two major increases in loss of within-cluster similarity are highlighted in bold 
type and occur here when fusing 11 clusters into 10 and 7 clusters into 6. On similar 
grounds to those discussed in relation to the 10 Total scores analysis, the 7 Cluster 
solution looks the more valuable. While the pattern of loss of within-cluster similarity is 
somewhat less discontinuous here than in the 10 Variable analysis, the choice of the 7 
Cluster solution as a cut-off point is strengthened by its relation to the 6 Cluster 
solution which was strongly indicated in the simpler analysis. This relationship is 
examined in the next section. 
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Fig. 5.2 
Error Plot for 30 Strategy Component Scores on different problem types 
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Table 5.3 
Error Increases for 30 Strategy Component Scores on different problem types 
Fusion Clusters Coeff. % Increase 
of Coeff. 
1 14 1.79 
2 13 2.33 30.2 
3 12 2.36 1.3 
4 11 2.40 1.7 
5 10 2.91 21.25 
693.47 19.2 
784.00 15.3 
874.50 12.5 
965.76 28.0 
10 5 7.66 33.0 
11 4 8.73 14.0 
12 3 10.21 17.0 
13 2 18.97 85.8 
14 1 35.12 85.1 
c) The 7 Cluster Solution 
With what is for these purposes a relatively small sample size of 72 cases, examining 
the reliability of this clustering solution by a split-halves procedure is not possible. The 
stability of the solution between the 10 and 30 scores analyses, however, is quite striking 
and enhances confidence in the 7 Cluster solution. The close relationship between the 6 
&7 Cluster solutions is demonstrated by the Contingency Table reported in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4 
Contingency Table: Allocation of cases for the 10 scores/6 clusters & 30 scores/7 
cluster solutions 
30 Problem 
Type Scores 
Analysis: 
7 Clusters 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
1,15,17 
19,22,34 
42, 
5 16 
6 
7 
10 Total Scores Analysis: 
6 Clusters 
23 4 5 
5,6,66 
2,13,26 
27,28,37 
38,40,45 
50,51, 
20,31,48 3,29,33 
36,43,49 
52,53,54 
56,57,64 
65 
21,41 
35 
58 
4,23,30 
46 
18,39,44 
60,61,62 
69,71 
7,8,9,10 
11,12,14 
24,32,47, 
68 
55,59,63 
67,72 
25,70 
The allocation of cases to the 7 and 6 cluster solutions which emerges from this table is 
reported in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5 
Allocation of cases to 7&6 Strategy Cluster solutions 
7 Clusters 6 Clusters 
Cl.!: 10 cases CI. 1: 8 cases 
- 
case 16 to C1.5 
+cases 5,6&66 from C1.5 
C1.2: 12 cases C1.2: 17 cases 
- 
cases 20,31 & 48 to C1.3 
- 
cases 21 & 41 to C1.4 
- 
case 35 to C1.7 
+ case 58 from C1.4 
C1.3: 20 cases C1.3: 13 cases + cases 20,31 & 48 from C1.2 
+ cases 4,23,30 & 46 from C1.4 
C1.4: 13 cases C1.5: 14 cases 
- 
cases 5,6, & 66 to C1.1 
+ cases 21 & 41 from C1.2 
C1.5: 1 case +case 16 from C1.1 
C1.6: 13 cases C1.4: 13 cases 
- 
case 58 to C1.2 
- 
cases 4,23,30 & 46 to C1.3 
C1.6: 7 cases 
- 
cases 25 & 70 to C1.7 
C1.7: 3 cases + case 35 from C1.2 
+ cases 25 & 70 from C1.6 
This analysis provides strong evidence for the 7 Cluster solution as a robust feature of 
the data. The extra information contained in the 30 scores analysis allows the 4 atypical 
cases in Cls. 5&7 to be separated out and Cls. 4&6 from the simpler analysis are 
combined. Apart from these changes, which clearly result from the more detailed data 
and the extra cluster in the 30 scores analysis, only 13 cases (18 %) switch clusters 
between the two analyses. Thus there is effectively 82% agreement between the two 
analyses in allocation of cases to clusters. 
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iii) The 7 Cluster Solution 
Analysis of the 7 Cluster solution reveals quite clear differential patterns of strategic 
behaviour amongst the sample of 72 cases. Reference to Table 5.6 (Diagnosis of the 7 
Clusters incorporating the raw and standardised means for each cluster on each of the 
30 Strategy Component scores across the 3 problem types) shows that each of the 30 
Strategy Component scores discriminates between the clusters at the 0.01 level of 
significance (tested using one-way Analysis of Variance). Furthermore, as we shall see, 
each of the clusters represents a pattern of strategic behaviour predictable from the 
previous research on hypothesis testing behaviour with the MDL task, as outlined in the 
earlier review of this work. 
Before coming on to an examination of the individual Strategy Clusters, however, some 
general points arise from the overall pattern of scores reported in Table 5.6. 
As regards Strategy Component 1 (No. of Hypotheses per Trial) the finding of Eimas 
(1969) and others that young children tend to consider one hypothesis at a time 
appeared to be the case only for the least sophisticated strategically. As will emerge, 
Clusters 4&5 were developmentally the simplest strategically, and it can be seen that 
the raw mean no. of hypotheses was one, or very nearly one, for these groups across all 
3 problem types. However, the finding of Phillips & Gholson (1980) that, given the 
opportunity, many children will produce more than one hypothesis at a time was also 
supported. The raw means for Clusters 1&6 are mostly well over 2. As we will see, 
this element in strategic approach to the MDL task emerged as a pivotal factor in 
relation to strategic style. 
The first crucial element in developing a strategic approach to the MDL task, identified 
by Gholson, Levine & Phillips (1972), was the ability to respond to feedback. As we 
have reviewed, they found kindergartners (5/6 yr. olds) failed to respond to negative 
feedback nearly half of the time. However, Kemler (1978) found children in this age 
group much more reliably responded to feedback with her more meaningful task. The 
results within the present study for Strategy Component 2 (Hypotheses consistent with 
Local Feedback) would appear to support those of Kemler (1978). As can be seen, on 
the standard version of the task (problem type a) all the clusters, with the exception of 
Cluster 5 (containing one 6 yr. old), produced locally consistent hypotheses over 90% 
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Table 5.6 
Diagnosis of the 7 Clusters: Raw and Standardised Mean Scores on the 30 
Strategy Components 
Strat Prob Clusters 
Comp Type Fp 1(10) 2(12) 3(20) 4(13) 5(1) 6(13) 7(3) 
1a 14.60 0.00** 0.87* 
-0.64? -0.11 -0.98** -0.99 1.06** 0.38 
2.11 1.20 153 1.00 1.00 2.23 1.82 
b 7.21 0.00** 0.09 
-0.44 -0.05 -0.70? -0.72 1.20** 0.47 
1.41 1.21 1.43 1.06 1.05 2.15 1.73 
c 11.12 0.00** 0.63 
-0.57 -0.22 -0.73* -0.75 0.67? 2.19** 
2-54 1.20 158 1.02 1.00 2.58 4.28 
2a 12.91 0.00** 0.25 0.06 0.23 
-0.62? -5.52** 0.36 0.36 
98.90 97.08 98.70 9038 42.00 100.00 100.00 
b 8.85 0.00** 
-0.79? -0.48 0.91** -0.25 -0.40 -0.34 1.19 
59.00 64.50 8955 68.62 66.00 67.15 94.67 
c 10.86 0.00** 
-0.54 0.45 039* -0.63? -2.21 0.36 -1.99** 
65.70 8750 90.75 63.69 29.00 85.62 33.67 
3a 12.65 0.00** 0.05 0.08 0.25 
-1.43** -0.41 0.88** 0.37 
82-50 83.08 86.10 55.00 74.00 97.92 8833 
b 8.88 0.00** 
-0.24 -0.28 0.45 -1.11** -0.83 0.88** 0.25 
65.90 65.08 80.00 48.23 54.00 88.85 76.00 
c 6.37 0.00** 
-0.34 0.11 0.63* -0.87* 0.57 0.34 -1.38 
7130 8050 9120 6054 90.00 85.23 50.00 
4a 281.01 0.00** 0.07 0.16 0.16* 
-0.01 -8.25** 0.16 0.16 
9950 100.00 100.00 99.00 50.00 100.00 100.00 
b 5.00 0.00** 
-0.69 -0.44 0.69* 0.34 -1.69 -0.37 0.12 
78.80 8250 99.10 94.00 64.00 83.46 90.67 
c 15.15 0.00** 
-0.82* 0.43 0.42 0.44 -2.67* -0.05 -2.57** 
77.40 98.00 97.75 98.15 47.00 90.00 48.67 
5a9.65 0.00** 
-1.51** 0.38 0.44 -0.21 -1.60 0.33 0.60 
52.00 9133 92.65 79.15 50.00 90.46 96.00 
b 6.25 0.00** 
-0.68 -0.42 0.74** 0.37 -0.59 -0.67 0.48 
61.80 67.75 9395 85.69 64.00 62.15 88.00 
c 12.04 0.00** -1.30** 0.53 0.51* 0.49 -1.21 -0.31 -1.49? 
4490 8825 87.80 8738 47.00 6831 4033 
6a 11.32 0.00** 
-0.18 0.12 0.48? -1.39** -0.75 0.52 0.92 
67.10 76.17 86.90 30.77 50.00 88.15 100.00 
b 10.30 0.00** 
-0.53 -0.37 0.86** -0.97** 0.34 0.14 1.01 
3690 41.75 80.05 23.23 64.00 57.69 84.67 
c 16.92 0.00** -0.38 0.24 0.61** -1.50** -0.54 0.52 0.69 
55.40 76.42 88.80 17.69 50.00 85.85 91.67 
7a 13.63 0.00** 
-1.42** 0.16 0.52* -0.59? -1.34 0.63? 0.94 
48.10 82.75 90.70 6631 50.00 93.08 100.00 
b 17.65 0.00** 
-1.34** -0.18 1.04** -0.28 -0.47 -0.29 0.87 
33.70 60.75 8920 5831 54.00 58.23 8533 
c 13.66 0.00** -1.24** 0.75* 0.66** -0.30 -2.16 -0.04 -1.09 
3850 84.67 82.70 6023 17.00 66.46 42.00 
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Strat Prob Clusters 
Comp Type Fp 1(10) 2(12) 3(20) 4(13) 5(1) 6(13) 7(3) 
8a 11.72 0.00** 
-1.40** 0.21 0.54* -0.63? -0.60 0.51 0.94 
26.20 7425 83.85 49.15 50.00 83.08 96.00 
b 18.36 0.00** 
-1.01** -0.20 1.13** -0.44 -0.15 -0.55? 0.97 
1950 4258 80.35 35.69 44.00 32.38 76.00 
c 12.64 0.00** 
-1.18** 0.93** 0.63** -0.35 -1.48 -0.28 -0.78 
25.10 81.08 73.05 47.15 17.00 48.92 35.67 
9a 20.92 0.00** 
-0.82** 0.06 0.63** -1.22** -1.84 0.72** 1.09 
57.00 75.83 88.05 4838 35.00 90.08 98.00 
b 19.00 0.00** 
-1.06** -0.38 1.11** -0.56? 0.09 -0.23 1.07 
3350 4850 8150 44.46 59.00 51.77 80.67 
c 16.66 0.00** 
-0.76* 0.80** 0.72** -1.01** -1.66 0.12 -1.06 
3930 78.42 76.45 33.08 17.00 61.31 32.00 
10 a 18.01 0.00** 
-0.87** -0.22 0.57** -1.06** -1.15 0.86** 1.28? 
36.70 54.42 76.20 31.31 29.00 8423 96.00 
b 14.10 0.00** 
-0.87* -0.53 1.08** -0.51** 0.07 -0.21 0.91 
21.90 30.67 71.70 31.08 46.00 38.69 6733 
c 11.68 0.00** 
-0.60 0.87** 0.57* -0.07** -1.56 0.09 -0.53 
28.40 7150 62.65 1454 0.00 48.46 3033 
Plain 
= 
Standardised score 
Italic 
= 
Raw score 
The significance of the variation of each standardised Cluster Mean from the population mean is tested using 
the Scheffe' Atypicality test. The degree to which each Strategy Component discriminates between Clusters 
overall is tested using one-way Analysis of Variance (F-ratio on left hand side of table) Levels of 
significance: ?=0.1 
* 
=0.05 
** 
= 
0.01 
The numbers in brackets after the Cluster numbers indicate the number of cases in each Cluster. 
of the time. These figures drop with the more difficult versions of the task, but even 
then are generally well above those reported by Gholson, Levine & Phillips (1972), even 
for Clusters 1&4, which, as will be seen, mostly contained 6 yr. olds. 
We have discussed the issue of attentional control in relation to this issue of responding 
to negative feedback. Tumblin & Gholson (1980), it will be recalled, directed children 
that 'wrong means look at the other picture'. Given that no attentional aid was used in 
the present study whatever (in which respect the procedure varied from Kemler's 
(1978)), the results for Strategy Component 2 would seem to support the view that 
children's difficulties with the standard MDL task, such as that used by Tumblin & 
Gholson (1980), arose from its abstractness, and children's consequent failure to 
understand its internal logic, rather than from their inability to control their attention. 
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As regards Strategy Component 3 (Choices consistent with Previous Hypothesis), 
Kemler (1978) did find that often young children's stated hypotheses did not predict 
their next choice of stimulus, but presented evidence that this was not a result of the kind 
of 'stimulus describing' first identified by Phillips (1974). The present figures would 
tend to support the view that the verbal 'introtacts' or hypotheses provided by the 
children were, generally, a valid indication of the real working hypotheses. On the 
standard problem type a stated hypotheses predicted the next choice well over 80% of 
the time for all but Clusters 4&5 (the two developmentally simplest strategy clusters). 
As we shall see, this and other evidence suggest that Cluster 4 might contain an element 
of 'stimulus describing'. 
These results combined with those for Strategy Component 4 (Lose/Shift Hypothesis) 
provide strong evidence of a good deal of Kemler's (1978) 'short-term efficiency'. As 
will be seen, for all but Cluster 5, disconfirmed hypotheses were abandoned a very high 
proportion of the time. The figures for problem type a are almost 100%, and even for 
the more difficult problem types b and c they do not drop too dramatically. A 
comparison of these scores with those for Strategy Component 6 (Win/Stay), however, 
clearly supports the finding of Schuepfer & Gholson (1980) that Lose/Shift Hypothesis 
is the earlier developing element in the development of full short-term efficiency. The 
figures for Win/Stay are dramatically lower than those for Lose/Shift Hypothesis; this 
is particularly the case for the developmentally earlier and younger Clusters 1&4, but 
is also the case to a lesser extent for all clusters. 
The scores for Strategy Component 5 (Lose/Shift Dimension) are also generally lower 
than for Lose/Shift Hypothesis, confirming that this element of strategic behaviour 
requires more understanding of the logic of the MDL task, and more co-ordination of 
information across trials. As we shall see, however, there are some interesting variations 
in scores between clusters on this component which are helpful in analysing the 
different strategic patterns. 
The figures for Strategy Components 7-10 confirm, as Gholson, Levine & Phillips 
(1972), Kemler (1978) and others have found, that these elements, requiring 'long-term 
efficiency' are later developing. The scores drop quite dramatically for the youngest 
groups (Clusters 1,4 & 5), and even many of the older children in Clusters 6&7 find it 
difficult to maintain their scores on the more difficult problem types b and c. Only 
Cluster 3, which we shall see emerges as strategically the most sophisticated group, 
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managed to maintain scores in the region of 70-80% on these elements of long-term 
processing across all problem types. 
Kemler (1978) did find evidence of 7 and 11 yr. old children using the 'hypothesis 
memory' necessary for long-term efficiency and carrying out Hypothesis and 
Dimension Checking strategies. Within the present study the older Clusters 3,6 &7 
maintained Hypothesis Checking ( Strategy Component 7) on problem type a over 90% 
of the time, and Dimension Checking (Strategy Component 8) over 80 %. Kemler 
(1978), in her Experiment 2, exploring the upper bounds of the capabilities of 7 and 11 
yr. olds, found no evidence, however, of Primary school aged children using 'stimulus 
memory' and carrying out the Focusing strategy. In this respect, the results of the 
present study differ. The scores for Strategy Component 9 (Focusing over 2 Trials) 
show that the pattern of behaviour for children in Strategy Clusters 3,6 &7 were 
consistent with this component on problem type a around 90% of the time. Even on 
Strategy Component 10 (Focusing over All Trials) the average figure for these clusters 
stays at around 80%. 
It is interesting to speculate as to the reasons why this better long-term efficiency 
appeared in the present study. The most likely explanation would seem to be that 
Kemler's (1978) version of the problem in her Experiment 2 was significantly more 
difficult than the version used within the present study. She used 5 and 8-dimension 
problems with randomly sequenced stimuli, compared to the 4-dimensional problems 
with orthogonally sequenced stimuli used here. As we have reviewed, there is ample 
evidence that, when faced with a more difficult problem, children (and adults) revert to 
simpler strategies which are less demanding, particularly in relation to working memory 
load. 
The other clear pattern which emerges from Table 5.6 is that, as predicted, problem 
types b and c, involving children in dealing with negative and redundant information, 
were more difficult and resulted in simpler strategies. We have reviewed earlier research 
which has identified the necessity of dealing with negative or redundant information as a 
factor making the MDL task more difficult. We also reviewed the debate as to whether 
this was a consequence of the extra demands made by this kind of information on 
memory load, or whether it was a consequence of particular difficulties with these kinds 
of information. Scardamalia (1977), among others has provided evidence of the 
simplification of strategies resulting from extra load on memory. On the other hand, 
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difficulties with negative information might be related to the 'confirmatory bias' 
originally identified by Wason (1960) and reconceptualised as a 'positive test strategy' 
by Klayman & Ha (1987). Difficulties with irrelevant information might be related to 
attentional deficits. Kemler, Shepp & Foote (1976) found 5&7 yr. olds attending to 
incidental information about attributes significantly more than 10 yr. olds. 
The results of the present study would tend to suggest that, whatever the source of these 
difficulties, they are probably different. Thus, while all the children tended to perform 
less efficiently on problem types b and c, there are clear differential patterns between the 
two problem types. Thus, as we shall see, children in Strategy Cluster 2 had particular 
difficulty with problem type b (negative information), while Clusters 6&7 performed 
relatively poorly on problem type c (irrelevant information). This would tend to support 
the view that these difficulties at least partly reflect inferential and attentional deficits; if 
these types of problems were more difficult simply because of extra memory load, then 
you would expect the same children to perform relatively less efficiently on both. 
a) Description of the Strategy Clusters 
There follows in Table 5.6a a detailed analysis of all 7 clusters. Within these analyses, a 
list of constituent cases is presented followed by the number of cases in the cluster and 
an analysis of the age range principally represented in the cluster (Cases 1-24 were 6 yr. 
olds; cases 25-48 were 8 yr. olds; cases 49-72 were 10 yr. olds). The analysis of 
Strategy Component scores first looks at the general position relative to all other 
clusters, and then, where applicable, at the position relative to the other cluster at the 
same general level of performance on the Strategy Components. Finally, an overall label 
is ascribed to each of the clusters which describes their pattern of strategic behaviour 
relative to the patterns found in previous studies of behaviour on the MDL task, as 
discussed in the second section of chapter 3. 
While they have some theoretical validity, Clusters 5&7 are excluded from much of 
the rest of the analysis because of the small number of cases. Since it is possible that 
they represent significant types of strategic behaviour, however, of which more cases 
would have been found with a wider sample (eg: a younger sample would probably 
produce more cases of Cluster 5: Object Preference) it will be interesting to note on 
occasion the way in which these cases relate to particular features of the analysis. 
158 
Table 5.6a 
Analysis of Strategy Clusters 
Cluster 1 
Cases: 1,5,6,15,17,19,22,34,42,66 (10) 
Age range: mostly 6 yr. olds (7 out of 10) 
Analysis of component scores: 
- 
generally weak (on components 2-10: 24 out of 27 standard scores negative) 
- 
particularly weak on more long-term, complex strategies (components 7-10: 
9 out of 12 scores sig. at 0.01 level and a further 2 at the 0.05 level) 
- 
relative to other generally weak CI. 4: 
- 
high on 1. Number of H's per T (mean over 2.00 on la &c; Cl. 1 component 
1a sig. at 0.05 level; C1.4 component 1a sig. at 0.01level, 1b at 0.1 level &1c at 0.05 
level), 3. Choices cons. with prey. H (C1.4 components 3a &b sig. at 0.01 level & 3c 
at 0.05 level) & 6. Win/Stay (C1.4 components 6a, b &c sig. at 0.01 level) 
- 
low on 4. Lose/Shift H (Cl. 1 components 4b &c negative; 4c sig. at 0.05 
level; C1.4 components 4b &c positive), 5. Lose/Shift D (Cl. 1 components 5a &c sig. 
at 0.01 level), 7. H checking (Cl. l components 7a, b &c sig. at 0.01 level) & 8. D 
checking (Cl. 1 components 8a, b &c sig. at 0.01 level) 
Strategic behaviour: Attribute (Dimension) Perseveration 
Cluster 2 
Cases: 2,13,26,27,28,37,38,40,45,50,51,58 (12) 
Age range: mostly 8 yr. olds (10 out of 12) 
Analysis of component scores: 
- 
generally intermediate (25 out of 30 scores not sig. ) 
- 
low on type b problems: negatives (on components 2-10: score for b is lowest 
in each case; all b standard scores negative; all a&c scores positive with single 
exception of 10a) 
- 
relative to other generally intermediate C1.6: 
- 
high on type c problems: noise (component 7c sig. at 0.05 level; 
components 8c, 9c & 10c sig. at 0.01 level) 
- 
low on 1. Number of H's per T (Cl. 2 standard scores all negative 
- 
component 1a sig. at 0.1 level; C1.6 standard scores all positive 
- 
components 1a &b sig. 
at 0.01level and ic at 0.1level) 
Strategic behaviour: Negative Information Difficulties 
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Cluster 3 
Cases: 3,4,20,23,29,30,31,33,36,43,46,48,49,52,53,54,56,57,64,65 (20) 
Age range: mostly 8& 10 yr. olds (16 out of 20) 
Analysis of component scores: 
- 
generally strong (on components 2-10 all standard scores positive; 22 out of 27 
sig. ) 
- 
particularly strong on more long-term, complex strategies (components 
7-10: 9 out of 12 scores sig. at 0.01 level and remaining 3 at the 0.05 level) 
- 
intermediate on 1. Number of H's per T (standard scores all near zero); 
Strategic behaviour: Focusing 
Cluster 4 
Cases: 7,8,9,10,11,12,14,21,24,32,41,47,68 (13) 
Age range: mostly 6 yr. olds (9 out of 13) 
Analysis of component scores: 
- 
generally weak (on components 2-10: 23 out of 27 standard scores negative) 
- 
particularly weak on 9. & 10. Focusing (components 9-10: 4 out of 6 scores 
sig. at 0.01 level and a further 1 at the 0.1 level) 
- 
relative to other generally weak C1.1: 
- 
low on 1. Number of H's per T (mean practically at basic minimum of 1.00; 
C1.1 component 1a sig. at 0.05 level; C1.4 component 1a sig. at 0.01 level, 1b at 0.1 level 
& lc at 0.05 level), 3. Choices cons. with prey. H (components 3a &b sig. at 0.01 
level & 3c at 0.05 level) & 6. Win/Stay (components 6a, b &c sig. at 0.01 level) 
- 
high on 4. Lose/Shift H (Cl. l components 4b &c negative; 4c sig. at 0.05 
level; C1.4 components 4b &c positive), 5. Lose/Shift D (Cl. l components 5a &c sig. 
at 0.01 level), 7. H checking (C1.1 components 7a, b &c sig. at 0.01 level; C1.4 
component 7a sig. at only 0.1 level) & 8. D checking (Cl. 1 components 8a, b &c sig. at 
0.01 level; component 8a sig. at only 0.1 level ) 
Strategic behaviour: High/Random Shift of Hypotheses; Stimulus Describing 
Cluster 5 (located in Cl. 1 in Totals solution) 
Case: 16 
Age range: 6 yr. old 
Analysis of component scores: 
- 
generally weak (on components 2-10: 23 out of 27 standard scores negative) 
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- 
particularly weak on 2. Locally cons. H (component 2a sig. at 0.01 level) & 4. 
Lose/Shift H (component 4a sig. at 0.01 level & 4c at 0.05 level) 
- 
low on 1. Number of H's per T (mean practically at basic minimum of 1.00; 
standard scores all negative) 
Strategic behaviour: Object Preference 
Cluster 6 
Cases: 18,39,44,55,59,60,61,62,63,67,69,71,72 (13) 
Age range: mostly 10 yr. olds (10 out of 13) 
Analysis of component scores: 
- 
generally intermediate (21 out of 30 scores not sig. ) 
- 
relative to other generally intermediate C1.2: 
- 
high on 1. Number of H's per T (C1.2 standard scores all negative 
- 
component 1a sig. at 0.1 level; Cl. 6 standard scores all positive 
- 
components 1a &b sig. 
at 0.01level and 1c at 0.1 level) 
- 
high on type a problems: standard (components 2-10: Cl. 6 scores higher 
on 8 out of 9 components; components 3a, 9a & 1Oa sig. at 0.01 level, 7a at 0.1 level) 
- 
low on type c problems: noise (Cl. 2 component 7c sig. at 0.05 level; 
components 8c, 9c & 10c sig. at 0.01 level) 
Strategic behaviour: High Hypotheses per Trial 
Cluster 7 (located in Cls. 2&6 in Totals solution) 
Cases: 25,35,70 (3) 
Age range: 8& 10 yr. olds 
Analysis of component scores: 
- 
generally strong (25 out of 30 scores not sig. but this is largely a product of the 
small group size) 
- 
high on type a problems: standard (on components 2-10: 8 out of 9 scores are 
the highest of all clusters) 
- 
high on component lc: Number of H per T/noise problems (sig. at 0.01 level) 
- 
low on type c problems: noise (on components 2-10: score for c is lowest and 
standard scores negative in 8 out of 9 cases; all a&b scores positive; components 2c & 
4c sig. at 0.01 level, 5c at 0.1 level) 
Strategic behaviour: Noise Difficulties 
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The interpretation of the one case in Cluster 5 is very straightforward; it is a clear 
example of the 'object preference' stereotype or response-set identified by Gholson, 
Levine & Phillips (1972), amongst others. The distinctively weak scores on Strategy 
Components 2 (Hypotheses consistent with Local Feedback) and 4 (Lose/Shift 
Hypothesis), noted in Table 5.6a, tell a very clear story. As was observed by the author 
during this child's responses to the MDL task, quite consistently on each problem, a 
preferred object was chosen and then adhered to, irrespective of feedback. 
The 3 children in Cluster 7 present a more complicated picture, and a rather enigmatic 
one. They produced a pattern of a generally sophisticated strategic response to the MDL 
task, but, as can be seen from the analysis in Table 5.6a, had very particular difficulties 
with type c problems (irrelevant information). As can be seen by their score of 4.28 on 
Strategy Component lc, they verbalised very large numbers of hypotheses, many of 
them irrelevant. Whether this was a problem of attention or a lack of understanding of 
the logic of the problem is difficult to assess. It would be interesting in a future study to 
see if a larger sample of children behaving in this way could be identified, and their 
responses analysed across a variety of inductive reasoning tasks, to see if their difficulty 
with the present task represents a more general deficit. 
The different patterns of strategic behaviour for the 5 main clusters (i. e. Clusters 1,2,3,4 
& 6, each of which have a reliable number of cases within the current sample) are 
illustrated by separate Standardised Mean bar charts (Fig. 5.3) and the Atypicality Chart 
of standardised means, which compares all 5 main clusters (Fig. 5.4. ) These 
demonstrate well the very different patterns of strategic behaviour contained within these 
clusters. 
Clusters 1&4 are evidently the developmentally earliest and strategically simplest. In 
Fig. 5.3 it can be seen that their scores were predominantly below the sample mean; the 
atypicality analysis reported in Fig. 5.4 shows that their scores were all either average or 
significantly below the mean. These groups are largely made up of 6 yr. olds. 
The analysis of Cluster 1 in Table 5.6a demonstrates that this group conformed to the 
pattern of 'attribute perseveration' identified by Kemler (1978), as we noted earlier, as a 
common pattern of response among kindergartners (5/6 yr. olds). This involves 
alternating between the two values of a dimension or attribute, consistent with local 
feedback. The really telling scores for this Cluster are those for Strategy Component 5 
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Figure 5.3 
Strategy Components for 5 Main Clusters: Standardised Mean scores 
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Figure 5.3 cont'd 
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(Lose/Shift Dimension). As can be seen from Table 5.6, on two out of the three 
problem types, Cluster 1 scored significantly lower (at the 0.01 level) on this component 
than the rest of the sample. They scored relatively well, however, on Strategy 
Component 6 (Win/Stay); their scores of 67%, 37% and 55% on the three problem 
types are all well in excess of the score of 25% which would be produced by chance 
responding. 
As Kemler (1978) argued, these children are showing evidence of some short-term 
efficiency, but are failing to co-ordinate information very effectively between trials. 
They do, however, have a plan; it is an inadequate plan, but a sort of a plan, nevertheless. 
Interestingly, this cluster also verbalised a relatively large number of hypotheses, which, 
as will be seen later in the analysis, emerged as a significant stylistic variation. 
Cluster 4, as will also be seen later, proved to be developmentally the simplest 
strategically of the 5 main Strategy Clusters. It is concluded in the analysis in Table 
5.6a that this cluster produced a pattern of behaviour which might well be described as 
'stimulus describing'. The crucial scores here are the relatively high scores on Strategy 
Component 4 (Lose/Shift Hypothesis), particularly relative to Cluster 1, and the 
significantly low scores (at the 0.01 level) relative to the rest of the sample on Strategy 
Component 6 (Win/Stay). The relatively high scores on Strategy Components 7 and 8 
(Hypothesis and Dimension Checking), compared to Cluster 1, are undoubtedly an 
artificial by-product of their strategy of considering only 1 hypothesis at a time and 
constantly switching hypotheses. On any particular trial, the children in this group 
appear to have chosen their hypothesis (and they consistently only verbalised one) at 
random from the 4 clothing items being worn by Anna. In this respect they were 
actually behaving exactly according to the 'zero memory' assumption first proposed by 
Restle (1962) as a model for human processing on the MDL task. Their scores on 
Win/Stay are no better than chance. Their high scores on Lose/Shift Hypothesis 
suggest support for the analysis of Schuepfer & Gholson (1980), that Lose/Shift 
emerges as a response to feedback before Win/Stay. Lose/Shift, as we shall see later in 
the analysis of results, emerged as the one aspect of strategic behaviour which bore no 
relationship to successful performance. Its establishment, nevertheless, appears to be a 
necessary early step in the development of inductive reasoning. 
The next cluster developmentally appears to be Cluster 2. The bar chart of standardised 
scores in Fig. 5.3 reveals a mixed pattern of scores above and below the sample mean, 
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and the atypicality chart in Fig. 5.4. shows an overwhelming preponderance of average 
scores, with just a few significantly above average. The analysis in Table 5.6a records 
that this group was largely composed of 8 yr. olds, and that the main distinguishing 
feature of their pattern of behaviour was relative difficulty with type b problems 
(negative information). Compared to Cluster 6, however, they performed well on type c 
problems (irrelevant information). As we have argued above, this suggests that these 
two sources of difficulty are related to different cognitive deficits. It will be interesting 
when we come to examine the relationships between underlying cognitive factors and 
performance with Strategy Clusters to compare the patterns of relationships within 
Clusters 2 and 6. This may help to interpret the nature of their different difficulties with 
the MDL task. Cluster 2 children produced a relatively low number of hypotheses per 
trial. 
Cluster 6 also showed a mixed pattern of behaviour. As is recorded in Table 5.6a, this 
was a predominantly 10 yr. old group, and in some ways the pattern of behaviour was 
more advanced than that of Cluster 2. The scores reported in Table 5.6 for Strategy 
Component 3 (Choices consistent with Previous Hypotheses), and 9 &10 (Focusing) 
are all significantly above the sample mean, and indicate planfulness and long-term 
efficiency. This cluster also had their difficulties with problem type b (negative 
information), but, perhaps most interestingly, scored lower than Cluster 2 
on problem type c. Their relative difficulties with irrelevant information may well be 
connected to the other key distinguishing feature of this cluster, which was the high 
number of hypotheses verbalised per trial (Strategy Component 1). As can be seen in 
Table 5.6, this cluster produced significantly more hypotheses per trial (at the 0.01 level 
for problem types a& b) than the rest of the sample. They produced their largest 
number of hypotheses, however, on problem type c. Scores on Strategy Component 1, 
as we have already indicated, emerged as pivotal in distinguishing different strategic 
styles of approach to the MDL task. 
Cluster 3 emerged as clearly the most sophisticated strategically, and has been 
characterised in Table 5.6a as the 'focusing' group. Examination of Figs. 5.3 and 5.4 
reveals that this group of children scored at levels significantly above the mean for the 
sample; this is particularly the case, as noted in the analysis in Table 5.6a, on the more 
long-term Strategy Components. What is perhaps most notable of all is the way that 
this group maintained their high level of performance on type b and c problems. Thus, 
as reported in Table 5.6, while Cluster 6 scored 84% on Strategy Component 10 
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(Focusing over All Trials) for problem type a, this figure fell to 39% and 48% for 
problem types b and c. The equivalent scores for Cluster 3 on problem types a, b and c 
were 76%, 72% and 63%. It is also of interest that this group produced a number of 
hypotheses per trial intermediate between the low of 1.00 and 1.20 recorded by 
Clusters 4 and 2, and the high of over 2.00 recorded by Clusters 1 and 6. 
The mostly 8& 10 yr. old children in this group were producing a level of strategic 
sophistication which Kemler (1978) failed to find with Primary aged children. Some 
children in this group produced 'perfect processing' on a number of problems, and, as 
we will see, there were 'ceiling effects' in some areas of the results of the study as a 
consequence. What is particularly striking is that this group included 4 children who 
were just 6 yrs. of age. 
The different patterns of strategic behaviour represented by the 5 main clusters are now 
further explored by examining in more detail the strategic behaviour of the 5 most 
central cases in each of these clusters. This is followed by a Discriminant Function 
Analysis of the Strategy Component scores of the 5 main clusters, as a means of 
investigating the relationships between the various cluster groups. 
b) Description of Central Cases in each Strategy Cluster 
As a further method of investigating the qualities of the different strategic patterns 
identified by the Cluster Analysis the 5 most central cases within each cluster were 
selected for more detailed study. 
These can easily be identified by reference to the table of Case-Cluster Similarity 
Coefficients reproduced in Appendix H. 1. The cases with the lowest coefficients are 
those most similar to the cluster centroids. Thus the cases identified for each cluster are 
as follows: 
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Cluster Cases 
1 5,6,15,19,42 
2 13,26,37,51,58 
3 36,43,46,56,64 
4 10,12,24,47,68 
6 39,44,59,69,71 
In Table 5.7 the pattern of scores is recorded for each of these cases on each of the 30 
Strategy variables, according to whether they were High, Average or Low relative to the 
sample mean. For this purpose these categories are defined thus: 
High 
=> Mean + 1/2 S. D. 
Average 
=< Mean + 1/2 S. D. and > Mean 
- 
1/2 S. D. 
Low 
=< Mean 
- 
1/2 S. D. 
The raw means, standard deviations and figures for Mean + 1/2 S. D. and Mean 
- 
1/2 
S. D. for the whole sample, used to produce these results, are reproduced in Appendix 
H. 2. 
Examination of the scores of these Central Cases serves to reinforce aspects of the 
analysis of clusters based on overall means; in particular, it can serve to highlight those 
variables upon which Central Cases are strongly consistent, as opposed to those 
variables where even the Central Cases show some variation. This will help to enhance 
interpretation of the essental nature and characteristics of particular clusters. 
Thus, in the present case, to begin with, the relative positions of the 5 main clusters, so 
clearly illustrated in the bar charts and atypicality chart in the previous section, is clearly 
reinforced. The central cases of Cluster 3, which exhibited the strongest, most 
sophisticated pattern of strategic behaviour (focusing), score average or high in every 
case on all Strategy Components except for some low scores on No. of Hypotheses per 
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trial, which is in a rather different category to all the other components as an average 
score is probably reflective of the most sophisticated response. This cluster is the only 
one with no low scores on the more long-term, sophiticated Strategy Components 7-10. 
Clusters 1&4, clearly the weakest groups, exhibit a preponderance of low scores 
amongst their central cases, particularly on the more sophisticated, long-term Strategy 
Components. On the highly significant Strategy Component 6 (Win/Stay) and on the 
more long-term Strategy Components 7-10, the central cases in these two clusters do 
not score once above average. The central cases of the two intermediate Clusters 2&6 
present the kind of mixed picture of high, average and low scores throughout the full 
range of Strategy Components which we would predict. 
For Cluster 3 the other point of interest is the varability in pattern of scores on Strategy 
Component 1. While the cluster mean, as we have noted earlier, suggests that children 
in this group produce an average number of Hypotheses per trial, in fact, the central 
cases tell a different story. Here we have case 46 producing high numbers of 
Hypotheses, case 56 low numbers, and the other somewhere in between. It would, 
therefore seem that producing an average number of Hypotheses is not an essential 
element of this pattern of strategic performance. 
The pattern of scores on Strategic Component 1 is, however, clearly indicative of a 
strong element in the strategic behaviour of children in Cluster 4. All 5 central cases 
scored low for each problem type on this component. This Cluster is also distinguished 
by a noticably low profile of scores on Strategy Component 6 (Win/Stay); only one of 
the central cases scores is other than low. This may well directly result, as we have 
suggested above, in their relatively good showing on Strategy Components 7&8 
(Hypothesis & Dimension Checking) compared to the other generally weak Cluster 1. 
These scores, however, would appear to be an artificial consequence of a very weak 
strategy of simply 'reading off an Hypothesis after each trial, with little or no 
co-ordination of information between trials. We have discussed the significance of the 
Win/Stay component for the development of a strategic approach to the MDL task in 
our earlier review of previous work on this task, and the pattern exhibited by Cluster 4 
supports this view. 
Between the two intermediate Clusters 2&6 Strategy Component 1 also distinguishes 
clearly; the predominant strong pattern here amongst the central cases is the high 
scoring of cases in Cluster 6, which picks it out from all the other clusters (although 
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even here there are two rather different patterns between Cases 39,44 & 59, who 
produced a high number of Hypotheses on all problem types, and Cases 69 & 71 who 
were only average on type b&c problems). There is also some support for the analysis 
suggested by looking at cluster means that Cluster 2 were distinguished by difficulties 
with type b problems (negative information). On Strategy Components 2-10 the central 
cases score high on only 4 occasions out of 45 scores (as opposed to 22 on both type a 
and type c problems). Cluster 6 score 32 highs on type a problems, 13 highs on type b 
problems and 14 highs on type c problems, all of which confirms the relative strengths 
of these two clusters on the different problem types. As we discussed above, Cluster 6 
would seem to be generally stronger than Cluster 2; the former's relatively poor scores 
on type c problems (noise/ irrelevant information) may be a consequence of their 
tendency to produce high numbers of Hypotheses, which may be a damaging strategy 
for this type of problem. 
Analysis of the Strategy Clusters by examining mean scores on the Strategy 
Components, and the pattern of strategic behaviour of central cases within the clusters, 
has suggested a developmental pattern from relatively weak to stronger strategic 
responses. There also appear to be possible stylistic variations. These two conjectures 
were further examined using Discriminant Function Analysis, as reported in the next 
section. 
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iv) Discriminant Function Analysis of 5 Main Clusters 
Discriminant Function Analysis was carried out on the 5 main clusters to explore the 
essential factors distinguishing between these different patterns of strategic behaviour 
on the MDL task. 
The Function/Strategy Component correlations are reported in Table 5.8. As can be 
seen from an inspection of that table, the analysis extracted 4 Functions, 3 of which 
accounted for a sig. percentage of the variance. An interpretation of the functions was 
carried out as follows: 
Function 1: this function accounts for 61.32% of the variance and loads heavily on 
Strategy Components 3(Choices cons. with prey. H), 6(Win Stay), 7& 8(H &D 
Checking) and 9 &10(Focusing). As such it may be interpreted as reflecting the 
developing ability to integrate new with previously received information. The key role 
of the Win/Stay component in the development of strategies on the MDL task has 
already been noted, and this is reinforced here. 
Function 2: this function accounts for 26.56% of the variance; it loads negatively on 
Strategy Component 1 (Number of Hs per T) and positively on components 
4c(Lose/Shift H: noise), 5(Lose/Shift D) and 7& 8(H &D Checking). This would 
appear to reflect a style variation or dimension essentially involving preference for a low 
or high number of verbalised hypotheses. 
Function 3: this function accounts for 8.10% of the variance and is difficult to 
interpret because of the very few Strategy Components upon which it loads at all 
significantly. It appears to discriminate between Clusters 1&2 and all the other 
clusters. Beyond the fact that these clusters follow on from one another on the 
developmental sequence, and therefore score fairly similarly on some of the strategic 
components, it is difficult to assign any particular significance to this function. 
Function 4: this function is not statistically significant (p= 0.0948) and accounts for 
only 4.02% of the variance. It is interesting, however, that it loads negatively at around 
the 
-0.4 level on 8 out of 9 of components 2-10 on type b problems (negative 
information). 
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Table 5.8 
Discriminant Function Analysis of 30 Strategy Components: Function/Strategy 
Component Correlations 
Strat Prob Functions 
Comp Type 1234 
1 H's per Ta 26 
-77 08 07 
bU Ai U 22. 
c 17 
-72 07 06 
2H cons/local a 35 
-27 -13 05 
Feedback b 45 30 21 
-48 
c 57 12 
-05 18 
3 Choice cons/ a 60 
-41 -10 28 
previous Hb 62 
--. 
U 15 12 
c 63 
-03 -04 01 
4 Lose/Shift Ha 30 
-04 -09 12 
b 17 36 28 
-43 
c 14 56 17 10 
5 Lose/Shift Da 45 41 26 34 
b 14 Al 20 
-53 
c 17 69 16 08 
6 Win/Stay a 67 
-23 -14 13 
b 67 00 09 
-27 
c 77 -15 -15 16 
7H Checking a 61 23 31 33 
b 51 42 24 
-- 
I1 
c IQ 52 -02 22 
8D Checking a 61 26 25 30 
b 58 44 07 48 
c 46 56 -16 20 
9 Focusing/ a 79 -06 11 22 
2 T's b 65 33 20 Z42 
c 70 24 -25 22 
10 Focusing/ a 73 -11 28 19 
All T's b 60 26 22 -48 
c 62 18 -33 26 
%Variance 61.32 26.56 8.10 4.02 
p <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 N. S. 
Correlations > 60 in bold 
Correlations > 30 underlined 
The loadings of individual cases in the 5 main clusters on Function 1 and Function 2 
(the two main functions which together account for 87.88% of the variance) are 
displayed on the scatterplot presented in Fig. 5.5. From this it can be seen that the 5 
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Fig 5.5 
Discriminant Function Analysis: scatterplot of individual loadings on 
Functions 1&2 
FUNCTION 1 AGAINST FUNCTION 2 WITH GROUP MEMBERSHIP LABELLED 
FUNCTION I 
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FUNCTION 2 
A= Cluster 1, B= Cluster 2, C= Cluster 3, D= Cluster 4, E= Cluster 6 
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main Strategy clusters separate out well, and would seem to represent distinctive patterns 
of strategic behaviour. This is further validation of the structure of Strategy Clusters 
identified. 
It also lends support to an analysis which suggests that there emerges from the present 
results both a developmental sequence of strategic behaviour on the MDL task, and a 
stylistic variation centred around the number of Hypotheses verbalised by children on 
each trial. 
Group centroids for each of the 5 main clusters on these Functions are reported in Table 
5.9. 
Table 5.9 
Discriminant Function Analysis: centroids for 5 Main Clusters 
Functions 
Cluster 1234 
1 72.96 
-12.45 -15.64 -7.49 
2 76.45 
-9.97 -15.87 -6.39 
3 80.33 
-10.37 -14.46 -7.55 
4 70.24 
-9.97 -13.70 -7.17 
6 78.17 
-11.89 -13.50 -6.47 
These cluster centroids, associated with the analysis of Function/Strategy Component 
correlations, support the following analysis: 
- 
Development of strategic behaviour: the scores of the 5 main clusters on Function 
1 suggest a developmental sequence of strategic behaviour on the MDL task. From 
simplest to most complex strategy pattern this developmental sequence runs through the 
clusters in the order 4 (High/Random Shift of Hypotheses), 1 (Attribute/Dimension 
Perseveration), 2 (Negative Information Difficulties), 6 (High Hypotheses per Trial), 3 
(Focusing), as demonstrated by Table 5.9a. 
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Table 5.9a 
Discriminant Function Analysis: centroids for 5 Main Clusters on Function 1 
in ascending order 
Cluster Score/F 1 
4 (High/Random Shift of Hypotheses) 70.24 
1 (Attribute/Dimension Perseveration) 72.96 
2 (Negative Information Difficulties) 76.45 
6 (High Hypotheses per Trial) 78.17 
3 (Focusing) 80.33 
While clusters 5 and 7 are two small to have formed part of the DSFN analysis it is also 
interesting to note their mean scores on Function 1. Cluster 5 (Case 16) scores 44.56, 
clearly placing this pattern of behaviour (Object Preference) at the simplest 
developmental level of all cases within the present sample. Cluster 7 (Cases 25,35 & 70) 
scores 76.07, which places this pattern (Noise Difficulties) on a par with Cluster 2. 
- 
Strategic Style: the scores of the 5 main clusters on Function 2 suggest a variation 
in strategic style principally associated with the number of hypotheses verbalised per 
trial. Thus it can be seen that at both the 'weak' and 'intermediate' levels of strategic 
development there is a low and a high H's per T variant, while at the level of focusing an 
intermediate (and more accurate) level is evident, as illustrated by Table 5.9b. 
While the mean H's per T for Cluster 3 may suggest an intermediate number was 
produced by the children in this cluster, however, it will be recalled that the analysis of 
the 5 most central cases has suggested that this mean may be to some extent misleading. 
Some central Cluster 3 individuals had High, and some Low, No. of Hypotheses per 
Trial scores. The figures for Standard Deviation also reported in Table 5.9b tend to give 
some support to this picture. It can be seen that the S. D. for Cluster 3 is the largest for 
any of the clusters, particularly when it is viewed as a proportion of the mean number of 
hypotheses produced. 
ý 
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Table 5.9b 
Discriminant Function Analysis: centroids for 5 Main Clusters on Function 2 
related to Mean Hypotheses per trial 
Strategic Cluster Score/F2 Mean S. D S. D. as a 
level H's per T H's per T% of Mean 
Weak 4 
-9.97 1.03 0.07 7.0 
1 
-12.45 2.02 0.50 24.8 
Intermediate 2 
-9.97 1.20 0.30 25.0 
6 
-11.89 2.32 0.28 12.1 
Strong 3 
-10.36 1.51 0.50 33.3 
It is perhaps interesting to note that on Function 2 Cluster 5 (Object Preference) scores 
-5.21 and Cluster 7 (Noise Difficulties) scores -12.09. 
The scatterplot of Function 1 against Function 2 (Fig. 5.5) shows the 5 main clusters to 
be tightly grouped, and illustrates clearly the relationship of each of the clusters to the 
development of efficient, strategic processing (Function 1) and strategic style (Function 
2). This evidence, together with consideration of Strategy Cluster mean ages, suggests a 
developmental pattern including two alternative routes, based upon strategic style, rather 
than one universal developmental route. The mean ages for each of the 5 main clusters, 
by strategic styles, is presented in Table 5.10. 
Table 5.10 
Strategy Cluster Mean ages related to scores on Strategy Component 1(No. of 
Hypotheses per trial) 
High H's per T Low H's per T 
Cluster 1: 7.23 yrs. Cluster 4: 7.09 yrs. 
Cluster 6: 9.75 yrs. Cluster 2: 8.68 yrs. 
Intermediate H's per T 
Cluster 3: 8.79 yrs. 
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This pattern again suggests that the sequence of development for individual children 
may not be through the whole sequence of increasingly more complex strategic patterns 
of behaviour, but may rather tend to follow one of two stylistic routes. In relation to the 
MDL task these stylistic alternatives manifest themselves in the number of hypotheses 
the child tends to produce ( and, arguably, consider) on each trial. 
The age-group patterning shown above further tends to suggest that, for this particular 
type of problem-solving, the cognitive style associated with producing a low number of 
hypotheses is the more effective and leads to children achieving Cluster 3 type strategic 
behaviour at a younger age than the high H's per T style. Thus, the mean age for Cluster 
6 is actually older than for Cluster 3. This might be taken to suggest that most of the 
children in Cluster 3 in this sample have come through the low H's per T route, although 
the evidence from the examination of central cases, and the S. D. for No. of H's per T for 
Cluster 3, did identify the possibility of some high H's per T children being already in 
Cluster 3. A tally of the children in Cluster 3 in relation to their ages and their 
individual mean No. of H's per T, furthermore, revealed that only one out of the four 6 
yr. olds and two out of the eight 8 yr. olds had above average scores for the cluster, while 
this was the case for five out of the eight 10 yr. olds. This would also fit into a model 
that suggested that children with High H's per T may tend to have followed a route 
through Clusters 1 and 6 and arrived in Cluster 3 at a relatively late stage. To find more 
children with a high H's per T route who have successfully moved into a Cluster 3 type 
of strategic pattern, we may have to sample older children than are included in the 
present study. Certainly, the transition from Cluster 1 to Cluster 6 appears to occur at a 
later age than that between Cluster 4 and 2, if these are indeed alternative developmental 
routes. 
Determining complex developmental routes such as is suggested by the present data is, 
of course, difficult within a cross-sectional study of this type. This is an issue which we 
shall return to in later parts of the analysis of results (for example, when we come to 
consider the relationship between strategy and performance scores in the next section, 
and when we come to consider the underlying cognitive abilities and qualities of the 
children in each of the Strategy clusters). We shall also want to return to it within the 
discussion of methodological issues. 
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Section C) Relationships between Strategies and Performance 
i) Performance Indicators 
a) Correlations between Performance Indicators 
As discussed in the previous section, indicators of performance on the MDL task were 
selected on the basis of features of performance which have been highlighted and 
explored in the literature. Subjects were, therefore, scored on the trial of their last error, 
the accuracy with which they verbalised the correct hypothesis during the criterion trials, 
and the extent to which the number of hypotheses they produced on Trials 1,2 &3 
matched the actual number of 'live' hypotheses on each of these trials. 
If we are to use these three indicators of performance it is first worth establishing 
whether they are indeed measuring separate aspects of performance, as suggested by the 
literature, or whether they appear, on this occasion, to be simply different ways of 
measuring the same general competence. This can most easily be explored by means of 
a correlation analysis between the Performance Indicators for the scores of the whole 
sample, as reported in Table 5.11. 
While a lot of the correlations in this matrix are statistically significant, showing that 
there are clear relations between at least some of these Performance Indicators, it is 
important to recognise the true strength of these relationships. The matrix reveals 37 
weak correlations ( less than + or 
- 
. 
40), 20 in the middle range ( between + or 
- 
. 
40 
and 
. 
70) and only 7 which are relatively strong ( more than 
. 
70). Most of the weak 
correlations relate to scores for Learning, and it is clear that improvement in 
performance between Rounds 1&2 is quite unrelated to overall performance on the 
other indicators. 
Scores for Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 &3 are also only weakly or moderately related to 
the other two indicators. The highest correlation with any of the scores on the other 
indicators is 
. 
51 (accounting for only just over 25% of the variance). The relatively weak 
relationships between this indicator and the other indicators may well be a product of the 
variation in strategic style related to the overall number of hypotheses per trial revealed 
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Table 5.11 
Correlations between Performance Indicators 
Trial of Verb. of H's on T's 
Last Error Hypothesis 1,2 &3 
abcLabcLabcL 
Trial of 
Last Error a 
b 55 
c 67 70 
L 06 
-01 07 Verb. of 
Hypothesis a 79 69 69 07 
b 59 85 73 02 73 
c 65 70 86 11 74 79 
L 04 03 14 57 07 01 05 
H's on T's 
1,2 &3a 51 42 51 
-05 44 40 43 00 b 40 40 48 
-18 42 38 35 -03 68 
c 12 15 13 02 13 25 24 04 13 10 
L 15 16 22 
-02 15 16 21 03 22 19 17 
Bold 
= sig. at 0.01 level 
Underlined 
= sig. at 0.05 level 
by the Discriminant Function Analysis earlier. Correlations for scores on H's on T's 1,2 
&3 between type c problems and the other two indicators are notably weak. Clearly the 
presence of redundant information has markedly affected the sample's ability to 
verbalise the correct number of hypotheses on these trials, and in a way that is largely 
unrelated to general performance levels. This would not seem to support the view 
expressed by some researchers, as we have reviewed in chapter 3, that inhibitory 
abilities (i. e. the ability to inhibit the effects of irrelevant information) are central to 
development of problem-solving performance on this kind of task. 
The strongest relationship appears to be between scores for Trial of Last Error and 
Verbalisation of the Correct Hypothesis during the Criterion Trials. The correlations of 
scores on these two indicators for the three problem types are 
. 
79,. 85 and 
. 
86. While 
this is an indication of a clear relationship between these two aspects of performance, the 
average correlation of 
. 
83 still only accounts for 69% of the variance. It seems 
worthwhile, therefore, to include both indicators in our subsequent analysis; we are 
particularly interested, for example, to explore any variation between Strategy Clusters in 
the relationship between these two aspects of performance. In our previous discussion 
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of performance on the MDL task the possibility of a developmental sequence between 
the different aspects of performance measured by the different Performance Indicators 
has been suggested. The theoretical relationships between the ability to verbalise one's 
active hypothesis and various aspects of metacognitive functioning also make this an 
important area of performance to explore. 
It is finally worth noting that the correlations between different problem types for each 
of the Performance Indicators are generally moderate but not very strong, varying 
mostly between 
. 
55 and 
. 
79 (at the most, accounting for little more than 50% of the 
variance). This is an indication that the problem type has implications for performance, 
as we would expect from the role played by problem type in the Cluster Analysis of 
strategic behaviour. Again, an interesting feature is the very weak correlations for scores 
on H's on T's 1,2 &3 between type c problems and the other two problem types. 
Whether this is an effect which varies between different patterns of strategic behaviour 
may be seen when we examine the Performance scores for the Strategy Clusters a little 
later in the analysis 
b) Performance scores for the three Age-groups and the Whole Sample 
The scores on the three Performance Indicators for the three age-groups and the whole 
sample of 72 children are reported in Table 5.12. These indicate clear developmental 
trends, with scores on all three indicators improving from the 6 yr. olds to the 8 yr. olds, 
and again to the 10 yr. olds on all problem types. 
Some support is offered in these figures for the suggestion that there might be a 
developmental sequence between different aspects of performance measured by the 
three Performance Indicators. The major gains in terms of Trial of Last Error (i. e. how 
quickly problems are solved) would appear to be between the 6 yr. olds and the 8 yr. 
olds. For all problem types the difference in means between the two youngest 
age-groups is 5.3 trials (roughly one S. D. ), whereas the difference between the 8 yr. 
olds and the 10 yr. olds is only 1.6 trials. This picture is fairly accurately repeated for 
Verbalisation of Hypotheses. Here the differences are, respectively, 1.7 hypotheses 
(one S. D. ) and 0.5 hypotheses. For both of these Performance Indicators the difference 
in scores between the 6 and 8 yr. olds is a little over 3 times that between the older two 
age-groups. However, for Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 &3 the picture changes. Here the 
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Table 5.12 
Means and Standard Deviations for Performance Indicators by Age groups and 
Problem types and for Whole Sample 
Problem type 
Am ab All Leaminiz 
group Mean S. D. Mean aD Mean S D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Trial of 
Last Error 
6r 
. 
8.9** 6.8 11.2** 6.6 11.3** 7.1 10.5** 5.6 1.5 7.7 
8y15,3.5 4.6 6.5 5.4 5.6 5.5 5.2 4.5 2.3 5.3 
10 r 2.8 5.0 4.9* 5.4 3.0** 4.8 3.6** 4.3 2.0 3.5 
Whole 
sample 5.1 6.2 7.5 6.4 6.7 6.8 6.4 5.7 1.9 5.8 
Verb of 
Hypothesis 
6xM, 2.1** 1.6 1.5** 1.9 1.8** 2.0 1.8** 1.7 0.6 1.5 
8yo, 4.1 1.5 3.2 1.7 3.3 1.7 3.5 1.4 0.2 1.3 
10 r 4.2* 1.4 3.7** 1.6 4.1** 1.3 4.0** 1.3 0.5 0.9 
Whole 
sample 3.5 1.8 2.8 2.0 3.1 1.9 3.1 1.7 0.5 1.3 
Hs on Is 
1.2&3 
Lm 3.1** 0.6 3.2* 0.5 2.9 0.9 3.1** 0.4 0.0 0.4 
8 ym 3.6 0.9 3.4 0.7 2.9 0.9 3.3 0.6 0.2 0.6 
10 r 4.5** 1.3 4.1** 0.9 3.3 1.2 4.0** 0.8 0.6 1.1 
Whole 
sample 3.7 1.1 3.6 0.8 3.0 1.0 3.5 0.7 0.3 0.8 
Scheffe' test (compares group mean to the mean of the rest) 
Levels of sig: *=0.05 level 
**=0.01 level 
respective figures are 0.2 points for the younger groups and 0.7 points (one S. D. ) for 
the older groups. In fact, the picture is exactly reversed. This indicates that the major 
gains in verbalising, and possibly processing, the optimum number of hypotheses on the 
first three trials of each MDL problem does not occur until the children are between 8 
and 10 yrs. old. 
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There is further support for this conclusion from an analysis of the number of children 
in each age group who actually produced the perfect processing pattern of 4,2 
,1 
hypotheses on the first 3 trials. This is an analysis suggested by the study carried out by 
Phillips & Gholson (1980), which we have discussed earlier, in which a memory aid 
was used permanently displaying all 8 possible hypotheses and children were asked to 
indicate "which things could still be correct". They found, for their task, 4 out of 40 
children aged 8 (10%) and 13 out of 40 children aged 11 (32.5%) who produced the 
perfect 4,2,1 pattern of hypotheses on at least one problem (out of 4). In the present 
study, with no memory aid, but with the task placed in a meaningful context, the figures 
were 2 out of 24 children aged 6 (8.3%), 4 out of 24 children aged 8 (16.7%) and 15 
out of 24 children aged 10 (62.5%). 
In relation to the developmental sequence of aspects of performance issue, the figures 
for both the present study and those of Phillips & Gholson (1980) reveal a major 
advance in performance after the age of 8. We will return to this issue again when we 
come to consider Performance scores for the Strategy Clusters, where more supportive 
evidence for a developmental sequence may also be found. A comparison of these two 
sets of figures also lends support to the view, however, that the performance on the 
MDL task is enhanced for young children when it is placed in a meaningful context. As 
we have argued earlier, children's reported memory difficulties with the MDL task are 
clearly at least in part a product of the abstract manner in which the task has most often 
been presented. 
This view is also supported by comparison of the Trial of Last Error scores for the 
standard problem (type a) in the present study with those reported by Ken-der (1978) 
and Phillips & Gholson (1980). The relative figures are reported in Table 5.12a. For 
the purposes of comparison, 3 has been deducted from the scores reported by Kemler 
(1978), since it is clear that she reported the total number of trials before the last error, 
including the first three trials which define the solution. 
As can be seen from the figures reported in Table 5.12a, the results of the present study 
are very much in line with those reported by Phillips & Gholson (1980), as are Kemler's 
(1978). It must be concluded that the advantages of the memory aid provided by 
Phillips and Gholson (1980) were cancelled out by the abstractness of the problem 
materials. That the results of the present study are so close to those of Kemler (1978), 
allowing for the difference in age groups and number of dimensions, also suggests that 
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Table 5.1'2a 
Means for Trial of Last Error on standard problem in present study, Kemler 
(1978) and Phillips & Gholson (1980) 
Present study Kemler 
Agg_ T of LE A= T of LE 
gL01ip group 
6 yrs. 8.9 5 yrs. 12.1 
8 yrs. 3.5 7 yrs. 7.8 (5 dims) 
10 yrs. 2.8 11 yrs. 2.7 (5 dims) 
hn 
& Phillips 
Agg T of LE 
groull 
8 yrs. 4.64 
11 yrs. 3.26 
the attentional aid used by Kemler (1978) served no very useful purpose in the context 
of a meaningful task, as we had suspected. The case we have argued earlier, that young 
children's reported problems of attending to the correct stimulus in the MDL task have 
been a function of the abstract, meaningless nature of the task, rather than of children's 
control of their attention, would seem to be supported by this result. 
The results also support the conclusion, predictable from previous findings discussed in 
chapter 3, that the problem types which involved processing negative information and 
ignoring irrelevant information were more difficult for the children than the standard 
problem. In all the figures there is only one case where a score on problem types b or c 
is at a higher level than that on problem type a (problem type b for 6 yr. olds on the Hs 
on Is 1,2, &3 indicator). It is interesting to note that the differences between the 
standard problem type and the other versions of the task appear to be generally smaller 
for the Hs per Ts 1,2 &3 indicator than for the other two indicators. This may be 
related to it being the latest developing aspect of performance, as noted above, which 
would tend to depress scores on the standard problem. 
It is notable that no significant differences appear between the age-groups for Learning 
(measured as the difference between the scores on the first and second problems of each 
type). It is possible that this apparent similarity may be masking two rather different 
effects. Many of the younger children may well not be in a position to learn about the 
task as a result of inadequate encoding. On the other hand some of the older children's 
performance may be subject to a ceiling effect, where their initial level of performance 
was so high that there was very little room for improvement. What is clear from the 
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S. D. figures is that there is very considerable variation within age-groups. It is clear that 
age is not a major determinant of the amount of improvement ( or 'learning') between the 
first and second round of problems. Whether this kind of improvement on the MDL 
task is related to some other factor will emerge in the later parts of the analysis. 
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ii) Strategies and Performance 
Having established and explored the pattern of development of the sample's 
problem-solving strategies on the MDL task, and having selected our Performance 
Indicators, it is important to establish that strategic development is related to improved 
performance. The existence of a clear relationship between strategic behaviour and 
performance will act as a kind of validation of the Strategy Clusters identified. 
This relationship has been explored in three ways. First, by examining the correlations 
between Strategy and Performance scores for the whole sample. Second, by examining 
Performance scores for the Strategy Clusters; and third, by looking at the Performance 
profiles of the 5 most "central" cases in each of the clusters. 
a) Correlations between Strategy Components and Performance Indicators 
Table 5.13 contains correlations between the Total scores (i. e. on all three problem 
types) for the 10 Strategy Components and the Total and Learning scores for the 3 
Performance Indicators. 
This table provides evidence that there is a clear relationship between the strategy 
components identified and overall level of performance on the MDL task. The Total 
columns for the 3 Performance Indicators contain a large percentage of highly 
statistically significant positive correlations. Of these 8 come into the weak category 
less than 
. 
40), 13 are moderate (between 
. 
40 and 
. 
70) and 10 are strong ( more than 
. 
70). 
When we look more closely it is particularly significant that all 10 of the strong 
correlations are for the 5 most sophisticated Strategy Components related to the Trial of 
Last Error and Verbalisation of Hypotheses scores. These 5 scores in relation to 
Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 &3 are also all highly statistically significant in the moderate 
range. Clearly performance is strongly related to the use of these strategies. That a large 
proportion of the variance is not accounted for by simple linear relationships between 
particular Strategy Components and Performance Indicators is perhaps also an 
indication that an approach looking at patterns of strategic behaviour may be more 
fruitful. 
187 
As we would predict, performance is also clearly but less strongly related to the use of 
simpler strategies, with the notable exception of Lose/Shift. This is a particularly good 
example, in fact, of the need to look at patterns of strategic behaviour through some 
technique such as Cluster Analysis, rather than at just simple linear relationships. If we 
refer back to the earlier analysis of the Strategy Clusters, it will be recalled that Cluster 
Table 5.13 
Correlations between Strategy Components and Performance Indicators 
Performance indicators 
Strategy Trial of Verb. of H's on T's 
Components Last Error Hypotheses 1,2 &3 
! QW L IMI L Total L 
1. H's per T 42 07 21 05 50 17 
2. H cons/local Fback 53 
-16 56 16 35 2. 
3. Ch. cons/ prey H 68 
-23 63 14 53 24 
4. Lose/Shift H 05 
-02 11 -10 08 14 
5. Lose/Shift D 22 
-01 30 -11 27 06 
6. Win/Stay 81 
-17 79 31 43 13 
7. H Checking 75 
-07 75 02 46 10 
8. D Checking 70 
-10 73 05 45 09 
9. Focusing/2 T's 81 
-14 86 14 54 222 
10. Focusing/All T's 84 
-09 87 07 61 27 
Bold 
= sig. at 0.01 level 
Underlined 
= sig. at 0.05 level 
4, which we have some indications is the least sophisticated group in terms of 
development of strategic behaviour, scored relatively highly on Lose/Shift. In the 
commentary upon this result we discussed possible interpretations of this phenomenon, 
from which we could predict that a simple linear correlation with performance on the 
MDL task would not be much in evidence. Thus, while Lose/Shift is an important 
component of a successful hypothesis-testing strategy on the MDL task, it can be the 
result of the child simply 'reading off a locally consistent hypothesis on each different 
trial with no reference to information available from previous trials. The strategic 
behaviour of children in Cluster 4 appeared to contain this element. 
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When we were looking at the relationships between Performance Indicators we noted 
that Learning was apparently unrelated to overall level of performance. From this 
present table it is clear that it is also largely unrelated to overall level of strategic 
behaviour. It is interesting to note, however, that there is a weak association between 
improvement in the number of Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 &3 and some Strategy 
Components, namely the relatively simple components of strategic behaviour concerned 
with local consistency (Components 2& 3), and the more sophisticated components 
concerned with focusing (Components 9& 10). Whether any stronger relationships 
exist between patterns of strategic behaviour and learning may emerge when we look at 
Performance related to Strategy Clusters in the next section. 
Lastly, in relation to this table, it is necessary to comment upon the relation between 
overall number of Hypotheses per Trial (Component 1) and the Performance scores. 
The number of Hypotheses per Trial is a rather different kind of measure to the other 
Strategy Components. To produce more hypotheses is not in itself a direct measure of 
better strategy in the same way as a high score on the other Strategy Components might 
usually be interpreted (although there are exceptions e. g. the high score of Cluster 4 on 
Lose/Shift to which we have just referred). The number of Hypotheses produced is to 
some extent, as we have discussed earlier, a matter of style. We have also argued that for 
the MDL task a low H's per T style appears to lead to earlier development of more 
sophisticated strategies. Nevertheless, examination of the overall average H's per T 
scores for the two stylistic developmental routes (see Table 5.9b) reveals a gradual 
increase in number of H's per T through both which would account for the weak to 
moderate correlations produced between Strategy Component 1 and performance. 
b) Performance Scores for Strategy Clusters 
We have seen from the previous section that some simple linear relations exist between 
our measures of strategy and performance. However, it is clear that this is not an 
adequate method of describing the full nature of these relationships. Performance needs 
to be looked at in relation to the different patterns of strategic behaviour revealed by the 
Cluster Analysis. The patterns of these relationships is represented by the raw and 
standardised mean scores on the Performance Indicators for each of the 7 Strategy 
Clusters reported in Table 5.14. 
. 
These patterns are further illustrated by separate 
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Table 5.14 
Raw and Standardised Mean Scores on the Performance Indicators for the 
Strategy Clusters 
Perf Prob Clusters 
Ind Type Fp 1(10) 2(12) 3(20) 4(13) 5(1) 6(13) 7(3) 
T of a 10.21 0.00** 
-0.74 0.12 0.47 -1.10** -0.80 0.73* 0.74 
Last 9.60 4.29 2.18 11.85 10.00 058 050 
Error b 14.90 0.00** 
-1.01** -0.01 0.85** -0.89** -1.94 0.40 0.55 
14.05 758 2.10 1327 20.00 4.96 4.00 
c 21.46 0.00** 
-0.49 0.28 0.59** -1.44** -1.95 0.60* 0.88 
10.00 4.75 2.63 1650 20.00 258 0.67 
L 2.95 0.013* 
-0.26 0.86? 0.03 -0.59 0.83 -0.01 -0.47 
0.44 6.86 2.13 
-1.49 6.70 1.87 -0.77 
Verb a 22.25 0.00** 
-0.95** 0.21 0.76** -1.29** -0.56 0.50 0.84 
of H 1.80 3.87 4.85 1.19 250 438 5.00 
b 17.84 0.00** 
-0.96** -0.04 0.91** -1.03** -1.45 0.36 0.69 
0.95 2.75 4.60 0.81 0.00 354 4.17 
c 16.29 0.00** 
-0.55 0.33 0.70** -1.34** -1.58 0.50 0.05 
2.00 3.71 4.42 0.46 0.00 4.04 3.17 
L 2.54 0.028* 
-0.37 0.60 0.05 -0.68 0.98 0.27 -0.02 
0.04 030 0.05 
-0.11 030 0.02 0.00 
H's on a 9.28 0.00** 
-0.40 -0.67 0.20 -0.67? -0.67 1.15** 0.82 
T1,2,3 3.30 3.00 3.98 3.00 3.00 5.04 4.67 
b 4.96 0.00** 
-0.25 -0.52 0.27 -0.63 -0.67 0.59 1.55 
3.35 3.13 3.78 3.04 3.00 4.04 4.83 
c 7.37 0.00** 
-1.02* 0.16 0.71** 0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -1.67? 
2.00 3.21 3.78 3.08 3.00 2.96 133 
L 1.51 0.19 0.03 
-0.26 0.30 -0.43 -0.34 0.39 -0.75 
030 0.06 051 
-0.08 -0.00 059 -033 
Plain 
= 
Standardised score 
Italic 
= 
Raw score 
The significance of the variation of each standardised Cluster Mean from the population mean is tested using 
the Scheffe' Atypicality test. The degree to which each Performance Indicator discriminates between Clusters 
overall is tested using one-way Analysis of Variance (F-ratio on left hand side of table) Levels of 
significance: ?=0.1 
*=0.05 
** = 
0.01 
The numbers in brackets after the Cluster numbers indicate the number of cases in each Cluster. 
190 
Standardised Mean bar charts for the 5 main clusters (Figure 5.6) and an Atypicality 
Chart (Figure 5.7), which compares all 5 main clusters. 
Examination of the pattern of performance for the Strategy Clusters revealed by these 
tables and charts shows that, as we have predicted, a very strong set of relationships 
exists between the Performance Indicators and different patterns of strategic behaviour. 
Table 5.14 shows that the scores for the 3 Performance Indicators on the three problem 
types all discriminate between the clusters at the 0.01 level of significance. Scores for 
Learning discriminate at the 0.05 level of significance for Trial of Last Error and 
Verbalisation of Hypotheses during the Criterion Trials. 
Inspection of the Standardised Mean bar charts (Figure 5.6) and the Atypicality chart 
(Figure 5.7) reveals a developmental pattern of improving performance which matches 
exactly the developmental sequence of strategic behaviour suggested by the 
Discriminant Function Analysis of cluster strategy scores discussed earlier (see Table 
5.9a). Thus, the developmental sequence of performance develops from the weakest to 
the strongest through the clusters in the order 4,1,2,6,3, which is exactly the same 
sequence of development in strategic sophistication. This developmental sequence of 
improvement in performance is seen very clearly when a tally is done of the number of 
Performance Indicators on which each of the Strategy Clusters performed at the High, 
Average or Low levels identified by means of the Scheffe' test, as illustrated in Table 
5.14a. 
Table 5.14a 
Levels on 12 Performance Indicators for the 5 Main Strategy Clusters 
Cluster Scheffe' scores 
Low Average High 
466 
148 
2 12 
693 
366 
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Figure 5.6 
Performance Indicators for 5 Main Clusters: Standardised Mean scores 
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While the analyses in the previous sections have revealed positive correlations between 
Performance scores and between Performance and Strategy scores, it was noted that 
Learning appeared to be unrelated or only weakly related to overall levels of 
performance and strategic behaviour. Examination of Learning scores for the Strategy 
Clusters, however, suggests a clear developmental pattern but one which is not linear, 
largely due to a "ceiling" effect with Clusters 6 and 3. These scores are recorded in 
Table 5.14b. 
Table 5.14b 
Standardised Mean scores for Learning of 5 Main Clusters 
Cluster Standardised Mean score for Learning 
Trial Verb. of H's on T"s 
Last Error Hypgtheses 1.2 &3 Avers 
4 
1 
2 
6 
3 
-0.59 -0.68 -0.43 -0.57 
-0.26 -0.37 0.03 -0.2 
0.86 0.60 
-0.26 0.4 
-0.01 0.27 0.39 0.22 
0.03 0.05 0.30 0.13 
As we have defined and measured Learning on the MDL task as the difference in 
performance between Rounds 1 and 2, subjects already performing at a relatively high 
level in Round 1 clearly suffer from a "ceiling" effect. However, it is worth noting that 
the average scores for Clusters 4,1 and 2 are in the same developmental sequence that 
we have found for strategic behaviour and overall performance. It is also interesting to 
note that it is on the Accuracy of Number of Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 &3 that Clusters 
6 and 3 do show some performance gain. Since we have predicted that this should be 
the latest developing of our three Performance Indicators, we would expect this to be 
least affected by any performance "ceiling", and so it appears to be. 
We can further examine this prediction about a developmental sequence between the 
different Performance Indicators by looking at the pattern of development of scores on 
them overall, across the 3 problem types. These average scores are reported in Table 
5.14c. 
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Table 5.14c 
Average Standardised Mean scores for the 5 Main Clusters on Performance 
Indicators across all 3 problem types 
Cluster Average Standardised Mean score 
Trial of Verb. of H's on Ts 
Last Error HyWtheses 1.2 &3 
4 
1 
2 
6 
-1.14 -1.22 -0.42 
-0.75 -0.82 -0.56 
0.13 0.17 
-0.34 
0.58 0.45 0.45 
3 0.64 0.79 0.39 
This analysis would seem to offer some mild support for the suggested sequence of 
different aspects or qualities of performance. The suggestion that the accuracy with 
which subjects are able to verbalise the "correct" number of Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 & 
3 is the last developing aspect of performance is borne out by the lack of improvement 
in score on this indicator between Clusters 4,1 and 2. It is not until the transition 
between Cluster 2 and 6 that any real progress appears in this aspect of performance. 
By contrast there is clear improvement from the start on the other two indicators. The 
ability to solve MDL problems in fewer trials and to verbalise the correct hypothesis 
upon problem solution do indeed appear to be very closely linked, as was suggested by 
the strong positive correlations found between these two indicators reported earlier. 
However, it is interesting to note that all the improvement on Trial of the Last Error 
appears to have been made by the transition between Clusters 2 and 6, whereas there is 
continuing improvement between Clusters 6 and 3 in respect of Verbalisation of the 
Correct Hypothesis. This would seem to support some developmental lag between these 
two indicators. The general model of a developmental sequence between the three 
aspects of performance measured by our Performance Indicators thus seems to be in 
line with our results. 
We have also previously noted, in discussing the correlations between Performance 
Indicators reported in Table 5.11, the weak correlations between performance on H's on 
Ts 1,2 &3 for type c problems (irrelevant information or 'noise') and performance on 
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the other two indicators and on the other two problem types. Again, it was suggested 
that this may well be the result of meaningful but not linear relationships which might be 
explored in relation to Strategy Clusters. To explore this we need to look at the pattern 
of development of scores on type c problems. This is reported in Table 5.14d. 
Table 5.14d 
Standardised Mean scores for the 5 Main Clusters on Performance Indicators 
for type c problems 
Cluster Type c Problem Standardised Mean scores 
Trial Verb. of H's on Ts 
Last Error HypQtheses 1.2 &3 
4 
1 
2 
6 
3 
-1.44 -1.34 0.03 
-0.49 -0.55 -1.02 
0.28 0.33 0.16 
0.60 0.50 
-0.08 
0.59 0.70 0.71 
Bold 
= sig. at 0.01 level 
Underlined 
= sig. at 0.05 level 
This table reveals that while scores on type c problems follow the normal developmental 
sequence for Trial of Last Error and Verbalisation of Correct Hypotheses during the 
Criterion Trials, for the Accuracy of Number of Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 &3a very 
different pattern emerges. This would be responsible for the low overall correlations 
between scores on this indicator for type c problems and other scores which we have 
discovered. Comparison with the previous table shows that Clusters 1 and 6 score more 
or less in line with the general developmental pattern overall on Hypotheses on Trials 1, 
2&3, but relatively poorly on type c problems on this Performance Indicator. Indeed, 
they are the weakest two clusters on this Performance Indicator on type c problems. 
As we have reported earlier, Clusters 1&6 are distinguished by their High Hypotheses 
per Trial strategic style, and the suspicion must be that this is related to their relatively 
poor performance here. It will be recalled from the analysis of the mean scores on the 
Strategy Components, reported in Table 5.6, that Cluster 6 scored poorly on type c 
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problems relative to Cluster 2, particularly on the more sophisticated, long-term Strategy 
Components. We have suggested earlier that the High Hypotheses per Trial strategic 
style may not be helpful to development on the MDL task, possibly because of the 
resulting extra load on working memory, and the scores on this indicator reflect this. 
The figures reported in Table 5.6 for the mean Number of Hypotheses per Trial 
(Strategy Component 1) on type c problems for Clusters 1 and 6 were 2.54 and 2.58 
respectively. These were higher figures than for the other problem types, and have 
resulted directly in the relatively poor performance in terms of accurately verbalising the 
correct number of hypotheses on the first three trials. The strategic style of Clusters 1 
and 6 clearly causes them particular difficulties when there is irrelevancy or'noise' 
present in a problem situation. This effect is particularly striking, as investigation of the 
individual Standardised Mean bar charts produced in Figure 5.6 reveals that these two 
clusters performed relatively well on this Performance Indicator on problem types a and 
b. It is possible that more light may be shone on these relationships when we come to 
look at underlying cognitive factors in the next section. 
As regards the results for other individual Strategy Clusters, it will be noted from 
examination of the individual Standardised Mean bar charts produced in Figure 5.6 that 
Cluster 2's difficulties with type b problems (negative information) (reported earlier in 
the discussion of Table 5.6) are reflected to some degree in their performance. On both 
Trial of Last Error and Verbalisation of Hypothesis during Criterion the Standardised 
Mean is negative on type b problems, yet positive on everything else. The interpretation 
of Cluster 4's strategic pattern as a kind of 'stimulus describing' is also supported by 
examination of their performance on Verbalisation of Hypothesis during Criterion. As 
Table 5.14 indicates, Cluster 4 is the weakest group on this Performance Indicator, both 
in terms of level of performance and learning, and is significantly weaker at the 0.01 
level than the rest of the sample on all three problem types. 
c) Performance scores of Central Cases in each Strategy Cluster 
As a further method of investigating the patterns of performance of the different 
strategic patterns identified by the Cluster Analysis the performance scores of the 5 
most central cases previously identified within the 5 main Strategy Clusters were 
selected for more detailed study. 
198 
In Table 5.15 the pattern of scores is recorded for each of these cases on each of the 
Performance Indicators, according to whether they were High, Average or Low relative 
to the sample mean. For this purpose these categories are defined as before, thus: 
High 
=> Mean + 1/2 S. D. 
Medium 
=< Mean + 1/2 S. D. and > Mean 
- 
1/2 S. D. 
Low 
=< Mean 
- 
1/2 S. D. 
The raw means, standard deviations and figures for Mean + 1/2 S. D. and Mean 
- 
1/2 
S. D. for the whole sample, used to produce these results, are reproduced in Appendix 
H. 3. 
As with the earlier analysis of scores on the 30 Strategy Components, examination of 
the scores on the Performance Indicators of these Central Cases serves to reinforce 
aspects of the analysis of clusters based on overall means; in particular, it can serve to 
highlight those variables upon which Central Cases are strongly consistent, as opposed 
to those variables where even the Central Cases show some variation. This will help to 
enhance interpretation of the essential nature and characteristics of particular clusters. 
Thus, once again, to begin with, the relative positions of the 5 main clusters, so clearly 
illustrated in the bar charts and atypicality chart in the previous section, is clearly 
reinforced. The central cases of Cluster 3, which exhibited the strongest levels of 
performance, score average or high in every case on all Performance Indicators except 
for 3 low scores on No. of Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 W. This cluster is the only one 
with no low scores on the other two Performance Indicators. Clusters 1&4, clearly the 
weakest groups, exhibit a preponderance of low scores amongst their central cases. 
Cluster 4 is confirmed as the weakest group of all with only one High score on any 
Performance Indicator amongst its 5 most central cases. The central cases of the two 
intermediate Clusters 2&6 present the kind of mixed picture of high, average and low 
scores throughout the full range of Performance Indicators which we would predict, 
with Cluster 6 looking rather the stronger. Overall, the patterns look remarkably 
consistent within Strategy Clusters, confirming the strong links between patterns of 
strategic behaviour and performance. 
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Table 5.15 
5 Main Strategy Clusters: Performance Indicator scores of Central Cases 
Performance Indicator/Problem Type 
T of LE Verb of H Hs on Ts 1,2,3 Case abcLabcLabcL 
Cl. l 
5LLLALLLALLAH 
6LLLALLLALLAA 
15 HLALLLLLHHLH 
19 LLLHLLLHLALA 
42 AAAAHAHLLALH 
C1.2 
13 LAAHLLAHLLAL 
26 AAAHHAAHLLAA 
37 HAAHHLALLLAA 
51 AHHAHHHALHHH 
58 HHHAAHHAAHHA 
C1.3 
36 HHHAHHHAAAAH 
43 HHHAHHHAHHAH 
46 HHHAHHHAHLAA 
56 AHHAHHHALLAA 
64 HAAHHHAAHHHH 
C1.4 
10 LLLLLLLLLLAA 
12 ALLALALLLLAA 
24 LALLLLLLLLAA 
47 LLLLLLLLLLHL 
68 LLLALLLALLAA 
C1.6 
39 HHHAHHHAHHHH 
44 AHHALHLHALLH 
59 HHHLHHAAHHAL 
69 HLHAHAHHHHLH 
71 HLHHHAHHHHAL 
H= High (> M+1/2 S. D. ) 
A= Average (< M+1/2 S. D. &> M-1/2 S. D. ) 
L= Low (< M-112 S. D. ) 
As regards Learning, it will be recalled from the analysis of the Standardised Means for 
the 5 main clusters, reported in Table 5.14b, that, overall, Cluster 4 exhibited the least, 
and Cluster 2 the most improvement on the MDL problems between rounds 1 and 2. 
The weak position of Cluster 4 is certainly confirmed by the performance of the central 
cases, who do not produce one High score for Learning between them. The picture as 
regards the cluster showing most Learning is a little more complicated. Cluster 2 
appears the strongest on Trial of Last Error, and at least as strong as Cluster 6 on 
Verbalisation of Correct Hypothesis during Criterion. However, Clusters 1,3 and 6 
come through the strongest in terms of improvement on Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 & 3. 
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This result may be a combined reflection of two factors. First, this being the most 
sophisticated, and therefore latest developing, aspect of performance, as we have 
discussed earlier, it becomes relevant for the two oldest and strategically most 
developed Clusters, 3&6. Second, we have noted the difficulties of Clusters 1&6 on 
this aspect of performance as a consequence of their High Hypotheses per Trial 
strategic style; these difficulties may well afford individuals in these clusters greater 
opportunity for improvement in this area. 
There is some support here also for the notion of a developmental sequence of different 
aspects of performance on the MDL task. If we look at the scores in Table 5.15 in the 
order of development of the Strategy Clusters (i. e. in the order Cluster 4,1,2,6,3) then, 
for Trial of Last Error and Verbalisation of Hypothesis during Criterion, the major 
change in pattern of scoring occurs between Clusters 1 and 2. Thus, in Cluster 2's 
scores there are markedly more Highs than for Clusters 4 and 1 on these first two 
Performance Indicators. For Number of Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 & 3, however, the 
major change occurs between Clusters 2 and 6 (eg the number of Lows for Clusters 4,1 
&2 is 9,9 & 8, and for Clusters 6&3 it is 5& 3). 
Finally, although the performance score patterns within the Strategy Clusters are 
generally strongly consistent, it will be noted that there are some within cluster 
differences. Most notably, the oldest members of Clusters 1&2 (cases 42,51 & 58) 
do appear to perform a little more strongly than the other central cases in their groups. 
Clearly strategy influences performance, but it is not the whole story. There are likely to 
be significant interactions between strategies adopted on any task, performance on that 
task, and general cognitive abilities and qualities. It is to these interactions that we turn 
in the final section of the analysis of results. 
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Section D) Relationships between Predictor measures, Strategy and 
Performance 
D Predictor Measures 
Having established some of the ways in which performance on the MDL task is related 
to the development of increasingly sophisticated and complex problem-solving 
strategies, we now turn our attention to underlying features of cognitive development 
which may be related to the development of these strategies. We have outlined earlier the 
literature concerned with working memory capacity, metacognition, locus of control, 
cognitive tempo (reflectivity-impulsivity) and field dependence 
-independence, all of 
which has indicated that these may be factors which crucially affect the development of 
children's ability to solve problems and to learn. To this list we have also added gender 
and age, which are clearly different kinds of predictor. It is important to establish to 
what extent the theoretically generated predictors of cognitive development are 
associated with performance on the MDL task, and to what extent there are other factors, 
currently unidentified but associated with gender or age, which predict performance. As 
with the measures of strategic behaviour and performance it is first of all helpful to look 
at the relationships between the Predictor Measures. These are reported in Table 5.16. 
This table overall provides good evidence of the relative independence of the Predictor 
Measures. There are no strong correlations (more than 
. 
70). The pattern of weak and 
moderate correlations does provide, however, evidence of some interesting relationships. 
First, it is interesting to note that Gender does not correlate with any of the other 
Predictor Measures. Not surprisingly, on the other hand, nearly all of the Predictor 
Measures do seem to be associated with Age, but only moderately so. The strongest 
relationship appears to be with scores on the Children's Embedded Figures Test 
(CEFT), but this is only at the 
. 
57 level accounting for 32.5% of the variance. 
The two measures of Working Memory, the WM test using the MDL materials and 
Pascual-Leone's FIT test, correlate at the 0.01 level of statistical significance, but only at 
the moderate level of 
. 
39. This suggests that the two measures may give us a more 
complete and reliable measure of the subjects' Working Memory capacities than either 
one of them alone. Both measures correlate with all the other Predictor Measures, with 
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Table 5.16 
Correlations between Predictor Measures 
Gen 
AU 
Wk Mein 
Aig 
-04 wm 
Wk WM 
-10 46 FIT 
Mem Meta Know 
FIT 04 50 39 01 
Meta Ql_ o 
Know 
Q2 08 
m 21 71 02 
2a 29 26 22 Q 
Meta A&C 
Q 
-03 36 33 2a 35 13 ML 
Meta NVc 13 23 21 32 02 28 02 SF 
A&C Meta 
SF 14 31 2ý 33 15 22 07 35 191 
Meta Tot 11 50 46 48 60 58 55 54 68 I 
LI 
-06 44 3Q 40 12 25 07 13 41 34 R-I 
Field Ind 
R-1 03 50 45 50 18 37 24 22 22 44 41 RFT 
Field RFT 
-21 32 38 44 05 19 24 14 17 27 32 -47 
Ind 
EFT 
-13 57 63 55 35 38 
Bold= sig. at 0.01 level 
Underlined 
= sig. at 0.05 level 
21 23 25 49 40 60 44 
the exception of Gender, at statistically significant weak or moderate levels. Again, the 
strongest relationship is with the CEFT. 
The pattern of interrelationships between the various measures of Metacognition 
consists entirely of weak correlations (less than 
. 
40), only 4 (out of 10) of which are 
even statistically significant. The relatively strong correlations between Q1 and Q3, and 
between Metacomprehension and Strategy Flexibility (both at the 0.01 level of 
significance) offers some small support for the notion of Metacognitive Knowledge and 
Metacognitive Awareness and Control being relatively distinct aspects of Metacognition, 
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as suggested by previous research. (The relatively strong correlations between individual 
measures and the Total Metacognition score are simply a product of the fact that the 
Total score is computed from the individual scores, as explained earlier, and so can be 
safely ignored. ) 
Correlations between the individual measures of different aspects of metacognition and 
other Predictor Measures are also all weak, although 26 (out of 35, if we ignore Gender) 
are statistically significant. The Total Metacognition score, however, correlates with all 
the other Predictor Measures at the 0.01 level of significance, with the exceptions of the 
Rod and Frame test RFT), with which it correlates significantly at the 0.05 level, and 
Gender. All this tends to suggest that the overall score is perhaps a more complete and 
reliable measure of the children's metacognitive capabilities than any of the individual 
measures. 
The two measures of Field Dependence-Independence (FDI) correlate positively at the 
0.01 level of statistical significance, but only at the moderate level of 
. 
44. This suggests 
that, like the two measures of Working Memory, the two measures are related, but may 
give us a more complete and reliable measure of the children's FDI than either one of 
them alone. If we ignore Gender and look at Total Metacognition rather than the 
individual measures, then Locus of Control, Reflectivity-Impulsivity (R-I) and the two 
measures of FDI each moderately correlate with all other Predictor Measures at the 0.01 
level of significance (with the single exception of the Rod and Frame test (RFT) and 
Total Metacognition, as indicated above). As indicated in chapter 4, R-I is scored in the 
direction of Reflectivity and the RFT is scored in the direction of Field-Independence 
(this is so throughout the ensuing analysis). These weak or moderate positive 
correlations between all the Predictor Measures indicate that we are looking here at 
relatively independent measures, but ones which are nevertheless associated together in a 
general way as different aspects of the development of cognitive abilities, as would be 
predicted from the developmental research. 
In our earlier review of work related to the analysis of children's developing problem 
solving, we examined the 4 transparadigmatic principles proposed by Sternberg & 
Powell (1983), and some suggestions arose from this about relationships between 
different aspects of cognitive functioning. For example, it was suggested that we might 
expect a relationship to exist between Reflectivity and Metacognitive Knowledge, since 
a more reflective style might be expected to allow more thorough representation of 
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problems. The notion of a strong and simply linear relationship here, however, is not 
particularly well supported by the figures in Table 5.16. As can be seen, the correlations 
with Qs 1,2 &3 are 
. 
18, 
. 
37 and 
. 
24. R-I correlated more strongly with the scores for 
Working Memory and Locus of Control. Similarly, the notion that Strategy Flexibility 
might be closely associated with Field-Independence did not receive strong support, 
with correlations of 
. 
17 and. 25 on this occasion. However, the correlation of 
. 
41 
between Strategy Flexibility and Locus of Control (the strongest relationship between 
Strategy Flexibility and any other measure) did lend some support to the view that 
attributional style might be significant at a general level for problem-solving 
performance. Whatever the relationships are between these various aspects of cognitive 
functioning, it is clear that they are likely to be complex rather than simply linear, as are 
their relationships with strategy development and problem-solving performance, to 
which we now turn. 
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ii) Predictors. Strategies and Performance 
The final stage of the analysis of results attempts to explore the relationships between 
the Predictor Measures and the development of strategic behaviour and performance on 
the MDL task. 
This analysis is in four parts. First, in order to explore the possibility of any simple 
linear relationships between the underlying aspects of cognitive functioning which we 
have included in the study as Predictor Measures and performance, correlations between 
the Predictor Measures and the Performance Indicators are examined. Second, as it is 
fundamental to the theoretical view taken in this study that performance will be mediated 
by strategies, it is necessary to examine the extent to which cognitive factors are 
associated with the level and pattern of strategic behaviour. This is done by examining 
correlations between Predictor Measures and Strategy Components, together with mean 
scores for the Strategy Clusters, and the profiles of the 'central cases' in each of the 5 
main clusters. Third, in an attempt to examine the interrelationships between underlying 
cognitive factors, strategic behaviour and performance a Multiple Regression Analysis 
of the contributions to performance of the Predictor Measures and patterns of strategic 
behaviour represented by the Strategy Clusters is carried out and examined. From these 
three analyses it is hoped to identify the aspects of cognitive functioning most closely 
related to the ability to solve and to learn about the MDL type of problem. Finally, 
because it is predicted by our model of the development of problem-solving strategic 
behaviour that there will be important interactions between different aspects of cognitive 
functioning, strategic behaviour and level of performance, we have explored these 
interactions by means of examining correlations within Strategy Clusters and other 
subsets of the sample population. 
a) Correlations between Predictor Measures and Performance Indicators 
Table 5.17 below contains correlations between the 14 Predictor Measures and the Total 
and Learning Scores for the 3 Performance Indicators. It reveals a number of clear and 
consistent patterns. 
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Table 5.17 
Correlations between Predictor Measures and Performance Indicators 
Performance Indicators 
Predictor Trial of Verb. of H's on Ts Measures Last Error Hypotheses 1,2 &3 
Total LT tat L Total L 
Gen 
-06 07 -04 -06 12 
-05 
AM 49 03 53 
-02 47 28 
Wk WM 48 05 46 
-04 42 07 M em 
FIT 46 23 45 05 40 09 
Meta Q1 49 00 51 02 34 01 
Know 
02 34 
-13 33 -16 27 -03 
Q3- 28 
-01 32 -12 22 00 
Meta M/ 43 
-11 39 -05 43 17 A&C 
SF 38 24 42 
-02 38 24 
Meta Tot 64 03 67 
-10 56 15 
Iuc 24 13 2-6 
-16 22 21 
R-I 35 
-02 Z -08 34 2a 
Field RFT 20 12 21 03 24 
-07 Ind 
CEFF 59 
-07 54 01 40 18 
Bold 
= sig. at 0.01 level Underlined 
= sig. at 0.05 level 
First, simple inspection reveals that scores on the Predictor Measures are generally 
positively correlated at a statistically significant level with overall performance, but that 
no simple linear correlation exists between the underlying aspects of cognition 
considered and the ability to improve performance on the MDL task as measured by our 
Learning indicator. Of the 42 correlations between the Predictor Measures and Learning 
Indicators only 4 are statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and the strongest 
correlation of these is only 
. 
28. 
Perhaps the two slight indications of note are that 3 of these 4 significant correlations 
are in relation to Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 &3 (related to Age, Strategy Flexibility (SF) 
and Reflectivity (R-I) and that 2 significant correlations are with Strategy Flexibility. 
We have noted earlier that H's on T"s 1,2 &3 seems to be the latest developing and thus 
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most sophisticated aspect of performance. Here we have mild support for the 
conclusion that ability to improve on this aspect of performance is related to age. It is 
also interesting that Reflectivity and Strategy Flexibility appear to some extent to be 
related to short-term improvements in this respect. From the cognitive factors 
considered in the present study, Reflectivity and Strategy Flexibility might be predicted 
to be among those more directly related to learning on a new task. 
In relation to general performance levels on the MDL task, the vast majority of our 
Predictor Measures show positive correlations at statistically significant levels. The 
exceptions are Gender, which does not appear to be related to performance at all, and the 
Rod & Frame test (RFT), which just scrapes one significant correlation but at a very 
weak level. We have already noted that Gender appears unrelated to the other Predictor 
Measures. These two results combined would seem to confirm that neither the 
performance or predictor measures used in the present study are in any way gender 
biased, which is very reassuring. It is perhaps also of interest that the RFT was the one 
other Predictor only weakly related to the Total Metacognition score, and that it is the 
latter which emerges here as the Predictor Measure most strongly related to overall 
performance. By contrast to the RFT scores, the Children's Embedded Figures Test 
(CEFT) scores emerge as quite strongly related to performance (at the 0.01 level) on all 
three indicators. Once again, this supports the view that the RFT and CEFT are 
measuring distinctly different aspects of FDI. 
The other three Predictor Measures with the weakest linear relationship to overall 
performance appear to be Locus of Control (all at the 0.05 level only), Q3 in the test of 
Metacognitive Knowledge (one insignificant, one at the 0.05 level, and one just at the 
0.01 level) and Q2 in the same test (one at the 0.05 level and two just at the 0.01 level). 
As we have reviewed, the measures we have described as Metacognitive Knowledge are 
to some extent an indication of the efficacy of the children's representation of the MDL 
problem. It is interesting that this would appear, on the basis of these results, to be less 
strongly related to performance than metacognitive awareness and control. All 6 
correlations for Metacognitive Awareness and Control are comfortably at the 0.01 level 
of significance. 
However, it is worthy of note that the aspect of performance which does emerge as 
consistently and significantly related to the measures reported under the heading of 
Metacognitive Knowledge is Verbalisation of the Correct Hypothesis during the 
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Criterion Trials. The scores on all three questions are related to this Performance 
Indicator at the 0.01 level. We have suggested in earlier discussions that these aspects of 
cognition and performance are linked by underlying representational processes, and the 
strength of the relationship which has emerged lends some support to this view. 
The level of performance on all 3 of our Performance Indicators for the MDL task is 
positively related at the 0.01 level of significance for 30 of the 42 correlations with the 
Predictor Measures. These correlations are at a moderate level, ranging between 
. 
34 and 
. 
67. While this suggests some degree of simple linear relationship, it also suggests that 
there may be important interactions between our cognitive predictors, or that there may 
be patterns of interaction between underlying cognitive factors, pattern of strategic 
behaviour and level of performance. The moderate correlations between performance 
and age certainly suggest that we are not looking at a simple maturational process; the 
strongest correlation for Age is 
. 
53 accounting for only just over a quarter of the 
variance. 
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b) Predictors and Strategies 
It is a central assumption of the present study that the relationship between underlying 
cognitive abilities and performance on the MDL task will be mediated by the pattern of 
strategic behaviour adopted. In order to explore our results in relation to this model, it is 
important to determine next, therefore, the nature of the relationships between cognitive 
factors and strategic behaviour. This analysis is carried out by examining three sets of 
results: correlations between Predictor Measures and scores on Strategic Components, 
mean scores on the Predictor Measures for the Strategy Clusters, and the profiles of the 
'central cases' within each of the 5 main clusters. 
1. Correlations between Predictor Measures and Strategy Components 
Table 5.18 contains correlations between the 14 Predictor Measures and the Total 
scores on the 10 Strategy Components. Not surprisingly, given the high levels of 
intercorrelations noted earlier between the Strategy Components and the Performance 
Indicators (see Table 5.13), this table reveals some patterns very similar to those noted 
above in relation to correlations between Predictor Measures and Performance 
Indicators (see Table 5.17). 
Thus, once again, all Predictor Measures show moderate positive correlations at 
statistically significant levels with the exception of Gender. The Rod & Frame test is 
again clearly the next weakest in its relationships with just two significant correlations at 
very low levels (this again contrasts with the CEFT which correlates strongly, 
particularly with the more long-term, sophisticated Strategy Components 6- 10). Q2 
and Q3 in the test of Metacognitive Knowledge again also show relatively weak linear 
relationships to scores on Strategy Components. Q2 has just three significant 
correlations, and only one of these just at the 0.01 level; Q3 has 4 significant 
relationships with two just at the 0.01 level. 
Locus of Control, however, which had only weak relationships (at the 0.05 level of 
significance) with the Performance Indicators, correlates at statistically significant levels 
with six of the Strategy Components, and with five of these at the 0.01 level. While 
these correlations are only at very modest levels, with the strongest of them at 
. 
41, there 
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is some modest support here perhaps for the hypothesis that Locus of Control may 
influence the strategic approach of individuals to problem-solving, but may not directly 
influence overall performance. Some interesting interactions between Locus of Control 
and other Predictors may emerge to account for this differential pattern of correlations, 
when we come to look at patterns of relationships within Strategy Clusters and other 
subgroups in the last part of this analysis. 
As before, the other nine Predictor Measures all show evidence of generally significant 
relationships, although these are once again at moderate levels. Interactions between 
Predictor Measures at different 
levels of strategic behaviour are once again indicated (as we noted when we examined 
the linear relationships between Predictor Measures and performance) 
, 
and these will be 
explored later. Overall the strongest linear relationships exist with the Total 
Metacognition and CEFT scores. 
Within the Metacognition scores a number of interesting patterns emerge. To begin 
with, the scores for Metacognitive Knowledge appear to be much more strongly related 
to the more long-term, sophisticated Strategy Components 6- 10 (8 significant at the 
0.01 level and 3 at the 0.05 level out of 15 relationships) than they are to the simpler 
aspects of strategic behaviour. This would tend to support the view that the 
development of a sophisticated strategic approach is dependent upon representation of 
the problem. 
As regards Metacognitive Awareness and Control, while Strategy Flexibility appears to 
correlate broadly with the whole range of Strategy Components (7 out of 10 at the 0.01 
level of significance), Metacomprehension correlates with fewer but, in two instances 
(H's per T and Ch. cons/H), at much higher levels. The two measures of Metacognitive 
Awareness and Control thus appear to relate very differently to the different components 
of strategic behaviour. Metacomprehension scores appear to be much more weakly 
associated with the more sophisticated Strategy Components, but more strongly 
associated with the simpler component of making choices consistent with the current 
hypothesis, and, very interestingly, with the number of hypotheses verbalised per trial 
(although it should be borne in mind that a high score on the latter makes a high score 
on former more likely, since there are more hypotheses for the choice on the next trial to 
be consistent with; in Table 5.1 these two Strategy Components were, therefore, not 
surprisingly found to be strongly correlated at the 0.01 level of significance). 
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The association between Metacomprehension and Number of Hypotheses per Trial, at 
. 
61 (accounting for approx 36% of the variance), could indicate either of two types of 
relationship. It might be an indication that scoring well on the Metacomprehension test 
is associated for some reason with the High H's per T stylistic developmental route 
associated with Strategy Clusters 1&6. Alternatively, it may be consistent with the 
finding that, within both stylistic developmental routes, the number of hypotheses per 
trial gradually increases (see Table 5.9b). Within the low H's per T style, at least, this 
clearly marks a gradual move towards optimum performance, which would, of course, be 
predicted to be associated with increasing Metacomprehension in relation to the 
problem-solving task. The analysis of mean scores for Predictor Measures by Strategy 
Clusters which follows may help to determine which of these interpretations is 
indicated. 
Moving on to examine the pattern of correlations in relation to the Strategy 
Components, it is helpful to compare these results with those contained in Table 5.13 
(Correlations between Strategy Components and Performance Indicators). Once again, 
it is noticeable that there is no simple linear relationship between the Lose/Shift Strategic 
Components and the Predictor Measures, in just the same way as no such relationship 
was evident between these Strategic Components and performance. Lose/Shift H is 
particularly weak with only 1 statistically significant correlation at the 0.05 level; 
Lose/Shift D has 6 statistically significant correlations, but nothing above 
. 
37, and is 
clearly weaker in its relationships than both the other two remaining simpler 
components (H cons/F which has 8 and Ch. cons/H which has 11 statistically 
significant correlations, 8 at the 0.01 level). The non-linear nature of the development of 
the Lose/Shift component of strategic behaviour, which we have discussed earlier, is 
thus once again reinforced. 
When we looked at the results in Table 5.13 it was noted that all 10 of the 'strong' 
correlations (> 
. 
70) with Performance Indicators were for the 5 most sophisticated 
Strategy Components. The picture is not quite so clearcut in relation to Predictor 
Measures. It is still the case that the 5 most sophisticated Strategy Components show 
the strongest pattern of relationships (ranging from 8 to 11 correlations at the 0.01 level 
of significance, and 10 to 11 statistically significant correlations overall). However, there 
are no strong correlations and 2 of the highest correlations (. 61), to which we have 
referred above (in relation to Metacomprehension), are with Strategy Components 1& 
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3. The pattern of relationships between Predictor Measures and Strategy Components 
thus appears to be more varied and diffuse than that between Strategy Components and 
Performance Indicators. 
As with relations between Predictor Measures and Performance Indicators, however, the 
strength of simple linear relationships between individual Predictor Measures and 
particular Strategy Components is clearly no more than moderate. This is not surprising 
and indicates once again that interactions between the underlying cognitive factors 
(Predictor Measures) themselves, and between these cognitive predictors, styles of 
strategic behaviour and performance may well be fruitfully investigated. Such 
interactions will be explored below within the Regression Analysis, and when we come 
to examine relations between Predictor Measures, Strategic Components and 
Performance Indicators within Strategy Clusters and within other subsets of the sample 
population. First, however, we will go on to look at the relationships between the 
Predictor Measures and the styles of strategic behaviour identified by our Strategy 
Clusters. 
2. Predictor Scores for Strategy Clusters 
The analyses conducted so far of correlations between individual Predictor Measures 
and both measures of strategy and performance on the MDL task have indicated that, of 
the cognitive factors considered in the study, aspects of Metacognition (and particularly 
Metacognitive Awareness & Control) and of Field-independence (particularly as 
measured by the Children's Embedded Figures Test) appear to be most strongly 
associated with the development of appropriate strategies and the achievement of 
improved performance. We have argued earlier, however, that to look at the Strategy 
Components individually does not relate well to the developing patterns of strategic 
behaviour adopted by children in response to the MDL task. It may, therefore, be more 
illuminating to examine the relation of underlying cognitive factors to Strategy Clusters. 
Table 5.19 contains raw and standardised means for the Predictor Measures for each of 
the 7 Strategy Clusters. The patterns of relationships revealed are further illustrated for 
the 5 main clusters by separate standardised mean score bar charts (Fig 5.8) an 
Atypicality Chart (Fig 5.9), and a table of the scores of the 5 most central cases (Table 
5.20). 
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Table 5.19 
Raw and Standardised Mean scores on Predictor Measures for the Strategy 
Clusters 
Predictor 
Measures Clusters 
ER 1(10) 2(12) 3(20) 4(13) 5(1) 6(13) 7(3) 
Gen 0.92 0.51 
-0.17 0.19 -0.07 0.26 
-0.97 0.10 
-0.97 
1.40 158 1.45 1.62 1.00 154 1.00 
Age 5.77 0.00** 
-0.69 0.18 0.24 -0.77? -1.43 0.81* 0.29 
7.23 8.68 8.79 7.09 6.00 9.75 8.87 
W_ä W_M 3.76 0.00** 
-0.50 -030 0.50 -0.66 1.31 0.30 0.69 
Mom 255 2.71 335 2.42 4.00 3.19 350 
FIT 5.19 0.00** 
-0.80 0.19 0.48 -0.57 -2.28 0.42 0.12 
2.75 3.92 4.26 3.02 1.00 4.19 3.83 
Meta Q1 2.48 0.03* 
-0.82 -0.08 0.40 -0.31 -0.41 0.32 0.49 
Know 0.70 125 1.60 1.08 1.00 154 1.67 
QZ 1.80 0.11 
-0.32 -0.45 0.35 -0.14 -1.42 0.21 0.71 
3.40 3.13 4.87 3.81 1.00 4-58 5.67 
Q33 2.07 0.06? 
-0.79 0.18 0.32 -0.24 0.74 -0.04 0.74 
1.20 23,3 250 1.85 3.00 2.08 3.00 
Metal 5.85 0.00** 0.24 
-0.43 0.16 -0.90* -0.98 0.89* 0.20 
A&C 3.40 2.08 3.25 1.15 1.00 4.69 3.33 
E 1.89 0.09? 
-0.27 0.27 0.38 -0.65 -0.81 0.10 -0.09 
0.50 1.00 1.10 0.15 0.00 0.85 0.67 
Meta Tot 5.19 0.00** 
-0.69 -0.09 0.55 -0.77? -0.87 0.46 0.64 
47.80 6338 80.02 4558 43.00 77.73 82.33 
LJC 2.09 0.06? 
-0.95? 0.14 0.29 -0.08 0.40 0.14 0.28 
9.60 1558 16.40 1438 17.00 15.62 1633 
$_I 3.22 0.00** 
-0.70 -0.17 0.66* -0.37 -0.14 0.13 -0.35 
-13.90 -4.42 1030 -8.12 -4.00 0.88 -7.67 
Field RFT 1.31 0.26 
-0.34 -0.01 0.22 -0.41 0.28 0.08 1.04 
-16.60 -14.17 -12.45 -17.15 -12.00 -13.46 -633 
Ind CEFT 6.59 0.00** 
-0.78 0.03 0.66* -0.73? -1.35 0.15 1.05 
13.60 1733 2020 13.85 11.00 17.85 22.00 
Plain 
= 
Standardised score 
Italic 
= 
Raw score 
The significance of the variation of each standardised Cluster Mean from the population mean is tested 
using the Scheffe' Atypicality test. The degree to which each Performance Indicator discriminates 
between Clusters overall is tested using one-way Analysis of Variance (F-ratio on left hand side of 
table) Levels of significance: ?=0.1 
* 
=0.05 
** 
= 
0.01 
The numbers in brackets after the Cluster numbers indicate the number of cases in each Cluster. 
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Figure 5.8 
Predictor Measures for 5 Main Clusters: Standardised Mean scores 
Cluster 1 0.4 
qe Ag Wtn Fit G11 02 03 MC SF MT LC Ref RF Ceft 
Cluster 2 0.4 
Qe Aq Wm Fit Q1 02 03 MC ýF `1- 1C Ref nF Cý°ý 
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Figure 5.8 cont'd 
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The first point to be noted in our analysis of the pattern of relationships between the 
Predictor Measures and strategic patterns of behaviour as represented by Strategy 
Clusters is that the statistical significance of the differences which appear is far less 
marked than that for the previous comparisons of Predictor Measures with overall 
Strategies and Performance. This is, of course, not surprising, since here we are dealing 
with much smaller sample groups and any variations within these groups (which we will 
explore when we come to look at the central cases) will fairly easily obviate the 
achievement of statistical significance. 
Nevertheless, it is notable that the F-ratio for the one-way Analysis of Variance, which 
measures the overall extent to which each measure discriminates between the Clusters, 
is statistically significant at the 0.01 level for 7 of the Predictor Measures, at the 0.05 
level for 1 measure, and at the 0.1 level for a further 3 measures. This leaves only 
Gender, Metacognition Q2 and the Rod & Frame test failing to discriminate at any 
significant level at all between the Strategy Clusters. These measures have been 
consistently the weakest throughout in relation to both strategy and performance. 
Further, examination of the separate standardised mean score bar charts for the 5 main 
clusters (Fig 5.8) and the Atypicality Chart (Fig. 5.9) reveals that the general pattern of 
scoring on the Predictor Measures by the Strategy Clusters is very much in line with the 
scoring for sophistication of strategic behaviour and level of performance. The 
developmental sequence identified earlier in our analysis of strategic behaviour using 
Discriminant Function Analysis (Table 5.9a) is clearly mirrored in the pattern of 
Predictor Measure scores. Thus, simply by observation of Figs. 5.8 & 5.9 it is evident 
that Clusters 4&1, which produced the simplest strategies, are also weakest in relation 
to the underlying cognitive factors represented by the Predictor Measures. Cluster 2 is 
intermediate in both instances, and Clusters 6&3 show the strongest performance in 
both regards. 
Thus, while the level of statistical significance of the differences between particular 
Clusters on any one Predictor Measure may be weak, the strength of the overall pattern 
of scores provides quite good evidence that some of the underlying cognitive factors 
related to the Predictor Measures are indeed related to the pattern of strategic behaviour 
on the MDL task. 
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Analysis of the overall correlations of Predictor Measures to Strategic Components (see 
Table 5.18) revealed that the Total Metacognition ( and within that, the scores for 
Metacognitive Awareness & Control) and CEFT scores were most strongly related in a 
general way to strategic behaviour. The current analysis reveals that CEFT and 
Metacognition Total again appear as amongst the most significant predictors (Cluster 3 
was significantly more field-independent on the CEFT than the remainder at the 0.05 
level, while Cluster 4 was significantly weaker metacognitively and significantly more 
field-dependent at the 0.1 level). However, it is notable that, in this instance, within 
Metacognition it is Metacomprehension which appears as most significant (i. e. at the 
0.01 level) in its own right, and in a particularly interesting way which we shall discuss 
below. 
The other most significant measures to emerge are those related to Working Memory, 
Cognitive Tempo (Cluster 3 children were significantly more reflective as a group than 
the remainder at the 0.05 level) and, not surprisingly, Age (Cluster 6 was significantly 
older at the 0.05 level, and Cluster 4 was significantly younger at the 0.1 level). The one 
other result worth noting is that Cluster 1 emerged as significantly more external in 
terms of Locus of Control than the remainder at the 0.1 level. Given that a number of 
these measures correlate with one another, even if only at relatively moderate levels (see 
Table 5.16), it is difficult from this analysis to disentangle their relative contributions to 
the behaviour of different Strategy Clusters. For this purpose we have carried out a 
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis, the results of which are reported below. 
A number of interesting issues have arisen in relation to particular Predictors upon 
which the mean score data may shed some light. We have discussed earlier the age 
compositions of the various Strategy Clusters (see Table 5.10) within our discussion of 
the developmental sequence and the two strategic styles revealed by the Discriminant 
Function Analysis. It was noted then that Cluster 3 is apparently more advanced 
strategically than Cluster 6, despite the fact that Cluster 6 is older than Cluster 3. 
Subsequently, it has been seen that Cluster 3 Performance is also at a higher level than 
that of Cluster 6 (see Table 5.14a). From this previous data, however, the question 
remains open as to the explanation of this apparent anomaly. It could be that the 
subjects in Cluster 6 have followed a developmental route direct from Cluster 1 
explained by a High Hypotheses per Trial strategic style which has delayed their 
development. On the other hand, it could be that the developmental route for any 
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individual child passes through Cluster 3 and on to Cluster 6 as a result of some kind of 
U-shaped learning development, as discussed in our earlier theoretical review. 
The evidence on this point from the mean scores for the Predictor Measures is, however, 
not entirely clear and gives some support to both possible developmental routes. This is 
an issue which may require longitudinal study for it to be definitively clarified, as we 
shall discuss later when we come to look at research implications of the present study. 
The evidence we do have, however, is intriguing and well worth examination. Thus, if we 
compare Clusters 3 and 6, while the differences for individual Predictor Measures are 
not statistically significant, it is worth noting that, ignoring Gender and Age, for the 
remaining 12 Predictor Measures Cluster 3 scores more strongly than Cluster 6 on 11, 
while the reverse is true only for Metacomprehension (of which, more below). This 
gives some support to the notion that Cluster 3 is more developmentally advanced than 
Cluster 6, the subjects within which are hampered on the MDL task by using an 
inappropriate strategic style. 
The data related to the scores on the test of Metacomprehension, however, appear to give 
some support to the conclusion that Cluster 6 is more developmentally advanced, 
according to some kind of U-shaped developmental pattern, with performance being 
depressed as a result of a more sophisticated strategy being attempted than that carried 
out at the Cluster 3 stage. We noted in the previous section that the scores for 
Metacomprehension for all subjects produced the strongest correlations of any of the 
Predictor Measures with individual Strategy Components (see Table 5.18). At. 61 the 
correlations with Strategy Components 1 (High H's per T) and 3 (Ch. cons/H) are 
moderate but significant at the 0.01 level. We also indicated in that section that the 
current analysis of mean scores on Predictor Measures for Strategy Clusters might help 
to interpret these results, particularly in relation to the High Hypotheses per Trial 
component. The relationship with this component is particularly interesting because of 
its key role in determining the two strategic styles identified in our analysis. 
The first question to be resolved is whether Metacomprehension is particularly 
associated with the High Hypotheses per Trial strategic style, or whether the correlation 
is the result of the general increase in H's per T which, as we noted in the previous 
section, appears in both stylistic developmental routes. The standardised mean scores 
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for Metacomprehension for each of the Strategy Clusters (taken from Table 5.19) are 
reported in Table 5.19a. 
Table 5.19a 
Standardised mean scores for Metacomprehension for 5 Main Strategy 
Clusters 
Hypotheses per Trial 
High Intermediate Low 
Cluster 1: 0.24 Cluster 3: 0.16 Cluster 4: 
-0.90* 
Cluster 6: 0.89* Cluster 2: 
-0.43 
*= sig. at 0.05 level (Scheffe' test) 
These results would seem to confirm that while Metacomprehension scores do improve 
within both stylistic routes, the High H's per T style is associated with 
Metacomprehension. As can be seen from the results, Cluster 6 scores at a significantly 
higher level than Clusters 2&3, while Cluster 1 scores at least as well as these Clusters 
and significantly better than Cluster 4. The relationship between Metacomprehension 
score and number of hypotheses verbalised on each trial is clearly evident from simple 
visual inspection of the overall pattern revealed in Table 5.19a. 
This pattern of results for Metacomprehension is highly intriguing as it seems to 
suggest that in this respect, at least, those subjects with good Metacomprehension are, 
nevertheless, adopting an apparently less appropriate pattern of strategic behaviour and 
being less successful in terms of their performance on the MDL task. The three 
possible explanations that suggest themselves are as follows. First, that there is some 
systematic error in the scoring of the test for Metacomprehension which artificially 
inflates the scores of subjects adopting a High H's per T strategy. Second, that this is a 
robust result and some phenomena associated with developing a more sophisticated 
strategy, resulting in a dip in performance, is occurring, for example, for the slightly 
older Cluster 6. Third, that the development of children in Strategy Clusters 1 and 6 in 
terms of strategic behaviour and performance on the MDL task is delayed because of 
their adoption of an unhelpful strategic style. Their Metacomprehension is relatively 
developed because they are older, but this has not helped them to develop strategically. 
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In order to examine the first possibility, of systematic error in the scoring of the test for 
Metacomprehension, two possible ways in which this may have occurred were 
investigated. First, since 3 points were scored only if the subject correctly pronounced 
themselves confident of their hypothesis immediately this was possible (i. e. on Trial 3) 
there may have been a bias towards the more impulsive child. An examination of the 
standardised mean scores for Reflectivity of the Strategy Clusters lends some support to 
this hypothesis. These scores are recorded in Table 5.19b, from which it can be seen 
that Cluster 1 is easily the most impulsive group (although this is not statistically 
significant) and Cluster 6 is significantly more impulsive than Cluster 3. However, it 
must be noted that the direct correlation between Metacomprehension score and 
Reflectivity was a very modest 0.23 (see Table 5.16). 
Table 5.19b 
Standardised mean scores for Reflectivity for 5 Main Strategy Clusters 
Hypotheses per Trial 
High Intermediate Low 
Cluster 1: 
-0.70 Cluster 3: 0.66* Cluster 4: -0.37 
Cluster 6: 0.13 Cluster 2: 
-0.17 
*= sig. at 0.05 level (Scheffe' test) 
The second possible way in which systematic error might have occurred emerges from 
an examination of the pattern of responses on the Metacomprehension test. If we look at 
the tests upon which subjects scored 2 points, where they correctly pronounced 
themselves confident of their hypothesis, but after it should have been possible to do so, 
and where the correct hypothesis was stated more than once before the subject 
pronounced themselves confident, a very interesting pattern emerges. If we just count 
those tests, for example, in Cluster 3 we find this occurring in 26 out of the 40 tests 
carried out by those 20 subjects (or 65% of tests). For Cluster 6, however, the figure is 
only 10 out of 26 tests carried out by 13 subjects (or 38% of tests). 
This finding prompted recalculation of scores on the Metacomprehension test, in two 
ways. First, a score of 2 was adjusted to a score of 3 where the subject had stopped the 
test just one trial after the trial upon which they should have been sure of the answer. It 
223 
was felt that this would make some allowance for the more careful, perhaps more 
Reflective subjects, and this simple change resulted in the scores for 26 subjects being 
adjusted. Second, the existing method of scoring assumes that, whatever strategy the 
subject is adopting, all the information from each trial is available to them, and, therefore, 
they should be able to be sure of the solution by Trial 3 (or 4 in the second way of 
calculating scores described above). This is almost certainly an oversimplification, and 
so a third scoring system was adopted which allowed for differences in strategy and 
assumed that the only information available to each subject was that which related to 
items about which hypotheses had been verbalised. This meant that the Trial at which 
each subject could be deemed to be in a position to be certain about their solution varied 
according to which hypotheses they generated. Adopting this system resulted in 
changes to a further 11 subjects scores. New mean scores for Metacomprehension for 
each of the Strategy Clusters were then calculated based on these two new ways of 
calculating subjects' scores. These are reported in Table 5.19c. 
Table 5.19c 
Standardised mean scores for Metacomprehension for 5 Main Strategy 
Clusters: 3 alternatives scoring systems 
Hypotheses per Trial 
High Intermediate Low 
Score 1: Original 
Cluster 1: 0.24 Cluster 3: 0.16 Cluster 4: 
-0.90* 
Cluster 6: 0.89* Cluster 2: 
-0.43 
Score 2: Trial 4 allowed 
Cluster 1: 0.08 Cluster 3: 0.23 Cluster 4: 
-0.93** 
Cluster 6: 0.95** Cluster 2: 
-0.46 
Score 3: Hypotheses sampled considered 
Cluster 1: 0.07 Cluster 3: 0.25 Cluster 4: 
-0.88* 
Cluster 6: 0.84* Cluster 2: 
-0.39 
** 
= sig. at 0.01 level 
*= sig. at 0.05 level (Scheffe' test) 
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Inspection of the scores achieved be each of the Strategy Clusters as a result of the 
different scoring methods reveals, however, that the relative positions in respect to 
Metacomprehension are remarkably robust. Under all three systems Cluster 6 scores 
significantly higher than the remainder, and Cluster 4 significantly lower. Clusters 1,2 
&3 are not significantly different, although it may be that the original scoring system 
slightly overestimated the performance of Cluster 1. Cluster 1 is the most impulsive 
which, as suggested above, may be related to some slight artificial overestimation of the 
Metacomprehension score for this group. That Cluster 6 is the group with the most 
awareness of their own comprehension, as measured by the test used within the present 
study, cannot, however, be seriously doubted. 
We are, therefore, left with the remaining two possibilities. Either, that some kind of 
U-shaped developmental growth pattern associated with developing a more sophisticated 
strategy, resulting in a dip in performance, is occurring, for example, for the slightly 
older Cluster 6. Or, that the development of children in Strategy Clusters 1 and 6 in 
terms of strategic behaviour and performance on the MDL task is delayed because of 
their adoption of an unhelpful strategic style. Their Metacomprehension is relatively 
developed because they are older, but this has not helped them to develop strategically. 
There are, as we have noted, limitations on the extent to which such an issue can be 
resolved with cross-sectional data. However, the evidence reported above of the 
overwhelming strategic and performance superiority of Cluster 3 relative to Cluster 6 
would seem to argue in favour of the latter possibility. This pattern of results, combined 
with the statistically significant but moderate correlation (reported in Table 5.17) 
between Metacomprehension and performance, would seem to support the view, 
reviewed earlier in relation to critiques of Piaget's model of cognitive conflict, that being 
aware of one's own level of understanding may be a necessary, but is not a sufficient 
condition for the development of effective strategic processing on a problem-solving 
task. 
In the discussion of the correlations between Predictor Measures and Strategy 
Components overall some indication was also highlighted that Locus of Control may 
not be related to Performance, but that it might be related to choice of strategies. This 
possibility is only mildly supported by the present results in relation to Strategy 
Clusters. The Scheffe' test result for Locus of Control (see Table 5.19) suggests that it 
discriminates between the Clusters only at a very weak level of statistical significance 
(0.1), and it is observable from the same table and from the Atypicality Chart (Fig. 5.9) 
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that only Cluster 1 varies in any notable way from the population mean, again only at the 
very weakest level of statistical significance. It may, of course, be that Locus of Control 
interacts in interesting ways with other underlying cognitive factors within Strategy 
Clusters, and this will be investigated below when we come to look at the relationships 
within subgroups. 
3. Predictor Scores of Central Cases in each Strategy Cluster 
As a further method of investigating the patterns of underlying cognitive factors of the 
different strategic patterns identified by the Cluster Analysis the Predictor Measure 
scores of the 5 most central cases previously identified within the 5 main Strategy 
Clusters were selected for more detailed study. 
As before, the pattern of scores is recorded according to whether they were High, 
Average or Low relative to the sample mean. For this purpose these categories are 
defined as before, thus: 
High 
=> Mean + 1/2 S. D. 
Medium 
=< Mean + 1/2 S. D. and > Mean 
- 
1/2 S. D. 
Low 
=< Mean 
- 
1/2 S. D. 
The raw means, standard deviations and figures for Mean + 1/2 S. D. and Mean 
- 
1/2 
S. D. for the whole sample, used to produce these results, are reproduced in Appendix 
H. 4. The two exceptions to this procedure on this occasion are Gender, where males and 
females are indicated with M and F, and Age, where this is recorded as 6,8 or 10. 
Inspection of the scores on the Predictor Measures of the 5 Central Cases in each 
Cluster (Table 5.20) confirms the variations between Clusters already identified and 
discussed, but also reveals that there are clear variations within Clusters. This suggests 
both that the pattern of strategic behaviour adopted may be mediated by other factors 
than those included in the present study, and that there may be interesting interactions 
between Predictors. 
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Table 5.20 
5 Main Strategy Clusters: Predictor Measure scores of Central Cases 
Predictor Measure 
Wk Mem Metacog FDI 
Case Gen Age WM FIT Q1 Q2 Q3 M/c SF Tot L/C R-I RFT CEFT 
Cl. 1 
5F6LALLLALLLLLL 
6F6LALLLHALAALL 
15 M6HLLALHLLAALA 
19 M6ALLLLHLLALHL 
42 M8ALHLHLLALLAL 
C1.2 
13 M6LLHAHLHHLLHL 
26 M8LLLLALLLLALL 
37 M8HHAAHLHAHHHH 
51 M 10 AHHAHHHHHAHA 
58 F 10 AAHAHHHHHAAH 
C1.3 
36 F8HHAHHHHHAHLH 
43 F8LLHAAHHHAHLA 
46 M8HAHLHALAHAAH 
56 M 10 HHHLHAHHHHHH 
64 F 10 HHHHHAHHHHHH 
C1.4 
10 F6LLAHLALLHAHA 
12 M6AAAHHLLALALL 
24 M6LLALLLLLALLA 
47 M8HLHALLLLALAA 
68 F 10 LALAALLLHHAL 
C1.6 
39 F8LAHLAHHHALLL 
44 M8HAAALHHAHALA 
59 F 10 HHHHHHLHLHHH 
69 M 10 HHAHLHLAAAAA 
H= High (> M+1C2 S. D. ) 
A= Average (< M+1/2 S. D. &> M-1/2 S. D. ) 
L= Low (< M-1/2 S. D. ) 
Thus, once again, the relative positions of the 5 main clusters, illustrated in the bar charts 
and atypicality chart in the previous section, is reinforced. The central cases of Cluster 
3, which exhibited the strongest levels of performance, score more Highs (39) and fewer 
Lows (7) than any other cluster. Cluster 6 scores the next strongest with 26 Highs and 
13 Lows. When we did this analysis on performance Cluster 6 looked rather stronger 
than Cluster 2, and so it is here. Clusters 1&4, clearly the weakest groups, once again 
exhibit a preponderance of low scores amongst their central cases. 
While the patterns of the central cases looked generally very consistent when we looked 
at Strategy Components and Performance Indicators, here we find some intriguing 
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variations. The clearest example of this variation within clusters appears in the 
intermediate Cluster 2. Here we have Case 26 (an 8 yr. old) with nearly all Low scores 
and a few Averages, Case 13 (a 6 yr. old) with a mixture of Lows and Highs, and the 
other 3 cases (an 8 yr. old and two 10 yr. olds) with a preponderance of Highs and 
Averages. This may be another example, as we found with performance, of the older 
members of clusters scoring a little more strongly than the younger central cases. There 
would appear to be a similar pattern 
, 
also, within Cluster 6, although here it is really just 
Case 59 which looks atypically strong. 
Overall the evidence of these Central Cases would seem to be that the relationships 
between underlying cognitive factors, strategies and performance on the MDL task are 
not straightforwardly linear. Some interesting interactions between these different 
aspects of cognitive functioning in relation to this kind of task may emerge when we 
look at relations within subgroups at the end of this analysis. 
One feature of interest are the scores on Metacomprehension for the cases within 
Clusters 1 and 6. It will be recalled that these two clusters scored particularly well on 
this aspect of metacognition, and this is reinforced here. All the cases in Cluster 6 and 
three cases in Cluster 1 score High on Metacomprehension. This is particularly striking 
because the scores within Cluster 1 for other metacognitive aspects are predominantly 
Low (4 out of 5 cases score Low overall for Metacognition), and even in Cluster 6 there 
are a number of Low scores also. 
From the previous analyses we have carried out of the relationships between Predictor 
Measures and Performance Indicators, Metacognition and CEFT have emerged as the 
most strongly related overall to performance. This is once again borne out here. The 
scores on Total Metacognition and CEFT for the weakest Clusters 1&4 are all Low or 
Average. Cluster 2 has a mix of scores at all levels, while Cluster 6 contains only one 
Low score on CEFT. Cluster 3, the strongest performing cluster, scores 8 Highs and 2 
Averages on these two measures. In a situation where many of the Predictor Measures 
correlate at reasonable levels with one another, however, it is not easy to disentangle the 
separate effects of individual factors. In order to help clarify this situation, a regression 
analysis was carried out, and this is reported next. 
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c) Multiple Linear Regression Analysis of Predictor Measures and Strategy 
Clusters in relation to Performance Indicators 
The previous analyses have suggested that interesting relationships exist in the data 
between some of the Predictor Measures and both strategic behaviour and performance 
on the MDL task. 
The strongest linear relationships, as revealed by the correlation matrices, with both 
Strategy Components and Performance appear to be exhibited by the Total 
Metacognition score and CEFT, a measure of Field-Independence. Within the Total 
Metacognition score, there is some evidence that Metacognitive Awareness & Control is 
more strongly related than Metacognitive Knowledge. When relationships with Strategy 
Clusters are examined these factors continue to be relatively strong, but Age and 
Working Memory also exhibit significant relationships. 
We have also discussed some interesting variations in relationships. Locus of Control, 
for example, appears to be relatively strongly related to Strategy Components, but not to 
Strategy Clusters or Performance. Metacomprehension, one of the two measures of 
Metacognitive Awareness & Control, appears to be significantly related overall to 
Performance, and yet is quite strongly associated with Strategy Clusters 1&6, which 
exhibit the High H's per T strategic style which appears to result in relatively weak 
Performance. 
In order to attempt to disentangle the separate relationships of the various underlying 
cognitive factors and patterns of strategic behaviour with performance, Multiple Linear 
Regression and Covariance Analysis was carried out for indicators of Performance and 
Learning. In this context, the Covariance Analysis carried out involved calculation of 
variance attributable to a series of reduced regression models which contained all but 
one of the Predictor Measures contained in the total regression (or 'full') model. The 
variance attributable to each Predictor Measure was then calculated by subtracting the 
variance explained by the reduced model from that explained by the full model. The 
results of these analyses are reported in Table 5.21 for Performance and Table 5.22 for 
Learning. The results for Performance are also illustrated by the bar charts in Fig. 5.10. 
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Figure 5.10 
Proportion of variance on Performance Indicators attributable to full and 
reduced regression models 
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1) Predictor Measures (Meta Total) 
Full Model 
Field Indep. 
Reflectivity 
Loc. of Control 
Metacog Total ** 
Working Mem 
Age 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 30 90 100 
2) Predictor Measures (Meta K and A/C) 
Full Model 
Field Indep. 
Reflectivity 
Loc. of Control 
Metacag A& C IWIMM 
Metacov K 
Working Mem r"- : 
Age 
+ý 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
3) Predictor Measures (Meta Total) + Strategy 
Full Model 
Strategy 
Field Indep. 
Reflectivity 
Loc. of Control 
Metacoq Total 
Working Mem 
Age 
T 
0 
I I i I i 
I 
** 
: ** 
T ýý -r 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 2: 0 90 100 
4) Predictor Measures (Meta K& A/C) + Strategy 
Fell Model 
Strategy 
Field Indep. 
Reflectivity 
Loc. of Control 
Metacov A&C 
Metacog K 
Working Mem 
Age 
.......................... 
ýý 
............................. 
......................... 
............................ 
I 
...................... 
..................... 
0 
T- ,T 
10 20 ý0 40 50 60 r0 20 90 100 
231 
Figure 5.10 cont'd 
Verbalisation of Hypothesis 
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Figure 5.10 cont'd 
Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 &3 
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For the purposes of these analyses the various Performance Indicators have been taken 
as the criterion variables, and 4 slightly different total regression models were 
constructed which included either just Predictor Measures or Predictor Measures and 
Strategy Clusters. The Predictor Measures included were Age, Working Memory 
(scores for WM & FIT combined), Metacognition (split in separate analyses into 
Knowledge and Awareness & Control), Locus of Control, Reflectivity and Field 
Independence (Rod & Frame and CEFT combined). The opportunity afforded 
by regression analysis to examine the variance explained by combinations of related 
variables has been taken up as indicated by this list. In as much as the combined 
measures generally correlate with one another positively, but at weak or moderate levels 
(see Table 5.16), it was felt that the combined measures might be a more robust 
indicator of the particular cognitive factors under investigation. In this kind of analysis, 
also, undue weight might be given to aspects represented by more than one individual 
measure. 
The 5 main Strategy Clusters were included in the regression model by means of the 
standard transformation of such categoric data known as 'dummy variable coding'. In 
this procedure, each Strategy Cluster became a variable and each case was simply coded 
1 or 0 depending upon whether they were in that Strategy Cluster or not. These 
variables were then looked at as a combined group within the regression analysis. In the 
analyses where Strategy Clusters were included, the 4 subjects who were not in the 5 
main clusters were excluded from the analysis. 
1. Performance 
As can be seen from the R2 figures in Table 5.21 
, 
all the full models related to 
Performance criteria explained sufficient of the variance to be significant at the 0.01 
level. 
The Covariance results reveal a number of interesting features of the data. 
First, it is apparent that for all three Performance Indicators a substantial proportion of 
the explained variance is attributable to interactions between the predictors. These figure 
range from 59.6% to 68.6%. This is very much in line with the view that there are 
significant interactions between underlying cognitive factors, choice of strategy and 
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performance in problem-solving behaviour. As has been previously indicated, it is the 
intention to explore these interactions further in the final section of this analysis. 
Second, these results give considerable support to the view that performance on the 
MDL task is largely associated with Strategic Behaviour and various aspects of 
Metacognition. In all the analyses in which it is included (models type 3& 4), Strategic 
Behaviour is the predictor which on its own accounts for the largest proportion of the 
explained variance, and this contribution is significant at the 0.01 level for analyses 
related to Trial of Last Error and Verbalisation of Hypothesis during Criterion. It is 
also notable that models type 3&4, which include Strategy Cluster as a predictor, 
consistently account for more of the total variance than models type 1&2, which do not 
include Strategy Cluster. 
In analyses where Strategy is not included in the Full Model (model types 1& 2) 
Metacognition clearly emerges as the most significant predictor. In model type 1 the 
contribution of Total Metacognition score is significant at the 0.01 level for all three 
Performance Indicators. In model type 2, both Metacognitive Knowledge and 
Metacognitive Awareness & Control emerge as significant predictors, in each case 
Awareness & Control being slightly more significant than Knowledge. 
It is particularly interesting to compare the results for Metacognition when Strategy is 
and is not included in the regression model. Comparison of model types 1&2 with 
model types 3&4 shows that when Strategy is included much of the independent 
contribution of Metacognition disappears. This is further evidence of the relationship 
between Metacognition and Strategic Behaviour. However, although in model type 3 
analyses the contribution of Total Metacognition is much reduced, it is nevertheless still 
significant in relation to all three Performance Indicators. 
When we look at the model type 4 analyses, it is clearly apparent that the inclusion of 
Strategy reduces the independent contribution of Metacognitive Awareness & Control 
significantly more than it does that of Metacognitive Knowledge. Thus, for the analyses 
related to Trial of Last Error and Verbalisation of Hypothesis during Criterion, while the 
contribution of Metacog A/C almost disappears in model type 4, the contribution of 
Metacog K remains significant at the 0.05 level. This suggests that while Metacognitive 
Knowledge may have a somewhat independent relationship with performance on the 
MDL task, Metacognitive Awareness & Control is much more closely associated with 
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strategic behaviour. This relates well with the general pattern of earlier results indicating 
stronger relationships for Metacognitive Awareness & Control than for Metacognitive 
Knowledge with both measures of strategic behaviour and performance. 
The only other statistically significant result is that for Field Dependence-Independence 
in relation to Trial of Last Error when Strategy Cluster is not included in the analysis. 
This confirms to some extent the results obtained in other analyses for CEFT, in 
particular. 
2. Learning 
Analyses of the various models related to Learning are reported in Table 5.22. As we 
have seen earlier, the relationships between the Predictor Measures and Learning appear 
to be weaker than those with Performance (see, for example, Table 5.17). In line with 
this the regression models related to scores for Learning account for less of the variance 
than those related to Performance. However, although fewer of these full models are 
statistically significant, there are nevertheless some interesting patterns in the results. 
To begin with, the pattern of relationships revealed is a much more diffuse and variable 
one than that for Performance, with a number of different 
Predictors making relatively large contributions to the explained variance. It is also 
clearly the case that the variance which is explained by the various models is accounted 
for much more by the independent effects of individual Predictors. The contributions of 
interactions between Predictors are much smaller than in the previous analysis, and even 
disappear altogether in several cases. 
The strongest relationship which emerges from these analyses, however, is that between 
scores for Learning and membership of particular Strategy Clusters. On both Trial of 
Last Error and Verbalisation of Hypothesis during Criterion the full models explain 
sufficient variance to be statistically significant only when they include Strategy Clusters 
(model types 3& 4). 
This result is very much in line with the evidence produced earlier in the section dealing 
with Performance scores for the Strategy Clusters, where a clear developmental pattern 
was identified in relation to Learning (see Table 5.14b). The present data would thus 
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seem to offer some support to the view that the Strategy Clusters not only represent 
different stages in the development of strategic behaviour in relation to the MDL task, 
but also imply different stages in the development of the ability to learn quickly about 
new tasks. This has important implications for our understanding of the development of 
problem-solving abilities in young children which we will discuss in the concluding 
chapter. 
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d) Interactions: Correlations between Predictors and Performance within 
subsets of the sample population 
Throughout the foregoing analysis of the relationships between cognitive factors, 
strategic behaviour and performance the non-linear nature of these relationships has 
been evident. Some Strategy Components have appeared relatively strongly in otherwise 
rather weak and simple overall patterns of strategic behaviour. The analysis of the 
Strategy Clusters has revealed a stylistic variance in the development of strategic 
behaviour. Some cognitive factors relate clearly to strategic behaviour but less clearly to 
performance. There is some evidence of the possibility of a U-shaped development of 
strategic behaviour, as is commonly observed in the development of problem-solving 
abilities. Finally, for example in the regression analysis, we have seen evidence of 
interaction effects between Predictors and Strategy in relation to Performance. 
In this final part of the analysis of the data an attempt was made to explore these 
interactions a little further by examining correlations between Predictor Measures and 
Performance Indicators within significant subsets of the sample population. The earlier 
examination of the significant differences between mean scores for Predictor Measures 
of the Strategy Clusters revealed that different cognitive factors appear to be significant 
at different stages of development (see Table 5.19). Thus, amongst the least 
sophisticated Strategy Clusters, while Cluster 4 was distinctively weak on 
Metacomprehension and overall Metacognition, Cluster 1 was distinctively external in 
terms of Locus of Control. Among the more sophisticated Strategy Clusters, Cluster 6 
was noticeably strong on Metacomprehension, while Cluster 3 children were 
distinguished by their Reflectivity and Field Independence. The present examination 
was intended to explore the ways in which the relationship between cognitive factors and 
performance may be mediated by interactions with other cognitive factors and with the 
pattern of strategic behaviour. 
Three types of subset were examined. First, we looked at subsets determined by the 
subjects' scores on Metacognition. This was selected as generally the most significant of 
the Predictor Measures. It is also worth noting that subsets selected on this basis in the 
previous study referred to earlier (Whitebread, 1983) yielded some highly significant 
comparisons. Second, in order to look at the ways in which the effects of cognitive 
factors on performance are mediated by strategic behaviour, the subsets determined by 
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Strategy Clusters were examined. Finally, relationships within the different age groups 
were investigated, within which it might be possible to explore the possibilities of 
U-shaped growth, and of relationships between underlying cognitive factors and 
performance strengthening as children grow older. 
1. Metacognition subsets 
The correlations between Predictor Measures and Performance Indicators for subsets 
determined by scores for Total Metacognition are reported in Table 5.23. The two 
subsets were produced simply by using 
the population mean score as a cut off point. Examination of the correlations within this 
table reveal that, in a number of ways, the cognitive factors most strongly associated with 
performance on the MDL task do indeed appear to vary as a function of metacognitive 
knowledge and processes. 
To begin with, it is notable that a number of Predictor Measures are associated at 
statistically significant levels with Performance within the Weak subset, but not within 
the Strong subset. These are, in order of strength of the correlations, CEFT, 
Metacognition Total itself, and both scores for Working Memory. This relates well to 
the earlier finding (Whitebread, 1983) that where weak metacognition is associated with 
the use of relatively simple strategies the level of performance will be dependent upon 
other abilities. In the previous study Working Memory appeared to be a strong factor in 
this context, and to this the present data would suggest we should add Field 
Independence. That the Metacognition score itself is a factor where metacognition is 
weak is perhaps a further indication of its pivotal significance in relation to the 
development of problem-solving skills on novel tasks. 
For the Strong subset only Age, Metacomprehension (in relation to Learning) and one 
aspect of Metacognitive Knowledge are statistically significant at all. This result tends to 
support the view that once metacognitive ability and knowledge have been developed 
very little else matters in relation to the successful development of problem-solving 
skills. The Age and Metacognitive Knowledge result perhaps indicate that the 
acquisition and utilisation of experience continues to refine skills up to a point. That 
Metacomprehension is so strongly related to improvement in the Trial of Last Error 
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Table 5.23 
Metacognition Subsets: Correlations between Predictor Measures & 
Performance Indicators 
Predictor 
Performance Measures 
Performance eng 
Measms T of L. E Verb/H H's-on T of L. E Verb/H H's on T123 T123 
Age 23 38* 11 
-06 03 06 43** 25 40* 13 
-04 32 
Wk WM 34* 31 38* 
-07 13 
-03 Mem 25 18 19 09 
-19 00 
FIT 32 32 33* 
-27 04 06 11 02 14 
-12 13 
-00 
Meta Q1 25 27 04 
-03 08 
-31 Know 30 33* 17 24 01 
-01 
Q2 25 15 32 18 
-20 08 
-04 09 
-00 21 
-10 -19 
Q3 06 12 02 11 
-11 -19 
-08 
-03 -01 00 
-13 -04 
Meta M/c. 09 02 22 03 04 24 
A/C 32 20 22 50** 
-13 04 
SF 22 21 12 
-17 17 22 
-12 03 11 
-27 -08 18 
Meta Total 47** 44** 36* 08 
-02 -07 10 27 24 18 
-21 05 
L of C 
-05 -04 07 08 
-18 -21 19 20 16 
-25 -13 27 
R-I 16 
-19 -25 12 09 
-06 06 
-06 -10 -25 05 -23 
F Dep-RFT 11 
-10 -05 -02 15 09 Indep 
-12 06 -12 19 -19 14 
CEFT 57** 52** 52** 
18 10 07 
* sig at 0.05 level Subgroup 1: Weak: 35 cases 
** sig at 0.01 level Subgroup 2: Strong: 37 cases 
25 
-01 -06 01 08 20 
score for the Strong subset, and not for the Weak subset, would appear to indicate that 
this ability is dependent upon other cognitive factors associated with the development of 
general metacognitive abilities for any effect it might have upon performance. This 
would tie in with the view that being aware of one's own level of understanding is a 
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Table 5.24 
Correlations between Predictor Measures & Performance Indicators within the 
5 Main Strategy Clusters 
Performance Indicators 
Performance Learning 
Predictor 
Measures T of L. E Verb/H H's on T of L. E Verb/H H's on T123 T123 
Age 
-27 10 16 -03 -13 -19 
-01 21 -21 14 -39 38 61* 46 52 51 113 59* 
-29 -22 29 -07 10 19 27 33 22 0m 
-36 10 
Wk WM 25 52 52 
-04 -27 -52 Mem 70* 46 54 32 
-41 ll 57 27 22 16 
-28 23 28 
-16 -37 -04 04 -22 01 08 46* 
-27 -14 -01 
FIT 27 20 
-30 -53 -04 31 
-44 -35 10 -38 29 -65* 70* 42 27 22 
-52 48 
-04 -24 03 35 16 -04 
-05 -08 25 -24 -06 -14 
Meta Ql 11 
-02 13 -25 44 -17 Know 58 81** 11 25 
-59 -39 
48 33 53 14 
-07 05 
43 51 30 33 
-13 -09 
-22 14 05 09 -07 -08 
Q2 34 44 
-20 09 -33 17 69* 38 54 31 
-24 02 
35 13 25 
-18 -12 00 
-49 -09 06 19 28 -29 02 25 07 11 
-46* -11 
Q3 
-00 35 -06 20 -54 08 
27 53 14 31 
-70* -11 
09 
-06 22 -21 -08 06 
43 10 30 58* 
-34 13 
-13 -19 04 -29 11 -17 
Meta M/c 39 51 05 36 
-73** -04 
ABC 05 
-27 50 03 19 -36 
38 59* 41 38 
-04 41 
14 
-09 07 -13 25 -34 
14 26 23 15 34 15 
SF 54 88** 
-12 09 -51 11 
22 16 42 17 
-37 -09 
25 24 45 
-33 13 01 
10 10 05 
-52 -27 03 
-05 03 44* -17 -12 
50* 
Meta Total 47 78** 
-05 15 -58* 04 
61 62 53 38 
-66* -33 
42 34 55 
-11 -02 14 
41 38 49 24 
-33 -20 
06 16 37 
-08 -31 20 
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Table 5.24 cont'd 
Performance Indicators 
Performance Learning 
Predictor 
Measures T of L. E Verb/H H's on T of L. E Verb/H H's on T123 T123 
L of C 
-11 11 
-01 
-08 11 
-01 
-01 -11 -29 
-13 35 10 57 33 35 22 
-68* 43 
-35 -28 -14 
-42 
-30 26 12 Al 
-1.4 -44 1¢ 
R-I 
-03 19 
-41 
-42 05 41 40 22 51 36 
-48 -05 26 17 09 34 
-64* 26 
-31 -49 17 57* 60* 26 
-0 22 Q2 M- 47*_ 
F Dep-RFT 
-10 
-01 21 08 
-04 -18 Indep 
-01 03 -21 -60 40 14 04 
-08 15 
-21 -29 14 
-15 -21 -01 34 22 
-04 
-12 Q2 U 
-12 =17 -34 
CEFT 02 32 33 46 
-24 
-32 62 22 63* 33 
-29 07 67* 39 33 24 
-46 20 
-25 -50 -09 24 49 18 2k 22 m 
---?. 2 
-42 1a 
* sig at 0.05 level Plain = Cluster 4 
** sig at 0.01 level Bold = Cluster 1 Plain Italic 
= 
Cluster 2 
Bold Italic 
=Cluster 6 
Plain Underlined 
= 
Cluster 3 
necessary but not sufficient requirement for learning how to tackle new problems. This 
relates to criticisms of Piaget's model of cognitive conflict as a mechanism for learning. 
2. Strategy Clusters 
In Table 5.24 are reported the correlations between Predictor Measures and 
Performance Indicators within each of the 5 Main Strategy Clusters. These results 
provide further support for the view that the relation between general cognitive factors 
and performance is mediated by the pattern of strategic behaviour. There are numerous 
cases where a significant relation exists between a Predictor and some Performance 
Indicators for a particular Strategy Cluster which does not exist for other strategic 
groups. In this sense the overall analysis of the relationships between Predictor 
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Measures and performance in relation to the MDL task clearly masks the very different 
and, in some cases, highly significant relationships which exists at different stages in the 
development of strategic behaviour. 
For ease of comparison Table 5.24a below lists those Predictors most strongly related 
to Performance Indicators for each of the Strategy Clusters. 
Table 5.24a 
Significant relations between Predictor Measures and Performance Indicators 
for the 5 Main Strategy Clusters 
Cluster Predictors sig. related to: 
Performance Learning 
4 Strat Flex/Meta Tot Metacomp/Meta Tot 
1 V; M/Meta K Q1, Q2/ FIT/Meta K Q3/Meta Tot 
CE FT 
2 Age/FIT/Metacomp /LEFT Age/Loc of Control/R-I 
6- Meta K Q3/R-I 
3 WM/Strat Flex Meta K Q2/Strat Flex/R-I 
At a general level it is perhaps notable to begin with that a wide range of different 
cognitive factors appear to be relevant to performance at different stages in strategic 
development. Once again, however, it is also notable that different aspects of 
Metacognition are significant for each of the Strategy Clusters in some way. 
For Cluster 4, at which stage children were commonly found to be 'stimulus describing' 
and failing to co-ordinate verbal hypotheses and stimulus choices, it is on the 
Performance Indicator of Verbalisation of Correct Hypothesis during Criterion that 
metacognitive processes are revealed to have the greatest impact. All four of the highly 
significant relationships highlighted in Table 5.24a relate to this aspect of Performance. 
For Cluster 1, where a high number of Hypotheses per Trial were produced, aspects of 
working memory, not surprisingly, become relevant to both performance and learning. 
It is interesting that the FIT score is significantly related to Trial of Last Error for 
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Cluster 2, which is the cluster which had difficulties with negative information, 
suggesting that this may be a problem of excess load on memory. Cluster 6, however, 
which, relative to Cluster 2, had difficulties with irrelevant information, is notably 
unaffected by working memory constraints. One measure of working memory is also 
relevant for Cluster 3's level of performance; here we have the cluster attempting the 
most sophisticated strategy of 'focussing' involving remembering and co-ordinating all 
hypothesis and stimulus information. 
Perhaps the most intriguing feature of these results are the relationships between 
cognitive tempo (R-I) and Learning, which are significant for Clusters 2,6 and 3, the 
most sophisticated strategy groups. While for Cluster 6 this is in what might perhaps 
be the expected direction of reflectivity being related to improved learning (on both Trial 
of Last Error and Verbalisation of Correct Hypothesis during Criterion), for Clusters 2 
and 6 the reverse is the case (for Verbalisation of Correct Hypothesis). It can only be 
assumed that here we either have a case of children being over-reflective, and seeing 
more in the task than actually exists, or that this is a 'ceiling' effect. Thus, if the more 
reflective children scored at a high level in Round 1, then their room for improvement in 
Round 2 is more limited, and their Learning score will be correspondingly depressed. 
It will be recalled that this kind of ceiling effect was evident (see Table 5.14b) for 
Clusters 6 and 3 in the earlier analysis of improvements in performance within the 5 
main clusters. 
3. Age groups 
The correlations between Predictor Measures and Performance Indicators within each of 
the three age-groups are reported in Table 5.25. This table contains very striking 
evidence of differential patterns between the three age-groups, particularly in relation to 
level of Performance. 
Thus the number of significant correlations between the Predictor Measures and 
performance for the three age groups are 5 for the 6 yr. olds, 1 for the 8 yr. olds and 15 
for the 10 yr. olds. We have reviewed earlier evidence that aspects of metacognition, for 
example, may become more closely related to performance with increasing age amongst 
children in these age-groups. Here we would appear to have a very clear effect of this 
kind, except that it would appear to more generally apply to measures of Working 
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Table 5.25 
Age-group Subsets: Correlations between Predictor Measures & Performance 
Indicators 
Performance Indicators 
Performance Learning 
Predictor 
Measures T of L. E Verb/H H's on T of L. E Verb/H H's on T123 T123 
Wk WM 37 32 32 06 07 17 
Mem 
-00 -08 -36 14 -11 41* 52** 52** 62** 
-20 -08 -02 
FIT 26 25 15 23 
-07 -15 
22 19 05 S3** 17 06 
45* 38 31 06 11 
-12 
Meta Ql 43* 43* 35 29 45* 
-52** 
Know 
-01 09 20 38 -50* -08 75** 75** 27 24 01 
-08 
Q2 40 24 20 
-14 -23 04 
08 11 
-14 29 -39 -21 
22 30 35 02 25 
-16 
Q3 05 15 09 09 10 45* 
-04 06 04 07 -34 -10 37 23 08 36 
-24 03 
Meta M/c 28 34 10 
-12 -24 16 
A/C 38 28 45* 24 
-04 34 
SF 
Meta Total 
LofC 
61** 49* 44* 
-11 22 -uö 
26 31 34 28 24 
-18 
15 16 29 
-14 -07 48* 
39 47* 26 
-44* -21 09 
63** 68** 
20 24 
81** 79** 
-19 15 03 
-08 
19 29 
R-I 
-34 34 
12 00 
-10 01 
F Dep-RFT 11 
-23 Indep 
-01 01 12 
-01 
CEFT 33 26 
29 18 
60** 53** 
* sig at 0.05 level 6 year olds 
** sig at 0.01 level 
10 year olds 
50* 23 22 
-53** 
33 23 41* 22 
48* 
-05 -03 01 
-19 -12 -16 -04 02 
-32 -06 05 
24 
-44* -34 16 
32 
-05 -24 19 
-01 -13 -23 -27 
15 26 46* 06 
-06 18 09 -26 18 
-13 -23 -38 
-23 -07 25 -08 
34 
-25 -05 
13 
-08 02 -03 -30 34 05 31 15 
8 year olds 
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Memory and Field-Independence. Both of these measures are significantly related to 
performance for the 10 yr. olds, but are not related at all for the younger age groups. 
For Metacognition, however, there is some kind of U-shaped pattern evidenced in the 
figures reported here, with a significant relationship to performance for the 6 yr. olds as 
well as the 10 yr. olds, but little or no such relationship for the 8 yr. olds. 
As regards Learning the patterns of relationships are much more complex. 8 of the 
statistically significant relationships are negative, and some of these may well be due to 
the kinds of 'ceiling' effects we have discussed above. There is one positive relationship 
for each of the three age-groups, each with a different predictor. 
While the efficacy of representation of the task (6 yr. olds: Meta KQ l) degree of 
strategy flexibility (8 yr. olds: SF) and reflectivity (10 yr. olds: R-I) might all well be 
related in complex ways to learning ability on the MDL task, the nature of these 
relationships is not clear from the current data and would need to be much more closely 
examined. What is clear, however, is that the present data suggests that complex 
relationships do exist between underlying cognitive processes, problem-solving 
strategies and performance on such as the MDL task. In the review of methodological 
issues and implications of the present study for theory and research, ways in which 
these relationships will need to be addressed will be discussed. 
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Chapter 6. SUMMARY & DISCUSSION 
While it is important to recognise the methodological limitations of the present study, 
and significant ways in which the issues addressed need to be examined in further work 
making use of complementary methodologies, the present study has produced some 
interesting and useful findings. The first section of this chapter reviews the main results 
reported in relation to the four aims of the study. The following sections in this chapter 
discuss methodological issues and implications of the present study for psychological 
theory and educational practice. 
Section A) Evidence in relation to Aims of the Study 
i) The Development of Problem-solving Strategies 
Previous research has suggested that children's responses to a problem-solving task can 
best be described in terms of increasingly sophisticated and complex patterns of 
strategic behaviour, involving successive recombinations of different strategic elements. 
The first main aim of the present study was to investigate the pattern of development of 
strategic behaviour amongst Primary school aged children on the Multidimensional 
Discrimination Learning (MDL) Task, a task which simulates in a controlled manner 
learning through the processes of rule induction. Three different versions of Kemler's 
(1978) story-and-game MDL task were used to allow the 6,8 & 10 yr. old children in 
the study to demonstrate their problem-solving abilities optimally, and to examine their 
responses to different sources of difficulty (i. e. negative and irrelevant information). 
The children's responses were analysed according to 10 Strategy Components derived 
from previous analysis of strategic behaviour on the MDL task, principally within the 
hypothesis testing literature. In an attempt to identify patterns within the children's 
responses, correlations between the scores on the Strategy Components were examined 
and the scores on the 3 different MDL problem types for the Strategy Components 
were analysed using Cluster Analysis. 
The correlations between the Strategy Components overall were predominantly positive 
and in the middle range. Thus, the pattern of inter-relationships revealed was not 
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straightforwardly linear, which suggested that analysis by clustering was particularly 
appropriate. A number of general patterns did emerge, however, which largely 
supported the suggested developmental patterns of previous researchers. Thus, the 
separate development of short-term and long-term processing suggested by Kemler 
(1978) was supported, as was the separate development of Lose/Shift and Win/Stay 
proposed by Schuepfer & Gholson (1980). The Number of Hypotheses per Trial 
verbalised by the children was found to be largely unrelated to the other Strategy 
Components, which accorded well with its status as a pivotal element in the two strategic 
styles later revealed in the analysis. 
The Cluster Analysis produced valuable data, both in relation to individual Strategy 
Components and in relation to the clusters of strategic behaviour it revealed. As regards 
Strategy Component 1 (No. of Hypotheses per Trial) the finding of Eimas (1969) and 
others that young children tend to consider one hypothesis at a time appeared to be the 
case only for the least sophisticated strategically. Many children produced more than 
one hypothesis at a time, in line with the finding of Phillips & Gholson (1980). 
The results for Strategy Component 2 (Hypotheses consistent with Local Feedback) 
supported the view that children's difficulties with the standard MDL task partly arose 
from its abstractness, and children's consequent failure to understand its internal logic, 
rather than from their inability to respond to feedback or control their attention. Even 
the youngest children in this study, which used Kemler's (1978) more meaningful task, 
responded to local feedback a very high proportion of the time, despite the lack of any 
attentional aid. 
As regards Strategy Component 3 (Choices consistent with Previous Hypothesis), the 
results broadly supported the view that the verbal 'introtacts' or hypotheses provided by 
the children were a valid indication of their real working hypotheses. These results 
combined with those for Strategy Component 4 (Lose/Shift Hypothesis) provided 
strong evidence of a good deal of Kemler's (1978) 'short-term efficiency'. 
Disconfirmed hypotheses were abandoned a very high proportion of the time. A 
comparison of these scores with those for Strategy Component 6 (Win/Stay), however, 
again clearly supported the finding of Schuepfer & Gholson (1980) that Lose/Shift 
Hypothesis is the earlier developing element in the development of full short-term 
efficiency. The scores for Strategy Component 5 (Lose/Shift Dimension) were also 
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generally lower than for Lose/Shift Hypothesis, confirming that this element of strategic 
behaviour requires more understanding of the logic of the MDL task, and more 
co-ordination of information across trials. 
The figures for Strategy Components 7-10 confirmed, as Gholson, Levine & Phillips 
(1972), Kemler (1978) and others have found, that these elements, requiring 'long-term 
efficiency' are later developing. However, the results of the present study differed from 
Kemler (1978) in that evidence was clearly found of children within this age group 
capable of using 'stimulus' memory and using a Focusing strategy. The most likely 
explanation of this different result would seem to be that Kemler's (1978) version of the 
problem was significantly more difficult than the version used within the present study. 
As we have reviewed, there is ample evidence that, when faced with a more difficult 
problem, children (and adults) revert to simpler strategies which are less demanding, 
particularly in relation to working memory load. 
The other clear overall pattern which emerged from the Cluster Analysis was that, as 
predicted, problem types b and c, involving children in dealing with negative and 
redundant information, proved to be more difficult and resulted in simpler strategies. 
The results tended to suggest that, whatever the source of these difficulties (working 
memory load, inferential difficulties, or attentional deficits) they were probably different, 
because different groups of children performed relatively well or badly on the different 
versions of the problem. 
As regards the developing patterns of response to the MDL task, the Cluster Analysis 
revealed a pattern of 7 clusters of increasingly complex strategic behaviours, within 
which 5 main clusters appeared in sufficient numbers to be worthy of further analysis. 
Each of these clusters represented a pattern of strategic behaviour predictable from the 
previous research on hypothesis testing behaviour with the MDL task. 
Clusters 5&7 had to be excluded from much of the rest of the analysis because of the 
small number of cases within the present sample. However, they both had some 
theoretical validity, and appeared to possibly represent significant types of strategic 
behaviour of which more cases might have been found with a wider sample. The 
interpretation of the one case in Cluster 5 was particularly straightforward, as it was a 
clear example of the 'object preference' stereotype or response-set identified by 
Gholson, Levine & Phillips (1972), amongst others. A younger sample would very 
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probably have produced more cases of this type of response, where feedback was 
largely ignored. The 3 children in Cluster 7 presented a more complicated picture, 
producing a generally sophisticated strategic response to the MDL task, but with very 
particular difficulties with type c problems (irrelevant information). They verbalised 
very large numbers of hypotheses on type c problems, many of them irrelevant, and this 
was an obvious source of their difficulties. Whether this was a problem of attention or a 
lack of understanding of the logic of the problem was difficult to assess. 
Amongst the 5 main clusters, Clusters 1&4 were developmentally the earliest and 
strategically simplest. They were largely made up of 6 yr. olds. Cluster 1 conformed to 
the pattern of 'attribute perseveration' identified by Kemler (1978) as a common pattern 
of response among kindergartners (5/6 yr. olds). This involves alternating between the 
two values of a dimension or attribute, consistent with local feedback. As Kemler 
(1978) argued, these children showed evidence of some short-term efficiency, but failed 
to co-ordinate information very effectively between trials. As research in a number of 
areas has found, young children are often planful in their problem-solving behaviour, 
but their plans are often inadequate. Such was the case with the children in Cluster 1. 
The children in this cluster also verbalised a relatively large number of hypotheses, 
which emerged as a significant stylistic variation. 
Cluster 4 proved to be developmentally the simplest strategically of the 5 main Strategy 
Clusters, producing a pattern of behaviour which might well be described as 'stimulus 
describing'. On any particular trial, the children in this group appear to have chosen 
their hypothesis (and they consistently only verbalised one) at random from the 4 
clothing items being worn by Anna. In this respect they were actually behaving exactly 
according to the 'zero memory' assumption first proposed by Restle (1962) as a model 
for human processing on the MDL task. Most significantly, their scores on Win/Stay 
were no better than chance. Their high scores on Lose/Shift Hypothesis again suggested 
support for the analysis of Schuepfer & Gholson (1980), that Lose/Shift emerges as a 
response to feedback before Win/Stay. Lose/Shift, as emerged later in the analysis of 
results, was the one aspect of strategic behaviour which bore no relationship to 
successful performance. Its establishment, nevertheless, appears to be a necessary early 
step in the development of inductive reasoning on this kind of task. 
The next cluster developmentally appeared to be Cluster 2. This group was largely 
composed of 8 yr. olds. The main distinguishing feature of their pattern of behaviour 
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was relative difficulty with type b problems (negative information). Compared to 
Cluster 6, however, they performed well on type c problems (irrelevant information). 
This finding, as indicated above, was taken to support the view that these two sources of 
difficulty are related to different cognitive deficits. 
Cluster 6 also showed a mixed pattern of behaviour. This was a predominantly 10 yr. 
old group, and in some ways the pattern of behaviour was more advanced than that of 
Cluster 2. The scores for Strategy Component 3 (Choices consistent with Previous 
Hypotheses), and 9 &10 (Focusing) were all significantly above the sample mean, and 
indicated planfulness and long-term efficiency. This cluster, however, also had their 
difficulties with problem type b (negative information), but, perhaps most interestingly, 
scored lower than Cluster 2 on problem type c (irrelevant information). Their relative 
difficulties with irrelevant information may well have been connected to the other key 
distinguishing feature of this cluster, which was the high number of hypotheses 
verbalised per trial. As we have already indicated, Number of Hypotheses per Trial 
emerged as pivotal in distinguishing different strategic styles of approach to the MDL 
task. 
Cluster 3 emerged as clearly the most sophisticated strategically, and was characterised 
as the 'focusing ' group. This group of children scored at levels significantly above the 
mean for the sample particularly on the more long-term Strategy Components. What 
was perhaps most notable of all was the way that this group maintained their high level 
of performance on type b and c problems. This group produced an intermediate 
number of hypotheses per trial. However, subsequent examination of 'central cases' 
within this cluster revealed that this mean might be misleading. There appeared to be 
children present within the cluster who verbalised relatively low and high numbers of 
hypotheses. The mostly 8& 10 yr. old children in this group were producing a level of 
strategic sophistication which Kemler (1978) failed to find with Primary aged children. 
Some children in this group produced 'perfect processing' on a number of problems. 
What is particularly striking is that this group included 4 children who were just 6 yrs. 
of age. 
Discriminant Function Analysis of the 5 main strategy 'clusters' revealed that they 
appeared to be clearly distinct groupings (although detailed analysis of individual 
'central cases' within clusters revealed some interesting variations within groupings). 
The different patterns of strategic behaviour revealed by the Strategy Clusters were 
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principally differentiated by an increasing ability to integrate information gained 
from different trials. Two stylistic variations were also identified which appeared to be 
principally related to the number of hypotheses verbalised on each trial. The evidence 
from this part of the analysis tended to suggest that the strategic style associated with 
producing a low number of hypotheses was the more effective for this kind of task, and 
led to children achieving Cluster 3 type strategic behaviour at a younger age than the 
high H's per T style. 
ii) Strategies and Performance 
The second main aim of the study was to examine the relationship with performance of 
the revealed patterns of strategic behaviour. Again derived from the work of Gholson 
(1980) and others reviewed above, 3 different measures of performance were devised 
within the present study. These Performance Indicators consisted of a measure of how 
quickly each problem is solved (Trial of Last Error), whether the solution to each 
problem is correctly verbalised once it has been discovered (Verbalisation of Correct 
Hypothesis during Criterion) 
, 
and to what extent 'perfect processing' is produced in the 
pattern of verbalised hypotheses on the first 3 trials of each problem (Hypotheses on 
Trials 1,2 & 3). A subsidiary aim of the study was to investigate the possibility that 
improvement on these Performance Indicators will not occur simultaneously, but will 
follow a developmental sequence representing a deeper understanding of the task. 
Examination of correlations between Performance Indicators indicated that reasonably 
strong positive relationships existed, but that there was enough independence between 
them to make it worthwhile to use all three. The relationships between Trial of Last 
Error and Verbalisation of the Correct Hypothesis during Criterion were much stronger 
than those of either of these indicators with Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 & 3. Correlations 
between scores on H's on T's 1,2 &3 for type c problems and the other two indicators 
were particularly weak. This evidence did not seem to support the view expressed by 
some researchers that inhibitory abilities (i. e. the ability to inhibit the effects of irrelevant 
information) are central to development of problem-solving performance on this kind of 
task. 
The scores on the three Performance Indicators for the three age-groups indicated clear 
developmental trends, with scores on all three indicators improving from the 6 yr. olds 
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to the 8 yr. olds, and again to the 10 yr. olds on all problem types. Some support was 
offered, however, for the suggestion that there might be a developmental sequence 
between different aspects of performance measured by the three Performance 
Indicators. The major gains in terms of Trial of Last Error and Verbalisation of 
Hypotheses appeared to be between the 6 yr. olds and the 8 yr. olds, whereas that for 
Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 &3 did not occur until the children were between 8 and 10 
yrs. old. This view was also supported by analysis of scores for the Strategy Clusters. 
That Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 &3 is the last developing aspect of performance was 
borne out by a lack of improvement in score on this indicator between Clusters 4,1 and 
2. It was not until the transition between Cluster 2 and 6 that any real progress appeared 
in this aspect of performance. By contrast there was clear improvement from the start on 
the other two indicators. However, while all the improvement on Trial of the Last Error 
appeared to have been made by the transition between Clusters 2 and 6, there was 
continuing improvement between Clusters 6 and 3 in respect of Verbalisation of the 
Correct Hypothesis. This would seem to support some developmental lag between these 
two indicators. The general model of a developmental sequence between the three 
aspects of performance measured by our Performance Indicators thus seems to be 
supported. 
The children in the present sample performed at least as well as those in Kemler's 
(1978) study, if not better, thus confirming that the form of the MDL task used enabled 
6-10 yr. old children to use their problem-solving abilities effectively. Comparison of 
the performance of children within the present study with those in previous studies lent 
support to the view that the performance on the MDL task, as for so many other 
problem-solving tasks, is enhanced for young children when it is placed in a meaningful 
context. This view was supported by comparison of the Trial of Last Error scores, and 
the number of children producing instances of 'perfect processing'. It was concluded 
that young children's reported problems of memory and of attending to the correct 
stimulus in the MDL task may have been a function of the abstract, meaningless nature 
of the task, rather than of children's poor memories or control of their attention. 
The results for the Performance Indicators also supported the conclusion that the 
problem types which involved processing negative information and ignoring irrelevant 
information were more difficult for the children than the standard problem. 
254 
There were strong relationships between patterns of strategic behaviour revealed by the 
Strategy Clusters and performance. Evidence in support of the strength of these 
relationships came from examination of correlations between Strategy and Performance 
scores, Performance scores for the Strategy Clusters and the Performance profiles of 
the 5 most "central" cases in each of the clusters. 
Examination of correlations between Strategy and Performance scores revealed that the 
relationship was particularly strong for the most sophisticated Strategy Components 
related to the Trial of Last Error and Verbalisation of Hypotheses scores. Performance 
was also clearly but less strongly related to the use of simpler strategies, with the notable 
exception of Lose/Shift. While some simple linear relations were shown to exist 
between the measures of strategy and performance, however, it was clear that this was 
not a completely adequate method of describing the full nature of these relationships. 
Investigation of the scores for Performance of the Strategy Clusters revealed a 
developmental pattern of improving performance which matched exactly the 
developmental sequence of strategic behaviour suggested by earlier by the Discriminant 
Function Analysis of cluster strategy scores. Thus, the developmental sequence of 
performance developed from the weakest to the strongest through the clusters in the 
order 4,1,2,6,3, which was exactly the same sequence of development in strategic 
sophistication. 
The performance of individual Strategy Clusters was also shown to be clearly related to 
their strategic behaviour. Thus, Cluster 2's difficulties with type b problems (negative 
information) were reflected to some degree in their performance. The interpretation of 
Cluster 4's strategic pattern as a kind of 'stimulus describing' was also supported by 
examination of their performance on Verbalisation of Hypothesis during Criterion. 
Cluster 4 was the weakest group on this Performance Indicator, both in terms of level of 
performance and learning. The difficulties of Clusters 1 and 6 with type c problems 
(irrelevant information) were also reflected, particularly in their scores on Hypotheses 
on Trials 1,2 & 3. 
Some interesting findings also emerged in relation to Learning from this part of the 
analysis. While the correlations between Performance Indicators related to scores for 
Learning had been weak, and no significant differences had appeared between the 
age-groups for Learning (although it was argued that this apparent similarity might 
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have been masking two rather different effects), examination of Learning scores for the 
Strategy Clusters suggested a clear developmental pattern. This pattern was not linear, 
however, largely due to a ceiling effect with Clusters 6 and 3. The average scores for 
Clusters 4,1 and 2 were in the same developmental sequence as that found for strategic 
behaviour and overall performance. 
The Performance profiles of the 5 most "central" cases in each of the clusters confirmed 
the strong links between patterns of strategic behaviour and performance, and the 
developmental sequence of different aspects of performance. There were, however, 
some interesting within cluster differences. Most notably, the oldest members of 
Clusters 1&2 appeared to perform a little more strongly than the other central cases 
in their groups. While the strong influence of strategies on performance was thus 
supported, it was also clear that this was not the whole story. The effect of underlying 
cognitive factors also needed to be examined, and it was to this that the next part of the 
analysis was devoted. 
iii) Predictors of the Development of Problem-solving Abilities 
It was the third main aim of the study to establish to what extent the patterns of strategic 
behaviour and performance on an inductive reasoning task such as the MDL task 
appeared to be related to a range of underlying cognitive factors proposed in the 
literature to be major contributors to the development of children's cognitive functioning. 
The influence of these factors were explored in two different ways within the present 
study. First, within the MDL task itself it was attempted to examine the influence of 
certain factors by varying the form of the problem. The results in relation to both 
strategic behaviour and levels of performance have indicated that problems involving 
negative or irrelevant information were more difficult for the children within the present 
study. Further, whatever the source of these difficulties (working memory load, 
inferential difficulties, or attentional deficits) they were probably varied, because 
different groups of children performed relatively well or badly on the different versions 
of the problem. 
Second, separately from the MDL task, subjects were assessed on Predictor Measures 
related to Working Memory capacity, Metacognitive Knowledge and Awareness and 
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Control, Attributional style (Locus of Control), Cognitive Tempo 
(Reflectivity-Impulsivity) and Field Dependence-Independence. In order to cover the 
possibility that other factors might be involved, the children's Gender and Age were also 
included in the analysis. Any large effects associated with these factors, and not 
associated with any of the cognitive factors included in the study, could be taken as 
evidence of the influence of contextual, maturational or other cognitive factors not 
included in the present study. 
Weak or moderate positive correlations between all of these Predictor Measures were 
recorded, with the notable exception of Gender, which indicated that we were looking at 
relatively independent measures, but ones which were nevertheless associated together in 
a general way as different aspects of the development of cognitive abilities. It appeared 
likely that overall relationships between these factors were not simply linear, but 
involved complex inter-relationships between themselves, and with strategies and 
performance, as was found by the author in a previous study (Whitebread (1983)). 
These relationships between the various cognitive factors considered and the children's 
behaviour and performance on the MDL task were examined in four ways. First, 
correlations between the Predictor Measures and Performance Indicators, and between 
the Predictor Measures and Strategy Components were investigated. These proved to 
be generally positive at statistically significant levels. Gender was once again an 
exception to this, however, the present study provided no evidence of Gender effects in 
relation to this version of the MDL task in any of the analyses. It would appear that we 
can be reasonably confident that the task, both in content and presentation, was gender 
neutral. The correlations between performance, strategies and age were moderate and 
suggested that we were not looking at a simple maturational process. The strongest 
relationships with performance and strategic behaviour appeared for Total 
Metacognition and the CEFT (while the Rod & Frame test, interestingly, was amongst 
the weakest in this respect). 
Within metacognition, there was some evidence from these analyses that Metacognitive 
Awareness and Control was more strongly related to performance than Metacognitive 
Knowledge. However, the aspect of performance which did emerge as consistently and 
significantly related to Metacognitive Knowledge was Verbalisation of the Correct 
Hypothesis during the Criterion Trials. The strength of these relationships lent support 
to the view that these two aspects of functioning are linked by a common relation to 
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underlying representational processes. The finding in relation to strategic behaviour, 
that scores for Metacognitive Knowledge were more strongly related to the long-term, 
sophisticated Strategy Components than to the simpler components, furthermore, gives 
an indication that these representational processes play an important part in the 
development of a sophisticated strategic approach to the MDL task. 
Within Metacognitive Awareness and Control, while Strategy Flexibility appeared to 
correlate broadly with the whole range of Strategy Components, Metacomprehension 
was more weakly associated with the more sophisticated Strategy Components, but 
more strongly associated with the simpler component of making choices consistent with 
the current hypothesis, and, very interestingly, with the number of hypotheses verbalised 
per trial (although it should be borne in mind that a high score on the latter makes a high 
score on the former more likely, since there are more hypotheses for the choice on the 
next trial with which to be consistent). The relationship between Metacomprehension 
and No. of Hypotheses per Trial was reflected, as reported below, in the 
Metacomprehension scores for different Strategy Clusters. This is an intriguing result 
which we will consider in a little bit more detail below. 
For the Predictor Measures generally, the strength of relationships with performance 
and strategic behaviour were very similar. For Locus of Control, however, an interesting 
distinction emerged. While this element of underlying cognitive functioning had only 
weak relationships with the Performance Indicators, it correlated at statistically 
significant levels with six of the Strategy Components. This was taken to suggest that 
attributional style may influence the strategic approach of individuals to 
problem-solving, but may not directly influence overall performance. 
Little evidence was found for simple linear correlations of any significance between the 
underlying aspects of cognition considered and the ability to improve performance on 
the MDL task as measured by the Learning scores. Significant but relatively weak 
positive correlations were reported for Strategy Flexibility and Cognitive Tempo 
(Reflectivity). 
Amongst the Strategy Components, Lose/Shift Hypothesis was the one aspect of 
strategic processing which appeared to be relatively unrelated to the underlying cognitive 
factors considered, as it had similarly been unrelated to performance. 
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Second, the mean scores for Predictor Measures within each of the Strategy Clusters 
were examined (together with the profiles of central cases in each of the clusters). 
While the levels of statistical significance here were not as strong, these analyses 
revealed clearly distinct patterns of underlying cognitive factors associated with each of 
the clusters. Furthermore, the developmental sequence between the Strategy Clusters 
identified earlier in the analysis of strategic behaviour using Discriminant Function 
Analysis was clearly mirrored in the pattern of Predictor Measure scores. 
As regards the relationships with particular aspects of cognitive functioning, once again, 
the CEFT and Metacognitive Awareness and Control were the most strongly 
discriminating between clusters. Thus, Cluster 3 was significantly more 
field-independent on the CEFT than the remainder of the sample, and Cluster 4 was 
significantly weaker metacognitively and significantly more field-dependent than the 
rest. The other most significant measures to emerge were those related to Working 
Memory (on both measures the pattern of scores matched the developmental sequence 
very closely) 
, 
Cognitive Tempo (Cluster 3 children were significantly more reflective as 
a group than the remainder) and, not surprisingly, Age (Cluster 6 was significantly 
older at, and Cluster 4 was significantly younger than the rest of the sample). The one 
other result worth noting is that Cluster 1 emerged as significantly more external in 
terms of Locus of Control than the other Strategy Clusters. 
Within Metacognition, the individual measure which discriminated most strongly 
between Strategy Clusters was Metacomprehension, and in a particularly interesting way 
to which we have referred above. Clusters 1 and 6, which shared the strategic style of 
producing a high number of hypotheses on each trial, scored particularly strongly on the 
test of Metacomprehension. Cluster 6 scored at a statistically significantly higher level 
on this measure than all the other clusters, and Cluster 1 scored at a level at least equal to 
that of Cluster 3 on this measure. On the face of it, this appears to be an intriguing and 
strangely anomalous result, since Cluster 3 has been shown to be more developed than 
both of these clusters, both in terms of strategic sophistication and level of performance. 
It is also worth reminding ourselves that Cluster 6 had a mean age older than that for 
Cluster 3. 
Various possible explanations were examined, but there are limitations on the 
conclusions which can be reached with the kind of cross-sectional data gathered in this 
kind of study. What does appear to be clear, however, is that the children in Clusters 1 
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and 6 performed relatively poorly on the MDL task, perhaps partly as a consequence of 
adopting an unhelpful strategic style which increased the memory load and made the 
task less manageable, despite being relatively aware of their own state of 
comprehension. This pattern of results would seem to support the view that being aware 
of one's own level of understanding may be a necessary, but is not a sufficient condition 
for the development of effective strategic processing on a problem-solving task. 
In recognition of the fact that a number of the Predictor Measures correlated with one 
another, even if only at relatively moderate levels, the third means of disentangling the 
relationships between cognitive factors, patterns of strategic behaviour and performance 
was to carry out Multiple Linear Regression Analyses. They revealed that the major 
factor which predicted strategic behaviour and performance on the MDL task was 
Metacognition, with, arguably Awareness & Control emerging as slightly more 
significant than Knowledge. Pattern of strategic behaviour was also confirmed as a 
clear predictor of performance, and even some relation with learning emerged in this 
analysis. The only other statistically significant result was that for Field 
Dependence-Independence in relation to Trial of Last Error when Strategy Cluster was 
not included in the analysis. This confirms to some extent the results obtained in other 
analyses for CEFT, in particular. 
Although the relationships between the Predictor Measures and Learning were weaker 
than those with Performance, some support was offered for the view that the Strategy 
Clusters not only represented different stages in the development of strategic behaviour 
in relation to the MDL task, but also a development in the ability to learn quickly and 
apply general strategies in relation to new tasks. This has important implications for our 
understanding of the development of problem-solving abilities in young children which 
we will discuss in the final section of this chapter. 
For all three Performance Indicators a substantial proportion of the explained variance 
was attributable to interactions between the predictors. This was in line with the view 
that there were significant interactions between underlying cognitive factors, choice of 
strategy and performance on the MDL task. These interactions were pursued further in 
the final section of the analysis, by means of looking at relations within subgroups. 
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iv) Interactions between Predictors, Strategy & Performance 
As we have indicated earlier, a previous study (Whitebread (1983)) had revealed 
significant interactions between underlying cognitive factors, patterns of strategic 
behaviour and performance on a reclassification task. In particular, this study concurred 
with other research which has suggested that significant interactions might be expected 
between metacognition and working memory. Interactions were also found between 
age, working memory and performance. The fourth main aim of the present study was, 
therefore, to examine the possibility that the relationships between different elements of 
problem-solving behaviour are complex and non-linear. 
Evidence from earlier parts of the analysis, for example, has suggested that different 
aspects of cognitive functioning might be significant at different points in development. 
Thus, amongst the least sophisticated Strategy Clusters, while Cluster 4 was distinctively 
weak on Metacomprehension and overall Metacognition, Cluster 1 was distinctively 
external in terms of Locus of Control. Among the more sophisticated Strategy Clusters, 
Cluster 6 was noticeably strong on Metacomprehension, while Cluster 3 children were 
distinguished by their Reflectivity and Field Independence. Earlier evidence has also 
indicated significant interactions between underlying cognitive factors, strategic 
behaviour and performance, and suggested that there might be non-linear developmental 
relationships present. 
These analyses were carried out, as in the previous study, by examining correlations 
between Predictor Measures and Performance Indicators within sub-groups of the 
sample. Subgroups were investigated defined by Metacognition (as was the case in the 
earlier study), by Strategy Cluster, and by Age. These analyses very largely confirmed 
interactions of the kinds predicted. 
Thus, for the Metacognition subgroups, a number of Predictor Measures were 
associated at statistically significant levels with Performance within the Weak 
Metacognition subset, but not within the Strong Metacognition subset. These were 
CEFT, Metacognition Total itself, and both scores for Working Memory. This relates 
well to the earlier finding (Whitebread, 1983) that where weak metacognition is 
associated with the use of relatively simple strategies the level of performance will be 
dependent upon other abilities. In the previous study Working Memory appeared to be 
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a strong factor in this context, and to this the present data would suggest we should add 
Field Independence. 
For the Strong Metacognition subset only Age, Metacomprehension and one aspect of 
Metacognitive Knowledge were statistically significant at all. This result tends to 
support the view that once metacognitive ability and knowledge have been developed 
very little else matters in relation to the successful development of problem-solving 
skills. That Metacomprehension is so strongly related to improvement in the Trial of 
Last Error score for the Strong subset, and not for the Weak subset, would appear to 
indicate that this ability is dependent upon other cognitive factors associated with the 
development of general metacognitive abilities for any effect it might have upon 
performance. This would once again confirm the view that being aware of one's own 
level of understanding is a necessary but not sufficient requirement for developing 
strategies to tackle new problems. 
Investigation of relations within Strategy Clusters revealed that there were numerous 
cases where a significant relation existed between a Predictor and some Performance 
Indicators for a particular Strategy Cluster which did not exist for other strategic 
groups. A wide range of different cognitive factors were thus found to be relevant to 
performance at different points in strategic development. It was also the case, however, 
that different aspects of Metacognition were significant for each of the Strategy Clusters 
in some way. Working Memory was also significant for a number of clusters. 
For particular clusters relationships emerged that had a clear link with their pattern of 
strategic behaviour. For Cluster 4, for example, the 'stimulus describing' strategy clearly 
tied in to the revealed correlation between metacognitive processes and Verbalisation of 
Correct Hypothesis during Criterion. 
For Clusters 2,6 and 3, the most sophisticated strategy groups, significant relati onships 
were also found between Cognitive Tempo (Reflectivity-Impulsivity) and Learning. 
This is a good example of an instance where the weak overall correlation, reported 
above, between Reflectivity and performance was, in fact, masking stronger relationships 
for particular groups. 
The, analysis of age subgroups revealed striking evidence of differential patterns 
between the three age-groups. For some Predictor Measures a picture emerged of a 
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developing relation with performance. Thus, the scores for Working Memory and 
Field-Independence were significantly related to performance for the 10 yr. olds, but 
not related at all for the younger age groups. For Metacognition, however, there was 
clear evidence of a U-shaped pattern of development, with a significant relationship to 
performance for the 6 yr. olds as well as the 10 yr. olds, but little or no such 
relationship for the 8 yr. olds. 
The data from the present study would therefore seem to support the view that complex 
relationships do exist between underlying cognitive processes, problem-solving 
strategies and performance on such as the MDL task. In the ensuing review of 
methodological issues and implications of the present study for theory and research, 
ways in which these relationships will need to be addressed will be discussed. 
v) Summary of Main Findings 
At the end of the literature review, the intentions concerning the major contributions of 
the present study to the investigation of children's problem solving were outlined. It is 
perhaps worth reviewing at this point the extent to which these general intentions have 
been fulfilled. 
First, it was a major intention of the present study to identify the developmental 
sequence of strategies developed by children on an inductive reasoning task, and, in 
particular, to provide a more systematic and comprehensive analysis of the development 
of children's strategies on the MDL task. In order to achieve this, a new methodology 
was developed involving the analysis of the children's responses in terms of Strategy 
Components, and the identification of developing patterns and combinations of these 
components by Cluster Analysis. 
This methodology would appear to be a valuable development. As we have seen from 
the foregoing review of the results of the study, this analysis produced valuable data, 
both in relation to individual Strategy Components and in relation to the clusters of 
strategic behaviour it revealed. A pattern of 7 clusters of increasingly complex strategic 
behaviours was revealed, 5 of which appeared in sufficient numbers within the present 
sample to be thoroughly analysed. Discriminant Function Analysis of the 5 main 
strategy 'clusters' revealed that they appeared to be clearly distinct groupings, 
principally differentiated by an increasing ability to integrate information gained 
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from different trials. Two stylistic variations were also identified which appeared to be 
principally related to the number of hypotheses verbalised on each trial. All of this is a 
clear advance on previous analyses of the development of children's strategic responses 
to this kind of task. 
This analysis of increasingly sophisticated patterns of strategic behaviour was strongly 
validated by investigation of the performance of the Strategy Clusters. This revealed a 
developmental pattern of improving performance which matched exactly the 
developmental sequence of strategic behaviour. Some support was also offered for the 
view that the Strategy Clusters not only represented different stages in the development 
of strategic behaviour in relation to the MDL task, but also a development in the ability 
to learn quickly and apply general strategies in relation to new tasks. 
The second major aim of the study was to investigate underlying cognitive factors 
which might be related to this development of strategic behaviour and performance on a 
novel task. Attempts to relate the development of strategies and performance on the 
MDL task to underlying cognitive factors are almost non-existant in the previous 
literature. Much of the literature concerned with children's cognitive development, 
furthermore, has been devoted to advancing the cause of one particular feature of the 
cognitive system as the fundamental determinant of cognitive change and development. 
The present study, by contrast, emphasises the need to get away from simple, single 
factor models of cognitive change and development, and instead investigate the 
significant interactions between a range of underlying cognitive factors, strategy use 
and performance. 
Some simple linear relations were shown to exist between the measures of the various 
cognitive factors, strategy and performance. The strongest linear relationships with 
performance and strategic behaviour appeared for metacognition and the CEFT (a 
measure of field dependence-independence). Within metacognition, there was some 
evidence, in line with previous findings, that metacognitive awareness and control was 
more strongly related to performance than metacognitive knowledge. The results of the 
present study also strongly support the view that being aware of one's own level of 
comprehension may be a necessary, but is not a sufficient cause of strategy 
development and improved performance. 
It was also clear from the results, however, that significant interactions were present 
between cognitive factors, strategy use and performance. Analysis of different subsets 
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of the data revealed strong relationships which were not apparent by looking at the data 
overall. Thus, for example, while Locus of Control appeared to have only weak 
relationships with performance, it appeared to be quite strongly related to the strategic 
approach of individuals to problem-solving. Different Strategy Clusters, representing 
different stages in the development of strategic processing, were distinguished from the 
remainder of the sample by different cognitive factors. Some support was also offered 
for the finding of the previous study (Whitebread, 1983) that metacognition interacts 
with other cognitive factors in relation to strategies and performance. Thus, where 
weak metacognition was associated with the use of relatively simple strategies the level 
of performance was dependent upon other cognitve factors. In the previous study 
working memory appeared to be a strong factor in this context, and to this the present 
data would suggest we should add field-independence. 
For Clusters 2,6 and 3, the most sophisticated strategy groups, significant 
relationships were also found between cognitive tempo (reflectivity-impulsivity) and 
learning. This was a good example of an instance where a weak overall correlation 
was, in fact, masking stronger relationships for particular groups. 
The analysis of age subgroups revealed striking evidence of differential patterns 
between the three age-groups. For some cognitive factors a picture emerged of a 
developing relation with performance. Thus, the scores for working memory and 
field-independence were significantly related to performance for the 10 yr. olds, but not 
related at all for the younger age groups. For metacognition, however, there was clear 
evidence of a U-shaped pattern of development, with a significant relationship to 
performance for the 6 yr. olds as well as the 10 yr. olds, but little or no such 
relationship for the 8 yr. olds. 
The data from the present study would therefore seem to support the view that complex 
relationships do exist between underlying cognitive processes, problem-solving 
strategies and performance on inductive reasoning tasks such as the MDL task. The 
exploration of these kinds of complex interactions has only recently begun to emerge in 
the literature, and the present study clearly makes a contribution to the beginnings of 
this kind of analysis. This will undoubtedly be an area of considerable research 
development in the immediate future. 
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Section B) Methodological Issues 
It is important to recognise the methodological limitations of the present study, as well 
as the strengths and advantages of the methods adopted. This will enable us to evaluate 
the extent of the claims which may be made based upon the evidence presented, as well 
as identifying complementary approaches which might indicate directions for further 
research. 
The first point to recognise is that the present study is experimental and has used a task 
which, although constructed in a way to make sense to young children, is nevertheless 
artificial. As we have reviewed, research on problem-solving has traditionally used 
artificial tasks. This approach offers clear advantages in terms of being able to define 
with some precision the parameters, procedures and goals involved. It also permits the 
setting up of controlled experimental procedures, as in the present study, which allows 
variables, to some degree, to be separated out. An example of this, for example, within 
the present study, would be the controlled pattern of negative and positive feedback; as 
Bruner et al (1956) pointed out, in real-world problem-solving this is an uncontrolled 
variable which might have a profound impact upon the pattern of the subject's strategic 
behaviour. 
At least within the present study, furthermore, the task was made meaningful to the 
children, by using Kemler's (1978) story-and-game version of the MDL task. Kemler 
(1978) claimed that this would enable children to use their problem-solving capabilities 
optimally, and we have presented results for performance which would seem to support 
this contention. The children certainly performed at levels which earlier researchers, 
using abstract versions of the MDL task, had thought to be beyond children in this age 
group. It was thus hoped to make use of some of the strengths of the experimental 
approach, while at least mitigating some of its more obvious shortcomings. 
Increasingly, however, as Siegler & Jenkins (1989), Achtenhagen (1991) and others 
have indicated, research into problem-solving has been carried out in 'natural' settings, 
and concerned itself with 'real life' problems and learning. This approach offers 
ecological validity, but at the cost of dealing with relatively ill-defined problems. As 
McKeachie (1987) has argued, it seems probable that both kinds of research will have 
something of value to offer, providing that we remain aware of the limitations of both 
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and recognise the findings as complementary. Different methodologies are perhaps 
better suited to the investigation of different kinds of questions. 
The approach adopted in the present study is perhaps more appropriate to examine the 
abilities of children to develop strategies on new tasks; as English (1992) has reviewed, 
the development of domain-general strategies has been clearly established as a vital 
element in the development of problem-solving abilities. Thus, in the case of the MDL 
task used within the present study, although it clearly requires inductive reasoning, 
which has been demonstrated to, be an important element in human learning, it might be 
argued that the kind of inductive reasoning required is explicit and formal, and this may 
only be indirectly related to the everyday processes of induction. A case might be made, 
however, that an important element in the development of cognitive functioning is the 
gradual bringing under conscious control of relatively autonomic processing. As 
Siegler & Jenkins (1989) and others have indicated, there has been considerable debate 
in the literature about what constitutes a strategy, but some element of control would 
seem to the present author to be a necessary requirement. The MDL task, presented in 
the kind of way it is within the present study, may be seen to require some deliberate 
strategy construction. To this extent, this kind of task may be an important indicator of 
the development of cognitive functioning. It might, for example, be particularly related 
to the ability to transfer learning from one domain to another. 
The more naturalistic approach, on the other hand, is perhaps more appropriate to 
investigate, for example, the processes of development of expertise within a particular 
domain. The results of both of these kinds of studies, and others, should not be seen as 
competing, but as information about different aspects of human learning and 
problem-solving, all of which can contribute to the development of unified models of 
human cognitive functioning. 
Alongside the development of study of more naturalistic problem-solving, different and 
appropriate methodologies have been devised. The present study was cross-sectional in 
design, and while this has been valuable for identifying the different patterns of strategic 
behaviour children produce, we have seen that, for example, questions about the pattern 
of development of individual children, and their transition from one kind of strategic 
behaviour to another, have been difficult to answer with the present data. As we have 
suggested, a more longitudinal design would be helpful in addressing this kind of 
question (see, for example, Hoppe-Graff (1989) for a detailed assessment of the 
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potential of the longitudinal approach). Questions of causality are, of course, amongst 
the most difficult to answer in this kind of area, and, again, longitudinal research has a 
contribution to offer in this respect. 
Another crucial area which it has not been possible to address properly within the 
present study is that concerned with the detail of the processes of strategy construction 
through experience. Siegler and Jenkins (1989) have reviewed a number of approaches 
to studying the detailed processes of complex real-world skills learning. These have 
included focusing on the quantitative changes in performance with practice, the 
examination of how children and adults learn from explicit instruction, and the approach 
favoured by Siegler and Jenkins (1989), which they term the 'microgenetic' approach. 
This approach involves the detailed observation of individual subjects over an extended 
period of time, and the intensive trial-by-trial analysis of their learning. 
While this approach is directed at, and suited to investigating, different kinds of 
questions to the present study, there is a common element which is shared between the 
two approaches. This is the analysis of subject's behaviour into strategy components. 
This methodology was adopted within the present study and can be seen, for example, in 
Kuhn & Phelps' (1982) microgenetic study of 8-10 yr. olds development of scientific 
reasoning strategies. As we have argued earlier, and as it is hoped the present study has 
demonstrated, this is a clear methodological advance on the previously common 
procedure within the literature of categorising children's behaviour in terms of strategies 
determined a priori by some kind of logical analysis of the task. As we shall indicate in 
the next section, this methodology has helped to reveal the complex nature of strategy 
construction and development. 
While Kuhn & Phelps (1982) used their analysis of their relatively small number of 
subjects (15) to produce detailed protocol analyses of each individual's pattern of 
behaviour, scores on the Strategy Components in the present study, with a larger sample 
(72), were used to find common patterns of behaviour by means of Cluster Analysis. 
This is precisely the technique used by Swanson, O'Connor & Carter (1991) to analyse 
the performance of a similarly sized sample (68) of 8-10 yr. olds on three 
problem-solving tasks (the Tower of Hanoi, a Combinatorial task and a Pendulum task), 
and it seems likely that this technique could be usefully employed more widely in this 
kind of analysis. As we have seen, the value of Cluster Analysis is that it is capable of 
finding complex patterns in multivariate data of the kind produced within the present 
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study, rather than reducing them to one or two linear factors. This method of analysis is, 
therefore, particularly well suited to attempts to accurately represent and reflect the 
complex nature of the development of children's problem-solving strategies, and the 
underlying cognitive factors which are involved. 
There are two further limitations of the methodology of the present study which need to 
be recognised. First, we have examined the patterns of children's strategic behaviour on 
just one task. While, as has been argued, there are reasons for thinking that the MDL 
task involves important aspects of children's developing abilities to learn, reason and 
solve problems, the work of the present study could usefully be extended to analyses of 
strategic behaviour on other tasks, both involving rule induction and other significant 
reasoning processes. This is essential in order to be able to determine which aspects of 
cognitive behaviour discovered to be significant for the MDL task have more general 
application. It would be interesting and important to investigate, for example, whether 
the children who had difficulties with negative or irrelevant information on the MDL 
task had a general processing difficulty in this area, or whether this was simply an 
artefact of the particular task. 
The other limitation of the present study relates to the validity of the various measures 
used. While some of the measures used were published instruments with a long 
research history, within which their reliability and validity has been to various extents 
established, some of the measures used were constructed within the present study, and 
the results obtained from them need to be viewed with some caution. The measurement 
of children's metacognitive processing has proved to be a particularly difficult area. 
While in this study the early mistakes of relying on children's self reports about general 
aspects of their metacognition were avoided, as identified by such as Schneider (1985), 
it would be useful in further studies to extend the range of measures of such aspects as 
Metacomprehension. 
In a recent study using the balance-scale task to investigate the interaction between 
self-monitoring abilities and cognitive strategies in children aged 8-14 yrs., for example, 
Normandeau (1992) used as indicators of self-monitoring all of the following: latencies 
before and after the solution of a problem, self-evaluation of one's ability to make the 
balance scale stay level, proportion of oriented moves on the balance scale, persistence 
on a problem, reacting to failure by changing strategies, verbal explanations and 
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self-evaluation of performance. This mixture of different sources of evidence relating to 
children's internal processing would seem to be a useful model of sound methodology 
in this area. 
Nevertheless, in defence of the present study, an attempt was made to collect evidence in 
ways which previous research in the field had shown to be more helpful. Swanson, 
O'Connor & Carter's (1991) analysis of problem-solving strategies, for example, relied 
entirely on children's verbal commentary. The methodology used within the present 
study to analyse children's strategies, where verbal introtacts were combined with 
analysis of patterns of choice behaviour, is clearly an advance in this regard. The 
measures used to assess the children's metacognitive processing, while they might not 
have been as thorough and varied as those employed by Normandeau (1992), were 
based on behavioural assessments and children's reports of their particular experiences 
with the MDL task, rather than simple assessments of children's declarative knowledge 
about general metacognitive processes, as used in many earlier studies. 
Siegler & Jenkins (1989) also review and make proposals about the use of the 
methodology of computer modelling. Given the complexities of the range of factors 
which would seem to be implicated in the development of children's strategy 
construction and problem-solving behaviour, and of the interactions between these 
factors, as reported elsewhere and in the present study, this would seem to be a further 
methodological approach which might very well make a useful contribution. We now 
turn, however, to a consideration of the psychological and educational of the findings 
which have emerged from the present study. 
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Section C) Implications for psychological theory and educational practice 
i) Psychological implications 
The present study, combined with much of the associated research in the area of 
children's problem-solving, has significant implications for psychological theory and 
research, and for educational practice. 
As regards developing models of the development of children's cognitive processing, the 
value of analysing their behaviour on tasks in terms of their cognitive strategies has been 
supported. The present study has demonstrated that this kind of analysis produces a 
clear picture of the increasing sophistication of children's approaches to 
problem-solving and reasoning tasks, and one which has considerable explanatory 
power in relation to their performance. Throughout the foregoing analysis, the patterns 
of strategic behaviour revealed have been closely related to all aspects of performance. 
Furthermore, the different Strategy Clusters were shown to represent not only different 
stages in the development of strategic behaviour, but also a development in the ability to 
learn quickly and apply general strategies in relation to new tasks 
The present study has further revealed and confirmed the complexities of the patterns of 
strategic behaviour produced by children, and this finding complements well the 
complex patterns of strategy construction revealed by microgenetic studies. A major 
finding of Kuhn & Phelps (1982), confirmed by Siegler & Jenkins (1989) has been 
that children do not proceed from one discrete strategy to another, simply abandoning 
the simpler strategy and adopting the more sophisticated at a stroke. By contrast, in 
both studies children used a variety of strategies at any one time. The first use of a 
more sophisticated strategy was commonly followed by the continued use of simpler 
strategies, with the more sophisticated approach only gradually establishing itself as the 
dominant element in the child's repertoire. Even then, apparently abandoned simpler 
strategies were returned to when the child was confronted with a more difficult problem 
(we have reviewed the experimental work of such as Scardamalia (1977) and Butterfield 
& Belmont (1977) which has also demonstrated this kind of phenomenon). 
New strategies, furthermore, have been shown by such as Kuhn & Phelps (1982) and 
Siegler & Jenkins (1989) not to be separate and discrete procedures. They are often 
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constructed by recombining elements of previous strategies or by adding on new 
elements to existing procedures. This is a picture which is well supported by the results 
of the present study. 
The present study has also supported the move within current research away from 
simple, single factor models of cognitive change and the development of 
problem-solving skills. While it is still valuable, of course, to study the effects of 
particular factors, analyses of problem-solving, including that contained within the 
present study, have increasingly suggested that it involves a wide variety of different 
cognitive processes. CLuster 3, the most successful group on the MDL task, scored at a 
higher level on nearly the whole range of cognitive factors considered in the present 
study, and were statistically significantly more Field-Independent and more Reflective 
than all the other groups. 
It is, furthermore, particularly important to look at the ways in which these various 
cognitive factors interact with one another. A growing amount of research in recent 
years has begun to address this issue. For example, Folds et al (1990), Bjorklund et al 
(1990) and Howe & O'Sullivan (1990) all contained within Bjorklund's (1990) useful 
collection of recent work on children's strategies, each address different aspects of 
cognitive processing which interact with children's use of strategies. Bjorklund et al 
(1990), for example, discuss the relationships among children's knowledge base, the 
efficiency of mental processing, a child's metacognitive knowledge, and the ways in 
which these factors interact with strategy development. English (1992)) has examined 
the interactions between domain-specific knowledge and domain-general strategies. 
Schneider & Weinert (1990) have edited a collection of studies devoted to the analysis 
of interactions between aptitudes, knowledge components and cognitive strategies. In a 
review of work related to memory development, they have themselves ( Schneider & 
Weinert (1989)) produced an integrative model of the contribution of basic capacities, 
strategies, metamemory and content knowledge to memory development, each of which 
makes a contribution at different stages. Clearly, this work needs to be continued and 
developed. Schneider & Weinert (1990), however, point to the fuzziness of some of the 
central concepts as an important area for development. 
Various particular interactions between cognitive factors have been revealed by the 
present study. Thus, a relationship was revealed between Reflectivity and Learning, but 
only for the more sophisticated Strategy Clusters. Metacomprehension was clearly 
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related to strategy development and performance overall, but some groups of children 
scored well on this measure while performing relatively poorly. Attributional style 
appeared to be related to Strategy Components, but was not directly related to 
performance. Each of these results tend to support the view that these elements may be 
necessary, but are not sufficient in themselves as explanations of problem-solving 
development. In each case, their effect is dependent upon interaction with other factors. 
In line with much recent and current research, metacognitive aspects of processing 
emerged as being most closely related to strategy development and performance on the 
MDL task. Here again, however, the picture was not one of a simple linear relationship. 
Schneider & Weinert (1989) have reviewed evidence suggesting that metacognitive 
abilities might become more closely related to performance as children grow older. In 
the present study, however, the relationship had a more U-shaped pattern. This is 
clearly a finding which it would be very interesting to explore further. As in the 
previous study carried out by the present author (Whitebread (1983)), an interaction was 
found between Metacognition and Working Memory, and a similar interaction was also 
found here for Field Dependence-Independence. For children who were weak 
metacognitively these two factors made a significant contribution to their performance 
on the MDL task. For children who were stronger metacognitively, their impact was 
much reduced. 
As regards Field Dependence-Independence, the very different results reported for 
scores on the RFT and CEFT would seem to support the view, reviewed by Kogan 
(1983), that these measures are related to different aspects of this construct. Not 
surprisingly, the aspect related to the ability to selectively attend to elements in a visual 
field were more closely related to performance on the MDL task than were those related 
to being able to detect the vertical. As we have seen, in fact, children's scores on the 
CEFT were amongst the Predictor Measures most strongly associated with performance 
on the MDL task. As we shall discuss in a moment, this may have important 
educational implications. 
One final area to which it is hoped the present study has made some contribution is the 
study of inductive reasoning. As we have reviewed, this has, until recently, been a 
relatively neglected area of cognitive functioning. At the moment, however, the 
recognition of the importance of the processes of induction for human learning, as 
indicated by such as Glaser & Pellegrino (1987), has led to a revival of interest. 
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Holland et al (1986) have produced an important model which needs to researched and 
explored. A number of researchers are currently engaged in exploring the possibilities 
of teaching inductive skills, and analysing the consequences for general cognitive 
functioning (see, for example, Klauer (1989,1992)). The MDL task was chosen for use 
within the present study because it involves the processes of rule induction. As we have 
indicated in our methodological review, it would be interesting and useful to carry out 
further study of a similar nature with other inductive reasoning tasks to discover the 
general applicability of some of the current findings. 
ii) Educational implications 
Within the educational sphere, a number of issues arise. Teachers need to know which 
factors are involved in the development of children's abilities to think, to reason and to 
solve problems. A substantial literature now exists which has established a number of 
the most significant factors, and it is hoped that the present study makes a contribution 
to that. As we reviewed at the beginning of the thesis, there is a strong, emerging 
interest in active, problem-solving approaches to learning and in teaching children to 
think. There is still much to be done, however, in raising teachers' understanding of the 
cognitive skills which enable children to tackle novel tasks and problems effectively, or 
how they 'learn how to learn'. 
One central area of interest, well supported by the findings of the present study, is that 
related to the development of metacognitive abilities. The work in Britain of such as 
Nisbet & Shucksmith (1986) and in America of such as Borkowski, Brown and their 
co-workers (see, for example, Pressley, Borkowski & O'Sullivan (1985) and Campione 
(1987)) has demonstrated that metacognitive abilities can be developed through teaching, 
and has begun to indicate the kind of pedagogical principles upon which such teaching 
must be based. Nisbet & Shucksmith (1986), in particular, argue that just making 
children aware of what they do not know or understand will not necessarily foster the 
ability or the desire to learn more effectively. Children also need to be shown how to 
learn. This is well supported by the evidence from the present study of children who 
scored well on Metacomprehension, but nevertheless performed relatively poorly. 
While, as we have reviewed at the beginning of the thesis, there is a resurgence of 
interest in 'active learning' within education at the moment, its impact is relatively limited, 
and many teachers could be much better informed about this kind of issue. English 
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(1992), amongst others, for example, has shown that within the mathematics curriculum 
children as young as 4 yrs. old can usefully be helped to engage in self-monitoring, and 
in the more explicit use of strategies. Many children, however, are still encouraged by 
their teachers to rely on algorithmic procedures which does not encourage the 
development of these kinds of metacognitive experiences and skills. 
As we also noted at the start of the thesis, the role of the teacher as mediator has 
increasingly been recognised, particularly with a resurgence of interest in Vygotskian 
approaches to learning in social contexts. English (1992) refers to the evidence that 
emerging teaching models based upon this kind of approach, such as the 'cognitive 
apprenticeship' model of Collins, Seely-Brown & Newman (1987) have appeared to be 
particularly helpful in terms of developing young children's metacognitive abilities. 
Some other elements which need to be addressed more clearly in relation to educational 
contexts have also been reinforced by the present study. For example, the impact of 
cognitive style, and in particular Field Dependence-Independence, has been a significant 
finding. Globerson (1985) and her colleagues, for example, have followed up 
Pascual-Leone's (1969,1970) original analysis of the impact of FDI on performance on 
different kinds of tasks, and have shown that Field-Dependent children can benefit from 
particular kinds of teaching. In particular, they were shown to be just as able to develop 
scientific reasoning abilities as Field Independent children, providing that the processes 
involved, and the features of the task to which they should attend, were made explicit. 
Two further elements of a teaching strategy that are likely to help young children 
become effective learners and problem-solvers are worth mentioning. First, the results 
of the present study support the general finding, first properly articulated by Donaldson 
(1978) and her colleagues, that children perform most effectively on tasks which are 
meaningful to them. In particular, the present study supports the finding that children 
can develop more sophisticated strategic approaches on this kind of task. Given the 
interaction between initial strategy use, declarative knowledge about strategies, and the 
development of more extensive strategic behaviour suggested by the bi-directionality 
hypothesis of Flavell (1978) and the Metamemory Acquisition Procedures (MAPS) 
model of Pressley, Borkowski & O'Sullivan (1985), it seems possible that encouraging 
the early use of strategies by young children through the use of meaningful contexts 
may have long-term beneficial consequences for them as learners. 
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Second, the work of Sweller et al (1983), which we have reviewed earlier in the thesis, 
has suggested that the shift in strategy from working backwards to working forwards 
that characterises the change from novice to expert, may be facilitated where problems 
are set which have more open-ended or non-specific goals. These results would appear 
to link well with findings in relation to 'exploration learning' by such as Sylva, Bruner & 
Genova (1976). They produced results which showed that children allowed free play 
with materials were then able to use them more flexibly and more effectively in 
problem-solving situations than children who had been given specific instruction. This 
work, together with that related to meaningful contexts, suggests that the efficacy of 
playful approaches to learning and problem-solving need to continue to be explored. 
Many teachers are actively engaged in encouraging young children to learn through 
play, and it seems probable that this likely to be constructive. However, as Vandenberg 
(1990) and others have demonstrated, there is an essential exploratory feature of the 
kinds of play which would appear to be most beneficial. 
As we reviewed at the beginning of the thesis, the general interest within education 
concerning problem-solving approaches has manifested itself particularly in the 
development of a number of programmes designed to teach children to think. Some of 
these, such as Feuerstein et al's (1980) Instrumental Enrichment and Bono's (1976) 
CoRT, are aimed at general thinking skills. Others, such as Adey et al's (1989) CASE 
materials, Lipman et al's (1980) Philosophy for Children and so on, are aimed at 
developing thinking skills within a particular knowledge domain. As we reviewed, many 
of these programmes contain similar elements, such as an emphasis on metacognitive 
skills, a recognition of the mediating role of the teacher, and a recognition of the 
significance of the attributional as well as the purely cognitive responses of the learner. 
Within psychological research Pressley et al (1987) have produced a model of the 
'Good Strategy User' which helpfully integrates a number of the features, including 
strategies, metacognition, motivation and knowledge, which have been highlighted by 
research related to children's and adult's problem-solving. At a more practical level, 
Sellwood (1991) has recently produced a Practical Problem-solving Model' which 
emerges from the new curriculum area of Design & Technology, but which is claimed 
to have applicability across the curriculum. It contains many of the same elements, but 
has usefully detailed the practical implications for the whole range of teaching activities 
from preparation and planning to assessment. 
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For all of these programmes a central issue is to facilitate transfer of learning and 
strategies to new domains and new tasks. What would seem to be supported by the 
findings of the present study is the view that problem-solving ability cannot simply be 
explained by expertise in a particular domain. Children faced with a novel task which 
relates to no particular domain of knowledge clearly vary enormously in the level of 
sophistication of response. We have found 6 yr. olds responding at almost adult levels 
to the MDL task, and 10 yr. olds whose level of response is very much more 
undeveloped. Thus, the current results would seem to support the view that there are 
general problem-solving abilities which children can apply across domains. 
Whether such generally applicable skills are best taught within particular domains 
remains an interesting question. The evidence concerning the efficacy of meaningful 
contexts, combined with that concerning the role of inductive processes in learning, 
would seem to suggest to the present author that children may be best served by being 
taught to think within a variety of knowledge domains. 
Symons et al (1989), in a review of cognitive strategy research, have usefully itemised 8 
common elements in the instructional approaches which are emerging from this area of 
research. First, research suggests children should be taught strategies and, at any one 
time, be taught a few strategies well rather than a large number superficially. Second, 
children should be encouraged to check and monitor their performance, and take 
remedial action when they are in difficulty. Third, it is important children learn when to 
use particular strategies; this is best accomplished by giving children the experience of 
using particular strategies across a range of contexts. Fourth, children need to be 
motivated to use strategies by being made aware of their efficacy for performance. 
Fifth, strategies are best taught within the contexts of real learning tasks, such as reading 
or mathematics, rather than as a separate entity (this relates to 'meaningfulness'). Sixth, 
the use of strategies is greatly enhanced by knowledge. Seventh, the role of the teacher 
should contingent upon the performance of the child on any particular task, taking more 
of a directive role where the child is in difficulty, but releasing control where the child is 
working well independently. Eighth, the teaching of strategies is not a quick fix, but a 
long-term and extensive business, and needs to be maintained throughout a child's 
education. 
In these 8 common elements Symons et al (1989) have encapsulated much of the 
current state of knowledge about the ways in which teachers can help young children to 
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become more effective learners and problem-solvers. It is a challenge to which many 
teachers are only too keen to rise. It is hoped that the present thesis has made a 
contribution to our developing understandings about the cognitive factors which enable 
some children to be able to reason, to learn and to solve problems very effectively from 
an early age. As our understandings improve in relation to these complex processes, it 
is to be hoped that we will be able to develop instructional practices that will help more 
children become effective learners, thinkers and solvers of problems. 
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8. APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A. 1 
MDL task: Basic cards & cut-outs 
Basic cards 
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Cut-outs 
w1vis 
ý (. 8mQ f 
ý bowzi! 
ý% hboý-j 
NcQ, w O. Le,. S 
vý 
--- 
Vý1e, 
ýv 
8aN1o 
Ol^S 
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APPENDIX A. 2 
MDL task: Sample cards: 4 dimensions 
I 
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APPENDIX A. 3 
MDL task: Sample cards: 8 dimensions 
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APPENDIX A. 4 
MDL task: Record Card 
1.4 dim standard problem 
e.. iO 
ý l. eff- , ý 
tiLip 
' rý na sws rai 
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3 cA rr` 
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oh 544 et rou 
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I r 'r 
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305 
3.8 dim problem with irrelevant information 
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APPENDIX A. 5 
MDL task: Sequence of Stimuli Presentation 
SýQUýIýK. k 0ý STMUU %Sft((ýTulý 
. 
4Kt" 
I. Acb 
.. -.. . _. _ý. _. _L 
2. abCD 
3. aý ýD 
I 
5. CkßCI 
Go NBc, d. 
abCd, 
I ý 9- Aö c, D 
ºo. RQCa, 
(I. A6GD 
lz. oý, b c. ý 
t3. 
ýý-. w8ca, hbGai 
l's. Aß cA ý6, p, bc, D 
-t 
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a gCD 
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abc, D 
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A bcD 
0 
aßý. D 
ab CD 
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APPENDIX A. 6 
MDL task: Scoring Procedures for the 10 Strategy Components 
1. Number of Hypotheses per Trial 
Total number of Hypotheses divided by number of Trials to criterion (i. e. Trials before 
5 consecutive Trials with correct Choices upon which problem is stopped). 
2. Hypotheses Consistent with Local Feedback 
Percentage of Hypotheses consistent with Feedback on the same Trial. Irrelevant 
Hypotheses in 8 dimension problems treated as inconsistent. 
3. Choice Consistent with Previous Hypothesis 
Percentage of Choices on Trial n consistent with Hypotheses on Trial n- 1. Choices 
following multiple Hypotheses allowed where Choice consistent with any Hypothesis. 
Trials following irrelevant Hypotheses in 8 dimension problems ignored. 
4. Lose/Shift Hypothesis 
Percentage of Hypotheses on Trial n-1 not repeated on Trial n after negative Feedback. 
Irrelevant Hypotheses in 8 dimension problems counted on basis of Feedback on Trial 
n i. e. counted positively if repeated after positive Feedback, and negatively if repeated 
after negative Feedback. 
A 100% score on Component 1 will produce a 100% score on this Component also. A 
difference will arise where new Hypotheses are produced on Trial n which are not 
Consistent with Feedback on that Trial. These will reduce the score on Component 1, 
but not on this Component. 
5. Lose/Shift Dimension 
Percentage of Dimensions on Trial n-1 not repeated on Trial n after negative Feedback. 
Irrelevant Hypotheses in 8 dimension problems counted on basis of Feedback on Trial 
n i. e. counted positively if repeated after positive Feedback, and negatively if repeated 
after negative Feedback. 
6. Win/Stay 
Percentage of Hypotheses on Trial n-1 repeated on Trial n after positive Feedback. 
Irrelevant Hypotheses in 8 dimension problems ignored. 
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7. Hypothesis Checking 
Percentage of Hypotheses on Trial n-1 not repeated on Trials to criterion after negative 
Feedback. Irrelevant Hypotheses in 8 dimension problems counted on basis of 
Feedback on subsequent Trials to criterion i. e. counted positively if repeated after 
positive Feedback, and negatively if repeated after negative Feedback. 
8. Dimension Checking 
Percentage of Dimensions on Trial n-1 not repeated on Trials to criterion after negative 
Feedback. Irrelevant Hypotheses in 8 dimension problems counted on basis of 
Feedback on subsequent Trials to criterion i. e. counted positively if repeated after 
positive Feedback, and negatively if repeated after negative Feedback. 
9. Focusing over 2 Trials 
Percentage of Hypotheses on Trial n consistent with Feedback on that Trial and on Trial 
n-1. Irrelevant Hypotheses in 8 dimension problems treated as inconsistent. 
10 Focusing over All Trials 
Percentage of Hypotheses on Trial n consistent with Feedback on that Trial and all 
preceding Trials (after Trial 3 this means consistent with solution). Irrelevant 
Hypotheses in 8 dimension problems treated as inconsistent. 
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APPENDIX A. 7 
MDL task: Scoring Procedures for the 3 Performance Indicators 
1. Trial of Last Error 
The number of the last Trial at which an incorrect Choice was made i. e. the Trial 
immediately before the criterion of 5 consecutive correct Choices was achieved, with 3 
subtracted (because the Feedback on Trials 1-3 was fixed). A last error on Trials 1-3 
scored 0. Failure to solve the problem resulted in a score of 20, which is the last Trial on 
which a wrong Choice could be made when extra Trials were allowed following a 
correct Choice on Trial 16. 
2. Verbalisation of Correct Hypothesis during Criterion Trials 
The number of Criterion Trials on which the correct Hypothesis was verbalised alone. 
Failure to reach criterion resulted in a score of 0. 
3. Number of Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 &3 
Since the "ideal" performance would be a sequence of 4,2,1 Hypotheses on the first 
three Trials, these numbers of Hypotheses on the appropriate Trial scored 2 points. 
One Hypothesis more or less on each Trial scored 1 point. 
Thus, the number of points scored for different numbers of Hypotheses on Trials 1,2 
&3 are shown in the following table: 
No. of Hypotheses 
Trial 12345 
100121 
212100 
321000 
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APPENDIX B. 1 
Working Memory Test using MDL Materials 
Results of Pilot Study 
Subject Age WM score 
161 
262 
363 
483 
582 
684 
7 10 5 
8 10 4 
9 10 6 
Average WM scores by Age-group: 
Age WM score 
62 
83 
10 5 
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APPENDIX B. 2 
Working Memory Test using MDL Materials 
Pre-training arrays 
1. bow (S) 
rou (B) 
gl (A) 
2. ban (S) bea (B) 
poi (A) ted (S) 
3. bob (B) buck (A) 
sgl (B) ring (S) pen (S) 
cro (A) rib (A) but (B) 
1-dim 
i 
2-dim 
3-dim 
I 
i 
11 
1 A 
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1 
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APPENDIX B. 3 
Working Memory Test using MDL Materials 
Record sheet and scoring procedure 
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bs. 
OW 
2. 6oA9 roU4/ Z Z 
A ba o 
5e-© o' 
3 ý edW bo ue 
Sat, thO 
. 
10 r; viciO 
3 3 
rb ' ý- ý 
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APPENDIX C. 1 
Figural Intersections Test 
Pre-training items 
314 
I 
1\11 
U 
315 
QO 
APPENDIX C. 2 
Figural Intersections Test 
Examples of test items 
316 
00 
LI i O 
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APPENDIX C. 3 
Figural Intersections Test 
Reliability & Validity 
From Manual for FIT: Figural Intersections Test 
(Juan Pascual-Leone, Dept. of Psychology, York University, Ontario) 
R1'I. IATY 
Reliabilities are available only for earlier forms of FIT. Since most 
of the items are the same and the test has been slightly expanded the reli- 
ability of FIT 752 should be similar. The split-half reliability for the FIT2 
score was calculated by taking at random half the items from each class (and 
discarding one item from classes with odd numbers of items). Subjects for 
each reliability computation were within a1 year age range. The reliabilities 
obtained for the FIT2 score, in each subject group where version A2 or C2 (the 
versions previous to 752) were used, are given in Table 2. The average is 
. 
83, 
which is quite acceptable. Cronbach's a for each sample is also shown. 
(Reliabilities are not yet available for the FITC score). 
VALIDITY 
The construct validity of FIT as a measure of M power (k) may be estab- 
lished by examining the percentage of items of each class which are passed by 
each of several age groups. The idea behind the FIT is that each additional 
shape in the test set should require one additional unit of M power (see Task 
Analysis). The developmental theory of the M operator specifies that one 
additional unit of M power is available to a child every two years following the 
age of 3. Therefore, if FIT is a valid measure of M power, the performance level 
of a given age on a given class of item should be equal to the performance level 
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of that age plus two years on the next higher class. This is so because the 
older subjects will have one additional unit of M power, and the higher class 
which has one additional shape requires one additional unit of M power in order 
to be solved at a level comparable to the lower class. 
Table 1 shows the percentage of items of each class which are passed by 
2 
various ages. The data are taken from several studies. All the studies involve 
middle class students who were group tested by school grade, and students beyond 
the normal one year age range for the grade were later excluded. Subjects who 
failed all items were also excluded. The typical number of observations per 
point is about 60 student x5 items. 
Table 1 shows the predicted compensation between age and item class. At 
the 75' performance level, age 7 passes class 3, age 9 passes class 4, age 11 
passes class 5, age 13 passes class 6, and age 15 passes class 7. Performance 
levels other than 75% generally show the same result (viz. each extra shape 
requires one extra unit of M power) in that the performance level on the higher 
class is reached by the next two year age group. 
TABLE1 
Percentage of items passed as a joint function of 
age and item class. 
FIT CLASS 
AGE 
7 
9 
11 
13 
15 
3456 78 
78 50 49 23 16 1 
86 67 61 37 28 11 
94 " 83 70 54 43 30 
97 94 88 75 61 51 
99 100 98 90 84 70 
TABLE2 
Reliabilites of FIT2 score. (Forms C2 and A2) 
Stud Age Split half Chronbach' 
R7111 7-8 86 90 
R717 9-10 91 93 
R7111 9-10 87 90 
R7111 11-12 87 
- 
RM A 90 84 
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APPENDIX C. 4 
Figural Intersections Test 
Scoring procedure 
Examples of answers for different classes 
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From Johnson (1982) 
APPENDIX C. 
Assignment of k Estimates on the basis of FIT Performance 
Four k scores were initially assigned to each subject on the basis 
of his/her FIT performance; a single k score was then computed for each 
subject based on the four scores. Each item class in the FIT version 
used (except class 2) contained at least one item with an irrelevant 
figure; the irrelevant figure appeared in the compound-form set but 
not in the discrete set for the item. In grouping items into classes, 
items with x reiZ: vant figures and one irrelevant figure may either be 
put into class x or into class x+1, depending on whether or not one 
assumes that the irrelevant figure adds to task demand (i. e., of 
item =x or x+I). The strategy of placing items with ? c+l f igures in 
the compound into class x has typically been used in scoring the FIT. 
However, there is some evidence (Garcia, Aragon, Owen, & Sachse, 1976; 
Parkinson, 1975; Skakich, 1978) that items with an irrelevant shape 
in the compound actually have an Md of x+l. Thus, in the present 
study scores were computed for each of the two ways of classifying 
items. These two ways of grouping items into classes are referred to 
as x scaling (x relevant +1 irrelevant = class x) and x+1 scaling (x 
relevant +1 irrelevant = class x+1). 
Two kinds of k scores were computed for cach way of scal-ini; the 
item classes. One kind of score was the K. 75 score which reTpc"atedly 
has been found to provide k estimates. close to theoretically-appropriate 
values (Furman, 1981; Goodman, 1979b; Parkinson, 1975; Pascual-Leone & 
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C. 2 
Burtis, 1975; Skakich, 1978; Van Esch, 1978). This score is obtained 
by grouping the items into classes and obtaining for each class the 
percentage of items passed in that class. The K. 75 score is the 
highest stimulus class at which at least 75% of the items are passed, 
provided that all (or all but one) of the lower classes also have 75 
pass rates (a drop to 60% pass in one lower class is allowed). (This 
score is sometimes referred to as the K80 score, however, given the 
number of items in each FIT class, there is no practical difference 
between using a pass rate of 75% and one of 80%. ) This way of scoring 
yielded two scores: K. 
-x and K75 
. 
75 x+1. 
The second kind. of k score is the S1-theoretical (or SIT) score. 
This score is based on the strong theoretical assumption that a child 
will solve all and only those items with class values less than or 
equal to his/her 1p (e. g., if a child has an ! jp of 3, s/he should 
solve all class 2 and 3 items, but no items of class 4 or higher). The 
score is computed by first summing the number of items solved across 
stimulus classes 2 through 7. One then uses a raw-score distribution 
to determine what SIT score corresponds to the (summed) raw performance 
score. Table C-1 lists the distributions for assigning SIT scores for 
the x and x+i scaling methods for the FIT version used in the present 
study. (Tlhe distrihution; were constructed based on the strong 
theoretical assumption stated above. ) I call the SIT scores SIT-x and 
SIT-x+l. 
Pascual-Leone (personal communication, 1982) suggests that the SIT 
score may be more reliable, because it is based on data from all 
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Table C-1 
Raw Score Distributions for Assignment of SiT Scores on the Basis 
of FIT (RAC 794) Performarce 
SIT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
5- 9 
1-0-15 
16-20 
21-25 
26-30 
>31 
No. of items in each class (for K75 cr 
,; umber of Correct Items (Classes 2 through 7) 
x scaling 
<4 
I 
Class x-scaling 
Total 75% 
2 5 4 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
5 
6 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
5 
x+1 scaling 
<4 
5--8 
9-13 
14-19 
20-24 
25-29 
>30 
x+l scaling 
60% Total 75% 60% 
3543 
3 433 
4543 
43 
4 
4 
4 
654 
3543 
3543 
3543 
9111 
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C, 4 
passed items. The K75 score, however, may he more valid, because it 
is sounder semantically, pegging k at the highest item class that is 
reliably passed., A single composite FIT-K score for each subject was 
constructed in the following manner. The four k-estimates for the 
subject were examined, and if at least three of the four scores had 
the same value then that majority value was assigned as the FIT-K 
score (e. g., scores of 3,3,3, and 4 yielded a FIT-K of 3). If 
there was no majority score value, then the mean of the four scores 
was assigned as the FIT-K score (e. g., scores of 2,2,3,4 yielded 
a FIT-K of 2.75); decimal values were retained. 
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APPENDIX D. 1 
Metacognition 
Metacognitive knowledge questions: record and scoring procedures 
Record sheet 
ýI. 
. 
&2b. £0. i4 
NJý 
84wA 
.1 
7 
3 ýAwg, ý--- I 
äawW.. ý3 
zýºýt 3 d4f 
a 
44 L4- 
4a; ff µ&Wz 5 
8' 
Scoring procedures 
I ý- 
3 
Ouestion 1 
1 point was awarded for each correct assessment to the two parts of this question. The 
criterion used to establish what was a correct assessment for each child was the number 
of problems solved of the three different types. Where scores were equal the standard 4 
dimension problem type was taken as the easiest, and either of the other two problem 
types as the hardest. 
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Question 2 
Points were awarded according to the following table: 
No. of 
complimentary Points awarded 
items "Easy "Hard" 
140 
230 
320 
410 
501 
602 
703 
804 
No. of 
identical Points awarded 
items "Easy "Hard" 
1 or 2 
-1/2 +1/2 3 or more 
-1 +1 
This scoring system could result in negative scores for the "Easy" question. However, 
the minimum allowable score was 0. 
Question 3 
In order to award points the suggested number of "swops" were added together for the 
two complimentary (2 diff) and two complimentary/two identical (2 d/s) pairs of cards, 
and for the four complimentary (4 diff) and four complimentary/ four identical (4 d/s) 
pairs. The number of "swops" suggested for the eight complimentary (8 diff) pair was 
then doubled. The three numbers of total "swops" obtained were then compared and 1 
point awarded for each of the following conditions that were met: 
4diff+4d/s > 2diff+2d/s 
8diffx2 > 2diff+2d/s 
8 diff x2>4 diff +4 d/s 
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APPENDIX D. 2 
Metacognition 
Metacomprehension: photographs 
Unsure 
.ý iS 
ýý 
Rý 
Sure 
327 
APPENDIX D. 3 
Metacognition 
Strategy Flexibility: example of test card 
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APPENDIX D. 4 
Metacognition 
Strategy Flexibility: record sheet 
S fc4b; Wy- 
rr; a 
rý t Z J 4- 5 6 7 8 
z I x iciý  icý) ý R r; K r\ 
3 ý X1W f Iýý  Irý;  ý(, ý ý (>> I! >> ii,; 
`ý i 1 I ýr i A 7r r 
s I xl(z) xR R K 2 
Ltvft ftc4; ea;; c4b ý 1'/'ia ýý 
Prebbý, l Z 3 4- S 6 7 8 
z 
3 
S 
I 
ý 
Xýz 
XR 
X% 
- 
ý 
. 
401 IMyf7 1 Tr., 
-LL 
'J I Z. 3 4 5 L 7 8 
1 91 K C 4 Z K K 
3 
ý 
S 
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APPENDIX E. 1 
CARALOC 
Questionnaire and scoring 
14ma 
------------ 1 Do you feel that most of the time i t' s 
not worth trying hard because things 
never turn out right anyway ? 
2 Do you feel that wishing can make good 
things happen ? 
3 Are people good to you no matter how 
you act towards them ? 
4 Do you like taking part in plays or 
concerts ? 
5 Do you usually feel that it's almost 
useless to try in school because most 
children are cleverer than you ? 
6 Is a high mark just a matter. of 'luck' 
for you ? 
7 Are you good at spelling ? 
ß Are tests just a lot of guesswork for 
you ? 
9 Are you often blamed for things which just aren't your fault ? 
10 Are you the kind of person who 
believes that planning ahead makes 
things turn out better ? 
Y? ýI N- 4 
0 
0 
2 
z 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Z 
1 
Z 
Z 
Z 
1 
0 
? y 
i 
I 
I 
I 
i 
11 Do you find it easy to get up in the 
morning ? 
12 When bad things happen to you, is it 
usually someone else's fau! t ? 0 Z 
I 
i 
I 
i 
13 When someone is very angry with you, is 
it impossible to make him your friend 
again ? 
14 When nice things happen to you, is it 
only good luck ? 
15 Do you feel sad when it's time to 
leave school each day ? 
16 When you get into an argument, is it 
usually the other person's fault ? 
17 Are you surprised when your teacher 
says you've done well ? 
18 Do you usually get low marks, even 
when you study hard ? 
19 Do you like to read books ? 
0 
C 
0 
0 
0 
7 
2 
Z 
2 
7 
20 Do you think studying for tests is aIZII 
waste of time ? ID 
i 
i 
i 
I 
1 
ý! 
APPENDIX F. 1 
MFF20 
Example of practice and test items 
1. Practice item 
I 
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7 U 
00 
OF 
000 
0 00 0 C) 
00 
000 
0 
0 
00 0 
2. Test item 
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APPENDIX F. 2 
MFFZO 
Record Sheet and Scoring Procedure 
Record sheet 
MýFzo aKnG ýý ý` Iz cc. ti- ýo 
-roý e rwrS ý! Laýeý. c.. ýZ 
- ý5 
0 
fMm nME P. ýSrýscs rtrm nMý KPýoNSES 
I 7o r 'ý ý- 56 lr 1 ý`ý `h 3456 
2 
"0 1 Z. - :5 4- 5 12. 2.0.0 1 2.3`f- 5 
3 S. ý IZ q- 56 13 I (. O i2 ýs 4" 56 
4 6G 1X3 
.5 '6, \ I+ HLOJ I35 
S b lb &Z 3Lf" 3 ºS 31. i) (R 2.3 u" 56 
6 Iý : >. b ,3+s6 16 ig. 5 fz36 
7 5.0 1z3 4- s& 17 11.0 123 s6ý 
g 1o. a I 2. sSsb Ig 11.0 1 zý s 
ý 21-0 Z3456 1ý 1Z- 
to 24 7. o Iz3 ý-ýb 
Scoring 
From the error and latency scores recorded for each of the children, as illustrated above, 
their score for Impulsivity was arrived at using the formula devised by Salkind & 
Wright (1977), as follows: 
Ii Zei 
- 
zli 
where Ii = impulsivity score for the ith child, ze1= a standard score for the ith child's 
total errors, and zli =a standard score for the ith child's mean latency. 
APPENDIX G. 1 
Field Dependence-Independence 
Rod & Frame Test: apparatus 
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APPENDIX G. 2 
Field Dependence-Independence 
CEFT: example items Tr 
--MT 
I 
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D1 
E1 
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APPENDIX H. 1 
Analysis of Central Cases 
Case-Cluster Similarity Coefficients 
CA Sf 
ý 
1 
3 
t 
5 
, 
7 
s 
0 
1J 
11 
11 
13 
14 
is 
16 
17 
ts 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
Is 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
f1 
42 
43 
44 
"S 
f6 
47 
49 
49 
so 
S1 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
6s 
60 
70 
71 
72 
SIMIIAMITt ylTw CIUS? EQS 
c. ýc52 
2.8631 
1.4063 
1.4345 
3.0086 
". 1360 
S. 3152 
4.0063 
2.6725 
4.3520 
S. 214 7 
2.0775 
1 
. 
0102 
I IL 3 ` s. 
1.5432 
3.78C7 
4 
. 
46 753 
3.3440 
1.3046 
0.961-9 
3.78t3 
3. S120 
1.538S 
3. »19 
2.3019 
1.2968 
1 
. 
7566 
5.72Q2 
2.5662 
0.7007 
1.2208 
5.7113 
6.4576 
4. i101 
4.5671 
3.1080 
5.31sa 
'j. 2249 
2.6249 
1 
. 
5059 
2'L, 4`&. NO 5`cz. 
3.3678 2.6204 5.0358 4.7969 
1.1856 2.7711 5.1041 ). 4310 
0.9970 3.8410 2.9735 6. a573 
1.9283 3.0616 2.7991 6.0532 
3.5429 1.3285 4.5223 4.7131 
_3.7452 1.5562 5.1655 4.3946 
4.1439 1.4911 ". 3131 3.1223 
3.0940 1.2026 5.3798 4.2Q35 
1.5200 0.9317 3.6581 4.1102 
3.3199 0.7482 4.9147 4.2919 
3.7879 1.1704 5.6417 4.6379 
1.5032 0.7183 2.7611 4.3ýa1 
0.3S23 1.4919 2.7923 5.0533 
2.4638 1 
. 
3400 3.9437 1.6597 -U-. T638"" 4.1934 4.9301 
2.5509 1.1041 5.1326 3.2605 2.8399 2.8117 6.7466 
10.5343 7.6552 11.8290 10.1045 7.3955 8.4631 0.0000 
2.7937 1.9411 4.926$ 4.0704 4.3176 4.1412 5.4196 
1.0066 2.6396 1.9176 2.5304 4.0422 2.0756 6.0517 
1.7885 0.6764 4.7667 3.0453 3.2988 3.0428 4.3590 
1.6360 3.5065 1.0482 1.4032 2.4924 1.8276 5.5652 
2.0089 2.6089 1.9783 1.2573 1.1026 2.9272 5.4497 
2.9130 1.7995 5.3954 4.0558 3.6857 1.8052 6.5677 
2.9348 2.9567 2.1984 3.0576 3.0927 2.5682 5.2193 
4.0431 2.3101 3.7499 2.6933 0.5967 4.1827 4.7284 
3.0562 6.1507 4.1796 S. 3S00 5.8967 0.5235 5.7930 
1.2301 2.0736 1.1338 0.4516 1.6708 2.9193 5.4110 
1.9688 2.0138 1.1563 1.0412 1.2487 2.9896 5.0779 
2.5602 4.2148 2.9808 1.3393 3.9905 4.9817 6.7702 
2.1303 6.6965 0.8069 1. S791 3.2400 2.2323 6.2737 
2.7384 4.4854 1.0260 2.6439 3.7181 2.1556 5.4408 
1.8038 2.6429 1.1021 1.1993 1.4994 2.4287 5.2S32 
5.2057 2.6198 5.7353 3.0522 0.9282 6.3763 S. SS72 
2.3445 4.9296 0.7758 1.3932 3.2566 3.0883 6.8421 
2.3018 1.3137 4.8419 2.6604 3.1393 4.5076 S. 3S68 
3.9263 5.1862 3.1208 3.8814 4.4991 2.3491 6.166? 
1.1275 3.569? 0.2554 0.8111 3.1624 2.4860 6.3411 
1.6675 3.7867 1.4518 0.9296 2.5922 3.1909 6.5820 
1.6969 3.5826 1.5565 1.0753 2.6265 2.9912 6.3420 
0.4493 3.5015 1.0159 1.5519 4.2308 1.6949 6.5949 
1.4845 2.2942 3.0679 1.4259 2.5618 3.4091 4.9090 
2. S395 2.9504 2.2583 1.5014 1.3353 3.2505 S. S841 
2.4799 1.0995 5.1371 2.5997 3.0299 4.0619 4.5786 
2.0691 5.6253 0.4766 2.2018 4.9577 2.3726 7.1697 
0.6368 2.4816 1.1011 1.3816 3.3397 2.3122 5.9981 
2.3453 3.0245 3.3760 1.2441 2.0453 5.0150 5.4237 
0.9672 3.5420 0.6349 1.7320 3.5496 1.9696 6.4030 
2.6069 1.7498 2.6689 1.31640 0.4553 3.6040 4.7590 
1.7487 3.8828 1.0140 1.6776 3.2707 1.6963 5.4023 
2.9055 6.7175 0.8452 2.6511 5.5483 3.3887 7.6866 
2.5189 3.9052 1.4143 1.1852 2.4288 4.4385 6.3249 
1.6674 3.1890 1.3965 0.6695 2.9980 3.7072 6.3257 
3.2029 6.3810 0.9808 2.5500 5.2099 3.7467 7.6834 
2.9547 5.7526 0.9753 1.8835 4.2569 3.3037 7.4011 
2.9792 6.235? 0.7133 2.2342 4.3169 2.3556 7.2394 
1.2644 3.1379 2.3232 1.9749 3.9270 1.7908 6.3363 
2.7357 5.5507 0.5984 1.4460 4.2498 3.6923 7.2112 
1.4129 5.4054 0.8645 1.7172 5.4614 3.1341 7.809S 
0.9665 3.1128 1.6795 0.8640 3.3299 3.3078 6.3905 
0.7247 2.5580 1.3629 1.7170 3.6647 0.9795 5.5075 
1.6423 1.9255 2.9099 2.1581 3.8681 3.6604 6.0897 
0.8065,2.7073 1.3039 1.3810 2.9224 2.6141 6.0152 
0.9162 3.7666 2.4047 1.8737 4.4527 3.4169 6.8196 
0.8784 1.9509 2.3590 2.3279 3.9135 1.7004 5.3678 
0.8465 3.7632 0.6363 1.3533 3.7373 2.1541 6.7023 
1.7817 6.2266 1.6074 2.5311 6.4676 3.6036 8.2933 
3.1359 1.3136 3.6765 2.7062 1.5659 6.1567 5.0436 
1.4315 3.3373 4.4317 2.7317 5.5783 4.1613 6.8506 
4.6540 2.1745 5.1718 2.8566 0.650? 5.7531 5.1697 
0.6252 1.6220 2.0985 0.9923 2.2894 3.0122 5.7524 
2.3115 4.3821 3.3575 6.6762 6.1524 1.4981 6.4234 
. 
0.6880 2.7236 1.8020 1.1910 3.2690 2.6708 6.48S0 
1.8979 2.8857 3.4470 2.1668 3.7368 2.1610 5.8652 
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APPENDIX H. 2 
Analysis of Central Cases 
30 Strategy Components: Raw means and Standard deviations for whole 
sample 
Strat Prob Mean S. D. M+1/2S. D M-1/2S. D 
Comp Type 
1a1.59 0.60 1.89 1.29 
b 1.46 0.57 1.75 1.18 
c 1.83 1.12 2.39 1.27 
2a 96.46 9.87 101.39* 91.52 
b 73.19 17.97 82.17 64.20 
c 77.68 22.06 88.71 66.65 
3a 81.54 18.52 90.80 72.28 
b 70.89 20.43 81.10 60.67 
c 78.31 20.45 88.53 68.08 
4a 99.06 5.95 102.03* 96.08 
b 88.93 14.75 96.30 81.55 
c 90.89 16.43 99.10 82.67 
5a 83.50 20.89 93.94 73.05 
b 77.22 22.60 88.52 65.92 
c 75.78 23.74 87.65 63.91 
6a 72.49 30.04 87.51 57.47 
b 53.35 30.98 68.84 37.86 
c 68.31 33.79 85.20 51.41 
7a 79.31 21.92 90.27 68.35 
b 64.93 23.32 76.59 53.27 
c 67.29 23.28 78.93 55.65 
8a 67.87 29.80 82.77 52.97 
b 48.19 28.55 62.46 33.91 
c 56.36 26.55 69.63 43.08 
9a 74.58 21.53 85.34 63.81 
b 56.93 22.14 68.00 45.86 
c 58.37 24.98 70.86 45.88 
10 a 60.60 27.58 74.39 46.81 
b 44.11 25.53 56.87 31.34 
c 45.90 29.38 60.59 31.21 
*Since the actual max. score for these variables is 100.00 any case where 100.00 is 
scored is counted as high. 
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APPENDIX H. 3 
Analysis of Central Cases 
Performance Indicators: Raw means and Standard deviations for whole sample 
Perf. Indicator Mean S. D. M+1/2S. D M-1/2S. D 
T. of last error a 5.06 6.16 8.14 1.98 
b 7.53 6.43 10.74 4.31 
c 6.66 6.85 10.08 3.23 
L 1.92 5.76 4.80 
-0.96 
Verb. of H. during 
criterion T's a 3.49 1.78 4.38 2.60 
b 2.83 1.95 3.80 1.85 
c 3.07 1.94 4.04 2.10 
L 0.45 1.27 1.08 
-0.18 
No. of H's on 
T's 1,2, &3a3.75 1.12 4.31 3.19 
b 3.56 0.82 3.97 3.15 
c 3.05 1.03 3.56 2.53 
L 0.27 0.81 0.67 
-0.13 
Since the Trial of Last Error is a negative indicator (i. e. the best performance = the 
lowest score) the categories High, Average and Low (for the analysis of Central Cases) 
are reversed for problem types a, b & c. Learning scores normally as positive scores are 
derived by subtracting Round 2 scores from Round 1. 
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APPENDIX H. 4 
Analysis of Central Cases 
Predictor Measures: Raw means and Standard deviations for whole sample 
Pred. Measure Mean S. D. M+1/2S. D M-1/2S. D 
Wk Mem WM 2.95 0.80 3.35 2.55 
FIT 3.69 1.18 4.28 3.10 
Meta KQl1.31 0.74 1.68 0.94 
Q2 4.11 2.19 5.01 3.01 
Q3 2.13 1.18 2.72 1.54 
Meta M/c 2.93 1.97 3.92 1.94 
A&C SF 0.75 0.92 1.21 0.29 
Meta Tot 65.72 26.08 78.76 52.68 
L, /C 14.82 5.50 17.57 12.07 
R-I 1.49 17.73 10.36 
-7.38 
FDI RFT 14.08 7.43 17.80 10.36 
CEFT 17.18 4.57 19.47 14.89 
Since R-I and RFT are negative indicators (i. e. the best performance = the lowest score) 
the categories High, Average and Low (for the analysis of Central Cases) are reversed. 
